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Central Asian Leadership Succession: When, Not If
Eugene B. Rumer
The Central Asian political landscape yields few signs of an impending storm in the near term. The absence of threats to the status quo, however, does not mean that it is accept- able or that it represents a stable political equilibrium in the region. Leadership succession in Central Asia bears watching for several reasons:
- as a precedent-setting process, it will provide the key missing element for the emerging political structures of the Central Asian states
- the tenure of the next generation will either make up for the shortcomings of its predecessors or aggravate them
- in the event of the latter, the stage will be set in Central Asia for more radical changes that could reverberate far beyond remote regional boundaries.
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Finding a Kashmir Settlement: The Burden of Leadership
Teresita C. Schaffer
The combined talents of the people of India and Pakistan, with the fitful help of a long list of others, have been trying for over 50 years to resolve the Kashmir issue. This essay offers no ready-made answers but rather suggestions on where to begin to look for them. Experience with other recent peace processes teaches valuable lessons about how would-be peacemakers need to approach their task and the ways in which third parties can help.
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The ROK–U.S. Alliance: Where Is It Headed?
Kim Dong Shin
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002) provides an important framework from which to examine the current crisis on the Korean Peninsula and other challenges in Northeast Asia. With its focus on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD), this strategy is concerned with North Korea as much as, if not more than, any other state. In particular, North Korea poses a unique set of challenges in regard to WMD. North Korea stands in sharp contrast to the Republic of Korea (ROK) on issues such as human rights, democracy, and market economies. The National Security Strategy suggests that the United States should revitalize its alliance with South Korea, while encourag- ing North Korea to transform its political and economic system. Yet South Korea and the United States are currently having some difficulties in developing a consensus on how to approach Pyongyang, and appear to have no clear plan to operationalize the strategy to deal. with North Korea.
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Technology, Transformation, and New Operational Concepts
Elihu Zimet, Robert E. Armstrong, Donald C. Daniel, and Joseph N. Mait
Throughout history, technology has been central to warfare, often giving qualitative advantages to numerically inferior forces. Typically, the rate of technology development has been relatively slow and the introduction of new weapons systems even slower, which has allowed evolutionary development of operational concepts. Today’s accelerated pace of technology development no longer allows sequential development of operational concepts. In addition, the current global political environment has placed demands upon the military that range from engaging in major regional conflicts to stabilization, reconstruction and peacekeeping, all creating a continuous need for flexible, adaptive systems and new concepts of operation.
The first purpose of this paper is to describe principal new developments in technology in the framework of how they can improve operational effectiveness in the uncertain world of the 21st century. The technologies are presented generically rather than by system, because a broader and more generic technology base is required to meet evolving opportunities. A second purpose is to examine the related issue of technology development and acquisition. Expectations for the rapid introduction of technologies that promote transformation must be tempered by the military requirement for continuous capability, even as new systems and operational concepts are introduced. Finally, although the United States leads the world in the development of military systems, the foundational military science and technology base shows signs of erosion. This erosion must be arrested if American military superiority is to be maintained.
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From Petro to Agro: Seeds of a New Economy
Robert E. Armstrong
Winston Churchill is said to have stopped predicting future events because the future was just “one damned thing after another.” Nonetheless, we need to keep an eye on the future and speculate as to what the next damned thing might be. One candidate is the changing raw material base for the economy.
Today, the hydrocarbon molecule is the basic unit of commerce. In a biobased economy, genes will replace petroleum. So, just as we currently demand assured access to sources of hydrocarbon molecules (oil), in the near future we will demand assured access to a broad-based, diverse supply of genes (plants and animals). This shift has security implications. Relations with oil-rich countries will be of less importance, and relations with gene-rich states—mostly the biodiverse regions along the equator— will assume greater significance. Conflicts may arise between gene-rich, technology-poor countries that control the basic raw materials of a biobased economy and gene-poor, technology- rich nations that control the production methods.
American instruments of power will be challenged to meet the demands of a biobased economy. We already see diplomatic challenges with the United Nations Framework Convention on Biological Diversity and controversy with Europe over genetically modified crops. Informational and economic challenges and opportunities will likewise appear. It may be challenging for U.S. land forces, especially the Army, to meet the demands of securing access to large supplies of new genetic material.
Agriculture will become increasingly important as a part of the Nation’s industrial base, as it offers the most economical way to produce large quantities of biological materials. Homeland defense will have to consider heartland defense, as agricultural fields will assume the same significance as oil fields.
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The Emergence of Mini UAVs for Military Applications
Timothy Coffey and John A. Montgomery
The successes of the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in Afghanistan most likely will accelerate the introduction of UAVs into the military force structure. What emerged in Afghanistan was a tiered observation-detection-targeting system consisting of spacecraft, the Global Hawk UAV, the Predator UAV, and often a spotter on the ground. However, in complex terrain, as in Afghanistan, and in urban situations, airborne assets may be needed much closer to the ground. A low-altitude tier of UAVs—mini UAVs—could serve such a purpose.
This paper provides a basic understanding of the aerodynamic scaling of mini UAVs and a sense of how their capabilities could be matched with specific missions. Mini UAVs have substantial limitations, but the low radar cross section, low infrared signature, low acoustic signature, and birdlike appearance of these vehicles, combined with the remarkable capabilities of miniaturized payloads, make them contenders for certain missions and potential valuable tactical assets.
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Colombia’s War: Toward a New Strategy
John A. Cope
Colombia’s new president, Alvaro Uribe, is confronting a protracted internal war and moving to assert national political authority. Hopes are being pinned on Uribe, the new “law and order” president who took office on August 7, 2002, with an overwhelming mandate to end violence, narcotics, and official corruption.
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China’s Trade Opening: Implications for Regional Stability
Howard M. Krawitz
In late 2001, China entered the World Trade Organization (WTO), a dramatic step that marks not only the end of a 15-year odyssey for Beijing but also the beginning of a new phase in the country’s internal development and its relations with the outside world. It may sound odd to suggest that joining the WTO—an organization focused on rules of conduct for trade and commerce—will influence not only China’s economy but also its political, military, and social development, as well as its interaction with the United States. Yet China’s efforts to play by WTO rules could affect its internal development far more extensively than has been the case with many new member nations.
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Dissuasion as a Strategic Concept
Richard L. Kugler
Some analysts want to downplay dissuasion or set it aside entirely because of its ambiguity. But ignoring this emerging idea would be short sighted. Despite its haziness, the term goes to the heart of new-era geopolitics in several key regions, including Asia. If the United States can learn how to dissuade skillfully, its strategic effectiveness in troubled regions will improve significantly. When the idea of deterrence first appeared 50 years ago, it too was ambiguous. During the Cold War, however, it acquired a role of central importance once it was equipped with a full-fledged strategic theory. The same may hold true for dissuasion in the early 21st century—but only if it too is equipped with the full set of analyses and calculations needed to bring it to life.
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Anticipating Strategic Surprise on the Korean Peninsula
James J. Przystup
Despite the current stagnation in South-North dialogue, relations between the Koreas have been subject to sudden shifts. In the warm afterglow of the historic June 2000 South-North Summit in Pyongyang, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung’s engagement policy appeared to have created a self-sustaining dynamic. Policymakers in Washington and Seoul scrambled to manage the potential diplomatic and security consequences of a rapid breakthrough in bilateral relations driven by presidential summitry.
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Flashman’s Revenge: Central Asia after September 11
Eugene B. Rumer
The terrorist attacks of September 11 swept away much of the uncertainty about Central Asia’s importance to the international system and its relationship with the major powers, especially the United States. Indeed, the five states of the region—Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan—have become among the most important frontline states in America’s war on terrorism. But the war did not alter many basic long-term trends in the region that will complicate U.S. activities as well as color Central Asian perceptions of the United States. Beyond the immediate demands of the war on terrorism, many fundamental questions remain unanswered: How important is Central Asia to the United States? What is the nature of U.S. interest in the region? What role should the United States play in Central Asia: security manager, hegemon, limited partner?
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U.S.-Russian Relations: Toward a New Strategic Framework
Eugene B. Rumer and Richard D. Sokolsky
In 2001, President Vladimir Putin made a strategic choice for Russia’s integration with the West. Indicators of this decision include Putin’s quest for better relations with the United States and Europe, his stated commitment to Russian membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), his pursuit of a new relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and his almost casual dismissal of the potential major irritants in the relationship with the United States and its allies—U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the likelihood of Baltic membership in NATO, sizeable U.S. military deployments to Central Asia, and a growing U.S. military presence in Georgia. Putin has unequivocally crossed these once-insurmountable red lines despite opposition from his closest advisers and the unease of the Russian public over the American presence in Russia’s backyard.
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Homeland Security: The New Role for Defense
Steven J. Tomisek
Before the terrorist attacks of September 11, the Armed Forces focused on deterrence, stability, and warfighting missions arising in overseas theaters. The U.S. homeland was regarded as a rear area, not a front line, and the job of securing it was primarily a task for civilian law enforcement agencies at the Federal, state, and local levels. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and the bioterrorist acts that followed, have prompted a review that reaffirms the Constitutional role of the Federal Government as protector of the states against foreign aggression and restores defense of the American homeland as the primary mission of the Department of Defense (DOD).
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U.S.-Iran Relations: Normalization in the Future?
Judith S. Yaphe
Since World War II, few countries have been of greater strategic concern to the United States than Iran. Whether as a dependable friend and preeminent regional partner or as an implacable enemy, Iran has occupied a special place in U.S. security thinking. It exerts influence on a range of important policy issues—from the Middle East peace process to post-Taliban Afghanistan—and when it acquires nuclear weapons capability within the next decade, it could become a significant factor driving U.S. and regional government policies on proliferation.
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Revising the Two-Major Theater War Standard
Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler
Preparing to fight two nearly simultaneous major theater wars (MTWs) has been the standard used to design U.S. defense policy and force structure since 1993. But with a broader spectrum of challenges looming, the threat of concurrent wars in the Persian Gulf and on the Korean Peninsula appearing less likely, and the emergence of China as a potential rival, a new approach is needed. Without a new standard, the Armed Forces will transform themselves using a rigid and outdated strategic model.
The standard put forth herein combines attention to peacetime needs with a fresh interpretation of wartime requirements. For peacetime, it would create force packages for regional commanders to perform deterrent, theater engagement, routine operational, and minor crisis management missions. In wartime, it would create a powerful joint force for handling one conflict which may be larger than a MTW, plus forces for two medium-sized operations elsewhere. This amounts to a new strategic calculus of one plus one-half plus one-half contingencies to determine U.S. force requirements.
This new standard aims to make defense plans not only responsive to real-world events, but also flexible and adaptable. It judges that preparing U.S. forces to handle a wide spectrum of events—big and small, in peace and war—may be more important than optimizing them for one canonical wartime scenario. It calls for a force structure that is large and adaptable enough to maintain core military capabilities in order to perform diverse strategic missions.
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Regional Conflicts with Strategic Consequences
M. Elaine Bunn, David E. Mosher, and Richard D. Sokolsky
During the Cold War, strategic capabilities were synonymous with nuclear capabilities, and U.S. strategic planning focused on nuclear deterrence and response against a single adversary. Today, more potential enemies are developing asymmetric capabilities to inhibit or prevent U.S. military intervention in regional conflicts— in short, to wage strategic warfare by implicitly or explicitly threatening highvalue political, military, or economic targets with weapons of mass destruction and disruption. U.S. security over the next several decades will depend increasingly on the ability to deter and respond effectively to strategic regional conflicts with significant escalation potential.
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The U.S. Strategic Posture Review: Issues for the New Administration
M. Elaine Bunn and Richard D. Sokolsky
In the past, U.S. decisionmakers have addressed strategic nuclear force and national missile defense issues in an incremental and uncoordinated manner. Too often, force structure decisions have been driven by near-term programmatic, budgetary, arms control, and political pressures rather than by long-term strategy and objectives. The forthcoming Strategic Posture Review (SPR) needs to fundamentally reassess the purposes of nuclear weapons, missile defenses, and the requirements of deterrence and stability in the new security environment.
The Bush administration should develop a comprehensive conceptual framework to decide on the size, composition, and posture of strategic offensive and defensive forces. Such a framework should integrate new assessments of deterrence and stability over the next 10–20 years, in light of the much more diverse threats facing the United States.
It will not be easy to come up with solutions that balance competing and often contradictory objectives. Improving U.S. capabilities to deal with one set of strategic concerns may complicate efforts to address others. SPR should include a reassessment of U.S. strategic force levels and targeting requirements; consideration of different hedges and reconstitution options against greater-than-expected threats, such as maintaining production capabilities or making unilateral strategic force reductions outside a formal treaty framework; and development of a broad calculus to assess the impact of national missile defense and other strategic developments on deterrence and stability.
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A Golden Opportunity: The Next Steps in U.S.-Indian Relations
John C. Holzman
President Bush has made closer relations with India a priority, thereby intensifying a process begun by the previous administration. Strengthening U.S.- India ties and cooperation on Asia-Pacific security issues can advance national interests in regional stability by reducing the risk of nuclear war on the subcontinent.
The first step in the process is to peel away remaining punitive sanctions against India. Although symbolic of the commitment to nonproliferation, sanctions are manifestly ineffective and counterproductive in South Asia. This applies to Pakistan as well as India.
Only India can initiate changes in the regional security atmosphere. The administration should focus on encouraging New Delhi to follow policies of restraint. Improved security relations will create equities that enable Washington to further encourage restraint.
Restraint would mean resuming a dialogue with Pakistan on nuclear issues; not deploying nuclear weapons; no further testing; and defining a minimum deterrent that engenders greater stability, that is, does not create incentives for either a first strike or for Pakistan to enhance its deterrent.
U.S. policy should link expanded bilateral ties to regular and more substantive military-to-military contacts. China and Pakistan may feel threatened by improved U.S.-India relations, and Pakistan may seek help from China or North Korea. Washington should counter this possibility by reassuring Beijing and also rebuilding badly damaged relations with Islamabad.
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China: Making the Case for Realistic Engagement
Michael E. Marti
China seeks to become the major power in Asia by 2050. Under its so-called New Security Concept, it will attempt to displace the United States as the preeminent military presence in the region while avoiding arms races with its Asian neighbors. Beijing will also try to retake “lost territories” at the expense of other Asian countries. China also seeks to achieve economic supremacy in Asia, drawing other nations into a regional market dominated by the Chinese yuan. American military power has been insufficient to overcome cultural divisions and divergent interests in Asia, so attempts to multilateralize regional security on the model of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization failed. These efforts bolstered the impression that Washington was looking for a way out of regional commitments.
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U.S.-Saudi Relations: Rebuilding the Strategic Consensus
Joseph McMillan
The United States inevitably will look to Saudi Arabia to play a critical role in any effective campaign against global terrorism. For Saudi Arabia to fulfill expectations, the United States must revitalize a strategic relationship that was under serious strain before the attacks on September 11.
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Adversary Use of NBC Weapons: A Neglected Challenge
John F. Reichart
Understanding has evolved in the last decade about how an adversary might use nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical weapons against the United States. Increasingly, America is concluding that potential adversaries view these not as “weapons of last resort” but rather as tactically and strategically useful. The United States can expect their use early in a conflict as well as throughout the extended battlefield, including on U.S. territory itself.
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Normalizing U.S.-Russian Relations
Eugene B. Rumer and Richard D. Sokolsky
Ten years after the Cold War, the United States is still looking for an organizing principle to guide policy toward Russia. Because of its systemic weakness, neither partnership nor competition is an appropriate concept. Washington should put aside its search for a comprehensive concept in dealing with Moscow and pursue a case-by-case approach rooted in specific U.S. interests.
Priority interests involve a redefined strategic relationship, including Russian acquiescence to national missile defense; collaboration by Moscow in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other destabilizing technologies; and inducing Russia to base its behavior on respect for the international norms to which it is committed. The United States should be prepared to deemphasize other issues, such as conventional arms sales, that do not threaten core national interests.
The Bush administration needs to communicate its intent to respect Russian interests, while making it clear that a productive relationship will depend primarily on Russian willingness to adhere to the values shared by the United States and other democratic nations. The choice of what kind of relationship Russia wants is largely in its own hands.
However, Russia’s chaotic policymaking and the mismatch between its ambitions and capabilities preclude resolving key bilateral issues. Therefore, prospects for engaging Russia constructively appear dim and the United States will have to go it alone in areas where Russian acquiescence is lacking.
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Do European Union Defense Initiatives Threaten NATO?
Kori N. Schake
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) is now the main item on Europe’s security agenda because of a focus on establishing a crisis management force capable of acting independently of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Although transatlantic policies will be colored by issues such as the Kyoto treaty, missile defenses, and relations with Russia, ESDP is likely to dominate defense debates as the European Union (EU) tries to meet the Helsinki Headline Goal of developing a corpssized expeditionary force that can deploy military forces capable of ensuring diverse tasks and establish new political and military structures that will enable the EU to guide and direct such operations.
To meet the Helsinki Goal, the European Union must surmount three problems: ensuring sufficient forces, building confidence in the quality of their performance, and finding substitutes for critical NATO assets. The approaches that EU members take to these tasks may indicate how serious they are about meeting the goal in fact as well as in name.
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Renovating U.S. Strategic Arms Control Policy
Richard D. Sokolsky
Decisions on the next phase of strategic force reductions and how to achieve them will have to await the resolution of larger issues related to the future of the U.S. strategic force posture and national missile defense. Once the Bush administration completes its Nuclear Posture Review, however, it will need to decide whether to continue the Cold War-style strategic arms reduction process or explore alternatives for reducing nuclear threats to national security and transforming the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship.
The traditional arms control process of negotiating legally binding treaties that both codify numerical parity and contain extensive verification measures has reached an impasse and outlived its utility. Moreover, new U.S. strategic priorities will require changes in the ends and means of arms control policy.
The United States and Russia should embrace a radically new framework to achieve deeper reductions in strategic nuclear forces. The centerpiece of such a reform agenda should be arms control through unilateral and parallel unilateral measures. To jump-start this process, the administration should give top priority to repealing legislation that prohibits the Nation from unilaterally reducing strategic forces until START II enters into force.
Unless the United States embraces a more flexible and innovative approach to strategic arms control, progress will be stymied in developing a nuclear weapons posture for the new security environment.
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A Military for the 21st Century: Lessons from the Recent Past
Anthony C. Zinni
The post-Cold War world environment has complicated rather than simplified the missions, strategy, and organization of the Armed Forces. Rapid downsizing after the fall of the Soviet Union and the Allied victory in the Persian Gulf War left a military lacking strategic direction, a thoughtful force structure, and a logical threat upon which to base future force structure.
This environment will not permit the luxury of a strategic pause. Allowing the new world order to arrange itself could present the Nation with an unforeseen threat that it cannot handle. To prevent such an eventuality, the military must address several challenges: the number of nontraditional threats, financing a military capable of meeting all the potential challenges it may face, the need to reform itself to handle rapid developments in technology, and interagency reform in coordination with military reform so that the full weight of national power can be brought to bear against adversaries.
A deliberate process of military transformation must account for the need for public support, which is essential for such a process to succeed. Transformation would encompass several areas: developing a realistic strategic direction; reviewing personnel recruitment and retention; understanding the implications of joint and combined warfare for organization, structure, core competencies, and operational concepts; revamping national security advisory and decisionmaking processes; and assessing the effects of technological and social changes on the military.
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