Research and Case Studies

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  The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Review of the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation

  James J. Przystup

  This paper is focused on the U.S.-Japan alliance as reflected in the evolution of the U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation. It begins with consideration of the October 3, 2013, 2+2 Statement released by Secretary of State John Kerry, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida, and Minister of Defense Itsunori Onodera. The statement reaffirmed the critical importance of the alliance to international stability and security, the U.S. commitment to the security of Japan, and a common strategic vision based on shared values. The statement also tasked the two governments to review the existing 1997 U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation. Over the course of three-plus decades, the guidelines have served as the framework for U.S.-Japan security cooperation.

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  Red China's "Capitalist Bomb": Inside the Chinese Neutron Bomb Program

  Jonathan Ray

  This paper examines why China developed an enhanced radiation weapon (ERW) but did not deploy it. ERWs, better known as “neutron bombs,” are specialized nuclear weapons with reduced blast effects and enhanced radiation, making them ideal tactical and antipersonnel weapons. Declassified U.S. intelligence and Chinese press reports indicate the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was interested in an ERW in 1977 and successfully tested a device on September 29, 1988. To date, however, these sources provide no evidence of deployment. This study exploits primary source documents to reconstruct the ERW program’s history, assesses drivers behind decisions throughout the program, and considers broader implications for PRC decisionmaking on weapons development. This case study suggests a model of a “technology reserve” in which China develops a weapons technology to match the capabilities of another state but defers deployment. This paper presents an analytic framework for examining how the technology reserve model might apply to China’s decisionmaking on ballistic missile defense (BMD), antisatellite (ASAT), and hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) systems.

  The framework considers five variables as potential drivers of China’s ERW decisionmaking. Specifically, it assesses the strategic environment of the PRC, the strategic value and normative value of the ERW, as well as the resource demands and technical feasibility of the ERW program. The framework also considers coalition politics of the ERW program as an intervening variable that influenced each of the above variables throughout the program’s history. The ERW program’s history comprised three phases:

  1. 1977–1980: Decision and Initial Research. In 1977, Chinese media followed the controversy over the U.S. decision to develop and deploy an ERW in Europe. Soviet media denounced the ERW and grew concerned at China’s silence on the controversy. After General Zhang Aiping [张爱萍] signaled the PRC’s interest in the ERW in the People’s Daily, scientists involved in the ERW program (herein referred as the weaponeers) began initial research and development (R&D). Some weaponeers argued against developing the ERW, worrying that it was unnecessary and would disrupt higher priority work on warhead miniaturization. Ultimately, they acquiesced to orders and combined the ERW and warhead miniaturization research to master common principles of the two systems.

  2. 1980–1984: Research and Development. In 1980, General Zhang told a member of a visiting U.S. delegation that China needed the ERW as a hedge against the Soviets. The weapon fit into China’s military strategic guideline of “active defense” to defend against a Soviet armored thrust and invasion. By then, the weaponeers were dividing the ERW problem into constituent parts, or “principles,” and solving them individually. From 1982 to 1984, China conducted five tests related to the ERW and warhead miniaturization. On December 19, 1984, the weaponeers conducted a successful “principles breakthrough” test. One weaponeer metaphorically described the successful test by saying that “the second generation of light boats has passed the bridge.”

  3. 1985–1988: Pause and Reevaluation. In 1985, China halted nuclear testing for 30 months. The pause coincided with a Soviet moratorium on testing and a leadership reshuffle that neutralized ERW proponent General Zhang. In 1986, the weaponeers warned PRC leaders that the United States and Soviet Union could conclude a nuclear test ban treaty, and they proposed accelerated testing to complete warhead designs. The Central Committee approved the report and provided funding. On September 29, 1988, China successfully tested an ERW design and added it to what one weaponeer called the “technology reserve.”

  No variable individually explains the ERW program’s decisions and outcomes. A tense strategic environment and the ERW’s high strategic value against Soviet armored divisions correlate with the program’s R&D but do not explain the fi al test in a more relaxed strategic environment. Similarly, the ERW’s normative value was initially high as a technological achievement, but a taboo against the weapon was fi mly in place before the fi al test. Resource demands and technological feasibility were challenges at the program’s beginning, and even after the weaponeers combined ERW and miniaturization research to conserve resources, the program still stalled in 1985. The 1988 fi al ERW design test for China’s “technology reserve” reflects both a hedge against changes in China’s strategic environment and the culmination of research. The evidence is incomplete, but it indicates that an ERW coalition led by General Zhang Aiping championed the program from 1977 to 1984 but fell apart before the ERW’s completion.

  This analytic framework and “technology reserve” model of matching a capability but deferring deployment help frame analyses of the PRC’s decisionmaking for its BMD, ASAT, and HGV programs. A cursory analysis indicates arms control possibilities for BMD, continued development of ASAT capabilities, and multiple possible outcomes for HGV development.

  Key themes and lessons from the ERW case study include the following:

  • Strong leaders versus institutional capacity. Coalitions with strong leaders such as Deng Xiaoping and Zhang Aiping drove the ERW program in a time of weak institutions. Today, China’s weapons development processes are more institutionalized but are still susceptible to factional politics.
  • Technology parity as an ideological imperative. Matching other states’ military technologies is an extension of Chinese techno-nationalism into weapons development decisions.
  • Importance of potential adversaries’ reactions. Soviet alarm over the ERW as a disruptive capability made the weapon more attractive to Chinese leaders. U.S. reactions to contemporary PRC weapons systems should be calm.
  • Need to update Chinese open-source research techniques. This research benefited from studies on Chinese open-source research techniques, but such literature is dated. Newer sources such as social media, blogs, chat rooms, and updated databases highlight the need for more current discussions.

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  China Moves Out: Stepping Stones Toward a New Maritime Strategy

  Christopher H. Sharman

  Over the last decade, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has increased the frequency, duration, complexity, and distance from the mainland of its operations. Not only does China maintain a permanent counterpiracy escort flotilla in the Indian Ocean, it also now routinely conducts naval exercises and operations beyond the first island chain throughout the year. This normalization of PLAN operations in the Western Pacific and beyond is an important step toward an emerging new maritime strategy that will incorporate far seas defense.

  Far seas defense involves extending PLAN combat capabilities into waters farther from China. The concept is consistent with stated PLAN goals and training requirements, but it is not formally incorporated into China’s current maritime strategy. Chinese President Hu Jintao’s 2004 New Historic Missions charter provided the PLAN with the strategic direction to develop concepts, experience, and tactics germane to establishing far seas defense capabilities. PLAN deployments to and exercises in the near seas since 2004 have been evolutionary steps toward implementing a near seas active defense strategy, but regular deployments deeper into the Western Pacific have also helped the PLAN build the ability to operate in the far seas and begin to operationalize the concept of far seas defense.

  This monograph begins by examining the geography, history, and strategic focus of near seas active defense, China’s current maritime strategy. It illustrates how the New Historic Missions expanded PLAN mission requirements from traditional near seas operating areas to operations in the far seas. The paper provides a strategic framework for a new maritime defense strategy that would incorporate far seas capabilities. It then examines the evolution of PLAN operations and exercises since 2004. The monograph concludes by identifying several factors that, if observed, would indicate PLAN incorporation of far seas defense as part of an emerging new maritime strategy.

  PLAN deployments to the Western Pacific since 2004 demonstrate a deliberate and methodical approach to normalization, from single fleet and single-dimensional (surface ship against surface ship) scripted exercises in the Western Pacific to multifleet coordinated unscripted training involving submarines, surface ships, unmanned aerial vehicles, and fixedwing aircraft. There has also been a gradual increase from a few ships conducting deployments to as many as 12 ships and submarines deploying simultaneously. The monograph summarizes these changes as well as PLAN trends in signaling and in the steady expansion of chokepoints used by PLAN ships to access the near seas. It also highlights the growing complexity of information over time.

  The PLAN is likely to gradually increase the frequency of combat readiness patrol deployments to the far seas over the next 5 to 7 years. An uptick is likely in mixed-platform PLAN surface action groups rehearsing a myriad of combat warfare disciplines, such as exercising antisubmarine, antiair, and antisurface warfare during deployments to the far seas. These combat readiness patrols may include deployments along various strategic sea lines of communication in the Pacific, chokepoints in the Indian Ocean, and perhaps even to the Northern Pacific to support China’s Arctic interests.

  Operationalization of far seas defense will consist of regular deployment of surface action groups that provide maximum flexibility to address ever-changing mission objectives. PLAN ships deploying to the far seas will possess robust communications capabilities and will be linked through relatively rapid information flow across and up the chain of command. PLAN near seas operations over the last decade have included political signaling, suggesting the PLAN will be used for this mission in the far seas as well.

  Indications that the PLAN is aggressively looking to operationalize far seas defense missions would include observation of Jiangdao light frigates assuming greater responsibility for missions traditionally assigned to larger PLAN combatants within the first island chain, construction of icebreakers, enhanced intelligence support to deployed ships, active reporting on distant sea operations in the official Chinese press, a gradual increase in the frequency of deployments, and enhanced PLAN logistics support capabilities.

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  The Grand Strategy of the United States

  R.D. Hooker

  From the earliest days of the Republic, the outlines of an evolving American grand strategy have been evident in our foreign and domestic policy. Much of that history continues to inform our strategic conduct, and therefore American grand strategy rests today on traditional foundations. Despite a welter of theory and debate, grand strategy as a practical matter is remarkably consistent from decade to decade, with its means altering as technology advances and institutions evolve but its ends and ways showing marked continuity.

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  Policy Challenges of Accelerating Technological Change: Security Policy and Strategy Implications of Parallel Scientific Revolutions

  James Kadtke and Linton Wells II

  This paper examines policy, legal, ethical, and strategy implications for national security of the accelerating science, technology, and engineering (ST&E) revolutions underway in five broad areas: biology, robotics, information, nanotechnology, and energy (BRINE), with a particular emphasis on how they are interacting. The paper considers the timeframe between now and 2030 but emphasizes policy and related choices that need to be made in the next few years to shape the future competitive space favorably, and focuses on those decisions that are within U.S. Department of Defense’s (DOD) purview. The pace and complexity of technological change mean that linear predictions of current needs cannot be the basis for effective guidance or management for the future. These are issues for policymakers and commanders, not just technical specialists.

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  The Bosnian Train and Equip Program: A Lesson in Interagency Integration of Hard and Soft Power

  Christopher J. Lamb, Sarah Arkin, and Sally Scudder

  Military assistance to Bosnian forces was part of a complex plan to resolve what one former Secretary of State called “the problem from hell.” When Yugoslavia began to disintegrate in the early 1990s following the Soviet Union’s demise, it released a mix of nationalist and ethnic movements that led to civil war. Ill-disciplined combinations of regular and irregular forces struggled to control territory and protect civilians, sometimes herding them toward ethnically homogenous enclaves in a process widely referred to as “ethnic cleansing.” The intentional displacement of civilian populations, often encouraged by atrocities including mass murder and rape, was a tragic and complex foreign policy problem that defied simple and easy solutions.

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  A Strategic Vision and a New Management Approach for the Department of the Navy’s Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Portfolio

  Joseph P. Lawrence

  This paper considers the Department of the Navy Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) program holistically. The underlying premise, that will be expanded on here, is that the Department is not doing a good enough job of strategically managing its RDT&E portfolio and that, at least partly as a result, the Department is spending too much and taking too long in getting new technology-driven capabilities into the hands of our warfighters. The goal of this paper is to identify a workable RDT&E process that better enables the Department of the Navy to identify, develop, and maintain the capabilities of our warfighters as notably the most advanced in the world.

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  The Nightmare Years to Come?

  Regis W. Matlak

  We have entered a particularly dangerous era in the Near East and South Asia— that is, the Greater Middle East. The context of today’s situation is more alarming than respective current crises—as bad as they may be. Rather, there is an increasingly radicalized and violent sectarian environment made up of crosscutting crises occurring in the midst of proliferation; precision weapons; cyber war; increased ungoverned territory vulnerable to global, regional, and local jihadist exploitation; majoritarian authoritarianism; uncompromising sectarianism; ethnic, tribal, and sectarian-driven civil wars; massive popular anger and frustration over the lack of essential services and a diminishing quality of life, particularly in areas such as water, electricity, health, education, employment, and economic collapse; water wars and environmental endangerment; and the vulnerability of sensitive infrastructure targeted by state and nonstate actors, or an empowered lone wolf in the service of a state or nonstate actors.

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  The U.S. “Rebalance” and Europe: Convergent Strategies Open Doors to Improved Cooperation

  Leo G. Michel and James J. Przystup

  The U.S. strategic “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific region has captured the attention of our

  European allies and partners. When the strategy (initially described as a “pivot to Asia”) was articulated in late 2011 and early 2012, European reactions were diverse. Some governmental officials, nongovernmental experts, and media commentators voiced concern that the strategy signaled at best a diminishing U.S. interest in European security affairs, or at worst a deliberate U.S. policy of disengagement from Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East.

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  The Indian Jihadist Movement: Evolution and Dynamics

  Stephen Tankel

  The Indian jihadist movement remains motivated primarily by domestic grievances rather than India-Pakistan dynamics. However, it is far more lethal than it otherwise would have been without external support from the Pakistani state, Pakistani and Bangladeshi jihadist groups, and the ability to leverage Bangladesh, Nepal, and certain Persian Gulf countries for sanctuary and as staging grounds for attacks in India. External support for the Indian mujahideen (IM) from the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence and Pakistan-based militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) persists, but the question of command and control is more difficult to discern. The IM is best viewed as an LeT associate rather than an LeT affiliate.

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  “Not an Idea We Have to Shun”: Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements in the 21st Century

  Christopher D. Yung, Ross Rustici, Scott Devary, and Jenny Lin

  China’s expanding international economic interests are likely to generate increasing demands for its navy, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), to operate out of area to protect Chinese citizens, investments, and sea lines of communication. The frequency, intensity, type, and location of such operations will determine the associated logistics support requirements, with distance from China, size and duration, and combat intensity being especially important drivers.

  How will the PLAN employ overseas bases and facilities to support these expanding operational requirements? The assessment in this study is based on Chinese writings, comments by Chinese military officers and analysts, observations of PLAN operational patterns, analysis of the overseas military logistics models other countries have employed, and interviews with military logisticians. China’s rapidly expanding international interests are likely to produce a parallel expansion of PLAN operations, which would make the current PLAN tactic, exclusive reliance on commercial port access, untenable due to cost and capacity factors. This would certainly be true if China contemplated engaging in higher intensity combat operations.

  This study considers six logistics models that might support expanded PLAN overseas operations: the Pit Stop Model, Lean Colonial Model, Dual Use Logistics Facility, String of Pearls Model, Warehouse Model, and Model USA. Each model is analyzed in terms of its ability to support likely future naval missions to advance China’s expanding overseas economic, political, and security interests and in light of longstanding Chinese foreign policy principles. This analysis concludes that the Dual Use Logistics Facility and String of Pearls models most closely align with China’s foreign policy principles and expanding global interests.

  To assess which alternative China is likely to pursue, the study reviews current PLAN operational patterns in its Gulf of Aden counterpiracy operations1 to assess whether the PLAN is currently pursuing one model over the other and to provide clues about Chinese motives and potential future trajectories. To ensure that this study does not suffer from faulty assumptions, it also explicitly examines the strategic logic that Western analysts associate with the String of Pearls Model in light of the naval forces and logistics infrastructure that would be necessary to support PLAN major combat operations in the Indian Ocean. Both the contrasting inductive and deductive analytic approaches support the conclusion that China appears to be planning for a relatively modest set of missions to support its overseas interests, not building a covert logistics infrastructure to fight the United States or India in the Indian Ocean.

  Key findings:

  • There is little physical evidence that China is constructing bases in the Indian Ocean to conduct major combat operations, to encircle India, or to dominate South Asia.
  • China’s current operational patterns of behavior do not support the String of Pearls thesis. PLAN ships use different commercial ports for replenishment and liberty, and the ports and forces involved could not conduct major combat operations.
  • China is unlikely to construct military facilities in the Indian Ocean to support major combat operations there. Bases in South Asia would be vulnerable to air and missile attack, the PLAN would require a much larger force structure to support this strategy, and the distances between home ports in China and PLAN ships stationed at the String of Pearls network of facilities along its sea lines of communication would make it difficult to defend Chinese home waters and simultaneously conduct major combat operations in the Indian Ocean.
  • The Dual Use Logistics Facility Model’s mixture of access to overseas commercial facilities and a limited number of military bases most closely aligns with China’s future naval mission requirements and will likely characterize its future arrangements.
  • Pakistan’s status as a trusted strategic partner whose interests are closely aligned with China’s makes the country the most likely location for an overseas Chinese military base; the port at Karachi would be better able to satisfy PLAN requirements than the new port at Gwadar.
  • The most efficient means of supporting more robust People’s Liberation Army (PLA) out of area military operations would be a limited network of facilities that distribute functional responsibilities geographically (for example, one facility handling air logistics support, one facility storing ordnance, another providing supplies for replenishment ships).
  • A future overseas Chinese military base probably would be characterized by a light footprint, with 100 to 500 military personnel conducting supply and logistics functions. Such a facility would likely support both civilian and military operations, with Chinese forces operating in a restrictive political and legal environment that might not include permission to conduct combat operations.
  • Naval bases are much more likely than ground bases, but China might also seek to establish bases that could store ordnance, repair and maintain equipment, and provide medical/mortuary services to support future PLA ground force operations against terrorists and other nontraditional security threats in overseas areas such as Africa.
  • A more active PLA overseas presence would provide opportunities as well as challenges for U.S.-China relations. Chinese operations in support of regional stability and to address nontraditional security threats would not necessarily conflict with U.S. interests and may provide new opportunities for bilateral and multilateral cooperation with China.
  • Long-term access to overseas military facilities would increase China’s strategic gravity and significantly advance China’s political interests in the region where the facilities are located. To the extent that U.S. and Chinese regional and global interests are not aligned, the United States would need to continue to use its own military presence and diplomatic efforts to solidify its regional interests.
  • A significantly expanded Chinese military presence in the Indian Ocean would complicate U.S. relations with China and with the countries of the region, compel U.S. naval and military forces to operate in closer proximity with PLA forces, and increase competitive dynamics in U.S.-China and China-Indian relations.
  • Finally, if some of the countries of the Indian Ocean region and elsewhere agree to host PLA forces over the long term, their decision will imply a shift in their relations with the United States, which may ultimately need to rethink how it engages and interacts with these countries.

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  Organizational Analysis of the TIDES Project and the STAR-TIDES Network using the 7-S Framework

  Paul T. Bartone, Mark Vaitkus, Kathleen Jocoy, Jocelyn V. Bartone, Linton Wells II, and Linda M. Wells

  This paper gives an in-depth organizational analysis of STAR-TIDES, a special project of CTNSP. STAR-TIDES is an open-network, global organization, a form that is increasingly common in the digital age. This report identifies the core “7-S” factors in STAR-TIDES (Strategy, Structure, Systems, Staffing, Skills, Style, and Shared values), with recommendations for improved performance. Results provide a template for how to conduct a 7-S organizational analysis.

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  Chance favors only the prepared mind:” The Proper Role for U.S. Department of Defense Science and Engineering Workforce

  Timothy Coffey

  This publication provides critical recommendations for managing the DoD’s 130,000 person Science and Technology workforce through a period of growing fiscal and geopolitical ambiguity. The report outlines a strategy that: prioritizes lessons learned through hands-on experience; cultivates practices that identify and support the most promising trends in technology and research; promotes advocacy for worthy programs, and; develops a process for ensuring competent “third parties” determine a fair price for acquisition and development. It concludes by urging the DoD return to a prudently managed, conservative S&T strategy that emphasizes workforce recruitment and training, adequate funding for research and development, and increased engagement with colleges and universities.

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  China’s Forbearance Has Limits: Chinese Threat and Retaliation Signaling and Its Implications for a Sino-American Military Confrontation

  Paul H.B. Godwin and Alice L. Miller

  Since its founding in 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has employed military force in defense of China’s security and territorial integrity. In many such instances, Beijing implemented a calculus of threat and retaliation signals intended first to deter an adversary from taking actions contrary to Chinese interests by threatening the use of military force and, if deterrence failed, to explain and justify Beijing’s resort to military force.

  This deterrence calculus was applied in each of the major instances in which Beijing has resorted to military force—in Korea in 1950, in the Sino-Indian border dispute in 1961–1962, in the Sino-Soviet border dispute in 1968–1969, and in China’s attack on northern Vietnam in 1979. It was also applied in instances in which Beijing’s effort at deterrence apparently succeeded and China ultimately stopped short of using military force. Examples include China’s responses to the intensifying American combat effort in Vietnam in 1965–1968 and to the 1991 debates in Taipei about delimiting the Republic of China’s sovereignty claims.

  Beijing implements this deterrence calculus by a carefully calibrated hierarchy of official protests, authoritative press comment, and leadership statements. If the crisis persists and Beijing perceives its interests are not satisfactorily taken into account, its statements escalate in level and may include at first implicit and thereafter increasingly explicit warnings that it may use military force to achieve its goals. This approach has been employed consistently despite the sweeping changes in the PRC’s place in the international order, the proliferation of foreign policy instruments at its disposal, the more complex crisis decisionmaking process and domestic political environment, and the dramatic evolution in the Chinese media over the decades.

  Significant improvements in China’s military capabilities, particularly in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) naval and air arms, have enhanced Beijing’s ability to press its territorial claims in the South and East China Seas. Chinese actions, often in response to challenges by other claimants, have raised regional tensions. Moreover, Beijing has at times hardened its objections to U.S. military exercises, aerial surveillance, and intelligence collection in China’s exclusive economic zone and in international airspace off its coasts. Aggressive maneuvers by Chinese military aircraft, fishing vessels, and civilian agency ships have led to serious incidents, including a collision between a PLA Navy (PLAN) fighter and a U.S. Navy reconnaissance aircraft that led to the death of the PLAN pilot.

  The question for U.S. policymakers is whether improving military capabilities will lead Beijing to substitute sudden or surprise attack for the politically calibrated deterrence signaling it has employed prior to its past use of force. This study assesses the problem in four ways. It first reviews China’s use of force since 1949 to determine the motivations driving Beijing’s employment of military coercion. Second, it assesses China’s crisis decisionmaking process and crisis management. Third, it assesses the prospects for China’s more aggressive use of military coercion in Asia’s emerging security environment. Finally, Beijing’s signaling of China’s intent to employ military coercion is assessed in detail using a series of crisis case studies covering the years 1961–2004.

  Although China’s military capabilities are continuing to improve and its standing and involvement in the world have changed quite dramatically, this study concludes that the traditional calculus of threat and retaliation statements remains a central tool in Beijing’s array of foreign policy and security instruments for responding to and managing tensions and disputes.

  The historical instances where China has used military power can be divided into those cases when Beijing has employed significant military force and those cases when lesser military coercion has been employed. As one would anticipate, the forces employed reflect the immediacy of the perceived threat, the importance of the interest being threatened, and the capabilities of the opposing military forces.

  Deterrence signaling has been more systematically and directly applied when Beijing has perceived a major military threat or strategic trend placing a high value interest in jeopardy. This includes all four of the Taiwan cases examined (in 1991, 1995–1996, 1999, and 2003–2004).

  China’s recognition of the power asymmetry between itself and the United States partially explains why none of the post–Korean War crises involving the United States evolved into direct military conflict. Chinese and American scholars agree that one characteristic of Sino- American crises is China’s consistent policy of seeking to avoid a military confrontation with the United States even as it employed or threatened the use of military force.

  This record does not, however, necessarily transfer to a potential Taiwan crisis. Here, some Chinese hold the view that whereas Taiwan involves a core interest for China, it is only of marginal strategic interest to the United States. Consequently, China should not be fearful of employing military force to deter Taiwan’s de jure independence because the United States could well decide that a war with China over Taiwan is simply too costly given the island’s low strategic value to the United States.

  This view of the asymmetric importance of Taiwan to China and the United States reflects a broader Chinese perspective on past Sino-American crises. From a Chinese perspective, Sino-American crises did not occur in locales where core U.S. security interests were at stake. Whether in Korea, China’s offshore islands, Vietnam, or Taiwan, China’s interests were under greater threat because the locales were on or near China’s national boundaries. More over, in crises over the offshore islands and Taiwan, China’s territorial integrity and national sovereignty were at stake. These perceived asymmetries of interest contribute to China’s view that U.S. policies and strategies are similar to those conducted by imperialist and hegemonic powers in the past.

  This same perspective of asymmetric interests applies to China’s maritime territorial claims in the South and East China Seas. Whereas Beijing recognizes a U.S. interest in freedom of navigation, any U.S. involvement in how these territorial disputes should be settled is unacceptable because the disputes do not involve U.S. strategic interests. For Beijing, these territorial disputes are sovereignty issues extending back to the 19th century when Japanese and Western imperialists began their violations of China’s sovereignty. In China’s view, they are not a matter where the United States has any legitimate interest.

  Despite its commitment to the restoration of its own sovereignty over islands in the South and East China Seas, Beijing is reluctant to employ direct military coercion when its claims are challenged. These disputes do not constitute a direct threat to Chinese security, and the political, economic, and security consequences of a military confrontation between China and its neighbors, including those with mutual defense treaties with the United States, are evident. Beijing’s resolve to avoid a military confrontation is particularly manifest with regard to the United States. Given the potentially grave consequences, if China does consider using military force, Beijing is almost certain to employ the same deterrence calculus it has maintained since the founding of the People’s Republic. It would do so to minimize the possibility that it will have to use the military force on which the deterrence calculus ultimately rests and to reduce the costs if force is used.

  China’s application of the deterrence calculus in a future crisis would likely have the following characteristics:

  • Systematic integration of political and diplomatic action with military preparations as the signaling escalates through higher levels of authority. Such preparations are often, if not always, overt and integrated into the political and diplomatic messages designed to deter the adversary from the course of action Beijing finds threatening.
  • Stating why China is justified in using military force should this prove necessary. The message targets both domestic and international audiences. In essence, Beijing declares that it confronts a serious threat to its security and interests that if not terminated will require the use of military force.
  • Asserting that the use of military force is not Beijing’s preferred resolution to the threat it faces, but one that will be forced upon it should the adversary not heed the deterrence warnings sent. In short, Beijing’s signaling strategy seeks to grant China the moral high ground in the emerging confrontation. Such an argument supports China’s self-identification as a uniquely peaceful country that employs military force only in defense and when provoked by adversaries threatening its security or sovereignty. Presumably, Beijing believes that asserting the moral high ground in a confrontation can ease international response to any military action China might take and thereby reduce the political costs of employing military force.
  • Emphasizing that China’s forbearance and restraint should not be viewed as weakness and that China is prepared to employ military force should that be necessary.

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  Crisis Stability and Nuclear Exchange Risks on the Subcontinent: Major Trends and the Iran Factor

  Thomas F. Lynch III

  Crisis stability—the probability that political tensions and low-level conflict will not erupt into a major war between India and Pakistan—is less certain in 2013 than at any time since their sequential nuclear weapons tests of 1998. India’s vast and growing spending on large conventional military forces, at least in part as a means to dissuade Pakistan’s tolerance of (or support for) insurgent and terrorist activity against India, coupled with Pakistan’s post-2006 accelerated pursuit of tactical nuclear weapons as a means to offset this Indian initiative, have greatly increased the risk of a future Indo-Pakistani military clash or terrorist incident escalating to nuclear exchange.1 America’s limited abilities to prevent the escalation of an Indo-Pakistani crisis toward major war are best served by continuing a significant military and political presence in Afghanistan and diplomatic and military-to-military dialogue with Pakistan well beyond 2014.

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  Suggestions for Evaluating the Quality of the Army’s Science and Technology Program: The Portfolio and Its Execution

  John W. Lyons, Richard Chait, and James A. Ratches

  This paper presents a methodology discussing the goal of establishing the strongest possible technology program appropriately aligned to the needs of its customers and the expectations of its stakeholders. The first chapter presents the essential elements of the Army S&T portfolio followed by discussions of the Army S&T portfolio and the evaluation of it.

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  External Collaboration in Army Science and Technology: The Army’s Research Alliances

  John W. Lyons and James A. Ratches

  In this study, the authors examine the decision for Army Research Laboratories to engage in external, formal collaborations such as collaborative alliances. They go on to assess ARL Collaborative Technology Alliances (CTAs), Collaborative Research Alliances (CRAs), and Information Technology Alliance (ITAs). The report concludes by examining the effectiveness of the examples given above, and a recommendation for formulating a set of assessment questions for Army managers considering collaboration in the future.

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  Some Recent Sensor – Related Army Critical Technology Events

  James A. Ratches, Richard Chait, and John W. Lyons

  Some Recent Sensor-Related Army Critical Technology Events, James A. Ratches, Richard Chait, and John W. Lyons examined current Critical Technology Events (CTEs) that are new or ongoing in US Army Science and Technology (S&T) community. CTEs are ideas, concepts, models and analyses, including key technical and managerial decisions, which have had a major impact on the development of a specific weapons system. The five on-going projects within the Army S&T portfolio selected for inclusion in the report are the Global Positioning System (GPS)-guided munitions, Excalibur; the persistent surveillance platform, Global Hawk; Unattended Transient Acoustic/Artillery MASINT System (UTAMS); the thermal imaging night sight technology; and 5V Li-ion batteries for battlefield power sources. The authors identified 42 CTEs in the development of the Army sensors; 24 of the 42 reported were uniquely contributed by the in-house Army laboratories; 57 percent of all the CTEs originated in the Army S&T laboratories. Further, the authors draw the following conclusions: that Army laboratories make significant technical and enabling contributions to Army platforms and capabilities; Army S&T laboratories are uniquely suited to represent, defend, and guide the satisfaction of Army requirements; Army laboratories have the people, infrastructure, and determination to satisfy evolving and established needs; and the Army S&T community is the singular force in collaboration with industry and academia that ensures Army needs are optimally met in an effective, efficient, and affordable manner. The report attempts to show that the S&T resources and processes in place continue to generate CTEs in the sensor and power area for the next generation of Army systems. It concludes that it is critical to the Army’s mission to foster and nurture the Army’s in-house S&T tech base.

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  Critical Technology Events (CTEs) that Support the Rationale for Army Laboratories Based on Science and Technology Functions Performed

  James A. Ratches and John W. Lyons

  This report, part of the “Project Hindsight Revisited” series of DTP publications, provides a retrospective look at 58 Critical Technology Events (CTEs) in DoD R&D investment, logically divided across 10 separate categories. The authors demonstrate the continuing relevance of Army laboratories in the development of critical weapons systems. Using specific examples, the study articulates the importance of maintaining quality staff and managers, ensuring the relevance of S&T program investments, and integrating servicemen and women with the larger scientific community to forecast technology trends.

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  The New NATO Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism: Analysis, Assessments, and Actions

  Stefano Santamato

  The history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will say that the first, and so far only, time NATO has called upon its Article 5 collective defense clause was on September 12, 2001, following a terrorist attack on one of its members. Yet, until the agreement by NATO Heads of State and Government on the new policy guidelines on counterterrorism on May 20, 2012, NATO did not have an agreed policy to define its role and mandate in countering terrorism.

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  The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992

  Susan J. Coch

  On the morning of September 28, 1991, then-Colonel Frank Klotz witnessed an historic moment at Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota. As he and other senior officers from the base bomber and missile units watched, the crews for the B-1 strategic bombers that had been on alert that day climbed into their cockpits, started the planes, and taxied one after another away from the alert aircraft parking area. That scene was repeated at all 11 Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases in the United States. By the end of the day, there were no U.S. bombers on alert for the first time in over 30 years.

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  Globalization of S&T: Key Challenges Facing DOD

  Timothy Coffey and Steven Ramberg

  This paper employs the results of a full economic analysis for the period 2005-2050 to estimate the S&T knowledge production for each of the world’s 17 largest economies. The present work establishes an empirical relationship between an economy’s gross domestic product per capita and its ability to generate S&T knowledge.

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  Taking the Battle Upstream: Towards a Benchmarking Role for NATO

  Stephan De Spiegeleire

  The main intuition underlying this paper is that the current (geo) political, technological, and especially financial realities may require NATO to take the battle for capabilities upstream.

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  The International Atomic Energy Agency's Decision to Find Iran in Non-Compliance, 2002-2006

  Nima Gerami and Pierre Goldschmidt

  On August 14, 2002, at a press conference in Washington, DC, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an exiled Iranian opposition group, drew worldwide attention when it publicly accused Iran of clandestinely developing nuclear weapons. Alireza Jafarzadeh, then-U.S. media spokesperson for the NCRI, described two “top secret” nuclear facilities being constructed in Iran at Natanz and Arak under the guise of front companies involved in the procurement of nuclear material and equipment. Noting that media attention had focused on Iran’s publicly declared civilian facilities, Jafarzadeh claimed that “in reality, there are many secret nuclear programs at work in Iran without knowledge of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),” the international body responsible for verifying and assuring compliance with safeguards obligations under the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

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  Constructive Convergence: Imagery and Humanitarian Assistance

  Doug Hanchard

  The goal of this paper is to illustrate to the technical community and interested humanitarian users the breadth of tools and techniques now available for imagery collection, analysis and distribution, and to provide brief recommendations with suggestions for next steps.