WMD Proceedings

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  Controlling Chemical Weapons in the New International Order

  John P. Caves , Jr. and W. Seth Carus

  Mr. John Caves, CSWMD Distinguished Fellow, and Dr. Seth Carus, NDU Emeritus Distinguished Professor of National Security Policy examine the breakdown in consensus decision-making at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and place this development in the context of Russia, China, and Iran’s larger challenge to a rules-based international order. The article further considers how this dynamic may play out in the OPCW in the coming years and discusses how the United States can continue to use the Chemical Weapons Convention and OPCW to defend the international norm against chemical weapons while better protecting itself and its allies and partners from a greater chemical weapons threat.

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  Cyber Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction

  Shane Smith

  For two decades, U.S. policymakers, military leaders, and analysts have drawn connections between cyber threats and WMD that demand attention from experts who work in both fields. While recognizing there are a variety of definitions for WMD in use today, the WMD Center does not believe classifying cyber threats as WMD is warranted or advantageous for the United States at this time.

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  Fentanyl as a Chemical Weapon

  John P. Caves , Jr.

  Fentanyl is a major topic in the news these days because of its significant contribution to the ongoing opioid epidemic in the United States. It clearly is a major counternarcotic challenge. But there also has been some reporting, including about congressional interest, as to whether fentanyl additionally should be considered a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) and whether U.S. Government chemical defense efforts should place greater emphasis on it. This paper provides some perspective on fentanyl as a chemical weapon.

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  The Proliferation Security Initiative in 2017: U.S. Interagency Perspectives

  Joanna M. Gabryszewski

  In 2003, President George W. Bush unveiled the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in a speech in Krakow, Poland. The initiative was announced as a commitment among endorsing nations to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems. What started with 11 like-minded nations that endorsed the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles had grown to 105 endorsers in 2016. This was achieved without treaties, ratifications, or other formal agreements as a basis for membership. The initiative continues to be based on a political commitment rather than on legal obligations. In the United States, what started in a Republican administration under President Bush continued to be supported by a Democratic administration led by President Barack Obama. With his Prague speech in April 2009, President Obama reiterated U.S. support of the PSI as an essential tool in U.S. foreign policy for fighting WMD proliferation.

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  Weapons of Mass Destruction: Challenges for the New Administration

  John P. Caves , Jr.

  The 2015 National Security Strategy identifies the proliferation and/or use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) among the top strategic risks to the Nation’s interests. This paper examines four pressing WMD challenges for the next U.S. administration. First, the prospects of a direct clash between the United States and a nuclear-armed adversary that could escalate to the nuclear level are likely to grow. Russia in particular has become more assertive in challenging U.S. interests and has developed concepts for the limited use of nuclear weapons in a conflict with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Second, the scope of North Korea’s nuclear, chemical, and suspected biological weapons programs likely will require resources for countering WMD that exceed those currently available to the United States and South Korea. Third, longstanding international efforts to prohibit chemical and biological weapons are threatened by the reemergence of chemical weapons use and potentially by rapid advances in the life sciences. Finally, concern that the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action may only postpone—rather than prevent—Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons will perpetuate tensions and proliferation pressures in the region. To meet these challenges, the next U.S. administration needs to: close gaps in capabilities, plans, and policies that weaken deterrence; reduce incentives for further proliferation by enhancing monitoring and verification measures and reassuring allies and partners; strengthen the Nation’s countering-WMD posture with increased resources and improved organization; stay on top of and leverage rapid scientific and technological developments in the life sciences and related fields; and improve the education of military officers, civilian national security professionals, and the broader public on WMD challenges and the necessary responses thereto.

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  Proliferation Risks of Civilian Nuclear Power Programs

  Paul I. Bernstein and Nima Gerami

  The risks of nuclear proliferation—the further spread of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable material, technology, and expertise—derive in part from the technical characteristics of the nuclear fuel cycle and the national and international management of fuel cycle activities. Civilian nuclear power plants themselves are not considered a high proliferation risk because it is difficult to make weapons-usable material from reactor fuel. The principal proliferation risk is that states can use the civilian nuclear fuel cycle as a source for the material, technology, and expertise needed to develop nuclear weapons. A state’s intent to develop a nuclear weapons capability can be concealed if its activities otherwise appear compliant with its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Creating more effective barriers to the diversion of civilian nuclear programs to military purposes—as North Korea has done and as Iran appears to be doing—is central to current efforts to strengthen the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.

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  Star Wars Rebooted: Global Missile Defense in 2017

  Bruno Gruselle

  At present and for the near future, missile defense (MD) is not in peril of dismemberment. Indeed, the level of political consensus on the need for a missile defense runs high, as demonstrated by the Obama administration since 2009.1 But there probably will be questions about the most appropriate policy and technical options going forward when the President and administration take office in 2017 either as incumbents or new arrivals. While the debate in Washington will probably concern such matters as whether the United States needs a maritime or land-based MD and where within the program the Nation should place its budgetary chips in what could become a very tense financial atmosphere, events elsewhere around the globe may confront the 2017 administration with some delicate strategic dilemmas and force it to make difficult choices.

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  Countering WMD in the 2010 QDR

  John P. Caves , Jr.

  Coming from the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), I probably will not surprise you by talking about the WMD aspects of this year’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Specifically, I will focus on its countering WMD aspects—that is, how the Department of Defense (DOD) thinks about and prepares to prevent, defend against, and mitigate the consequences of adversary use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. I will not discuss the review’s missile defense or nuclear deterrence aspects, but my fellow panelists may do so.

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  Future Foreign Perceptions of Chemical Weapons Utility

  John P. Caves , Jr.

  It is inherently speculative to address future foreign perceptions of chemical weapons (CW) utility. This is not only because it concerns things that may be, rather than things that already are, but also because those who might be considering or already pursuing CW capabilities for the future will not be openly sharing their views. Classified sources and assessments also cannot be addressed in this unclassified forum. This paper, therefore, offers some educated guesses about how rational actors might view the future utility of CW on the basis of open source information about relevant technological trends and assumptions about pertinent aspects of the future international security environment.