CSR Policy Briefs

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Shaping U.S. Policy on Africa: Pillars of a New Strategy

Johnnie Carson

In the four decades since most African states achieved independence, the continent has never been a foreign policy priority for the United States. During the early years of American engagement with Africa, Washington focused its attention on preventing communist countries from gaining major military bases or monopolistic concessions over any of the continent’s important strategic minerals. Although the United States provided large amounts of development assistance and food aid to a number of African states, most American interest and support was directed toward African countries and leaders who were regarded as Cold War allies. In those countries still struggling for independence, the United States usually supported African insurgents who were pro-Western and anticommunist in their orientation. In South Africa and Namibia, Washington generally professed great sympathy for eventual majority rule and independence but largely supported the status quo out of fear that liberation groups allied with the Soviet Union or China would win power in any political transition.
Japan’s Constitution and Defense Policy: Entering a New Era?

Rust Deming

Japan’s postwar defense policy was set by the 1947 constitution. Early in the occupation, General Douglas MacArthur and his staff concluded that the 19th-century Meiji constitution needed to be revised or entirely replaced if Japan were to become a true democracy, with the Emperor removed from any political role. In January 1946, convinced that the elitist and authoritarian Japanese establishment was incapable of producing a democratic constitution, MacArthur ordered his staff to produce a draft. One week later, an entirely rewritten constitution emerged and was presented to the Japanese. Included in the draft was Article IX:

War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. The threat or use of force is forever renounced as a means of settling disputes with any other nation. No Army, Navy, Air Force, or other war potential will ever be authorized and no right of belligerency will ever be conferred upon the state.¹
Eliminating Adversary WMD: Lessons for Future Conflicts

Rebecca K.C. Hersman and Todd M. Koca

As tensions between Iraq and the United States worsened in mid-to-late 2002 and as preparations began for Operation Iraqi Freedom, policymakers and military planners began to wrestle with the challenges posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Indeed, Iraqi defiance and deception in the face of United Nations (UN) sanctions, coupled with growing fears of WMD transfer to terrorist organizations—most prominently al Qaeda—were two primary reasons for confronting Saddam Hussein. Just as in the first Gulf War in 1991, deterring and defending against possible Iraqi use of WMD against coalition forces were key concerns for planners. However, as the crisis escalated in 2002, Department of Defense (DOD) planners began to foresee another challenge: how to remove comprehensively and permanently the threat of Iraqi WMD, not just to U.S. troops but also to the Middle East region and the world.
Apocalyptic Terrorism: The Case for Preventive Action

Joseph McMillan

The nature and capabilities of 21st-century terrorists, especially those such as al Qaeda and its allies who pursue an apocalyptic agenda, make it essential that governments can take decisive preventive action, including the use of force, rather than waiting to respond to attacks after the fact. In certain circumstances, this means being able to conduct military operations on the territory of foreign countries without their consent.
Securing Afghanistan: Entering a Make-or-Break Phase?

Robert B. Oakley and T.X. Hammes

To appreciate Afghanistan’s predicament, it is essential to understand that all Afghan politics are tribal. Thus, while Afghans share a genuine national identity, their immediate concern in any political process is to advance or preserve the welfare of their ethnic or extended family group. Further, since the Russians and British artificially imposed the country’s international borders, the tribes are not wholly contained within Afghanistan. They straddle the borders with surrounding nations. Thus, tribal politics are also international politics.
Collision Avoidance: U.S.-Russian Bilateral Relations and Former Soviet States

Eugene B. Rumer

The year 2003 was a difficult one in U.S.-Russian relations, and 2004 promises to be even more challenging. Disagreements between Washington and Moscow over Iraq were the most visible in a series of events that also included American concerns about Chechnya, the authoritarian tilt in Russian domestic politics, Russia’s fading media freedom, selective prosecution of independent-minded businessmen, and meddling in the internal affairs of its neighbors. Together, these events add up to a trend that spells trouble for the ambitious U.S.-Russian strategic framework inaugurated by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir Putin in 2002. Yet rarely if ever has the need for greater cooperation between the two countries been more urgent than it will be in 2004 and the years to come.
Partnership for Peace: Charting a Course for a New Era

Jeffrey Simon

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) faced a strategic challenge: how to shape the post-Communist reform process in Central and Eastern Europe in ways that would foster stability and allow for cooperation on common security problems. NATO created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in December 1991 to promote dialogue on common security concerns with these countries and the former Soviet Union. The NACC dialogue bridged the former East-West divide and illuminated opportunities for practical cooperation. The council also helped Central and East European politicians understand that defense requirements are best rooted in democratic politics and that national security encompassed civil emergency planning and a broader range of concerns, not just the military.
Turbulent Transition in Iraq: Can It Succeed?

Judith S. Yaphe

One year after liberation, most Iraqis are impatient with the military occupation of their country. Although grateful for the removal of Saddam Hussein’s cruel and repressive regime, many assumed the United States and its coalition members would soon go home and leave them to sort out their political, economic, and military fate. The war, after all, had been fought to liberate Iraqis from political tyranny, not to defeat the Iraqi people. Both U.S. and Iraqi expectations were high that the transition from oppression to democracy would be smooth and quick and that Iraqi political elites would move swiftly to ensure democratic rule.
Preemptive Action: When, How, and to What Effect?

M. Elaine Bunn

What role should preemptive action play in U.S. national strategy? In the wake of the first public statements by President George W. Bush in June 2002, and in the buildup to military action against Iraq, the issue quickly became a lightning rod for controversy. While some commentators hailed preemption as a valuable concept whose time had come, others condemned it as a dangerous precedent that could damage American interests, strain our relations overseas, and make the United States a feared unilateralist in the international system. All the hue and cry has done little to clarify the issues and choices that policymakers face in weighing the utility and limits of the concept.
Modernizing China’s Military: A High-Stakes Gamble?

Howard M. Krawitz

China’s accelerated push to modernize the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) raises two important questions: What impact will such change have upon the PLA image, status, and role in Chinese society? And how will Chinese military modernization affect the strategic interests and security concerns of the United States and China’s neighbors in the region?
Resolving Korea’s Nuclear Crisis: Tough Choices for China

Howard M. Krawitz

Clearly, Washington and Beijing do not see eye to eye on North Korea. From the U.S. perspective, North Korea is a rogue state (one that is still technically a U.S. enemy, to boot), with an announced intent to develop further its nuclear capability and acquire nuclear weapons—in spite of formal agreements in which Pyongyang promised not to engage in such pursuits. Pyongyang’s rhetoric and behavior highlight its willingness to use nuclear blackmail as a tool for achieving its aims. It has heightened tensions by implying that it might export nuclear weapons or fissile material if its needs are not met. Summed up, North Korea poses a tangible, real-time threat to U.S. allies in East Asia and to U.S. national security interests.
Building an Iraqi Defense Force

Joseph McMillan

The reconstruction and reform of the Iraqi armed forces will inevitably take place in the context of both Iraq’s present and past. Saddam Hussein and his predecessors, going back to the creation of the state, have left Iraq a legacy of endemic domestic political violence, dysfunctional civil-military relations, and, in recent decades, an ideology of unremitting hostility to virtually every one of Iraq’s neighbors.
NATO Decisionmaking: Au Revoir to the Consensus Rule?

Leo G. Michel

It should come as no surprise that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) officials are fond of citing Mark Twain’s retort to doomsayers that reports of his death were greatly exaggerated. Having survived many rough tests since its birth, the 54-year-old alliance is still working to recover from a bruising disagreement among its members over the decision by some to oust Saddam Hussein’s regime. Its services, however, are still very much in demand:

■ About 37,000 NATO-led military personnel remain on crisis management duty in the Balkans.

■ NATO recently launched its first out-of-Europe operation, taking command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

■ In July 2003, the Senate voted unanimously to encourage the Bush administration to seek help from NATO in Iraq.

■ Several prominent Members of Congress and nongovernmental experts have called for a NATO peacekeeping mission between Israelis and Palestinians.
Central Asian Leadership Succession: When, Not If

Eugene B. Rumer

The Central Asian political landscape yields few signs of an impending storm in the near term. The absence of threats to the status quo, however, does not mean that it is accept- able or that it represents a stable political equilibrium in the region. Leadership succession in Central Asia bears watching for several reasons:
- as a precedent-setting process, it will provide the key missing element for the emerging political structures of the Central Asian states
- the tenure of the next generation will either make up for the shortcomings of its predecessors or aggravate them
- in the event of the latter, the stage will be set in Central Asia for more radical changes that could reverberate far beyond remote regional boundaries.
Finding a Kashmir Settlement: The Burden of Leadership

Teresita C. Schaffer

The combined talents of the people of India and Pakistan, with the fitful help of a long list of others, have been trying for over 50 years to resolve the Kashmir issue. This essay offers no ready-made answers but rather suggestions on where to begin to look for them. Experience with other recent peace processes teaches valuable lessons about how would-be peacemakers need to approach their task and the ways in which third parties can help.
The ROK–U.S. Alliance: Where Is It Headed?

Kim Dong Shin

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002) provides an important framework from which to examine the current crisis on the Korean Peninsula and other challenges in Northeast Asia. With its focus on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD), this strategy is concerned with North Korea as much as, if not more than, any other state. In particular, North Korea poses a unique set of challenges in regard to WMD. North Korea stands in sharp contrast to the Republic of Korea (ROK) on issues such as human rights, democracy, and market economies. The National Security Strategy suggests that the United States should revitalize its alliance with South Korea, while encourag- ing North Korea to transform its political and economic system. Yet South Korea and the United States are currently having some difficulties in developing a consensus on how to approach Pyongyang, and appear to have no clear plan to operationalize the strategy to deal. with North Korea.
Colombia’s War: Toward a New Strategy

John A. Cope

Colombia’s new president, Alvaro Uribe, is confronting a protracted internal war and moving to assert national political authority. Hopes are being pinned on Uribe, the new “law and order” president who took office on August 7, 2002, with an overwhelming mandate to end violence, narcotics, and official corruption.
China’s Trade Opening: Implications for Regional Stability

Howard M. Krawitz

In late 2001, China entered the World Trade Organization (WTO), a dramatic step that marks not only the end of a 15-year odyssey for Beijing but also the beginning of a new phase in the country’s internal development and its relations with the outside world. It may sound odd to suggest that joining the WTO—an organization focused on rules of conduct for trade and commerce—will influence not only China’s economy but also its political, military, and social development, as well as its interaction with the United States. Yet China’s efforts to play by WTO rules could affect its internal development far more extensively than has been the case with many new member nations.
Dissuasion as a Strategic Concept

Richard L. Kugler

Some analysts want to downplay dissuasion or set it aside entirely because of its ambiguity. But ignoring this emerging idea would be short sighted. Despite its haziness, the term goes to the heart of new-era geopolitics in several key regions, including Asia. If the United States can learn how to dissuade skillfully, its strategic effectiveness in troubled regions will improve significantly. When the idea of deterrence first appeared 50 years ago, it too was ambiguous. During the Cold War, however, it acquired a role of central importance once it was equipped with a full-fledged strategic theory. The same may hold true for dissuasion in the early 21st century—but only if it too is equipped with the full set of analyses and calculations needed to bring it to life.
Anticipating Strategic Surprise on the Korean Peninsula

James J. Przystup

Despite the current stagnation in South-North dialogue, relations between the Koreas have been subject to sudden shifts. In the warm afterglow of the historic June 2000 South-North Summit in Pyongyang, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung’s engagement policy appeared to have created a self-sustaining dynamic. Policymakers in Washington and Seoul scrambled to manage the potential diplomatic and security consequences of a rapid breakthrough in bilateral relations driven by presidential summitry.
Flashman’s Revenge: Central Asia after September 11

Eugene B. Rumer

The terrorist attacks of September 11 swept away much of the uncertainty about Central Asia’s importance to the international system and its relationship with the major powers, especially the United States. Indeed, the five states of the region—Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan—have become among the most important frontline states in America’s war on terrorism. But the war did not alter many basic long-term trends in the region that will complicate U.S. activities as well as color Central Asian perceptions of the United States. Beyond the immediate demands of the war on terrorism, many fundamental questions remain unanswered: How important is Central Asia to the United States? What is the nature of U.S. interest in the region? What role should the United States play in Central Asia: security manager, hegemon, limited partner?
U.S.-Russian Relations: Toward a New Strategic Framework

Eugene B. Rumer and Richard D. Sokolsky

In 2001, President Vladimir Putin made a strategic choice for Russia’s integration with the West. Indicators of this decision include Putin’s quest for better relations with the United States and Europe, his stated commitment to Russian membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), his pursuit of a new relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and his almost casual dismissal of the potential major irritants in the relationship with the United States and its allies—U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the likelihood of Baltic membership in NATO, sizeable U.S. military deployments to Central Asia, and a growing U.S. military presence in Georgia. Putin has unequivocally crossed these once-insurmountable red lines despite opposition from his closest advisers and the unease of the Russian public over the American presence in Russia’s backyard.
Homeland Security: The New Role for Defense

Steven J. Tomisek

Before the terrorist attacks of September 11, the Armed Forces focused on deterrence, stability, and warfighting missions arising in overseas theaters. The U.S. homeland was regarded as a rear area, not a front line, and the job of securing it was primarily a task for civilian law enforcement agencies at the Federal, state, and local levels. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and the bioterrorist acts that followed, have prompted a review that reaffirms the Constitutional role of the Federal Government as protector of the states against foreign aggression and restores defense of the American homeland as the primary mission of the Department of Defense (DOD).
U.S.-Iran Relations: Normalization in the Future?

Judith S. Yaphe

Since World War II, few countries have been of greater strategic concern to the United States than Iran. Whether as a dependable friend and preeminent regional partner or as an implacable enemy, Iran has occupied a special place in U.S. security thinking. It exerts influence on a range of important policy issues—from the Middle East peace process to post-Taliban Afghanistan—and when it acquires nuclear weapons capability within the next decade, it could become a significant factor driving U.S. and regional government policies on proliferation.
Revising the Two-Major Theater War Standard

Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler

Preparing to fight two nearly simultaneous major theater wars (MTWs) has been the standard used to design U.S. defense policy and force structure since 1993. But with a broader spectrum of challenges looming, the threat of concurrent wars in the Persian Gulf and on the Korean Peninsula appearing less likely, and the emergence of China as a potential rival, a new approach is needed. Without a new standard, the Armed Forces will transform themselves using a rigid and outdated strategic model.

The standard put forth herein combines attention to peacetime needs with a fresh interpretation of wartime requirements. For peacetime, it would create force packages for regional commanders to perform deterrent, theater engagement, routine operational, and minor crisis management missions. In wartime, it would create a powerful joint force for handling one conflict which may be larger than a MTW, plus forces for two medium-sized operations elsewhere. This amounts to a new strategic calculus of one plus one-half plus one-half contingencies to determine U.S. force requirements.

This new standard aims to make defense plans not only responsive to real-world events, but also flexible and adaptable. It judges that preparing U.S. forces to handle a wide spectrum of events—big and small, in peace and war—may be more important than optimizing them for one canonical wartime scenario. It calls for a force structure that is large and adaptable enough to maintain core military capabilities in order to perform diverse strategic missions.