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U.S.-Iran Relations: Normalization in the Future?

Judith S. Yaphe

This Strategic Forum paper examines the prospects for normalization in U.S.–Iran relations, analyzing the historical evolution of bilateral tensions since the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the strategic barriers to sustained diplomatic engagement. The author evaluates the political, ideological, and security factors that have shaped U.S. policy toward Iran, including regional instability, nuclear concerns, and competing strategic priorities in the Middle East. The paper assesses whether changing geopolitical conditions or domestic political shifts could create opportunities for rapprochement, while recognizing enduring mistrust and structural obstacles. It concludes by outlining policy considerations for U.S. decisionmakers seeking to balance deterrence, regional security, and diplomatic engagement in managing the bilateral relationship.
High-Energy Lasers: Technical, Operational, and Policy Issues

Elihu Zimet

After more than 30 years of technology development and many billions of dollars in investment, the Department of Defense is poised to operationally deploy its first high-energy laser (HEL) weapon system, the airborne laser. The unique attributes of an HEL—speed-of-light delivery of energy, surgical precision, variable lethality, and multiple target engagement—could significantly alter the balance between offensive and defensive weapons or provide options for nonlethal weapons. On the other hand, the long development period and large outlay of funding to date suggest the significant technical, operational, and policy challenges of fielding such systems.

This paper considers the unique and promising attributes of HEL weapon systems and examines the technical challenges, at both the system and component level, that need to be overcome for an HEL to be competitive against alternative weapon systems. Related operational and policy issues are also discussed. The paper concludes that advances in HEL technology emphasizing speed, precision, and flexibility together with the ongoing transformation of the military services have both indicated the need and provided the opportunity for further HEL development and testing.
Computer Simulation and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Peter D. Zimmerman and David W. Dorn

All nuclear weapons now in the American stockpile were developed with the aid of computer models validated by comparison with nuclear tests. However, those models required the use of parameters that were not well understood and often needed adjustment to make computation and test agree. Facing the possibility of a test ban, the Department of Energy initiated a Stockpile Stewardship Project to develop a predictive capability with validated, physics-based simulation tools at its core. This program is charged with maintaining the performance, reliability, and safety of U.S. nuclear weapons without nuclear testing. To meet the requirement for maintaining the enduring stockpile, the Department of Energy engaged the three national weapons laboratories in creating the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI). ASCI advanced computational capabilities and three dimensional models, combined with major experimental and testing facilities, should make it possible for the United States to maintain its present nuclear stockpile indefinitely. The authors believe that the ASCI computational capabilities also will enable nuclear weapon designers to draw on archived data from more than 1,000 nuclear tests to adapt proven designs to future mission requirements. Through extensive computer modeling and nonnuclear testing, new nuclear weapons could be designed and introduced into the stockpile, so long as the new weapons used design concepts similar to those proven in nuclear tests.
Maritime Access: Do Defenders Hold All the Cards?

Arthur H. Barber III and Delwyn L. Gilmore

National security strategy depends on sustaining access to world markets for American commerce in peacetime and for the Armed Forces to various parts of the globe in times of crisis or war. Potential nation-state adversaries understand the importance of this access and are devising strategies and investing in systems to delay, discredit, or deny U.S. entry to those regions of vital interest where they wish to become the dominant power. Most of these regions are adjacent to international waters where American naval forces freely operate today.

Naval forces provide a valuable degree of sovereign and secure access in a strategic environment in which overseas land bases are becoming increasingly restricted politically and vulnerable militarily. The mobility and layered defensive capabilities of American warships, particularly those operating in carrier battle groups, make them the hardest of all tactical forces for an adversary to find, target, and effectively strike with antiaccess systems, such as cruise or ballistic missiles.

State-of-the-art long-range surveillance systems, such as satellites, are ineffective against moving targets at sea. Mobility also keeps ships from being vulnerable to ballistic missiles and makes accurate, long-range targeting of antiship cruise missiles a great operational challenge. Moreover, the latest generation of weapon systems for defense against submarines and cruise missiles is extremely effective against the current and projected systems of potential adversaries. These defensive systems are fielded on many, but not all, U.S. ships because of budget constraints and past estimates that likely adversaries had minimal naval capabilities. As national strategy changes to one that accounts for more demanding antiaccess threats, the technology and operational skill will become available to sustain assured access for American naval forces.
UCAVs—Technological, Policy, and Operational Challenges

Charles L. Barry and Elihu Zimet

The Bush administration and Congress are in concert on the goal of developing a fleet of unmanned aircraft that can reduce both defense costs and aircrew losses in combat by taking on at least the most dangerous combat missions. Unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) will be neither inexpensive enough to be readily expendable nor—at least in early development—capable of performing every combat mission alongside or in lieu of manned sorties. Yet the tremendous potential of such systems is widely recognized, and allies as well as potential adversaries are moving quickly to mount their own research and development programs. The United States is committed to fielding UCAV capabilities by 2010, principally for the missions of suppression of enemy air defense and deep strike, which are among the highest risk tasks for the Air Force and naval aviation.

Currently, UCAVs are unproven, infant technologies just being designed, simulated, and demonstrated. Enthusiasts must be aware that significant technological, policy, and operational challenges must be met. An operational UCAV capability is not expected to be available to U.S. field and fleet commanders for 10 years. Yet a nexus of mature technologies, policy support, and operational needs has been reached, and it is both possible and necessary to accelerate development of UCAVs. Their potential is apparent, and there is sustained momentum behind programs for all the services.
Adapting Forces to a New Era: Ten Transforming Concepts

Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler

A key Department of Defense goal is to build highly capable forces whose mastery of high-tech warfighting will allow decisive victories against new threats and well-armed opponents in future operations. A set of new operational concepts, many of which have surfaced in the ongoing defense strategy review, may facilitate this goal. They focus on rapid and decisive operations in distant theaters rather than on homeland defense. As generic concepts for future warfighting, they offer valuable insights on combat capabilities that should be acquired. Before these principles can be adopted, they must be scrutinized on their individual merits and integrated to provide balanced guidance to force development.

New operational concepts must be embedded in a sensible transformation strategy that should be carried out in measured, purposeful ways. The strategy should focus on the mid term, during which new threats may appear but entirely new forces will not be able to be built. The standard of preparing for two regional wars should be replaced with one that focuses on capabilities for the widening spectrum of conflict and operations in new geographic locations. A three-theater standard should be adopted that readies forces to wage one big war in any single theater while also having sufficient assets for medium-sized strike missions and traditional operations elsewhere. Transformation should strive to create adaptable forces that can handle shifting challenges, unfamiliar missions, and periodic strategic surprises. It should produce a future posture dominated by improved legacy forces but including some ultra-high-tech forces for special missions. If new operational concepts are capable of producing such forces and capabilities, they may deserve serious consideration.

Ten new operational concepts have emerged as candidates for inclusion in transformation and Joint Vision 2020. These concepts focus on building better forces for multiple purposes and employing these forces in specific ways. If the concepts are adopted, creating combat and support forces for them will require programmatic measures. Many of the concepts can be pursued by reorganizing existing forces, continuing normal modernization, or acquiring new information systems and smart munitions. Nonetheless, they will require some budget increases plus a resource strategy that responds to fiscal constraints. Investing wisely in a full set of new concepts will produce stronger forces than focusing on a few concepts in ways that deprive others of funds. The combination of new concepts, not any of them individually, offers promise for the future. Moreover, these concepts, which focus on creating high-tech strike forces, must be accompanied by capabilities for low-intensity conflict and by investments in such often-overlooked areas as logistic support, bases and infrastructure, maintenance, and war reserves.
Managing Change: Capability, Adaptability, and Transformation

Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler

The Bush administration defense review is pointing to an era of far-reaching change in military strategy, forces, and technology. To succeed, this effort must be guided by a new set of strategic precepts. Since 1997, the precepts of shape, respond, prepare have helped guide how national security policy has approached change. In the coming years, capability, adaptability, and transformation can perform a similar function. The first and third precepts are well documented. The second, however, needs greater attention—not only because adaptability is important although easily overlooked, but also because it is a bridge between the other two precepts. These three precepts incorporate the main characteristics needed by the Armed Forces:
- A core military capability to win wars today and support peacetime goals—a near-term concern.
- The adaptability to modify that existing core capability to meet new strategic conditions—a mid-term concern.
- A wise transformation that reorients the military to take advantage of new technologies for the long term.
These precepts are compatible but must be pursued in a balanced and integrated manner that reflects their interconnection. The pursuit of near-term capabilities should be accompanied by enhanced efforts to create broader options for the mid term, in ways that establish a sound strategic foundation for longer-term visions. The near-term capability of the military can be preserved by keeping them sufficiently large and ready and by improving them in selected areas. In the mid term, their flexibility can be strengthened by adopting broader employment plans, reengineering current organizational structures, and fielding emerging technologies. In the long term, they can be transformed not only by modernizing existing weapons, but also by acquiring new types of platforms and technologies. Even in an era of tight fiscal constraints, this threefold challenge can be met if a balanced approach is followed—thereby preserving the hard-won strategic effectiveness of the military not only in the coming years but the distant future as well.
Revising the Two-Major Theater War Standard

Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler

This Strategic Forum paper evaluates the continued relevance of the post–Cold War “two–major theater war” (two-MTW) standard that has guided U.S. defense planning since 1993. Arguing that the strategic environment has evolved beyond the assumptions underpinning the two-MTW framework, the authors contend that preparing to fight two nearly simultaneous large regional wars no longer adequately captures emerging threats. They highlight the declining likelihood of concurrent conflicts in the Persian Gulf and on the Korean Peninsula, the rise of China as a potential peer competitor, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the growing importance of peacetime engagement and smaller-scale contingencies. The paper proposes a revised planning construct—“one plus one-half plus one-half” contingencies—combining capacity for one large theater war with forces for two medium-sized operations elsewhere. This approach aims to enhance flexibility, strategic responsiveness, and adaptability in both peacetime and wartime planning.
Regional Conflicts with Strategic Consequences

M. Elaine Bunn, David E. Mosher, and Richard D. Sokolsky

During the Cold War, strategic capabilities were synonymous with nuclear capabilities, and U.S. strategic planning focused on nuclear deterrence and response against a single adversary. Today, more potential enemies are developing asymmetric capabilities to inhibit or prevent U.S. military intervention in regional conflicts— in short, to wage strategic warfare by implicitly or explicitly threatening highvalue political, military, or economic targets with weapons of mass destruction and disruption. U.S. security over the next several decades will depend increasingly on the ability to deter and respond effectively to strategic regional conflicts with significant escalation potential.
The U.S. Strategic Posture Review: Issues for the New Administration

M. Elaine Bunn and Richard D. Sokolsky

This Strategic Forum examines key issues facing a new U.S. administration in reassessing the nation’s strategic posture. It argues that post–Cold War conditions require a more integrated approach to deterrence that accounts for evolving threats from Russia, China, and emerging regional actors. The authors evaluate the role of nuclear forces, missile defense, and arms control in maintaining strategic stability while adapting to new security challenges. The paper highlights the need to balance offensive and defensive capabilities, sustain the credibility of extended deterrence, and modernize elements of the nuclear force structure. It concludes that a coherent strategic framework, linking nuclear policy, missile defense, and broader defense strategy, is essential to ensure effective deterrence and national security in a changing threat environment.
A Golden Opportunity: The Next Steps in U.S.-Indian Relations

John C. Holzman

This Strategic Forum examines opportunities to strengthen U.S.-India relations at a pivotal moment in the post–Cold War security environment. It argues that shifting geopolitical dynamics and India’s growing regional and global influence create conditions for expanded bilateral cooperation. The paper highlights areas for progress, including defense engagement, economic ties, and strategic dialogue, while acknowledging lingering constraints such as differing policy priorities and India’s tradition of strategic autonomy. It emphasizes the importance of sustained U.S. engagement to build trust, deepen cooperation, and align long-term interests. Ultimately, the analysis concludes that advancing the U.S.-India partnership can enhance regional stability, support a favorable balance of power in Asia, and contribute to broader U.S. national security objectives.
Resurrecting Transformation for the Post-Industrial Era

Douglas A. Macgregor

We must hold our minds alert and receptive to the application of unglimpsed methods and weapons. The next war will be won in the future, not in the past. We must go on, or we will go under.

—General of the Army Douglas A. MacArthur, while serving as Chief of Staff, 1931

The Bush administration took office amid high hopes for the fundamental transformation of the Armed Forces. Yet within months, the problem that transformation was designed to solve—changing a large, expensive Industrial Age structure, especially the Army, into a leaner, more strategically agile Information Age force—receded as more pressing issues arose. Instead of being transformed, Cold War military structures will remain unchanged for the time being, while morale and quality of life are shored up. Into this policy vacuum, military leaders have tossed an expensive collection of wish lists that tend to one of two extremes: a bigger, faster, better version of some platform already in use, or something out of science fiction with delivery timelines that stretch all the way to 2032.¹ Although these modernization programs are billed as promoting transformation, they are business as usual.

Fortunately, this is not the whole story. Help may be on the way. The terms of reference for the current Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) anticipate the emergence of new ground, naval, and air forces reorganized for “more rapidly responsive, scalable, modular task-organized units, capable of independent combat action as well as integration into larger joint and combined operations”² sometime after 2006. How the bureaucratic politics of service-centric operational thinking and single-service modernization will produce this outcome is unclear.

This statement also begs the question, why wait until 2006 to build joint warfighting capabilities with today’s forces and technologies when the United States needs—and can achieve—these capabilities now to protect its global interests? Experience in the private sector demonstrates that successful corporations do not plan to transform in the distant future; they transform constantly, just as the world around them transforms. Military transformation is a process, not an end-state that depends on exotic technologies that may not be available for decades. America can lose its position of military dominance only by standing still and investing in the past.
China: Making the Case for Realistic Engagement

Michael E. Marti

This Strategic Forum examines the role of engagement in U.S. policy toward China and argues for a more realistic approach grounded in China’s long-term strategic objectives. It highlights Beijing’s ambition to emerge as a dominant regional power while avoiding direct confrontation and costly arms races. The paper cautions against assumptions that U.S. engagement alone can significantly reshape China’s political or strategic trajectory. Instead, it advocates a balanced strategy that combines continued engagement with prudent hedging to protect U.S. interests. The analysis emphasizes the need to align expectations with achievable outcomes, recognizing both the opportunities and limits of cooperation. Ultimately, it concludes that realistic engagement, tempered by strategic competition, is essential to managing the evolving U.S.-China relationship and maintaining regional stability.
U.S.-Saudi Relations: Rebuilding the Strategic Consensus

Joseph McMillan

This Strategic Forum examines the strain in U.S.-Saudi relations and outlines steps to rebuild a shared strategic foundation in the aftermath of shifting regional dynamics and rising tensions. It argues that the partnership, long rooted in mutual security interests, has been weakened by political, military, and societal pressures, including the challenges of sustaining U.S. military presence and differing priorities in the Middle East. The paper emphasizes Saudi Arabia’s critical role in U.S. efforts to address regional instability and counter terrorism, while highlighting the sensitivities surrounding sovereignty and legitimacy within the Kingdom. It proposes rebuilding consensus through clearer strategic alignment, improved diplomatic coordination, and adjustments to U.S. military posture. Ultimately, the analysis underscores that restoring trust and managing mutual expectations are essential to sustaining an effective bilateral relationship.
Current Export Policies: Trick or Treat?

David R. Oliver Jr.

Any discussion of export controls needs some context. How did the current system evolve? What is it intended to protect? More than two decades ago, during the height of the Cold War, a well-placed spy told us that more than 5,000 Soviet war systems depended on U.S.-made parts. To throw sand in the communist machine, Richard Perle, then in the Reagan administration, conceived of a system of export control licenses, with accompanying stiff financial and jail penalties, to stop American companies from exporting anything that might conceivably be of technological value to the Soviets. A bureaucracy of hundreds of people at Defense, State, Commerce, Justice, and Treasury was put into place to enforce this policy. Most people, and I am one of them, believe Perle's system worked and was precisely the right system for that time.

But times change, and bureaucracies, once in place, do not atrophy for lack of relevance. Outside stimulus is required. The people put in place during the Cold War have since worked diligently to perfect their system. Not only were they determined to prevent gun running and the export of items to construct nuclear weapons but also, with the passage of time, they began to ensure nothing of possible military value crossed our borders. This bureaucracy has become increasingly more complex and stifling. Three years ago, when a U.S. company imported a key component for a satellite control station from France (a traveling wave tube), and, when the tube was found to be broken, the U.S. company was denied permission to send it back to France to get a refund! The bureaucracy knows not what it does. The Berlin Wall has fallen, the Soviet Union has collapsed, Kosovo has come and gone, but nothing has changed in the bureaucracy's warren of regulations, reviews, and delays. Working on a Cold War course, the bureaucrats have succeeded in digging a regulatory pit so deep as to cripple the most powerful arm of U.S. foreign policy--trade--as well as the international relationships and friendships that come from commerce.

As soon as they hear the word trade, most Americans lose interest. We have mixed feelings about industry. We worry whether there is sufficient (if any) patriotism in the boardroom of a multinational corporation. In addition, we do not like to think of America as an arms merchant. We are not interested in making some fat-cat American industrialist rich at the expense of a shopkeeper in Brazil. But the real issues for America are much, much larger. With our current export control policy, we limit and hurt friends and weaken the U.S. military and our allies.
Adversary Use of NBC Weapons: A Neglected Challenge

John F. Reichart

Understanding has evolved in the last decade about how an adversary might use nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical weapons against the United States. Increasingly, America is concluding that potential adversaries view these not as “weapons of last resort” but rather as tactically and strategically useful. The United States can expect their use early in a conflict as well as throughout the extended battlefield, including on U.S. territory itself.
Normalizing U.S.-Russian Relations

Eugene B. Rumer and Richard D. Sokolsky

This paper examines the challenges of defining a stable framework for engagement between Washington and Moscow. Past efforts to characterize the relationship as either a strategic partnership or a renewed rivalry have proven insufficient. The authors propose a pragmatic, interest-based approach that evaluates cooperation and competition on a case-by-case basis. The article highlights how enduring differences in political values, security priorities, and global objectives continue to shape bilateral interactions. While opportunities for cooperation remain in areas such as arms control and nonproliferation, they are often limited by persistent mistrust and conflicting interests. A more flexible and realistic policy, grounded in U.S. national interests, offers a more effective way to manage the complexities of U.S.-Russian relations.
Do European Union Defense Initiatives Threaten NATO?

Kori N. Schake

This paper looks at whether European efforts to develop independent defense capabilities undermine or support the transatlantic alliance. EU defense initiatives, particularly the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), do not inherently threaten NATO. Instead, the primary concern lies in Europe’s limited military capabilities and continued reliance on U.S. support. This paper explores how EU-led operations, focused largely on crisis management, differ from NATO’s broader warfighting role. It highlights the importance of coordination, interoperability, and avoiding duplication between the two institutions. Stronger European defense capabilities, if aligned with NATO, can reinforce, rather than weaken, the alliance and contribute to more effective burden sharing.
Renovating U.S. Strategic Arms Control Policy

Richard D. Sokolsky

This paper argues that traditional, treaty-based approaches to arms control are increasingly misaligned with the post–Cold War security environment. With progress on formal agreements stalled and U.S. and Russian priorities diverging, reliance on legally binding treaties has limited further reductions in nuclear risks. The paper proposes a more flexible framework centered on unilateral and reciprocal measures, cooperative threat reduction, and increased transparency. These approaches have already produced meaningful results and are better suited to addressing challenges such as tactical nuclear weapons, nondeployed warheads, and nuclear safety. A reoriented strategy focused on reducing nuclear risks, improving U.S.-Russian relations, and supporting broader national security objectives offers a more practical path forward.
A Military for the 21st Century: Lessons from the Recent Past

Anthony C. Zinni

This paper looks at how U.S. military operations have changed since the Cold War and what those experiences suggest for the future. Drawing on recent missions, Zinni shows that the operating environment has become more complex, not less, with forces expected to handle everything from major conflicts to peacekeeping and humanitarian crises. The paper highlights the growing importance of adaptability, joint operations, and readiness across a wide range of scenarios. It also emphasizes the need to better align force structure, training, and strategy with these evolving demands. It argues for a military that is flexible, responsive, and prepared to operate across diverse and unpredictable challenges.
China Rising: New Challenges to the U.S. Security Posture

Jason D. Ellis and Todd M. Koca

This Strategic Forum explores how China’s growing military capabilities and strategic ambitions are reshaping U.S. defense planning. It points to China’s expanding defense budget, modernization of its forces, and increasing missile capabilities as key factors driving concern in Washington. The paper also highlights persistent uncertainty surrounding China’s intentions, including limited transparency, tensions over Taiwan, and concerns about proliferation and espionage. These dynamics make it difficult for U.S. policymakers to assess future risks and plan effectively. It also emphasizes that China’s rise presents long-term strategic challenges, requiring the United States to adapt its security posture, maintain deterrence, and prepare for a shifting balance of power in Asia.
Transforming the Armed Forces of Central and East Europe

Jeffrey Simon

This Strategic Forum looks at the ongoing effort to reshape post-Cold War militaries in the region into effective contributors to Euro-Atlantic security. The paper highlights how early optimism about integration with Western institutions gave way to more difficult, long-term challenges, including limited resources, incomplete reform plans, and institutional friction. It also explores key issues such as downsizing forces, restructuring defense institutions, and strengthening civilian control of the military. The transition to professional forces and the integration of defense ministries also present political and social challenges that complicate reform efforts. This paper also emphasizes that while progress has been made, sustained commitment, realistic planning, and external support are critical to completing the transformation and ensuring these forces can operate effectively within NATO frameworks.
Military Lessons from Desert One to the Balkans

Ike Skelton

This Strategic Forum reviews key U.S. military operations from the failed Iran hostage rescue in 1980 through interventions in Lebanon, Grenada, Panama, the Persian Gulf, and the Balkans to identify enduring lessons for future force development. The U.S. military improved significantly after the post-Vietnam period by learning from both failures and successes across these operations. This paper highlights recurring challenges, including unclear missions, coordination gaps, force protection, and the need for effective joint operations. It also emphasizes the growing complexity of missions, which increasingly include peacekeeping, coalition operations, and nontraditional contingencies. Future effectiveness depends on applying past lessons while preparing for different and evolving forms of conflict.