CSR Policy Briefs

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Finland, Sweden, and NATO: From “Virtual” to Formal Allies?

Leo G. Michel

The “Open Door” policy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been an article of faith for Allies and aspirants alike for more than a decade. Its most recent formulation, approved at the November 2010 Lisbon Summit, states: “The door to NATO membership remains fully open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and whose inclusion can contribute to common security and stability.”
Chinese Military Transparency: Evaluating the 2010 Defense White Paper

Phillip C. Saunders and Ross Rustici

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) State Council Information Office released the seventh edition of its biennial defense white paper, “China’s National Defense in 2010,” on March 31, 2011. This document aims to communicate the latest information on China’s military development, strategy, capabilities, and intentions. China began publishing defense white papers in 1998, partly as a means of increasing transparency in response to regional concerns about the growing capabilities and actions of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Despite the systematic release of these documents, many of China’s neighbors and other regional powers continue to express concerns about China’s lack of military transparency. The Chinese maintain that they are becoming more open over time and highlight the importance of transparency about strategic intentions rather than capabilities.
Avoiding a Crisis of Confidence in the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent

John P. Caves Jr.

The United States needs to modernize and ensure the long-term reliability and responsiveness of its aging nuclear deterrent force and nuclear weapons infrastructure. It cannot otherwise safely reduce its nuclear weapons, responsibly ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, confidently deter and contain challenges from rising or resurgent nuclear-armed near peers, and effectively dissuade allies and partners from acquiring their own nuclear weapons. Modernization is fundamental to avoiding a future crisis of confidence in the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
Reforming the Inter-American Defense Board

John A. Cope

Does the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) have a future in an era of multidimensional security? Burdened by a mid-20th-century military structure and a tradition of U.S. leadership, lingering deep antimilitary discomfort within the Organization of American States (OAS), and severely shrinking financial and human resources, the Board, with its secretariat and 27-member council of delegates,¹ has not been functionally useful to the OAS or its own membership and is ripe for disestablishment. Perceived to be out of touch, inflexible, and difficult to control, the IADB would cease to exist if funding were denied or markedly reduced.²
Private Contractors in Conflict Zones: The Good, the Bad, and the Strategic Impact

T.X. Hammes

In Iraq and Afghanistan, the use of contractors reached a level unprecedented in U.S. military operations. As of March 31, 2010, the United States deployed 175,000 troops and 207,000 contractors in the war zones. Contractors represented 50 percent of the Department of Defense (DOD) workforce in Iraq and 59 percent in Afghanistan. These numbers include both armed and unarmed contractors. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, the term contractor includes both armed and unarmed personnel unless otherwise specified. The presence of contractors on the battlefield is obviously not a new phenomenon but has dramatically increased from the ratio of 1 contractor to 55 military personnel in Vietnam to 1:1 in the Iraq and 1.43:1 in Afghanistan.
Africa’s Irregular Security Threats: Challenges for U.S. Engagement

Andre Le Sage

This paper provides an overview of Africa’s irregular, nonstate threats, followed by an analysis of their strategic implications for regional peace and stability, as well as the national security interests of the United States. After reviewing the elements of the emerging international consensus on how best to address these threats, the conclusion highlights a number of new and innovative tools that can be used to build political will on the continent to confront these security challenges. This paper is intended as a background analysis for those who are new to the African continent, as well as a source of detailed information on emerging threats that receive too little public or policy-level attention.
Somalia’s Endless Transition: Breaking the Deadlock

Andre Le Sage

In January 2009, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed succeeded Abdullahi Yusuf as pres- ident of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Sheikh Sharif took office following the conclusion of United Nations (UN)–brokered peace negotiations in Djibouti between a warlord-dominated TFG and moderate opposition forces that led the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in 2006. It was hoped that Sheikh Sharif would move forward with the long list of transitional tasks required to establish a permanent government for the country and extend control over areas seized by al Shabab.¹To his credit, Sheikh Sharif’s appointment led to the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from the country, and eliminated al Shabab’s ability to use Ethiopian occupation as a rallying cry. TFG supporters also point to ongoing efforts to reinvigorate the constitutional process, draft a citizenship law, make senior-level appointments in a revived judicial system, establish an independent central bank, utilize port revenues for public service delivery, and craft political cooperation deals with the regional administration in Puntland (northeast Somalia) and other militias opposed to the insurgency.
Prioritizing Strategic Interests in South Asia

Robert B. Oakley and T.X. Hammes

For the last 8 years, the United States has focused its South Asia efforts primarily on Afghanistan. Despite repeated calls in U.S. strategic documents for a regional approach, the public debate has consistently returned to Afghanistan. During the Obama administration’s lengthy 2009 policy review, public discussion narrowed even further to the single issue of troop strength. With the President’s speech on December 1, the debate over the number of troops faded, only to be replaced by discussions about the proposed withdrawal start date of July 2011 and the time necessary to deploy an additional 30,000 troops into Afghanistan. Obviously, the administration has just begun to implement its new plan, and the outcome remains uncertain. It will be years before we can determine if the new policy is successful.
Global Commons and Domain Interrelationships: Time for a New Conceptual Framework?

Mark E. Redden and Michael P. Hughes

Over the last several years, examination of U.S. national security interests within the context of the global commons has emerged as a major policy issue in the defense community.² At the highest levels of the Department of Defense (DOD), there is now an awareness that the U.S. military will be confronted by a host of challenges “to stability throughout the global commons.”³ Furthermore, the Nation can “expect to be increasingly challenged in securing and maintaining access to the global commons and must also be prepared for operations in unfamiliar conditions and environments.”⁴ In response, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report has now assigned “assured access” to the commons as a top priority for U.S. military forces^.5
U.S.-Mexico Homeland Defense: A Compatible Interface

Victor E. Renuart Jr. and Biff Baker

This paper responds to a previous Strategic Forum (no. 243, July 2009) entitled U.S.-Mexico Defense Relations: An Incompatible Interface by Craig Deare. Some of the assertions and conclusions within Dr. Deare’s paper were flawed due to an outdated U.S.-Mexico paradigm that preceded the 9/11 attacks and recent counter-drug operations in Mexico. If his work had been published prior to the establishment of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), it would have been well received, but times have changed. Because of our collective experiences over the past 6 years, we find implausible the notion that USNORTHCOM is not staffed or experienced enough to support Mexico’s security cooperation needs. Hence, U.S.-Mexico Homeland Defense: A Compatible Interface is intended to set the record straight by pointing out the numerous areas of cooperation between Mexico and the United States since the establishment of USNORTHCOM.
Strengthening the IAEA: How the Nuclear Watchdog Can Regain Its Bark

Gregory L. Schulte

Yukiya Amano recently became the new Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the world’s nuclear watchdog. Amano, an experienced Japanese diplomat, faces a challenging agenda: stalled investigations into the clandestine nuclear activities of Iran and Syria, the need to ensure high levels of safety and security as more countries opt for nuclear power, the dangers associated with the spread of technologies readily diverted to build nuclear bombs, a threat of nuclear terrorism not taken seriously by all IAEA members, and a Board of Governors too often split between developed and developing countries.
Iraqi Security Forces after U.S. Troop Withdrawal: An Iraqi Perspective

Najim Abed Al-Jabouri

Recent U.S. assessments of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have shown a slow but constant improvement in overall performance and combat capability, but have noted the continuing destructive effect of political influence on the forces. Major challenges remain, including corruption, weak rule of law, overlap in responsibilities, sectarianism, logistical deficiencies, and the lack of professionalism. Despite the overall improvement in the Iraqi forces, as recently as March 2009 the Department of Defense (DOD) reported that they are incapable of operating independently.¹
Aligning Disarmament to Nuclear Dangers: Off to a Hasty START?

David A. Cooper

Although the strategic arms reductions required by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) have long since been fulfilled, there are sound reasons to preserve aspects of this legacy treaty beyond December 5, 2009.¹ While few have seen this as a top national security priority, there has been no real dispute about the desirability of trying to extend at least some START elements, most notably its longstanding verification provisions. If nothing else, these proven mechanisms underpin the standalone reductions in operationally deployed strategic warheads that the more recent Moscow Treaty requires by 2012.² As then–Secretary of State Colin Powell noted in submitting the Moscow Treaty to President George W. Bush in 2002, “START’s comprehensive verification regime will provide the foundation for confidence, transparency and predictability in [these] further strategic offensive reductions.”³ Largely with the aim to preserve this transparency infrastructure, the Bush administration responded positively to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s call in 2006 for talks on a new treaty to replace START, which began in March 2007. However, this effort never produced a common understanding on the basic shape of a new agreement. Both sides agreed early on that they did not want to extend START per se. But whereas the United States simply wanted to enhance the Moscow Treaty with transparency measures drawn from, or, in some cases, going beyond START, Russia sought an entirely new treaty that would effectively supersede the Moscow Treaty. Its main goal was to shift the operative unit of account for Moscow Treaty reductions from deployed warheads to the START formula focusing on delivery systems.⁴ Fundamentally, the Bush administration viewed the Moscow Treaty approach as advantageous to U.S. interests, and therefore was unwilling to contemplate superseding this basic framework merely for the sake of extending verification measures.⁵
U.S.-Mexico Defense Relations: An Incompatible Interface

Craig A. Deare

The U.S. national security community has begun to pay greater attention to Mexico in 2009. Reports of unprecedented (in recent history, at least) violence related primarily to drug trafficking organizations (DTOs)¹ and speculation regarding the Mexican government’s ability to adequately address the deteriorating security situation have reached the attention of the President, National Security Advisor, Director of National Intelligence, Secretary of State, Attorney General, Secretary of Homeland Security, and Secretary of Defense. This escalation of issues beyond the bureaucratic levels that routinely deal with Mexico in the security realm is unusual.
Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the Evolving Character of Modern Conflict

Frank Hoffman

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates directly challenged the Pentagon’s strategists and military chiefs in an important speech at the National Defense University in September 2008. The speech was a critical assessment of the prevailing U.S. military culture and the prism through which our Armed Forces see themselves. This prism clarifies what is important about the future and how we posture our forces for the future. Secretary Gates questioned that mindset and its hold on the Services and the Department of Defense’s capitalization practices.
Unity of Effort: Key to Success in Afghanistan

Christopher J. Lamb and Martin Cinnamond

The U.S. Government strategy for success in Afghanistan unveiled by President Obama on March 27, 2009, emphasized a classic population-centric counterinsurgency approach. The novelty of this approach can be debated, but clearly the emphasis has shifted under the Obama administration. Securing the population and reducing civilian casualties are now the focus of attention. This approach should be more popular with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies, who prefer stabilization operations to offensive operations against insurgents, and with the Afghan government, which has vocally objected to operations that produce inadvertent civilian casualties. The possibility of greater support from Allies and the Afghan government increases the likelihood that the strategy can be executed with better unity of effort. The architects of the new strategy recognize that it puts a premium on better collaboration and that they have limited time for demonstrating progress. In these circumstances, taking every reasonable step to strengthen unity of effort is necessary.
Radicalization by Choice: ISI and the Pakistani Army

Robert B. Oakley and Franz-Stefan Gady

Events in Pakistan today resemble a fast-moving kaleidoscope. Although it is impossible to predict the future, Pakistan’s very existence as a state undoubtedly is at stake. The danger this poses to the region and to the United States is of the greatest magnitude. For better or worse, the Pakistani army and its intelligence unit, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), remain the most important elements in determining Pakistan’s future. The army establishment is the glue that holds this large multi-ethnic, nuclear-armed Muslim country together. Throughout Pakistan’s history, the army has served as “kingmaker” with decisive influence on political leadership, as guarantor of stability within the state, and as protector of the nation against external threats.
North Korea: Challenges, Interests, and Policy

James J. Przystup

On April 14, 2009, Pyongyang, in response to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) statement condemning North Korea’s April 4 rocket launch, ended its participation in the Six-Party Talks aimed at the denuclearization of North Korea and added that it “will no longer be bound to any agreement” of those talks. Pyongyang also declared its intent to “strengthen our self- defensive deterrent in every way.” On May 25, North Korea conducted its second nuclear test. On July 4, North Korea test fired seven missiles into the Sea of Japan.
The United States and the Asia-Pacific Region: National Interests and Strategic Imperatives

James J. Przystup

From its earliest days, the United States has been engaged in trade with East Asia. In February 1784, the Empress of China left New York harbor, sailing east to China, arriving at Macau on the China coast in August of that year. The ship returned to the United States the following May with a consignment of Chinese goods, which generated a profit of $30,000. In 1844, China granted the United States trading rights in the Treaty of Wanghia.
Managing Strategic Competition with China

Phillip C. Saunders

In the Obama administration’s first major speech on Asia policy, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton highlighted the need for a “positive, cooperative relationship” with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that could help the United States address an array of global challenges. Dismissing the view that a rising China must be an adversary, she argued that “the United States and China can benefit from and contribute to each other’s successes” and stressed the importance of working “to build on areas of common concern and shared opportunities.”¹ Her subsequent remarks in Beijing highlighted the importance of U.S.-China cooperation in addressing the global economic crisis, building a partnership on clean energy and climate change, and working together on a range of shared international security challenges.² Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg later called for building a “positive, cooperative and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship for the 21st century.”³
Ukraine Against Herself: To Be Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian, or Neutral?

Jeffrey Simon

Ever since Ukraine declared independence in August 1991, its main security preoccupation and challenge has been its search for identity. Nostalgic to maintain its long and close association with Russia, which has become increasingly competitive with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), and at the same time eager to become a more cooperative and close partner with the Euro-Atlantic community, Ukraine has consistently tried to have it both ways. On the one hand, Ukrainian political leaders’ aspirations for membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions have been driven, in part, by the desire to solidify independence from Russia. This impulse has roots that go back to the earliest days of its independence, when the fate of ex-Soviet nuclear weapons deployed on Ukrainian territory was being decided and Kyiv appealed to the United States and its NATO Allies for security guarantees against the specter of Russian resurgence.
Diverging Roads: 21st-century U.S.-Thai Defense Relations

Lewis M. Stern

Security issues were the core motivat-ing force behind Washington’s commitment to preserve Thailand’s sovereignty and dignity at the end of World War II—even as our British and French allies sought to treat the kingdom as a belligerent that should have been occu-pied and compelled to pay reparations for its wartime alliance with Japan. The rationale for the postwar alliance with the United States was the common commitment to opposing and containing the threat of communism.
U.S.-Cambodia Defense Relations: Defining New Possibilities

Lewis M. Stern

In his speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies annual Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in late May 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates laid out a vision of U.S. policy toward the region. The vision relies on longstanding treaty allies in Southeast Asia—the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia—as “cornerstones of U.S. foreign policy.” However, that vision does not stop there: it is designed to build a “new comprehensive partnership” with Indonesia and Singapore, to increase cooperation with Malaysia and Vietnam, and “to forge new partnerships in places long disregarded. This includes our emerging dialogue with Cambodia, as well as developments with Laos.” The dialogue with Cambodia thus holds out the prospect of a new partnership with a “long disregarded” country.
U.S.-Vietnam Defense Relations: Deepening Ties, Adding Relevance

Lewis M. Stern

The bilateral defense relationship with Vietnam developed in three phases. The first phase, from initial contacts during which the notion of defense normalization was broached in 1995–1996 to the preparations for the March 2000 visit of then–Secretary of Defense William Cohen, was characterized by Vietnamese caution regarding U.S. intentions, and matching reservations in Washington plus a concern regarding the importance of preserving the prisoner of war/missing in action (POW/MIA) priority focus.
Burma in Strategic Perspective: Renewing Discussion of Options

Lewis M. Stern, George Thomas, and Julia A. Thompson

U.S. policy toward Burma has kept attention riveted on democracy, on nudging the Burmese military junta toward a commitment to elections, on holding the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) to high standards regarding human rights and religious freedom, and on galvanizing regional and global support for a policy trajectory that edges the country closer to a moment when free speech, assembly, and freedom from fear dislodge the stranglehold of the military dictatorship that has dominated Burma since the early 1990s.