Policy Briefs

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  China Rising: New Challenges to the U.S. Security Posture

  Jason D. Ellis and Todd M. Koca

  The future strategic capabilities of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will substantially differ from the past; both numerical increases and significant qualitative improvements are likely.

  Key information gaps, aggravated by a lack of transparency, hamper our understanding of China’s expanding nuclear and missile capabilities, doctrinal innovations, and evolving strategic intentions.

  While U.S. and PRC interests intersect in a number of areas, there are also important differences. The status and future disposition of Taiwan is perhaps the single greatest flashpoint for conflict, a case in which U.S. deterrence of a range of PRC military steps may fail and escalation ensue.

  A rising power, China is striving to become a heavyweight in Asia. The longterm complementarity of U.S. and PRC interests is predicated in large part on Beijing’s strategic choices.

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  Transforming the Armed Forces of Central and East Europe

  Jeffrey Simon

  The transformation of Central and East European (CEE) armed forces into modern contributors to Euro-Atlantic security during the next decade will be more difficult than in the last, because euphoria over joining the West is dissipating, and attention is turning to problems of reform.

  CEE governments have been unable to provide long-term plans and to guarantee resources to build military capabilities. Plans still must be developed, especially in Slovakia and Slovenia, and reliable projections of resources are sorely needed in Romania.

  Downsizing and restructuring militaries and integrating general staffs within ministries of defense can create friction in civilmilitary relations; the United States could help mitigate such problems through retraining aimed at alternate careers and meritbased career development programs.

  In moving to all-volunteer forces, CEE partners will lose an instrument for shaping the citizens of young democracies (such as Lithuania) and manpower pools from which to recruit extended-service volunteers (like Germany). NATO allies could provide partner programs focused on conscription to foster civic virtues and help define training for specific military roles and missions.

  Confusion prevails over the appropriate length of conscription for each CEE country. However, terms of 6 or 7 months can only prepare reserve forces and are not adequate to meet operational requirements.

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  Military Lessons from Desert One to the Balkans

  Ike Skelton

  The performance of the Armed Forces has shown a marked improvement since its low point in the post-Vietnam era. Military leaders have deliberately sought out and internalized lessons from each succeeding conflict. The challenge for the next generation is learning the lessons of these past operations and building an even more effective, flexible force.

  The military cannot pick and choose its missions. Their political masters may well decide that national interests require the use of force for more nontraditional missions or in situations that may be less than ideally suited to military solutions.

  Force protection is critical; high rates of casualties can erode popular support and undermine the mission. On the other hand, excessive fear of casualties can erode the morale of the Armed Forces. The key is forging American leadership that understands the military risks involved.

  Commitments to our allies may draw us into conflicts where U.S. national interests are limited, but where American leadership is essential to the vitality of the alliance.

  Even a small operation conducted abroad requires an extraordinary range of well-trained forces, either highly deployable or already in theater.

  Despite successes, the Armed Forces must address a number of challenges: urban warfare, weapons of mass destruction, tracking and destroying mobile targets, the need for lighter, more deployable forces, and the burden of ongoing operations.