Policy Briefs

Printing is not supported at the primary Gallery Thumbnail page. Please first navigate to a specific Image before printing.

Switch View to Grid View Slideshow

Central Asian Leadership Succession: When, Not If

Eugene B. Rumer

The Central Asian political landscape yields few signs of an impending storm in the near term. The absence of threats to the status quo, however, does not mean that it is accept- able or that it represents a stable political equilibrium in the region. Leadership succession in Central Asia bears watching for several reasons:
- as a precedent-setting process, it will provide the key missing element for the emerging political structures of the Central Asian states
- the tenure of the next generation will either make up for the shortcomings of its predecessors or aggravate them
- in the event of the latter, the stage will be set in Central Asia for more radical changes that could reverberate far beyond remote regional boundaries.
Finding a Kashmir Settlement: The Burden of Leadership

Teresita C. Schaffer

The combined talents of the people of India and Pakistan, with the fitful help of a long list of others, have been trying for over 50 years to resolve the Kashmir issue. This essay offers no ready-made answers but rather suggestions on where to begin to look for them. Experience with other recent peace processes teaches valuable lessons about how would-be peacemakers need to approach their task and the ways in which third parties can help.
The ROK–U.S. Alliance: Where Is It Headed?

Kim Dong Shin

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002) provides an important framework from which to examine the current crisis on the Korean Peninsula and other challenges in Northeast Asia. With its focus on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD), this strategy is concerned with North Korea as much as, if not more than, any other state. In particular, North Korea poses a unique set of challenges in regard to WMD. North Korea stands in sharp contrast to the Republic of Korea (ROK) on issues such as human rights, democracy, and market economies. The National Security Strategy suggests that the United States should revitalize its alliance with South Korea, while encourag- ing North Korea to transform its political and economic system. Yet South Korea and the United States are currently having some difficulties in developing a consensus on how to approach Pyongyang, and appear to have no clear plan to operationalize the strategy to deal. with North Korea.
Technology, Transformation, and New Operational Concepts

Elihu Zimet, Robert E. Armstrong, Donald C. Daniel, and Joseph N. Mait

Throughout history, technology has been central to warfare, often giving qualitative advantages to numerically inferior forces. Typically, the rate of technology development has been relatively slow and the introduction of new weapons systems even slower, which has allowed evolutionary development of operational concepts. Today’s accelerated pace of technology development no longer allows sequential development of operational concepts. In addition, the current global political environment has placed demands upon the military that range from engaging in major regional conflicts to stabilization, reconstruction and peacekeeping, all creating a continuous need for flexible, adaptive systems and new concepts of operation.

The first purpose of this paper is to describe principal new developments in technology in the framework of how they can improve operational effectiveness in the uncertain world of the 21st century. The technologies are presented generically rather than by system, because a broader and more generic technology base is required to meet evolving opportunities. A second purpose is to examine the related issue of technology development and acquisition. Expectations for the rapid introduction of technologies that promote transformation must be tempered by the military requirement for continuous capability, even as new systems and operational concepts are introduced. Finally, although the United States leads the world in the development of military systems, the foundational military science and technology base shows signs of erosion. This erosion must be arrested if American military superiority is to be maintained.
From Petro to Agro: Seeds of a New Economy

Robert E. Armstrong

Winston Churchill is said to have stopped predicting future events because the future was just “one damned thing after another.” Nonetheless, we need to keep an eye on the future and speculate as to what the next damned thing might be. One candidate is the changing raw material base for the economy.

Today, the hydrocarbon molecule is the basic unit of commerce. In a biobased economy, genes will replace petroleum. So, just as we currently demand assured access to sources of hydrocarbon molecules (oil), in the near future we will demand assured access to a broad-based, diverse supply of genes (plants and animals). This shift has security implications. Relations with oil-rich countries will be of less importance, and relations with gene-rich states—mostly the biodiverse regions along the equator— will assume greater significance. Conflicts may arise between gene-rich, technology-poor countries that control the basic raw materials of a biobased economy and gene-poor, technology- rich nations that control the production methods.

American instruments of power will be challenged to meet the demands of a biobased economy. We already see diplomatic challenges with the United Nations Framework Convention on Biological Diversity and controversy with Europe over genetically modified crops. Informational and economic challenges and opportunities will likewise appear. It may be challenging for U.S. land forces, especially the Army, to meet the demands of securing access to large supplies of new genetic material.

Agriculture will become increasingly important as a part of the Nation’s industrial base, as it offers the most economical way to produce large quantities of biological materials. Homeland defense will have to consider heartland defense, as agricultural fields will assume the same significance as oil fields.
Nonlethal Capabilities: Realizing the Opportunities

E.R. Bedard

The use of lethal force has not always been appropriate to handle situations that the U.S. military has faced in the post-Cold War world. Nonlethal weapons offer a precision, accuracy, and effective duration that can help save military and civilian lives, break the cycle of violence by offering a more graduated response, and even prevent violence from occurring if the opportunity for early or preclusionary engagement arises.

Fully exploiting nonlethal capabilities will require the refinement of existing technologies and the creation of new technologies. The effectiveness of the capabilities must be sufficiently reliable and predictable to give commanders confidence in their employment. Because nonlethal capabilities are a fairly new concept to domestic and international publics, military and civilian decisionmakers must be educated about them.

As we step forward into the 21st century, we must look for new opportunities to leverage developing and emerging technologies that enable warfighting commanders to capitalize on the full spectrum of nonlethal capabilities. The value added will best be realized when we ensure that technology, operations, and policy are in balance, and the education of the American leadership, warfighters, and public is complete. These capabilities must become part of our daily lexicon.
The Virtual Border: Countering Seaborne Container Terrorism

Hans Binnendijk, Leigh C. Caraher, Timothy Coffey, and H. Scott Wynfield

America’s potential vulnerability to terrorist attack through exploitation of the global trade and transportation system is now widely recognized. The sheer magnitude and diversity of this global system coupled with the permeability of U.S. borders afford numerous avenues to attack American targets. Maritime commerce, and container shipping in particular, provides a highly attractive means not only of delivering weapons but also of smuggling terrorists themselves into the American homeland. Thousands of ships from every part of the globe deliver millions of individual containers to American ports each year. Compounding the problem is an inspection process that has been slow to shift from more traditional practices, such as the search for illegal narcotics, to the search for terrorist weapons. This situation stems in part from a lack of information specifying cargo contents, complicating U.S. Customs Service efforts to identify high-risk containers for inspection upon arrival, and from the commercially driven need to move trade goods rapidly through the transportation system. The problem does not end at the American shoreline, however. The intermodal transportation network, encompassing sea, land, and rail linkages, represents a vast conduit that could be exploited for an attack on not only port facilities and marine terminals but also inland population centers and shore infrastructure. By using global positioning system technology, terrorists may achieve precision targeting capabilities and create a “poor man’s” intercontinental ballistic missile from a container.
Toward Missile Defenses from the Sea

Hans Binnendijk and George Stewart

Developments of the past 18 months have created new possibilities for the sea basing of national defenses against intercontinental ballistic missiles. Some conceivable designs would enhance U.S. prospects for defeating a rogue state missile attack on the United States and its allies, but other deployments could undermine the Nation’s strategic stability with Russia and China. The most efficacious architecture from both a technical and strategic perspective would include a U.S. Navy boost-phase intercept program and some sea-based radar. Given the complications of using existing Aegis ships for the missile defense mission, the Navy should consider constructing a separate ship designed solely for this purpose.
The Emergence of Mini UAVs for Military Applications

Timothy Coffey and John A. Montgomery

The successes of the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in Afghanistan most likely will accelerate the introduction of UAVs into the military force structure. What emerged in Afghanistan was a tiered observation-detection-targeting system consisting of spacecraft, the Global Hawk UAV, the Predator UAV, and often a spotter on the ground. However, in complex terrain, as in Afghanistan, and in urban situations, airborne assets may be needed much closer to the ground. A low-altitude tier of UAVs—mini UAVs—could serve such a purpose.

This paper provides a basic understanding of the aerodynamic scaling of mini UAVs and a sense of how their capabilities could be matched with specific missions. Mini UAVs have substantial limitations, but the low radar cross section, low infrared signature, low acoustic signature, and birdlike appearance of these vehicles, combined with the remarkable capabilities of miniaturized payloads, make them contenders for certain missions and potential valuable tactical assets.
Colombia’s War: Toward a New Strategy

John A. Cope

Colombia’s new president, Alvaro Uribe, is confronting a protracted internal war and moving to assert national political authority. Hopes are being pinned on Uribe, the new “law and order” president who took office on August 7, 2002, with an overwhelming mandate to end violence, narcotics, and official corruption.
Computer Games and the Military: Two Views

J.C. Herz and Michael R. Macedonia

Simulations are a critical aspect of U.S. military training. Commercial computer games are a growing part of our entertainment industry. The two fields have much in common, and the military can learn from the successful experience of the commercial sector. J.C. Herz provides an industry look at gaming technology and culture and suggests ways in which commercial experience can be applied to the military. Michael Macedonia responds to Herz’s analysis and provides a military gamer’s perspective on computer games and the military.

Despite their common antecedents, the commercial gaming and defense simulation industries have developed differently since the 1970s. Once much smaller and weaker, commercial computer gaming has grown into a $7 billion industry and has outpaced military simulations in terms of technology and innovation. Herz attributes this growth to user-driven innovation in software design and the social ecology driving online multiplayer games. The commercial gaming industry encourages player innovation by soliciting feedback in the design and development phases of new products and by incorporating player modifications into the next iterations of established products. User-driven innovation is successful because it is inherent in the industry’s cultural infrastructure, which can leverage interpersonal dynamics of competition, collaboration, hunger for status and peer acknowledgement, and tendency to cluster. This social ecology that drives online multiplayer games invests players in games and compels them to play. As the military attempts to incorporate information technologies into simulation, Herz suggests that it will require not only hardware and software infrastructure but also the cultural infrastructure to leverage these resources.

Macedonia recognizes the role that the commercial game industry has played in military simulations over the past 25 years. The military has readily adopted commercial simulations for use in strategy and tactics games in school curricula and for developing individual and collective skills in unit training. These efforts have resulted in stimulating collaborative activities, either with military modifications of commercial games or commercial simulations developed for the military. The military further recognized the importance of commercial entertainment technology with the creation of the Institute of Creative Technology, which brings together the defense and commercial industries to produce a revolution in how the military trains and rehearses for upcoming missions and to prepare for the challenges of the 21st century.
China’s Trade Opening: Implications for Regional Stability

Howard M. Krawitz

In late 2001, China entered the World Trade Organization (WTO), a dramatic step that marks not only the end of a 15-year odyssey for Beijing but also the beginning of a new phase in the country’s internal development and its relations with the outside world. It may sound odd to suggest that joining the WTO—an organization focused on rules of conduct for trade and commerce—will influence not only China’s economy but also its political, military, and social development, as well as its interaction with the United States. Yet China’s efforts to play by WTO rules could affect its internal development far more extensively than has been the case with many new member nations.
Dissuasion as a Strategic Concept

Richard L. Kugler

Some analysts want to downplay dissuasion or set it aside entirely because of its ambiguity. But ignoring this emerging idea would be short sighted. Despite its haziness, the term goes to the heart of new-era geopolitics in several key regions, including Asia. If the United States can learn how to dissuade skillfully, its strategic effectiveness in troubled regions will improve significantly. When the idea of deterrence first appeared 50 years ago, it too was ambiguous. During the Cold War, however, it acquired a role of central importance once it was equipped with a full-fledged strategic theory. The same may hold true for dissuasion in the early 21st century—but only if it too is equipped with the full set of analyses and calculations needed to bring it to life.
Global Trade: America’s Achilles’ Heel

James M. Loy and Robert G. Ross

Much has been written in the aftermath of September 11 on the porosity of America’s borders and the failure of various agencies to share, fuse, analyze, and exploit available information to stop foreign threats before they enter the country. The resources and methods available to U.S. border control agencies appear to be no match for the myriad threats that could arrive from outside the country. Nowhere is the gap between vulnerability and capability greater than along the Nation’s sea borders. Asymmetrical military and terrorist threats have a natural gateway into America via the marine transportation system.

In the uncertainty following the September attacks, the immediate response of security services around the country—the Coast Guard included—was to shut down the systems under their control until measures were taken to ensure that additional attacks were not already in progress. These system stoppages were generally short-lived because the economic impacts were intolerable, not only in dollar costs but also in potential loss of access to the essentials of daily American life. The United States is a trading nation, both domestically and globally, and relatively unimpeded movement of goods and people is necessary for its economy to function. Transportation is our social and economic cardiovascular system, and ensuring its continuation is vital. The post-attack shutdowns were a tourniquet to control bleeding but had to be released quickly to preserve the patient.

Given the importance of international goods and materials to the American economy, closing our borders for more than a short period is infeasible. Furthermore, with our growing reliance on just-in-time delivery of foreign goods, even slowing the flow long enough to inspect either all or a statistically significant random selection of imports would be economically intolerable. However, the transportation system, especially the maritime component, remains highly vulnerable to attack or other exploitation by terrorists. Thus, a major challenge facing the responsible agencies in the post-September 11 “new normalcy” is to develop border controls and transportation security measures that reduce the threat of the national transportation system’s being used either as a weapon or as an essential logistic link in some other kind of attack.1 Moreover, we must develop ways to better protect the Nation without sacrificing economic vitality or overwhelming the Federal, state, local, and corporate budgets.

Information is the key. Our national ability to detect potential threats in or to transportation can be significantly improved through effective use of information that, to a great extent, is already available. With sufficient advance information on inbound ships, cargoes, crews, and passengers, the various border control agencies will be better able to separate the good from the bad and intercept the bad before it becomes a problem for the country. This notion—exploiting available information to discern threats and concentrate resources to stop them—is at the heart of the maritime domain awareness (MDA) concept.
Relevancy and Risk: The U.S. Army and FutureCombat Systems

Joseph N. Mait and Jon G. Grossman

In the post-Cold War geostrategic environment, the U.S. Army has been challenged to balance its ability to conduct a major theater war with its requirement to deploy to numerous smallscale conflicts. To realize the capabilities it needs, the Army has proposed a visionary transformation of light infantry and heavy armored forces into medium-weight forces capable of fighting the full spectrum of military conflicts. Key to this transformation is the development of the Future Combat Systems (FCS), which depends on substantial improvements in six critical technology areas: sensors, networks, robotics, survivability, lethality, and power sources.

In assessing these critical technologies, we found a wide range of estimates concerning the technologies’ maturity and applicability to FCS. Using open literature sources, we found that technology demonstrations in the six areas needed to support a milestone B decision (scheduled for 2003) could not occur until 2004 at the earliest or as late as 2010. Estimates for when the technologies could be ready for FCS low rate production varied from 2006 to 2015.

The uncertain maturity of these technologies does not mean that transformation is not technically feasible. Rather, innovative management of technical risk is required. We recommend developing initial versions of FCS for low-intensity conflicts and, as technologies mature, new versions for higher-intensity combat.
The Airborne Laser from Theory to Reality: An Insider’s Account

Hans Mark

Albert Einstein spent World War I in Berlin, where he developed a theory that described electromagnetic radiation in equilibrium with atoms that could emit and absorb radiation. The innovation in Einstein’s work, which was published in 1916 and 1917, was that he used the newly developed quantum theory to obtain his results. The most important result was not only that the atoms in the assembly could absorb and emit radiation spontaneously but also that atoms in certain excited states could be induced to emit radiation.¹ Einstein called this discovery the stimulated emission of radiation. Einstein’s discovery provided the basis for the development of lasers, though the phenomenon would not be observed in the laboratory for many years.
Small Security: Nanotechnology and Future Defense

John L. Petersen and Dennis M. Egan

Scientists believe that nanotechnology will soon give humans the ability to move and combine individual atoms and molecules into microscopically tiny mechanical, electrical, and biological “machines” that will replace many of today’s production processes and tools. Although current work is focused on materials, optics, and electronics, nanotechnology eventually will find applications throughout society. Advances in nanotechnology will feed back into conventional industry, which in turn will demand and promote further advances in nanotechnology in a cycle that is familiar from the silicon revolution of recent decades. This time, however, the cycle will operate more rapidly and produce even more far-reaching change. Computers based on nanotechnology will be smaller and more powerful and will accelerate advances in nanotechnology itself. Even without computers, nanotechnology will allow incorporation of a kind of intelligence into materials that will react to and influence their environment in complex and predictable ways, much as biological organisms do. Taken a step further, nanoscale robots, or nanobots, will be able to operate autonomously to inspect, mend, or destroy targeted substances. Biological nanobots will do the same operating on DNA instructions. Both types of nanobots will be able to replicate themselves.

Such revolutionary capabilities will produce change that can be predicted only in its magnitude, not its details. The Internet already assures the nearly instantaneous and universal dispersion of information; nanotechnology will extend and ramify the Web until it becomes an encompassing fog of interconnection that will take globalization to its extreme. Today, information and pollution have no national boundaries. Before many years, the same will be true of another of humanity’s constructs, nanotechnology.
Anticipating Strategic Surprise on the Korean Peninsula

James J. Przystup

Despite the current stagnation in South-North dialogue, relations between the Koreas have been subject to sudden shifts. In the warm afterglow of the historic June 2000 South-North Summit in Pyongyang, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung’s engagement policy appeared to have created a self-sustaining dynamic. Policymakers in Washington and Seoul scrambled to manage the potential diplomatic and security consequences of a rapid breakthrough in bilateral relations driven by presidential summitry.
Biological Weapons: Toward a Threat Reduction Strategy

Brad Roberts and Michael Moodie

A decade ago, the U.S. military and its allies had a close call with biological weapons (BW) in the war to expel Iraq from Kuwait. Iraqi BW could have inflicted horrific casualties on coalition forces, but the war stopped short of the contingency for which Iraq had prepared, predeployed, and preauthorized the use of such weapons: a march on Baghdad to remove the regime. A decade later, the United States is again poised for war against Iraq—this time for the explicit purpose of regime removal. Moreover, it is engaged in a war on terrorism against adversaries who evidently are strongly interested in BW. But the close call of a decade ago, and the concern it generated among senior Gulf War military leaders, do not appear to have translated into substantial improvements to the operational capability of current U.S. military forces to project power and prevail against BW-armed adversaries. Despite the efforts of many committed individuals, large vulnerabilities in the U.S. BW defense posture remain. Technology remains in the pipeline and not on the battlefield. Operational concepts seem founded on the assumption that an adversary would not dare use these weapons or, if he did, that U.S. forces could simply operate around them, as if they were chemical weapons.

The present scare seems to have generated even broader high-level concern than did the potential exposure to Iraqi BW 10 years ago. How can this concern be translated into an action agenda that will succeed at reducing present and future threats? How should we understand the risks of BW while the Al Qaeda leadership and anthrax mailer remain at large—and as the prospect of another war against Saddam Husayn looms on the horizon? Our focus here is on the threat of biological weapons to military forces and operations; where appropriate, we sketch out some connections to the BW homeland security challenge.
Flashman’s Revenge: Central Asia after September 11

Eugene B. Rumer

The terrorist attacks of September 11 swept away much of the uncertainty about Central Asia’s importance to the international system and its relationship with the major powers, especially the United States. Indeed, the five states of the region—Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan—have become among the most important frontline states in America’s war on terrorism. But the war did not alter many basic long-term trends in the region that will complicate U.S. activities as well as color Central Asian perceptions of the United States. Beyond the immediate demands of the war on terrorism, many fundamental questions remain unanswered: How important is Central Asia to the United States? What is the nature of U.S. interest in the region? What role should the United States play in Central Asia: security manager, hegemon, limited partner?
U.S.-Russian Relations: Toward a New Strategic Framework

Eugene B. Rumer and Richard D. Sokolsky

In 2001, President Vladimir Putin made a strategic choice for Russia’s integration with the West. Indicators of this decision include Putin’s quest for better relations with the United States and Europe, his stated commitment to Russian membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), his pursuit of a new relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and his almost casual dismissal of the potential major irritants in the relationship with the United States and its allies—U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the likelihood of Baltic membership in NATO, sizeable U.S. military deployments to Central Asia, and a growing U.S. military presence in Georgia. Putin has unequivocally crossed these once-insurmountable red lines despite opposition from his closest advisers and the unease of the Russian public over the American presence in Russia’s backyard.
Effects-Based Operations: Building the Analytic Tools

Desmond Saunders-Newton and Aaron B. Frank

The U.S. military, under the guidance of the Secretary of Defense, is moving toward a new concept of military planning and operations that is agile and adaptable to the conflict at hand. The aim is to develop capabilities that can rapidly break an adversary’s will to fight and undermine the utility of asymmetric capabilities. The new concept called effects-based operations (EBO) encompasses processes, tools, and organizations that focus on planning, executing, and assessing military activities for the effects produced rather than merely tallying the number of targets destroyed. EBO practitioners draw on the full range of instruments of national power to anticipate, track, and understand the indirect as well as direct effects of U.S. actions throughout the enemy political, military, and economic systems.

The EBO concept requires deep knowledge not only of enemy but also of friendly capabilities and structures. The current suite of analytic tools employed by the Department of Defense cannot support this approach to military operations. These tools were not designed to determine how the use of force affects adversary strategic will, to model adaptive behavior, to represent unintended consequences, or to evaluate alternative courses of action that include other instruments of national power beyond military force.
Homeland Security: The New Role for Defense

Steven J. Tomisek

Before the terrorist attacks of September 11, the Armed Forces focused on deterrence, stability, and warfighting missions arising in overseas theaters. The U.S. homeland was regarded as a rear area, not a front line, and the job of securing it was primarily a task for civilian law enforcement agencies at the Federal, state, and local levels. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and the bioterrorist acts that followed, have prompted a review that reaffirms the Constitutional role of the Federal Government as protector of the states against foreign aggression and restores defense of the American homeland as the primary mission of the Department of Defense (DOD).
Rediscovering the Infantry in a Time of Transformation

E.J. "Bing" West

In the summer of 2001, the Bush administration expressed impatience with the military services, suggesting that unspecified legacy capabilities had to give way to a “transformation” that would be based upon “stealth, precision weaponry, and information technologies.” Operations in Afghanistan, however, have shown the wisdom of today’s balanced force structure. In the current campaign, all-source intelligence has been used to vector teams on the ground, which in turn have identified targets for aircraft that have shattered the opposing forces. The result has been devastating air power controlled by Americans on the ground, with a psychological effect rippling far beyond Afghanistan. All governments inclined to harbor anti-American terrorists now understand that the consequences may be their removal from power, not just a few cruise missiles hitting empty buildings.

U.S. ground forces, however, are still vulnerable; they lag far behind the resources devoted to air and high-level command, control, and communications (C³). Now is the time to recognize the multifaceted roles of the rifleman and to recapitalize the infantry. A transformation based upon facts rather than theory would shift resources from C3 niceties for high-level staffs to force protection essentials for the people doing the fighting.
U.S.-Iran Relations: Normalization in the Future?

Judith S. Yaphe

Since World War II, few countries have been of greater strategic concern to the United States than Iran. Whether as a dependable friend and preeminent regional partner or as an implacable enemy, Iran has occupied a special place in U.S. security thinking. It exerts influence on a range of important policy issues—from the Middle East peace process to post-Taliban Afghanistan—and when it acquires nuclear weapons capability within the next decade, it could become a significant factor driving U.S. and regional government policies on proliferation.