Policy Briefs

Follow

• 

  Responsive Space and Strategic Information

  Simon P. Worden and Randall R. Correll

  American strategists face a daunting challenge; they must assure and defend American and allied interests, induce and encourage international security cooperation, and deter, dissuade, and defeat a diverse range of potential adversaries. This challenge has been addressed by senior political leadership in recent policy statements, such as the Nuclear Posture Review of 2002, and in the formation of an expanded U.S. Strategic Command, but this vision has not yet taken root in the Department of Defense components responsible for providing operational capability.

  We propose a new strategic posture based upon a war-prevention focus. The central element of our proposal is a transformational space and information sortie capability. American space capabilities now depend on a fixed infrastructure of large, expensive satellites. We argue for a complementary capability to launch small, inexpensive payloads in time of crisis to augment and reconstitute existing capabilities and perform entirely new special operation missions and global conventional strikes through space. These assets also would expand information operations beyond network defense and network attack to create effects in the minds of our adversaries and those who would support them.

  An enabler for these new capabilities will be the technology to deliver effects in and through space rapidly and affordably. A similar capability will be needed to deliver effects through cyber space. Space-based nodes would be critical components of an integrated physical, cyber, and psychological application of military force and strategic influence. These technologies exist today both in the United States and elsewhere. But a focused and funded program to develop them for military purposes is not yet in place.

  This new strategic posture will arguably require the formation of a new space and information military service to organize, train, and equip the space and information force structure of the future. The nucleus of such a new service exists today in the U.S. Strategic Command and its components.

• 

  China’s Forever War: What If a Taiwan Invasion Fails?

  Joel Wuthnow

  Key Points

  • A failed People’s Republic of China (PRC) attempt to seize Taiwan would only be one step in a much longer conflict. Beijing will learn, rebuild, and may try again.
  • Beijing would be more risk acceptant if its leaders face threats of removal. This could invite further escalation to quell domestic critics and reset battlefield conditions.
  • In a post-invasion aftermath, deterrence must be quickly reestablished, but in such a way that does not imperil the PRC leadership’s survival.

• 

  Rightsizing Chinese Military Lessons from Ukraine

  Joel Wuthnow

  Russia’s failures in the early phases of the 2022 Ukraine conflict, and Ukraine’s successes, have raised questions about the implications for China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA). U.S. and other foreign analysts have identified several lessons the PLA could learn from the Ukraine conflict that would improve China’s prospects in a future conflict with Taiwan and the United States or potentially with a different regional rival. The PLA has made it frustratingly difficult to answer these questions using direct evidence: several months into the conflict, PLA officers have produced almost nothing detailing their views on the implications of the conflict for future Chinese operations and modernization. It is also doubtful that internal assessments, if they exist, will be available in a way that can substantiate foreign speculation.

• 

  Baltics Left of Bang: The Southern Shore

  Marcel Hadeed, Mariusz Kaminski, Monika Sus, Brett Swaney, and Amelie Theussen

  Sponsored by the U.S. National Defense University (NDU) and the Swedish Defence University, this is the fourth and final paper in a series of INSS Strategic Forums dedicated to the multinational exploration of the strategic defense challenges faced by the Baltic states. The December 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy describes Russia as “using subversive measures to weaken the credibility of America’s commitment to Europe, undermine transatlantic unity, and weaken European institutions and governments.”1The American and European authors of this paper, along with many others, came together in a series of exercises conducted in late 2017 through the winter of 2019 to explore possible responses to the security challenges facing the Baltic Sea region (BSR).

• 

  Winning the Fight Taiwan Cannot Afford to Lose

  Drew Thompson

  Taiwan’s defense approach has long relied on purchases of U.S. equipment and attempts to emulate U.S. doctrine. The U.S. military, however, has focused on projecting power to fight smaller adversaries around the world, while Taiwan faces the prospect of defending its homeland from China’s increasingly capable People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The United States is deeply committed to defending Taiwan, particularly as it becomes increasingly clear that Taiwan’s military needs to adapt to the rising threat posed by the PLA and the risk that Xi Jinping might seek to use force to compel unification. China has long had the ability to blockade or to launch missiles or air strikes against Taiwan, but a defiant Taipei could resist such coercion and refuse to surrender. Beijing can only be certain that it can compel unification if it can mount an invasion. Deterring invasion is, therefore, the ultimate objective for the United States and Taiwan. Maintaining cross-strait stability in the face of an increasingly wellresourced and modernizing PLA requires continual innovation and adaptation, including the updating of defense concepts.

• 

  PLA Overseas Operations in 2035: Inching Toward a Global Combat Capability

  Joel Wuthnow, Phillip C. Saunders, and Ian Burns McCaslin

  Over the past decade, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has followed two general development trajectories. The primary focus has been on deterring adversaries and building the capability to fight high-intensity, short-duration wars around China’s periphery—what the PLA often refers to as “informationized local wars.” This has included acquisition of advanced combat capabilities, supported by progress in doctrine, training, logistics, and command and control (C2). A central theme has been strengthening the PLA’s ability to conduct joint operations, thus correcting problems of ground force dominance and poor interservice cooperation. A secondary focus has been on nontraditional security operations, such as peacekeeping, maritime law enforcement, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR). Such missions, usually involving only a single service, have been conducted within the region and farther from China’s shores, reflecting the expansion of Chinese interests and the growing presence of Chinese citizens outside East Asia.

• 

  Baltics Left of Bang: Comprehensive Defense in the Baltic States

  Dalia Bankauskaite, Janis Berzins, Deividas Slekys, Tony Lawrence, Brett Swaney, and T.X. Hammes

  Sponsored by the National Defense University (NDU) and the Swedish National Defense University, this paper is the third in a series of Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Forums dedicated to the multinational exploration of the strategic defense challenges faced by the Baltic states. The December 2017 National Security Strategy described Russia as “using subversive measures to weaken the credibility of America’s commitment to Europe, undermine transatlantic unity, and weaken European institutions and governments.” The U.S. and European authors of this paper, along with many others, came together in a series of wargames conducted in late 2017 through the winter of 2019 to explore possible responses to the security challenges facing the Baltic Sea region. This third installment in the series highlights research and gaming insights indicating the value of a comprehensive defense for building resilience and resistance capabilities among the Baltic states.

• 

  The European Union’s Permanent Structured Cooperation: Implications for Transatlantic Security

  Colonel Jonathan Dunn USA

  In November of 2017, the European Union (EU) officially launched the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) project, its latest attempt to deepen defense cooperation among EU members. Earlier that same year, the EU approved two other important initiatives designed to strengthen defense cooperation: the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the European Defence Fund (EDF). Shortly after the launch of PESCO, many U.S. defense officials expressed skepticism about its value.1 This is not surprising; U.S. officials have reflexively opposed European defense initiatives such as PESCO since the end of the Cold War. U.S. opposition to these initiatives reflects its fear that they could lead the EU to become a competitor to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for European security issues and resources, and in so doing reduce U.S. influence in European security.

• 

  Beyond Borders: PLA Command and Control of Overseas Operations

  Dr. Phillip C. Saunders

  China’s latest round of military reforms is driven primarily by Xi Jinping’s ambition to reshape the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to improve its ability to win informationized [xinxihua, 信息化] wars and to ensure that it remains loyal to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The reforms are unprecedented in their ambition and in the scale and scope of the organizational changes. Virtually every part of the PLA now reports to different leaders, has had its mission and responsibilities changed, has lost or gained subordinate units, or has undergone a major internal reorganization. The relationships between and among the Central Military Commission (CMC) departments, offices, and commissions, the services, and the theater commands (TCs) have all changed. The reforms established new joint command and control mechanisms and thus have important implications for how the PLA conducts operations within and beyond China’s borders.

• 

  Baltics Left of Bang: Nordic Total Defense and Implications for the Baltic Sea Region

  Håkon Lunde Saxi Ph.D., Bengt Sundelius, and Brett Swaney

  Sponsored by the U.S. National Defense University (NDU) and the Swedish National Defense University, this paper is the second in a series of Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Forums dedicated to the multinational exploration of the strategic and defense challenges faced by the Baltic states. The December 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy described Russia as “using subversive measures to weaken the credibility of America’s commitment to Europe, undermine transatlantic unity, and weaken European institutions and governments.” The U.S. and European authors of this paper, along with many others, came together in late 2017 to explore possible responses to the security challenges facing the Baltic Sea Region (BSR). This second report highlights early research and gaming insights indicating the importance of total defense and comprehensive security, whole-of-society approaches to deterrence and defense of the Baltic Sea Region from Russian aggression. It also provides recommendations for how the Nordic and Baltic states can leverage aspects of total defense and comprehensive security to generate a credible asymmetric defense and build societal resilience.

• 

  Just Another Paper Tiger? Chinese Perspectives on the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy

  Dr. Joel Wuthnow

  In March 2018, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi responded to a question about the Donald Trump administration’s new “free and open Indo-Pacific” strategy by comparing it to “sea foam in the Pacific or Indian Ocean” that might get some attention, “but soon will dissipate.” Wang’s remarks raise an important question for U.S. policymakers: Is Beijing so confident in its own influence, and doubtful of U.S. commitments in the region, that it perceives a green light to continue or expand the kinds of behavior Washington is trying to discourage, such as coercion of China’s territorial rivals and “predatory” lending?

• 

  The PLA Beyond Asia: China’s Growing Military Presence in the Red Sea Region

  Dr. Joel Wuthnow

  China’s establishment of a military base in Djibouti in 2017 was an important “first” for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which had never operated a base on foreign territory. It was also a milestone in a gradually expanding PLA presence in the Red Sea region. Over the previous decade, China deployed peacekeepers to conflicts in the oil-producing states of Sudan and South Sudan, conducted anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, and increased its military diplomacy throughout the area. By the time the Djibouti base opened, the PLA was already maintaining a presence of more than 2,000 personnel in the region—far more than in any other area outside the Indo-Pacific. While PLA capabilities have remained largely concentrated in Asia, its Red Sea presence showcased an increasing ability to project power to other regions and suggested that additional deployments may occur as China seeks to defend its overseas interests.1 The PLA role in the region has also entered the Chinese popular imagination: the navy’s evacuation of Chinese and foreign citizens from Yemen in 2015 was the basis of Operation Red Sea, one of China’s top grossing films of 2018.

• 

  Baltics Left of Bang: The Role of NATO with Partners in Denial-Based Deterrence

  Colonel Robert M. Klein USA (Ret.), Lieutenant Commander Stefan Lundqvist Ph.D., Colonel Ed Sumangil USAF, and Ulrica Pettersson Ph.D.

  This paper is the first in a sequence of INSS Strategic Forums dedicated to multinational exploration of the strategic and defense challenges faced by Baltic states in close proximity to a resurgent Russia that the U.S. National Security Strategy describes as “using subversive measures to weaken the credibility of America’s commitment to Europe, undermine transatlantic unity, and weaken European institutions and governments." The American and European authors of this paper, along with many others, came together in late 2017 to begin exploration of the most significant Baltic states security challenges through focused strategic research and a series of multinational, interactive theater wargames sponsored by the U.S. National Defense University and Swedish Defence University. This first paper highlights early research and wargaming insights indicating the importance of denial-based deterrence for protection of the Baltic states from potential Russian aggression. It also provides recommendations for how the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States, and the Baltic states can best improve their ground, maritime, and air forces to generate credible denial-based deterrence.

• 

  The Enduring Relevance of the U.S.-Japan Alliance

  James J. Przystup

  For over six decades, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan and the U.S. forward-deployed military presence in Japan have served as the foundation of stability, prosperity, and security in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. It is the basis of the U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy and is a central pillar of its global strategy. The ability to project power halfway around the world from Japan was critical to the allies’ success in the 1991 Persian Gulf War—the USS Independence was then homeported in Japan. The deployment of the Kitty Hawk from Japan to the Persian Gulf in support of Operations Southern Watch and Iraqi Freedom underscored the global significance of the U.S. presence in Japan and the U.S.-Japan alliance.

• 

  Technology and National Security: The United States at a Critical Crossroads

  James Kadtke and John Wharton

  Globalization of science and technology, emerging and unpredictable threats (both manmade and natural), conventional and emerging weapons of mass destruction, and an inversion of technology flow from the private to public sectors all present challenges to our national security.

• 

  Low-Cost Access to Space: Military Opportunities and Challenges

  Philip Stockdale, Scott Aughenbaugh, and Nickolas J. Boensch

  Space activity is critical to the American way of war. The commercialization of space has potentially radical implications for U.S. national security through its impact on a range of military and intelligence functions and on the ability of the nation to effectively project power around the globe.

• 

  The Pentagon’s Pivot: How Lead Users Are Transforming Defense Product Development

  Adam Jay Harrison

  Historically, the Department of Defense (DOD) has relied on strategic forecasting to determine specifications for new military products. These specifications are codified in formal product requirements that drive new product development (NPD).

• 

  Developing an Innovation- Based Ecosystem at the U.S. Department of Defense: Challenges and Opportunities

  Adam Jay Harrison, Bharat Rao, and Bala Mulloth

  The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) is looking at new ways to spur entrepreneurship and innovation among its stakeholders and related constituencies.

• 

  Will Technological Convergence Reverse Globalization?

  T.X. Hammes

  The Economist defines globalization as the “global integration of the movement of goods, capital and jobs,” and for decades, the process has been advancing. The combination of labor cost advantages, increasingly efficient freight systems, and trade agreements fueled globalization by providing regional cost advantages for manufacturing. Over the last six decades, it transformed agricultural societies into industrial powerhouses.

• 

  Korean Unification and the Future of the U.S.-ROK Alliance

  David F. Helvey

  Security alliances can take many forms. They can be bilateral or multilateral, symmetric or asymmetric, highly institutionalized or largely unstructured. Regardless of form, security alliances as instruments of statecraft, at their most fundamental level, reflect a deliberate commitment among states to aggregate resources in the pursuit of common interests. For over 60 years, the U.S.–Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance has defended South Korea from external attack and, through the combined efforts of both countries, contributed to peace and stability not only on the Korean Peninsula, but also in Northeast Asia, across the Asia-Pacific, and beyond.

• 

  Reflections on U.S.-Cuba Military-to-Military Contacts

  Hal Klepak

  The strategic import of U.S.-Cuba relations was underscored by President Barack Obama’s historic visit to Cuba from March 20–22, 2016, and his comment that he had come to Cuba “to bury the last remnant of the Cold War in the Americas.” Geography also reinforces the strategic importance of both countries to one another. Cuba sits astride the intersection of the three large bodies of water dominating the approaches to the southern United States. The large island nation is in a position to block, complicate, or facilitate U.S. border control efforts in many ways. Partnering with Cuba also might allow the United States to benefit from Cuba’s notable record of using soft power effectively in the Western Hemisphere and beyond.

• 

  Cross-Functional Teams in Defense Reform: Help or Hindrance?

  Christopher J. Lamb

  On May 12, 2016, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) announced its markup of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2017. Committee chairman John McCain (RAZ) stated that the bill “contains the most sweeping reforms of the organization of the Department of Defense [DOD] in a generation.” The House Armed Services Committee version of the NDAA contained fewer reforms, but the committee emphasized that reform was necessary because “security challenges have become more transregional, multi-domain, and multi-functional. . . . U.S. superiority in key warfighting areas is at risk with other nations’ technological advances; and . . . [DOD] lacks the agility and adaptability necessary to support timely decisionmaking and the rapid fielding of new capabilities.”

• 

  National Security Reform and the 2016 Election

  Christopher J. Lamb and Joseph Bond

  There are few issues of greater intrinsic importance to the United States than national security reform—or one riper for resolution. Twenty years ago most senior leaders were skeptical of allegations that the national security system was “broken”; they believed the system functioned well enough to manage the Nation’s most pressing problems. Since then numerous prominent experts have been sounding the alarm from inside the system and from without.1 No fewer than nine blue-ribbon groups have argued in favor of system reforms (see tables 1 and 2).2 The overwhelming majority of scholars publishing independently on the issue favor reform. During the 2008 Presidential election, the momentum in favor of national security reform was so strong that many thought it was inevitable. This presumption was reinforced when President Barack Obama appointed well-known proponents of reform to senior positions in the National Security Council staff, Department of State, Department of Defense (DOD), and Intelligence Community.4 Yet reform did not take place during the Obama administration, and so far it has not been an issue in the 2016 Presidential race, either. This paper examines why reform was sidetracked, whether it could emerge as a campaign issue during the 2016 Presidential election, and why it is in candidates’ and the Nation’s interest that it does.

• 

  China’s Future SSBN Command and Control Structure

  David C. Logan

  China’s ongoing modernization program is transforming the country’s

  nuclear arsenal from one consisting of a few liquid-fueled, silo-based

  missiles carrying single warheads to a larger force of more advanced

  mobile solid-fueled missiles, some of which are capable of carrying multiple

  warheads. Perhaps most significant for its nuclear policies, China is also on the

  verge of fielding its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent, having already

  completed four nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and with a fifth

  vessel currently under construction.

• 

  The NATO Warsaw Summit: How to Strengthen Alliance Cohesion

  Alexander Mattelaer

  It is often stated that cohesion constitutes the center of gravity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Yet divergent domestic pressures and external threat perceptions are threatening to pull Allies apart and leave the Euro-Atlantic security architecture in shatters. When NATO Heads of State and Government meet in Warsaw on July 8–9, 2016, the stakes will be high. Not since the end of the Cold War has the security outlook been as bleak or the collective resources for meeting multiple threats as meager.