Download

Download Full Text (710 KB)

Description

Dissuasion as a Strategic Concept examines how U.S. defense and foreign policy can go beyond traditional deterrence to prevent adversaries from choosing conflict or escalation in the first place. The paper defines dissuasion as the strategic practice of discouraging adversaries from contemplating harmful behavior by shaping their expectations and perceived costs of action. The author explores how dissuasion complements deterrence and assurance strategies, particularly in complex regional contexts such as the Korean Peninsula, where multiple actors’ perceptions and incentives interact. Drawing on historical cases and theory, the paper offers insights into designing policies that reduce the likelihood of miscalculation and strategic surprise through proactive engagement, credible commitment, and strategic communication.

Document Type

Policy Brief

Region(s)

Korean Peninsula, East Asia, United States

Topic(s)

National Security, Defense Policy, Strategic Competition

Publication Date

12-2002

Publication

Strategic Forum

Publisher

National Defense University Press

City

Washington, DC

Keywords

strategic dissuasion, deterrence, U.S. defense policy, Korean Peninsula, national security, alliance assurance, conflict prevention, strategic concepts, geopolitical stability

Dissuasion as a Strategic Concept

Share

COinS