Policy Briefs

Printing is not supported at the primary Gallery Thumbnail page. Please first navigate to a specific Image before printing.

Switch View to Grid View Slideshow

Visions of Order: Japan and China in U.S. Strategy

James J. Przystup and Phillip C. Saunders

The search for order has long challenged diplomats and statesmen. Today’s liberal international economic and political order has evolved out of a century of conflict, revolution, and war into a pattern of interestbased cooperation among the world’s great powers. The international system, however, is not a self-regulating mechanism; maintenance of order, once established, requires the active and full participation of major powers with high stakes in the effective functioning of the system.
China, Russia and the Balance of Power in Central Asia

Eugene B. Rumer

Since the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) called upon the United States to commit to withdraw its military personnel from Central Asia at its July 2005 summit, the SCO has acquired the reputation as a significant obstacle to U.S. policy. However, this reputation obscures the real state of affairs. Notwithstanding press reports about the challenge posed by the SCO to U.S. policy in Central Asia, a close look at the organization, the behavior of its members, their motivations, and the practical impact of their declarations suggests that the SCO’s challenge to U.S. interests and policies in Central Asia is less than meets the eye.
Countering Terrorism Across the Atlantic?

Kimberley L. Thachuk

Differences in strategic vision and concepts of security are central to the U.S. and European Union (EU) approaches to counterterrorism. While the United States conceives of a war against terrorism, Europe does not. As a result of different perceptions of the threat, both sides of the Atlantic take divergent approaches to homeland security. Europeans tend to favor the use of a law enforcement strategy over a warfighting approach. Meanwhile, the U.S. administration believes that a quasi-militaristic, overtly proactive, and highly vigilant stance will serve as the best deterrent to future attacks. By their own standards, Europeans are doing more to counter terrorism since September 11 and even more since the attacks in Madrid (March 11, 2004) and in London (July 7, 2005); by U.S. standards, these measures sometimes appear inadequate. As a result, there are significant transatlantic divergences on the best methods for halting the spread of terrorism.

The way ahead in an EU–U.S. counterterrorism relationship may be to focus on positive areas such as capacity building, anticorruption measures, and strengthening multilateral agreements. Further, the key to apprehending—or at least interrupting—terrorist conspiracies may well lie in cooperating on the law enforcement side to apprehend and incarcerate terrorists for criminal activity. The United States may have to be satisfied when terrorists are brought to justice for organized criminal activity in EU states. While this does not hold the same political weight as convictions for terrorism, the result may be fewer acts of terrorism. Perhaps the greatest task for the transatlantic counterterrorism partnership is to renew the sense of urgency for cooperation in areas where the United States and EU countries do agree.
Restructuring Special Operations Forces for Emerging Threats

David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb

Special Operations Forces (SOF) are vital for combating terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. SOF prominence in these missions has only grown since September 11, 2001, when the Nation realized its unprecedented power did not shield it from devastating unconventional attacks. While SOF are consumed by their operations in the war on terror, national leaders need to acknowledge neither Washington nor U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is organized for optimal use of SOF.
Constabulary Forces and Postconflict Transition: The Euro-Atlantic Dimension

David T. Armitage Jr. and Anne M. Moisan

Since the early 1990s, multinational stabilization efforts in the wake of conflicts or major natural disasters have repeatedly encountered problems in filling the so-called security gap. In places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, outside interveners have faced a compelling need to use specialized capabilities that can fill the gap between the point where military operations—whether for combat, peacekeeping, or counterinsurgency—leave off and community-based policing activities pick up. In particular, ensuring a capacity to manage and defuse civil disturbances and other threats to public order has become a sine qua non for overall mission success.¹
A New Military Framework for NATO

Hans Binnendijk, David C. Gompert, and Richard L. Kugler

Although Americans and Europeans do not always agree on political strategies in the Middle East, they have a compelling reason to reach an accord on the need to strengthen North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military forces for future operations in that region and elsewhere. If adequate military capabilities are lacking, the Alliance will not be able to act even when its political leaders agree on the need to do so. But if it creates such capabilities, it will be able to act either ad hoc or across the board if a common political strategy eventually were to emerge.

This article proposes a new and comprehensive military framework to help guide NATO improvements in the years ahead. This framework envisions a pyramid-like structure of future NATO forces and capabilities in five critical areas: a new NATO Special Operations Force, the NATO Response Force, high-readiness combat forces, stabilization and reconstruction forces, and assets for defense sector development. The United States would provide one-third of the necessary forces, and Europe would be responsible for the other two-thirds. For the Europeans, creating these forces and capabilities is a viable proposition because they require commitment of only 10 percent of their active military manpower, plus investments in such affordable assets as information networks, smart munitions, commercial lift, logistics support, and other enablers. If NATO succeeds in creating these forces for power projection and expeditionary missions, it will possess a broad portfolio of assets for a full spectrum of operations against such threats as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and cross-border aggression.
The Changing Landscape of Defense Innovation

Paul Bracken, Linda Brandt, and Stuart E. Johnson

In a rapidly evolving business environment, many successful companies have transformed themselves by reexamining their core missions and competencies and exploiting innovation in nontraditional ways. General Electric still manufactures products but now identifies itself as a services company. Wal-Mart has become the premier retailer by capitalizing on its logistics and support systems. These two giants and other companies have realized that they can become more profitable by exploiting new regions of the business landscape.

Applying this business model to national defense, the innovation landscape can be said to have three regions: products (airplanes, tanks, ships), processes (integrated systems), and retrofits of legacy systems. While the Department of Defense (DOD) is not a commercial enterprise, nor can it change its critical missions as a private firm might do, it, too, operates in a dynamic environment and should be in a continual process of transformation to adjust to and exploit change. Achieving the right balance of effort in these three regions will pay handsome dividends.

Until recently, DOD has invested most heavily in region one, the acquisition of new hardware based on new technologies. Already expensive to acquire, new hardware is even costlier because of its added complexity and need for extensive contractor support. To increase value realized from defense investments, the authors recommend shifting some resources to regions two and three. Creating a framework for exploiting process and retrofit innovation would provide significant increases in capabilities while facilitating successful integration of new product technologies into the existing infrastructure.
Russia and NATO: Increased Interaction in Defense Research and Technology

Donald C. Daniel and Michael I. Yarymovych

As a member of both the Partnership for Peace and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)–Russia Council (NRC), Russia enjoys remarkable status in an alliance formed principally to counter Soviet aggression. Active participation in one additional element of NATO—the Research and Technology Organization (RTO)—would offer unique opportunities to enhance relationships and mutual security. The RTO is the largest organization of its type in the world, has an extremely active program of work, and is eager to work with Russia.

Enhanced cooperation between NATO and Russia in defense-related research and technology would not be easy. Mistrust is an obstacle, as is difficulty communicating in English and French, the official NATO languages. Also, Russian economic weakness impedes consistent participation, particularly in events outside Russia.

NATO could reach out to Russia, offering sequential, specific opportunities and limited funding. These opportunities could include involving young Russian scientists and engineers in selected, defense-related research and technology projects; having a special ad hoc senior executive group identify a small number of flagship activities and report on progress to the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors, the Military Committee, and the NRC; and inviting a few mid-level scientists, engineers, or technical managers to work directly with RTO staff in Paris, where they could assist in defining and providing support for specific elements of the RTO program of work.

If NATO vectors toward Russia in this way, Russia must respond by vectoring toward the Alliance. The key here is a more consistent and cooperative representation by Russia in the forums that are available to it. Russian representatives must also become more fluent in English and French to achieve meaningful dialogue. This is especially true at the technical, senior executive levels. Finally, Russia must respond promptly to these initiatives. The opportunities are there. Now is the time.
U.S.-Australia Alliance Relations: An Australian View

Paul Dibb

Australia is America’s oldest friend and ally in the Asia-Pacific region. The two countries fought alongside each other in World War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam, the 1991 Gulf War, and most recently in Afghanistan and Iraq. The closeness of the two nations today is without precedent in the history of the relationship. Australia is now America’s second closest ally in the world, after the United Kingdom.
Sustaining U.S.-European Global Security Cooperation

Stephen J. Flanagan

Many on both sides of the Atlantic hope that European-American relations will resume a more civil and cooperative course in the aftermath of differences over Iraq. President George W. Bush’s visit to Europe in February 2005 and subsequent initiatives suggest that restoring transatlantic security cooperation will be a priority of the administration. Given the acrimony in official exchanges and the vilification in popular media over the past 2 years, not to mention lingering differences over strategy and policy, the wounds will not heal quickly. If both sides take steps to enhance consultations and are willing to make policy adjustments, however, there is hope for fashioning complementary and even some common European and American approaches to critical transatlantic and global security issues.
Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation

T.X. Hammes

On May 1, 2003, President George W. Bush declared the end of major combat in Iraq. While most Americans rejoiced at this announcement, students of history understood that it simply meant the easy part was over. In the following months, peace did not break out, and the troops did not come home. In fact, Iraqi insurgents have struck back hard. Instead of peace, each day Americans read about the death of another soldier, the detonation of deadly car bombs, the assassination of civilians, and Iraqi unrest.
Sweden’s Use of Commercial Information Technology for Military Applications

Franklin D. Kramer and John C. Cittadino

Sweden, a nation of only 9 million people with a political climate that has fostered a posture of nonalignment for over half a century, has nevertheless maintained highly credible, modern, and high-technology military forces. Sweden has expanded the mission of forces originally designed for the Cold War to include international peacekeeping. The focus of this study is the Swedish formula for achieving the high-technology military capabilities that successfully compensate for a small standing force. What policies and processes enabled the Swedish military to take advantage of leading-edge producers of commercial information technology (CIT)? What lessons does the Swedish model hold for the U.S. Department of Defense?

A National Defense University case study examined the Swedish experience, policy, process, and government-industry relationships to determine ways to improve America’s ability to capitalize on the use of CIT in military systems. The case study included a review of published Swedish policies, regulations, and reports but is based predominantly on meetings and interviews with Swedish industry and government officials.

The case study found more similarities than differences in Swedish and American policies and processes for acquiring commercial technology for military systems. Perhaps the most significant difference is that in Sweden, government and industry participants in the acquisition process have embraced the policy for maximum utilization of CIT, whereas Americans still debate whether commercial technology can do the job in warfighter or other defense applications. Furthermore, Sweden has initiated an acquisition process that routinely examines all requirements to determine the potential to do the job with CIT and then performs tradeoff analyses to determine acceptance.
The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Toward an Equitable and Durable Solution

Aaron David Miller

In any discussion of U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli issue, honest debate and clarity are essential. During my nearly 25 years of advising 6 U.S. secretaries of state on Arab-Israeli negotiations, 3 basic propositions have been relevant throughout, including during these last 4 years when everything that right-thinking Arabs, Israelis, and Americans worked to achieve seemed to be battered down or broken.
Needed—A NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Force

Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler

At the Istanbul Summit in June 2004 , NATO endorsed the further transformation of military capabilities to make them “more modern, more usable, and more deployable to carry out the full range of Alliance missions.” The Istanbul Communiqué especially called for continuing progress on the NATO Response Force and the Prague Capabilities Commitments.

To accomplish this, NATO needs a new initiative for its defense agenda: creation of better forces and capabilities for stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations outside Europe, including the greater Middle East. The real challenge is to reorganize, refocus, and rebalance current assets so that NATO can respond promptly and effectively to future contingencies. This challenge can be met by creating a NATO S&R Force (SRF). This force would be a logical complement to the NATO Response Force , but would be structured differently. Instead of a small standing joint force, the SRF would consist of flexible and modular national forces totaling one or two division-equivalents, mostly ground forces, that could be assembled to generate the necessary mix of capabilities for S&R operations. In this new NATO defense concept, the combination of the NATO Response Force for rapid, forcible-entry missions, the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps or other High Readiness Forces for major combat operations under a combined joint task force, and an SRF would provide a full-spectrum capability for the new strategic environment. NATO adoption of this three-pillar posture will constitute a major step toward preparing for future responsibilities.
Deploying Missile Defense: Major Operational Challenges

M. Elaine Bunn

If all goes according to plan, by the end of 2004, the United States will deploy eight ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) interceptors¹ in Alaska and California, along with land-, sea-, and space-based sensors and the command and control systems to support the interceptors. By the end of 2005, 12 more GMD interceptors will be added, along with additional sensors and interceptor missiles on Navy ships.
Shaping U.S. Policy on Africa: Pillars of a New Strategy

Johnnie Carson

In the four decades since most African states achieved independence, the continent has never been a foreign policy priority for the United States. During the early years of American engagement with Africa, Washington focused its attention on preventing communist countries from gaining major military bases or monopolistic concessions over any of the continent’s important strategic minerals. Although the United States provided large amounts of development assistance and food aid to a number of African states, most American interest and support was directed toward African countries and leaders who were regarded as Cold War allies. In those countries still struggling for independence, the United States usually supported African insurgents who were pro-Western and anticommunist in their orientation. In South Africa and Namibia, Washington generally professed great sympathy for eventual majority rule and independence but largely supported the status quo out of fear that liberation groups allied with the Soviet Union or China would win power in any political transition.
NATO Technology: from Gap to Divergence?

Donald C. Daniel

A widening technology gap between the United States and other NATO members will challenge the ability of NATO to function as a cohesive, multinational force. Over several decades, great disparities in the funding of defense research and technology by NATO members has produced a widening technological gap that threatens to become a divergence—a condition from which the Alliance may not be able to recover. The technology gap, in turn, is creating a capabilities gap that undercuts the operational effectiveness of NATO forces, including the new NATO Response Force.

With only slight modifications (not additions) to current total defense expenditures, and using funds that will be available as they restructure their forces, European members could not only double their current investment but take significant strides to ensure that they are not left behind in a world dominated by technology.

In addition, and of equal importance, the United States must share more of its fundamental basic and applied research with NATO partners, take a greater role of leadership in NATO’s Research and Technology Organization(RTO), and increase participation across all technical areas in the RTO. These primary actions, coupled with other actions by all NATO nations and the Allied Command Transformation, offer the potential to dramatically improve a situation that very much needs immediate attention. It is a relatively straightforward matter now. NATO has both a capabilities gap and a technology gap. Immediate attention to the latter, with a commitment by every NATO nation to invest three percent of its military budget in research and technology, may, over time, significantly reduce the capability gap.
Japan’s Constitution and Defense Policy: Entering a New Era?

Rust Deming

Japan’s postwar defense policy was set by the 1947 constitution. Early in the occupation, General Douglas MacArthur and his staff concluded that the 19th-century Meiji constitution needed to be revised or entirely replaced if Japan were to become a true democracy, with the Emperor removed from any political role. In January 1946, convinced that the elitist and authoritarian Japanese establishment was incapable of producing a democratic constitution, MacArthur ordered his staff to produce a draft. One week later, an entirely rewritten constitution emerged and was presented to the Japanese. Included in the draft was Article IX:

War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. The threat or use of force is forever renounced as a means of settling disputes with any other nation. No Army, Navy, Air Force, or other war potential will ever be authorized and no right of belligerency will ever be conferred upon the state.¹
Global Networks: Emerging Constraints on Strategy

Bob Fonow

If current trends in communications technologies and services persist, the United States will be hard pressed to keep a strategic advantage in network capability. The international telecommunications system is rebalancing into four major centers of influence and innovation. Within ten years, Europe, India, and China will have the same technological and innovative capabilities in telecommunications as the United States. This shift is problematic for U.S. national security, because the global telecommunications infrastructure is becoming an important strategic battlespace—the physical battlefield of information warfare. Understanding the dynamic of regional balancing is critical to shaping U.S. responses

Underscoring this dynamic is a shift from hierarchical science and technology development based on U.S. educational dominance to globally distributed centers of technological development facilitated by the international telecommunications network.

This article assesses the changing geopolitical structure of the international telecommunications system and analyzes the problems and opportunities for the United States in a vastly different telecommunications environment. Much of the writing on U.S. network-centric warfare and information warfare capabilities reflects unbounded enthusiasm, with little emphasis on vulnerabilities and the capabilities of potential adversaries. A thoughtful evaluation of new strategic constraints is imperative.
Military Transformation and Joint Experimentation: Two Views from Above

Harold W. Gehman Jr. and James M. Dubik

Military transformation— “a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations”— is on the minds and agendas of everyone dealing with the military. Many people talk about transformation; the two authors of this Defense Horizons have done something about it. In fact, they are among the few who have been responsible for shaping and implementing the concept. To get a better idea of what goes into this process, particularly the element of joint experimentation that is helping to identify and define the nature of change, Defense Horizons presents the views of two of America’s leading military officers who have been involved in the process.

Admiral Harold Gehman, the last commander of Atlantic Command (before it became Joint Forces Command, or JFCOM) and initiator of the Joint Experimentation Directorate, presents a framework for how experimentation can advance the goals of transformation and clarifies terms and relates them to the tasks at hand. He also considers the role of the joint experimentation process, uses historical analogies to identify the prerequisites for successful transformation, and gives examples of where earlier attempts have failed and why. Finally, he shows how joint experimentation can help achieve success in our current efforts by minimizing conditions that have brought about failure in the past.

Moving from the theoretical basis established by Admiral Gehman to practice, Major General James Dubik, Director of the JFCOM Joint Experimentation Directorate, describes how the Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Campaign is an important catalyst for transforming military capability. He describes the “two-path strategy to innovation” being employed, involving Joint Prototypes and Joint Concepts and actionable recommendations. He leads the reader through how this process is working today to achieve transformation.
Eliminating Adversary WMD: Lessons for Future Conflicts

Rebecca K.C. Hersman and Todd M. Koca

As tensions between Iraq and the United States worsened in mid-to-late 2002 and as preparations began for Operation Iraqi Freedom, policymakers and military planners began to wrestle with the challenges posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Indeed, Iraqi defiance and deception in the face of United Nations (UN) sanctions, coupled with growing fears of WMD transfer to terrorist organizations—most prominently al Qaeda—were two primary reasons for confronting Saddam Hussein. Just as in the first Gulf War in 1991, deterring and defending against possible Iraqi use of WMD against coalition forces were key concerns for planners. However, as the crisis escalated in 2002, Department of Defense (DOD) planners began to foresee another challenge: how to remove comprehensively and permanently the threat of Iraqi WMD, not just to U.S. troops but also to the Middle East region and the world.
XVIII Airborne Corps: Spearhead of Military Transformation

Douglas A. Macgregor

War transforms armies. Combat accelerates transformation by moving it out of the realm of academic debate and endless speculation about the future to a pragmatic approach focused on fielding new capabilities within new combat formations as soon as possible. In war, transformation means conserving equipment and operational methods that are still relevant while incorporating new technologies, tactics, and organizations that enable victory. It is nearly impossible to replicate in peacetime training the true conditions of land warfare—ambiguity, uncertainty, and above all terror, killing, and exhaustion. For the Army, the best opportunity to transform involves parallel evolution, a method that moves new technologies into combat formations today and explores what the troops will actually do with them in action. With a conflict in progress, this approach is better than trying to predict future uses in an inflexible operational requirements document developed in isolation from the field environment.

Joint, expeditionary warfare demands agile land, sea, and air forces linked by more than simply networked sensors and communication. Brain-to-brain connectivity animated by a cultural predisposition to deploy and fight anywhere on short notice akin to the special operations mindset is equally vital to transformation. Additionally, routine joint training and operations within a joint rotational readiness system are essential to readiness for joint expeditionary warfare. In the new come-as-you-are strategic environment, Army mission-focused force packages must bring the Joint Force Commander the capabilities he needs, whether they be theater missile defense or survivable, mobile, armored fighting vehicles that deliver accurate, devastating firepower.

XVIII Airborne Corps seems ideally positioned to spearhead Army transformation. Scaling, equipping, and organizing existing XVIII Airborne Corps forces for integration as specialized modules of combat power into plug-and-play joint command and control structures, such as the notional Standing Joint Force Headquarters, gives the Army an unprecedented opportunity to pursue new directions in adaptive force design.
Alternative Approaches to Army Transformation

Joseph N. Mait and Richard L. Kugler

Army transformation is an attempt to provide future forces with enhanced capabilities in lethality, survivability, and mobility, both strategic and tactical. Alternatives to achieving these goals differ in emphasis on weight and reliance on technology. That is, transformation plans differ if the objective is weight reduction as opposed to weight redistribution. In one approach, platform weight is reduced to meet mobility goals. However, shedding weight has implications for platform survivability and lethality; previous attempts to design a single platform that is simultaneously lethal, mobile, and survivable have not done so satisfactorily. Thus, advances in materials are required to insure the survivability of a lightweight platform. Advances in network technology are also required to make the platform more aware of its environment. The immaturity of these technologies increases the risks inherent in transformation based strictly on platform characteristics.

In contrast, weight redistribution considers parameters other than platform weight and networks to meet Army goals. Indeed, due to the weight of support assets, replacing all combat platforms with 20-ton vehicles reduces only marginally the overall weight of a division and corps. An alternative approach to transformation restructures Army forces into small, modular units, pre-positioned across the globe, and deployed in a timesequential manner. This approach, with its reduced dependency on technology, is a practical near-term alternative and should be pursued in parallel with technology development.
Defense Laboratories and Military Capability: Headed for a BRACdown?

Michael L. Marshall

For 150 years, military laboratories have made vital contributions to national defense. In recent years, they have been significantly reduced in number by several rounds of base realignment and closure (BRAC). Even so, they remain the primary source of internal technical competence within the Department of Defense (DOD). Their capability in that role will depend on how DOD answers two questions. Is there excess laboratory capacity—too many laboratories relative to forecasts of future force structure? What is their military value—their likely contribution to the future operational needs of warfighters.

As required by law, DOD has publicly announced the criteria it will use in making BRAC 2005 decisions. None directly acknowledge the military value of research and development (R&D). Consequently, excess capacity and military value judgments about the labs will depend on metrics now being formulated and the subjective weights they are assigned in computations. This calculus will place greater weight on options that allow DOD to combine separate but similar functions, such as R&D, on single bases. This emphasis on jointness could lead to such recommendations as a single defense research laboratory or to approaches that would parse the current technical work of the labs into a number of bins and then assign responsibility for each to a single service. Experience suggests that reliance on overly simplified “closure-by-arithmetic” decisions could lead to serious mistakes in deciding which laboratories to close and which to keep. America’s ability to wage high-tech warfare depends on avoiding such mistakes.
The Science and Engineering Workforce and National Security

Michael L. Marshall, Timothy Coffey, Fred E. Saalfeld, and Rita R. Colwell

Trends in the American science and engineering (S&E) workforce and national research and development (R&D) funding patterns and priorities have troubling implications for the economic and national security of our nation. Especially worrisome are:
- A general lack of interest among American-born youth, especially women and minorities, in pursuing education in the physical sciences, mathematics, environmental sciences, and engineering at the undergraduate and graduate levels;
- A rapidly accelerating accumulation of intellectual capital, including an educated S&E workforce, in China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan;
- A long-term decline in the overall Federal investment in R&D as a percentage of gross domestic product, especially among the physical sciences and engineering; and
- Reduced Department of Defense funding for research throughout the 1990s, a trend that has exacerbated the general decline in the physical sciences and engineering, despite the importance of these fields to the development of new military capabilities.