Policy Briefs

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  The Science and Engineering Workforce and National Security

  Michael L. Marshall, Timothy Coffey, Fred E. Saalfeld, and Rita R. Colwell

  Trends in the American science and engineering (S&E) workforce and national research and development (R&D) funding patterns and priorities have troubling implications for the economic and national security of our nation. Especially worrisome are:

  • A general lack of interest among American-born youth, especially women and minorities, in pursuing education in the physical sciences, mathematics, environmental sciences, and engineering at the undergraduate and graduate levels;
  • A rapidly accelerating accumulation of intellectual capital, including an educated S&E workforce, in China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan;
  • A long-term decline in the overall Federal investment in R&D as a percentage of gross domestic product, especially among the physical sciences and engineering; and
  • Reduced Department of Defense funding for research throughout the 1990s, a trend that has exacerbated the general decline in the physical sciences and engineering, despite the importance of these fields to the development of new military capabilities.

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  Apocalyptic Terrorism: The Case for Preventive Action

  Joseph McMillan

  This policy brief examines the growing threat posed by apocalyptic, religiously motivated terrorist movements, particularly al Qaeda, and argues that their ideology, intent, and capabilities require a reassessment of international norms governing the use of force. Unlike earlier terrorist groups constrained by political objectives, apocalyptic terrorists seek mass casualties and reject traditional limits on violence, making purely reactive or law-enforcement approaches inadequate. The brief contends that under certain circumstances states must retain the ability to take preventive action, including military operations on foreign territory, when governments are unwilling or unable to suppress terrorist threats within their borders. Drawing on principles of customary international law, sovereign responsibility, and the inherent right of self-defense under the UN Charter, the author makes the case that preventive action can be legally and morally justified. Building international consensus around this doctrine is essential to sustaining legitimacy in the global struggle against terrorism.

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  Securing Afghanistan: Entering a Make-or-Break Phase?

  Robert B. Oakley and T.X. Hammes

  This paper assesses Afghanistan’s security and political trajectory in early 2004, arguing that the country had entered a decisive “make-or-break” phase in post-Taliban stabilization. The authors analyze the persistence of warlordism, Pashtun resentment, Taliban-led insurgency, narcotics trafficking, and cross-border dynamics involving Pakistan, Iran, India, and Central Asia. They examine the evolving coalition response, including the expansion of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Operation Enduring Freedom’s shift toward population-centered counterinsurgency, development of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and police forces, Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) initiatives, and the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) model. The brief argues that sustained U.S. leadership, expanded international engagement, security sector reform, and accelerated reconstruction are essential to prevent renewed civil war and ensure long-term Afghan stability.

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  Collision Avoidance: U.S.-Russian Bilateral Relations and Former Soviet States

  Eugene B. Rumer

  This Strategic Forum policy brief analyzes the growing risk of tension between the United States and Russia as expanding U.S. political and military engagement in former Soviet states intersects with Moscow’s renewed determination to consolidate influence over its “near abroad.” After September 11, U.S. security involvement in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia intensified in support of counterterrorism objectives and the sovereignty of newly independent states. Simultaneously, a broad Russian political consensus has emerged favoring an exclusive sphere of influence along its periphery and resisting long-term U.S. and NATO presence. These converging trajectories place U.S. and Russian policies on a potential collision course. The brief argues that confrontation or formal spheres of influence would undermine regional stability and bilateral relations. Instead, sustained dialogue, transparency, and mutually understood “rules of the road” are essential to manage differences and prevent miscalculation while preserving the independence of former Soviet states.

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  Partnership for Peace: Charting a Course for a New Era

  Jeffrey Simon

  This Strategic Forum brief examines the future of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) following Alliance enlargement and shifting post-9/11 security priorities. With many former partners joining NATO, the program faces questions about its continued relevance. The brief argues that PFP remains essential for promoting defense reform, democratic civil-military relations, interoperability, and regional security cooperation among remaining partner states. It recommends restructuring the program to address distinct regional needs, strengthening subregional initiatives, enhancing counterterrorism cooperation, and improving resource allocation. A revitalized Partnership for Peace, better integrated with NATO’s strategic objectives, would support stability in Europe’s periphery and reinforce long-term Euro-Atlantic security.

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  Turbulent Transition in Iraq: Can It Succeed?

  Judith S. Yaphe

  This Strategic Forum policy brief analyzes Iraq’s fragile political transition following the June 2004 transfer of sovereignty from the Coalition Provisional Authority to the Iraqi Interim Government. It assesses three interrelated challenges: the risk of civil war, the legitimacy of transitional governance, and the long-term development of political institutions. While sectarian and ethnic tensions among Sunni Arabs, Shi’a Arabs, and Kurds are pronounced, the brief argues that large-scale civil war is not inevitable. Instead, instability is more likely to stem from extremist movements, militia power, and disputes over federalism and control of territory, particularly Kirkuk. The author contends that the success of Iraq’s transition depends on the United States empowering Iraqi leaders as genuine partners, avoiding overreach in political decisionmaking, supporting disarmament of militias, and sustaining security during institution building. Failure to manage the transition effectively could produce prolonged instability with regional consequences.

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  Dirty Bombs: The Threat Revisited

  Peter D. Zimmerman and Cheryl Loeb

  Nuclear radiation, invisible and detectable only with special instruments, has the power to terrify—in part because of its association with nuclear weapons—and to become an instrument of terrorists. Radioactive isotopes can be spread widely with or without high explosives by a radiological dispersion device (RDD) or so-called dirty bomb. This paper provides a general overview of the nature of RDDs and sources of material for them and estimates the effects of an assault, including casualties and economic consequences. Many experts believe that an RDD is an economic weapon capable of inflicting devastating damage on the United States. This paper is in full agreement with that assessment and makes some quantitative estimates of the magnitude of economic disruption that can be produced by various levels of attack. It is also generally believed that even a very large RDD is unlikely to cause many human casualties, either immediately or over the long term. A careful examination of the consequences of the tragic accident in Goiânia, Brazil, however, shows that some forms of radiological attack could kill tens or hundreds of people and sicken hundreds or thousands. Nevertheless, contrary to popular belief, RDDs are not weapons of mass destruction.

  The authors recommend several policies and actions to reduce the threat of RDD attack and increase the ability of the Federal Government to cope with the consequences of one. With improved public awareness and ability to respond, it should be possible to strip RDDs of their power to terrorize.

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  Biology and the Battlefield

  Robert E. Armstrong and Jerry B. Warner

  The military and the life sciences have been intertwined throughout history. Biology has often been a source of offensive weapons, ranging from the hurling of plague victims over the walls of Kaffa (which probably started the 14th-century Black Death) to the anthrax attacks of fall 2001.

  The military-biology relationship also has a humane side. Over the years, medical advances have saved countless soldiers and contributed to the overall well being of society. From the smallpox inoculation of Continental Army recruits in 1777—nearly 20 years before Edward Jenner’s smallpox vaccination—to the development of modern vaccines, military physicians have a lengthy and impressive record of achievements.

  Biology has a new military role in the 21st century. Using the tools of biotechnology, the emphasis is now on increasing warfighting capabilities by improving matériel and enhancing warrior performance. Potential new tools range from small electronic devices based on bacterial proteins to foods that contain vaccines. The possibilities range from warriors functioning without difficulty in extreme environments to unmanned aerial vehicles flying in autonomous swarms.

  For the military to benefit fully from the advances of 21stcentury biology, a new organization is needed within the Department of Defense (DOD) that addresses the ethical, legal, and regulatory implications of biotechnology. This entity also must ensure that DOD biotechnology spending is increased and that the majority of the funds are directed to warfighting issues rather than the longstanding biological concerns of medical and defensive measures.

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  Transforming NATO Command and Control for Future Missions

  Charles L. Barry

  No military function is more critical to operational success than effective command and control (C2). There also is no more daunting military function to get right when it comes to the employment of complex multinational formations in the fast-paced arena of crisis response. Since the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—unique as an alliance with a permanent standing C2 structure—has ventured into a broader spectrum of missions and across a wider geographical area of operations, posing far greater C2 challenges than the single mission, fixed-territory defense of the past. Threats to NATO interests have increased, demanding military structures and capabilities that can be employed on shorter notice and further outside NATO territory. At the same time, more sophisticated information-based battle systems and technologies are driving the need for increasingly interoperable forces. A key factor for success in this new environment will be a more agile, flexible, and responsive NATO C2 architecture for the 21st century.

  The NATO summit at Prague in November 2002 was a major milestone in the evolution of alliance command structure and future military force posture. Prague decisions outlined a new arrangement that will take several years and significant investment by both NATO and each member state to put in place. Although many details must still be worked out, early momentum toward the Prague goals is strong and encouraging. Those efforts should not falter at a time of new and proximate threats to NATO member territory and citizens, or collective interests.

  Alliance military commanders direct their organizations through the architecture of the distinctive NATO political-military process called consultation, command, and control (C3). Although C3 is a single NATO process, consultation is focused on the political process of consensus decisionmaking among allies, while command and control (C2) is a military function achieved through the full array of NATO military command and force structures, doctrinal command relationships, and technical standards and interoperability agreements. NATO C2 is also underpinned by a multifaceted communications and information system (CIS) that provides the connectivity and networks to conduct military operations. Related but separate NATO doctrines cover the functions of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

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  Dual-Track Transformation for NATO

  Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler

  Recent strains between the United States and some European allies have raised concerns that NATO is becoming irrelevant or even headed toward extinction. A breakup of NATO would severely damage the United States and Europe as well as prospects for global peace. As an urgent priority, NATO must restore its unity and strengthen its capacity for common action in the Greater Middle East. But how can this goal be achieved in today’s climate?

  The solution is for NATO to pursue a new dual-track strategy of military and political transformation that could be launched at the Istanbul Summit next spring. The military track should further strengthen efforts to field a NATO Response Force and otherwise prepare European forces for expeditionary missions. The political track should aim to create a common transatlantic vision for the Middle East, while enhancing NATO’s capacity to act flexibly and constructively there in peace, crisis, and war.

  Such a NATO strategic realignment is not mission impossible. NATO has survived previous trans-Atlantic stresses by adopting dual-track strategies that harmonized American and European interests. For example, almost forty years ago the Harmel Report reconciled detente with deterrence and defense. A new Harmel Report is needed to forge a similar reconciliation of U.S. and European policies toward NATO’s role in the Middle East. In addition, the Istanbul Summit can take other practical steps: e.g., a NATO resource commitment to increase defense investments as force structure is reduced, a NATO defense transformation roadmap to guide force improvements, and a new “Partnership for Cooperation” that would pursue ties with friendly Middle Eastern militaries. A bold Istanbul agenda of this sort offers NATO an opportunity to replace recent debates with a common approach for making the alliance more secure and effective in a troubled world.

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  Moore’s Law: A Department of Defense Perspective

  Gerald M. Borsuk and Timothy Coffey

  The past 50 years have seen enormous advances in electronics and the systems that depend upon or exploit them. The Department of Defense (DOD) has been an important driver in, and a profound beneficiary of, these advances, which have come so regularly that many observers expect them to continue indefinitely. However, as Jean de la Fontaine said, “In all matters one must consider the end.” A substantial literature debates the ultimate limits to progress in solid-state electronics as they apply to the current paradigm for silicon integrated circuit (IC) technology. The outcome of this debate will have a profound societal impact because of the key role that silicon ICs play in computing, information, and sensor technologies.

  The consequences for DOD are profound. For example, DOD planning assumptions regarding total situational awareness have been keyed to Moore's Law, which predicts the doubling of transistor density about every 18 months. While this prediction proved to be accurate for more than thirty years, we are entering a period when industry will have increasing difficulty in sustaining this pace. Under the current device and manufacturing paradigm, progress in areas such as total situational awareness will slow or stagnate. If DOD planning assumptions are to be met, the DOD science and technology program would be well advised to search aggressively for alternate paradigms beyond those on which Moore's Law is based to ensure new technology capabilities. The purpose of this paper is to examine the current prognosis for silicon IC technology from a DOD perspective.

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  Preemptive Action: When, How, and to What Effect?

  M. Elaine Bunn

  This Strategic Forum paper examines the Bush administration’s evolving concept of preemptive action in the post-9/11 security environment. It analyzes the strategic rationale behind the emphasis on preemption—particularly concerns about rogue states, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—and distinguishes between preemptive and preventive uses of force. The author explores historical precedents, legal and ethical considerations, operational requirements, and the potential military and political consequences of preemptive action. The paper argues that while preemption remains a legitimate option in extreme circumstances, especially where WMD threats are imminent, its application requires careful evaluation of intelligence reliability, proportionality, alliance cohesion, and long-term strategic effects. Ultimately, it concludes that preemptive military action is likely to remain a rare but important tool of U.S. national strategy, to be used judiciously and only under narrowly defined conditions.

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  Hydrogen as a Fuel for DOD

  Timothy Coffey, Dennis R. Hardy, Gottfried E. Besenbruch, Kenneth R. Schultz, Lloyd C. Brown, and Jill P. Dahlburg

  Energy issues have been at the center of the national security debate for some time, and the current situation in the Persian Gulf underscores the strategic importance of sound energy policy. Activities or developments—geopolitical, environmental, technological, or regulatory—that materially change the energy security equation are, naturally, of great interest to the Department of Defense (DOD). The announcement by President George Bush in his State of the Union address that he intends to accelerate research and development (R&D) for hydrogen-powered vehicles toward the objective of total U.S. energy independence has great potential impact on DOD. This paper examines a number of technical issues connected with energy independence through hydrogen and how they might affect DOD. We conclude that the move to a hydrogen economy will be a massive undertaking, requiring large investments and decades to accomplish. We will show that, with few exceptions, pure hydrogen is not a viable fuel for DOD missions, primarily because of the DOD requirement for compact, high-volumetric energy density power sources. As a result, to meet its unique needs, DOD likely will have to increase its dependence on nuclear power and support R&D that investigates ways to use hydrogen to synthesize hydrocarbon fuels in an environmentally compliant fashion. Several suggestions and recommendations will be made in this regard.

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  Alternative Governance: A Tool for Military Laboratory Reform

  Timothy Coffey, Kenneth W. Lackie, and Michael L. Marshall

  Throughout the Cold War, the United States maintained an edge over adversaries by fielding technologically superior warfighting systems. This strategy depended on a strong research and development (R&D) effort in both the public and private sectors, and the community of military laboratories in the Department of Defense played an essential role in the overall effort. Because of the importance of these labs during the Cold War, defense planners continually focused on ways to improve and strengthen them.

  The end of the Cold War, however, shifted the focus away from laboratory improvement toward consolidation, closure, realignment, and personnel downsizing, as many came to believe much of the R&D done by the military laboratories could, and even should, be done by the private sector. Scrutiny of the labs greatly increased as a constant stream of base realignment and closure and other cost-reduction efforts sought to decrease their roles and size. Because these actions focused almost exclusively on efficiency, little attention was paid to improving the effectiveness of the labs—their ability to carry out their assigned missions. Most activity directed at improving laboratory operation has dealt with incremental modifications of the current governance model. Currently, the military labs are Government-owned, Government-operated organizations. As many studies have noted, this governance model puts the laboratories at a great disadvantage and complicates their ability to accomplish their assigned missions. Alternative approaches have been suggested by lab reformers but have never been implemented. Since the current governance model is well known, and attempts to modify it are well documented, this paper discusses several alternative governance models for the labs, with emphasis on the Government-owned, contractor- operated and Government-owned corporation models. While there would be issues with regard to conversion of an existing military lab to a Government corporation or comparable entity, the long-term, mission-enabling benefits of such a conversion could far outweigh any near-term complexities.

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  The Air Force: Science, Technology, and Transformation

  Donald C. Daniel

  A unique connectivity exists in the Air Force between science, technology, and transformation. From the defining moment of powered flight in 1903 to the creation of the Air Force as a separate service in 1947 to the present, these three elements have been continuously linked and undoubtedly will remain so.

  This paper provides a brief historical perspective of the ties between science, technology, and transformation in the earliest days of the Air Force; gives an overview of current Air Force science and technology; offers a look at five future transformational capabilities—unmanned combat aerial vehicles, small munitions, directed energy weapons, microsatellites, and the joint battlespace infosphere—that demonstrate the strong nature of the link today; and lastly, presents some challenges and issues.

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  NATO Defense Science and Technology

  Donald C. Daniel and Leigh C. Caraher

  The accord establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 provided the framework for the greatest international mechanism ever in defense science and technology. From its earliest days, NATO involvement in science and technology has sought to build cooperation and promote security and stability. Today, the central element of the NATO defense science and technology program is the Research and Technology Organization (RTO), which provides the best basis for collaboration among the most technologically advanced countries in the world. Through this body, alliance nations plan and execute activities that cover the full spectrum of technologies vital to current and future security.

  RTO and its two predecessors, the Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development and the Defense Research Group, have a history of fostering long-term relationships among senior executives, scientists, and engineers; sharing information and research; and enhancing military capabilities. There is no international activity that rivals RTO in scope, magnitude, or potential. RTO can continue to build on these successes by emphasizing longevity of its highly qualified members, prioritizing areas of opportunity, integrating the seven newest NATO invitees, and building a closer relationship with Russia. This paper examines the origins of NATO defense science and technology, provides an overview of the Research and Technology Organization, and analyzes the elements that make RTO successful. The paper concludes with recommendations for enhancing RTO effectiveness in the 21st century.

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  The Silence of the Labs

  Don J. DeYoung

  Something important to the Nation’s defense has vanished, yet the top Pentagon brass never noticed. Not the stuff of headlines, this loss would not arouse public concern, especially during these times of terrorist massacres, anthrax attacks, corporate scandal, and war. Nevertheless, like the miner’s canary that is first to die with the rush of an ill wind, this loss is a warning.

  In the span of 18 months, the Department of Defense (DOD) lost a key part of its 25-year-old ability to perform fiber optics research at the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), the only site with this world-class defense capability. It was not time for DOD to exit this critical field. Urgent security needs not being met anywhere else were being addressed. Both the scale of the loss and the speed with which it occurred reveal a growing problem: the private sector’s increasingly successful recruitment of the best scientists working for the DOD Defense Laboratories. While personnel losses are to be expected in any enterprise, public or private, this particular loss exposes the diminished DOD ability to retain the technical talent necessary to accomplish its mission.

  The death of this “canary” sends warning that an ill wind is blowing for the Defense Laboratories.¹ Without reform, their loss of expertise will worsen, eventually to the point where it affects good government and poses significant risks to national security. Should this happen, the Nation will suffer what President Dwight Eisenhower called “a disastrous rise of misplaced power.”

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  Beyond the Mainland: Chinese Telecommunications Expansion

  Robert C. Fonow

  In most countries, expansion of the telecommunications network beyond national borders has followed diplomatic and business expansion. On this basis, an informed practitioner might be expecting the Chinese telecommunications system to spread beyond its borders sometime in the later part of this decade. However, Chinese authorities have been quick to act upon a series of unexpected opportunities for acquiring international telecom- munications assets. This article discusses the international secu- rity implications of Chinese telecommunications expansion.

  Since the telecommunications collapse of 2001, Chinese buy- ers have purchased several large telecommunications networks in Asia previously owned by U.S. investors. Among these are:

  ■ PSINet, which was one of the early developers of the Internet. Hong Kong assets were purchased by CITIC, a company reported to have close relations with the People’s Liberation Army.

  ■ Level 3, which was sold to a joint venture including Pacific Cen- tury CyberWorks, a company run by Richard Li, the son of Hong Kong bil- lionaire Li Ka Shing—both of whom maintain close contacts with central government authorities in Beijing.

  ■ Asia Global Crossing assets, which was purchased by China Net- com, the newly renamed northern division of the incumbent carrier China Telecom.

  ■ Global Crossing, Inc., which claims its own Asian assets in a highly publicized pending deal including a direct investment by Hutchin- son Whampoa and Singapore Telemedia. Hutchinson eventually backed out, leaving Singapore Telemedia as the sole potential owner. But, as this paper argues, the deal still facilitates China’s expanding network capa- bility and influence.

  These assets, previously paid for by American investors at a cost of up to $20 billion, were bought for an average cost of as lit- tle as 3 cents on the dollar, representing a huge loss of American capital value.1 Each company had extensive networks covering several Asian countries with large capacity circuits and direct ity into the United States.

  It is unlikely that such a broad-based move into international telecommunications was simply a fortuitous consequence of China’s transition to a free market economy. Several interesting questions arise. First, to what extent was the Beijing leadership behind this acquisition spree (even though most of the action took place in Hong Kong)? Second, and perhaps more importantly, how will this purchase of assets by national Chinese network services providers enable Chinese interests to control the telecommunications domain in Asia, and how this will impact U.S.-China relations in the areas of military competition and foreign policy? And, third, how will an expanding international telecommunications capability affect internal political and economic developments in China?

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  A New PPBS Process to Advance Transformation

  Stuart E. Johnson

  The Office of the Secretary of Defense has released its first Transformational Planning Guidance to steer the Armed Forces through a joint process of transformation. This is a strong step in the direction of making transformation and innovation visible parts of the defense planning process, but more is needed. The planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) through which the Department of Defense (DOD) prioritizes its programs and resources has to be restructured to facilitate transformation and innovation, not to obstruct them. DOD has begun a trial resource allocation process that will reduce the burden of repetitive report generation that has drained time and energy away from innovative, strategic change. This process gives senior leadership an opportunity to shift its attention from wrestling with budget detail to developing initiatives to transform U.S. forces. However, this change will not happen of its own accord. A set of proposals that would enable senior leadership to move its focus from the back end (budgeting) of the resource allocation process to the front end (planning and idea generation) is presented below. A review of how the PPBS has evolved is presented to highlight the need to target specific parts for restructuring.

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  Decision Dominance: Exploiting Transformational Asymmetries

  Merrick E. Krause

  This paper introduces a new operational concept—decision dominance—to help guide the strategic employment of U.S. forces in wartime. This concept is not a replacement for existing paradigms. If added to the current list, however, it may better illuminate how American forces can operate effectively in ways that will achieve their political-military goals more decisively in future wars.

  Decision dominance builds upon current operational concepts, particularly effects-based operations and rapid decisive operations. Yet it goes further by giving warfighting options to shape the operational and strategic decisions of an adversary. Decision dominance is an attempt to exploit emerging transformational U.S. military capabilities to create a transformational strategy and Joint Capstone Concept. It reflects a strategy for the use of military force in concert with other instruments of power. This strategy involves evaluating adversary options and eliminating those deemed undesirable, effectively funneling the decisionmaking process of the enemy leadership to achieve a desired outcome.

  This paper first discusses the nature of conflict in the modern strategic environment and some popular contemporary military concepts of operations. Next, it examines the operational relevance of decision dominance and its application in conflict. Decision dominance argues that a strategy exploiting the realms of space, time, and knowledge may be invaluable by allowing decisionmakers to achieve political ends, using military means, to coerce methodically and effectively, with minimal cost and risk to both sides.

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  Modernizing China’s Military: A High-Stakes Gamble?

  Howard M. Krawitz

  This Strategic Forum paper examines the political, social, and strategic risks associated with China’s accelerated military modernization. While Beijing seeks to transform the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a technologically advanced, professional force capable of supporting China’s rise as a major power, the author argues that modernization may carry significant internal and regional consequences. The paper analyzes how professionalization, expanded recruitment from urban and educated populations, and enhanced military capabilities could alter the PLA’s traditional identity as the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party. It explores potential tensions between party control and military professionalism, evolving civil-military relations, and the broader implications for regional stability and U.S. security interests. Ultimately, modernization is framed as a high-stakes gamble: it could yield a more disciplined and stabilizing force—or foster nationalism, political friction, and increased strategic risk in the Asia-Pacific.

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  Resolving Korea’s Nuclear Crisis: Tough Choices for China

  Howard M. Krawitz

  This Strategic Forum paper analyzes China’s complex strategic calculus in addressing North Korea’s nuclear crisis. While the United States views Pyongyang’s nuclear program as an immediate proliferation and alliance threat, Beijing approaches the crisis through a broader lens shaped by regional stability, regime survival concerns, historical ties, domestic political sensitivities, and great-power rivalry with Washington. The author examines China’s limited leverage over North Korea, the risks of economic sanctions or regime collapse, refugee flows into Northeast China, and the potential for regional nuclear proliferation involving Japan or Taiwan. The paper argues that Beijing is likely to pursue a multilateral diplomatic approach that enhances Chinese influence while minimizing political risk and avoiding overt alignment with U.S. coercive strategies. Ultimately, China’s choices remain constrained by Pyongyang’s unpredictability and by Beijing’s desire to preserve regional stability and its international image.

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  Transformation and the Defense Industrial Base: A New Model

  Robbin F. Laird

  American force transformation is about building a new expeditionary model with flexible, modular forces that can be managed on a global basis to protect U.S. interests. Breaking the tyranny of geography on military forces is a key aspect to change.

  Transformation represents a shift in the demand side of the defense industrial business to provide for these new capabilities. The Department of Defense (DOD) is seeking system-of-systems management to deliver capabilities to the services and for joint military operations. This represents a shift from the past emphasis upon platforms and a primary focus upon service-specific technologies and programs.

  As the demand side of the equation has shifted, so has the supply side. Defense consolidation in the 1990s dealt with scarcity; now the newly emerged mega-primes are asked to play the role of lead systems integrators (LSIs) or system-of-systems managers to deliver capability to DOD for transformed operations.

  DOD moved to a different way of doing business before the transformation effort emerged as a core priority. Now that the transformation agenda is dominating the shift in the relationship between industry and government, working through LSI roles in shaping capabilities-based procurement will be especially important.

  Additionally, the new LSI and system-of-systems management model is shaping a new approach to allies. The new model can allow industry to shape new capabilities on a transatlantic basis. Rather than the old export-after-production model, the new LSI model, coupled with a transformation emphasis, leads to the shaping of new opportunities for developing capabilities before core series production decisions would be taken.

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  Building an Iraqi Defense Force

  Joseph McMillan

  This Strategic Forum paper analyzes the challenges of reconstructing Iraq’s armed forces following the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The author argues that rebuilding Iraq’s military must prioritize constitutional civilian control, professional military education, ethnic and sectarian inclusivity, and a defensively oriented force posture over rapid modernization or adoption of U.S. military models. Drawing on Iraq’s history of politicized civil-military relations and internal repression, the paper emphasizes the need to reform officer selection, integrate or demobilize militias, and establish parliamentary oversight mechanisms to prevent the armed forces from reemerging as instruments of domestic control or regional aggression. The study recommends a conscription-based force of approximately 350,000 personnel structured for territorial defense rather than power projection. Ultimately, it concludes that building a stable Iraqi nation-state must take precedence over building a powerful military.

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  NATO Decisionmaking: Au Revoir to the Consensus Rule?

  Leo G. Michel

  This Strategic Forum paper examines growing debates within NATO over the viability of the Alliance’s long-standing consensus rule for decisionmaking, particularly in light of enlargement and disagreements surrounding the Iraq War. The author analyzes how the consensus principle has shaped NATO’s political cohesion, operational planning, and crisis response, drawing on case studies including Kosovo, post–September 11 actions, and the February 2003 dispute over defensive planning for Turkey. While acknowledging frustrations with consensus procedures, the paper argues that the rule reflects NATO’s character as an alliance of sovereign states and remains central to its legitimacy and cohesion. It evaluates potential reforms—such as enhanced contingency planning authority, coalition-of-the-willing mechanisms within NATO, and modified voting procedures—and concludes that targeted procedural adjustments, rather than abandoning consensus, offer the most viable path forward.