CSR Policy Briefs

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  Regional Conflicts with Strategic Consequences

  M. Elaine Bunn, David E. Mosher, and Richard D. Sokolsky

  During the Cold War, strategic capabilities were synonymous with nuclear capabilities, and U.S. strategic planning focused on nuclear deterrence and response against a single adversary. Today, more potential enemies are developing asymmetric capabilities to inhibit or prevent U.S. military intervention in regional conflicts— in short, to wage strategic warfare by implicitly or explicitly threatening highvalue political, military, or economic targets with weapons of mass destruction and disruption. U.S. security over the next several decades will depend increasingly on the ability to deter and respond effectively to strategic regional conflicts with significant escalation potential.

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  The U.S. Strategic Posture Review: Issues for the New Administration

  M. Elaine Bunn and Richard D. Sokolsky

  In the past, U.S. decisionmakers have addressed strategic nuclear force and national missile defense issues in an incremental and uncoordinated manner. Too often, force structure decisions have been driven by near-term programmatic, budgetary, arms control, and political pressures rather than by long-term strategy and objectives. The forthcoming Strategic Posture Review (SPR) needs to fundamentally reassess the purposes of nuclear weapons, missile defenses, and the requirements of deterrence and stability in the new security environment.

  The Bush administration should develop a comprehensive conceptual framework to decide on the size, composition, and posture of strategic offensive and defensive forces. Such a framework should integrate new assessments of deterrence and stability over the next 10–20 years, in light of the much more diverse threats facing the United States.

  It will not be easy to come up with solutions that balance competing and often contradictory objectives. Improving U.S. capabilities to deal with one set of strategic concerns may complicate efforts to address others. SPR should include a reassessment of U.S. strategic force levels and targeting requirements; consideration of different hedges and reconstitution options against greater-than-expected threats, such as maintaining production capabilities or making unilateral strategic force reductions outside a formal treaty framework; and development of a broad calculus to assess the impact of national missile defense and other strategic developments on deterrence and stability.

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  A Golden Opportunity: The Next Steps in U.S.-Indian Relations

  John C. Holzman

  President Bush has made closer relations with India a priority, thereby intensifying a process begun by the previous administration. Strengthening U.S.- India ties and cooperation on Asia-Pacific security issues can advance national interests in regional stability by reducing the risk of nuclear war on the subcontinent.

  The first step in the process is to peel away remaining punitive sanctions against India. Although symbolic of the commitment to nonproliferation, sanctions are manifestly ineffective and counterproductive in South Asia. This applies to Pakistan as well as India.

  Only India can initiate changes in the regional security atmosphere. The administration should focus on encouraging New Delhi to follow policies of restraint. Improved security relations will create equities that enable Washington to further encourage restraint.

  Restraint would mean resuming a dialogue with Pakistan on nuclear issues; not deploying nuclear weapons; no further testing; and defining a minimum deterrent that engenders greater stability, that is, does not create incentives for either a first strike or for Pakistan to enhance its deterrent.

  U.S. policy should link expanded bilateral ties to regular and more substantive military-to-military contacts. China and Pakistan may feel threatened by improved U.S.-India relations, and Pakistan may seek help from China or North Korea. Washington should counter this possibility by reassuring Beijing and also rebuilding badly damaged relations with Islamabad.

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  China: Making the Case for Realistic Engagement

  Michael E. Marti

  China seeks to become the major power in Asia by 2050. Under its so-called New Security Concept, it will attempt to displace the United States as the preeminent military presence in the region while avoiding arms races with its Asian neighbors. Beijing will also try to retake “lost territories” at the expense of other Asian countries. China also seeks to achieve economic supremacy in Asia, drawing other nations into a regional market dominated by the Chinese yuan. American military power has been insufficient to overcome cultural divisions and divergent interests in Asia, so attempts to multilateralize regional security on the model of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization failed. These efforts bolstered the impression that Washington was looking for a way out of regional commitments.

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  U.S.-Saudi Relations: Rebuilding the Strategic Consensus

  Joseph McMillan

  The United States inevitably will look to Saudi Arabia to play a critical role in any effective campaign against global terrorism. For Saudi Arabia to fulfill expectations, the United States must revitalize a strategic relationship that was under serious strain before the attacks on September 11.

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  Adversary Use of NBC Weapons: A Neglected Challenge

  John F. Reichart

  Understanding has evolved in the last decade about how an adversary might use nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical weapons against the United States. Increasingly, America is concluding that potential adversaries view these not as “weapons of last resort” but rather as tactically and strategically useful. The United States can expect their use early in a conflict as well as throughout the extended battlefield, including on U.S. territory itself.

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  Normalizing U.S.-Russian Relations

  Eugene B. Rumer and Richard D. Sokolsky

  Ten years after the Cold War, the United States is still looking for an organizing principle to guide policy toward Russia. Because of its systemic weakness, neither partnership nor competition is an appropriate concept. Washington should put aside its search for a comprehensive concept in dealing with Moscow and pursue a case-by-case approach rooted in specific U.S. interests.

  Priority interests involve a redefined strategic relationship, including Russian acquiescence to national missile defense; collaboration by Moscow in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other destabilizing technologies; and inducing Russia to base its behavior on respect for the international norms to which it is committed. The United States should be prepared to deemphasize other issues, such as conventional arms sales, that do not threaten core national interests.

  The Bush administration needs to communicate its intent to respect Russian interests, while making it clear that a productive relationship will depend primarily on Russian willingness to adhere to the values shared by the United States and other democratic nations. The choice of what kind of relationship Russia wants is largely in its own hands.

  However, Russia’s chaotic policymaking and the mismatch between its ambitions and capabilities preclude resolving key bilateral issues. Therefore, prospects for engaging Russia constructively appear dim and the United States will have to go it alone in areas where Russian acquiescence is lacking.

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  Do European Union Defense Initiatives Threaten NATO?

  Kori N. Schake

  European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) is now the main item on Europe’s security agenda because of a focus on establishing a crisis management force capable of acting independently of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

  Although transatlantic policies will be colored by issues such as the Kyoto treaty, missile defenses, and relations with Russia, ESDP is likely to dominate defense debates as the European Union (EU) tries to meet the Helsinki Headline Goal of developing a corpssized expeditionary force that can deploy military forces capable of ensuring diverse tasks and establish new political and military structures that will enable the EU to guide and direct such operations.

  To meet the Helsinki Goal, the European Union must surmount three problems: ensuring sufficient forces, building confidence in the quality of their performance, and finding substitutes for critical NATO assets. The approaches that EU members take to these tasks may indicate how serious they are about meeting the goal in fact as well as in name.

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  Renovating U.S. Strategic Arms Control Policy

  Richard D. Sokolsky

  Decisions on the next phase of strategic force reductions and how to achieve them will have to await the resolution of larger issues related to the future of the U.S. strategic force posture and national missile defense. Once the Bush administration completes its Nuclear Posture Review, however, it will need to decide whether to continue the Cold War-style strategic arms reduction process or explore alternatives for reducing nuclear threats to national security and transforming the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship.

  The traditional arms control process of negotiating legally binding treaties that both codify numerical parity and contain extensive verification measures has reached an impasse and outlived its utility. Moreover, new U.S. strategic priorities will require changes in the ends and means of arms control policy.

  The United States and Russia should embrace a radically new framework to achieve deeper reductions in strategic nuclear forces. The centerpiece of such a reform agenda should be arms control through unilateral and parallel unilateral measures. To jump-start this process, the administration should give top priority to repealing legislation that prohibits the Nation from unilaterally reducing strategic forces until START II enters into force.

  Unless the United States embraces a more flexible and innovative approach to strategic arms control, progress will be stymied in developing a nuclear weapons posture for the new security environment.

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  A Military for the 21st Century: Lessons from the Recent Past

  Anthony C. Zinni

  The post-Cold War world environment has complicated rather than simplified the missions, strategy, and organization of the Armed Forces. Rapid downsizing after the fall of the Soviet Union and the Allied victory in the Persian Gulf War left a military lacking strategic direction, a thoughtful force structure, and a logical threat upon which to base future force structure.

  This environment will not permit the luxury of a strategic pause. Allowing the new world order to arrange itself could present the Nation with an unforeseen threat that it cannot handle. To prevent such an eventuality, the military must address several challenges: the number of nontraditional threats, financing a military capable of meeting all the potential challenges it may face, the need to reform itself to handle rapid developments in technology, and interagency reform in coordination with military reform so that the full weight of national power can be brought to bear against adversaries.

  A deliberate process of military transformation must account for the need for public support, which is essential for such a process to succeed. Transformation would encompass several areas: developing a realistic strategic direction; reviewing personnel recruitment and retention; understanding the implications of joint and combined warfare for organization, structure, core competencies, and operational concepts; revamping national security advisory and decisionmaking processes; and assessing the effects of technological and social changes on the military.

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  China Rising: New Challenges to the U.S. Security Posture

  Jason D. Ellis and Todd M. Koca

  The future strategic capabilities of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will substantially differ from the past; both numerical increases and significant qualitative improvements are likely.

  Key information gaps, aggravated by a lack of transparency, hamper our understanding of China’s expanding nuclear and missile capabilities, doctrinal innovations, and evolving strategic intentions.

  While U.S. and PRC interests intersect in a number of areas, there are also important differences. The status and future disposition of Taiwan is perhaps the single greatest flashpoint for conflict, a case in which U.S. deterrence of a range of PRC military steps may fail and escalation ensue.

  A rising power, China is striving to become a heavyweight in Asia. The longterm complementarity of U.S. and PRC interests is predicated in large part on Beijing’s strategic choices.

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  Transforming the Armed Forces of Central and East Europe

  Jeffrey Simon

  The transformation of Central and East European (CEE) armed forces into modern contributors to Euro-Atlantic security during the next decade will be more difficult than in the last, because euphoria over joining the West is dissipating, and attention is turning to problems of reform.

  CEE governments have been unable to provide long-term plans and to guarantee resources to build military capabilities. Plans still must be developed, especially in Slovakia and Slovenia, and reliable projections of resources are sorely needed in Romania.

  Downsizing and restructuring militaries and integrating general staffs within ministries of defense can create friction in civilmilitary relations; the United States could help mitigate such problems through retraining aimed at alternate careers and meritbased career development programs.

  In moving to all-volunteer forces, CEE partners will lose an instrument for shaping the citizens of young democracies (such as Lithuania) and manpower pools from which to recruit extended-service volunteers (like Germany). NATO allies could provide partner programs focused on conscription to foster civic virtues and help define training for specific military roles and missions.

  Confusion prevails over the appropriate length of conscription for each CEE country. However, terms of 6 or 7 months can only prepare reserve forces and are not adequate to meet operational requirements.

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  Military Lessons from Desert One to the Balkans

  Ike Skelton

  The performance of the Armed Forces has shown a marked improvement since its low point in the post-Vietnam era. Military leaders have deliberately sought out and internalized lessons from each succeeding conflict. The challenge for the next generation is learning the lessons of these past operations and building an even more effective, flexible force.

  The military cannot pick and choose its missions. Their political masters may well decide that national interests require the use of force for more nontraditional missions or in situations that may be less than ideally suited to military solutions.

  Force protection is critical; high rates of casualties can erode popular support and undermine the mission. On the other hand, excessive fear of casualties can erode the morale of the Armed Forces. The key is forging American leadership that understands the military risks involved.

  Commitments to our allies may draw us into conflicts where U.S. national interests are limited, but where American leadership is essential to the vitality of the alliance.

  Even a small operation conducted abroad requires an extraordinary range of well-trained forces, either highly deployable or already in theater.

  Despite successes, the Armed Forces must address a number of challenges: urban warfare, weapons of mass destruction, tracking and destroying mobile targets, the need for lighter, more deployable forces, and the burden of ongoing operations.