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  Rightsizing Chinese Military Lessons from Ukraine

  Joel Wuthnow

  Russia’s failures in the early phases of the 2022 Ukraine conflict, and Ukraine’s successes, have raised questions about the implications for China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA). U.S. and other foreign analysts have identified several lessons the PLA could learn from the Ukraine conflict that would improve China’s prospects in a future conflict with Taiwan and the United States or potentially with a different regional rival. The PLA has made it frustratingly difficult to answer these questions using direct evidence: several months into the conflict, PLA officers have produced almost nothing detailing their views on the implications of the conflict for future Chinese operations and modernization. It is also doubtful that internal assessments, if they exist, will be available in a way that can substantiate foreign speculation.

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  Baltics Left of Bang: The Southern Shore

  Marcel Hadeed, Mariusz Kaminski, Monika Sus, Brett Swaney, and Amelie Theussen

  Sponsored by the U.S. National Defense University (NDU) and the Swedish Defence University, this is the fourth and final paper in a series of INSS Strategic Forums dedicated to the multinational exploration of the strategic defense challenges faced by the Baltic states. The December 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy describes Russia as “using subversive measures to weaken the credibility of America’s commitment to Europe, undermine transatlantic unity, and weaken European institutions and governments.”1The American and European authors of this paper, along with many others, came together in a series of exercises conducted in late 2017 through the winter of 2019 to explore possible responses to the security challenges facing the Baltic Sea region (BSR).

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  Winning the Fight Taiwan Cannot Afford to Lose

  Drew Thompson

  Taiwan’s defense approach has long relied on purchases of U.S. equipment and attempts to emulate U.S. doctrine. The U.S. military, however, has focused on projecting power to fight smaller adversaries around the world, while Taiwan faces the prospect of defending its homeland from China’s increasingly capable People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The United States is deeply committed to defending Taiwan, particularly as it becomes increasingly clear that Taiwan’s military needs to adapt to the rising threat posed by the PLA and the risk that Xi Jinping might seek to use force to compel unification. China has long had the ability to blockade or to launch missiles or air strikes against Taiwan, but a defiant Taipei could resist such coercion and refuse to surrender. Beijing can only be certain that it can compel unification if it can mount an invasion. Deterring invasion is, therefore, the ultimate objective for the United States and Taiwan. Maintaining cross-strait stability in the face of an increasingly wellresourced and modernizing PLA requires continual innovation and adaptation, including the updating of defense concepts.

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  PLA Overseas Operations in 2035: Inching Toward a Global Combat Capability

  Joel Wuthnow, Phillip C. Saunders, and Ian Burns McCaslin

  Over the past decade, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has followed two general development trajectories. The primary focus has been on deterring adversaries and building the capability to fight high-intensity, short-duration wars around China’s periphery—what the PLA often refers to as “informationized local wars.” This has included acquisition of advanced combat capabilities, supported by progress in doctrine, training, logistics, and command and control (C2). A central theme has been strengthening the PLA’s ability to conduct joint operations, thus correcting problems of ground force dominance and poor interservice cooperation. A secondary focus has been on nontraditional security operations, such as peacekeeping, maritime law enforcement, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR). Such missions, usually involving only a single service, have been conducted within the region and farther from China’s shores, reflecting the expansion of Chinese interests and the growing presence of Chinese citizens outside East Asia.

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  Baltics Left of Bang: Comprehensive Defense in the Baltic States

  Dalia Bankauskaite, Janis Berzins, Deividas Slekys, Tony Lawrence, Brett Swaney, and T.X. Hammes

  Sponsored by the National Defense University (NDU) and the Swedish National Defense University, this paper is the third in a series of Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Forums dedicated to the multinational exploration of the strategic defense challenges faced by the Baltic states. The December 2017 National Security Strategy described Russia as “using subversive measures to weaken the credibility of America’s commitment to Europe, undermine transatlantic unity, and weaken European institutions and governments.” The U.S. and European authors of this paper, along with many others, came together in a series of wargames conducted in late 2017 through the winter of 2019 to explore possible responses to the security challenges facing the Baltic Sea region. This third installment in the series highlights research and gaming insights indicating the value of a comprehensive defense for building resilience and resistance capabilities among the Baltic states.

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  The European Union’s Permanent Structured Cooperation: Implications for Transatlantic Security

  Colonel Jonathan Dunn USA

  In November of 2017, the European Union (EU) officially launched the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) project, its latest attempt to deepen defense cooperation among EU members. Earlier that same year, the EU approved two other important initiatives designed to strengthen defense cooperation: the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the European Defence Fund (EDF). Shortly after the launch of PESCO, many U.S. defense officials expressed skepticism about its value.1 This is not surprising; U.S. officials have reflexively opposed European defense initiatives such as PESCO since the end of the Cold War. U.S. opposition to these initiatives reflects its fear that they could lead the EU to become a competitor to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for European security issues and resources, and in so doing reduce U.S. influence in European security.

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  Beyond Borders: PLA Command and Control of Overseas Operations

  Dr. Phillip C. Saunders

  China’s latest round of military reforms is driven primarily by Xi Jinping’s ambition to reshape the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to improve its ability to win informationized [xinxihua, 信息化] wars and to ensure that it remains loyal to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The reforms are unprecedented in their ambition and in the scale and scope of the organizational changes. Virtually every part of the PLA now reports to different leaders, has had its mission and responsibilities changed, has lost or gained subordinate units, or has undergone a major internal reorganization. The relationships between and among the Central Military Commission (CMC) departments, offices, and commissions, the services, and the theater commands (TCs) have all changed. The reforms established new joint command and control mechanisms and thus have important implications for how the PLA conducts operations within and beyond China’s borders.

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  Baltics Left of Bang: Nordic Total Defense and Implications for the Baltic Sea Region

  Håkon Lunde Saxi Ph.D., Bengt Sundelius, and Brett Swaney

  Sponsored by the U.S. National Defense University (NDU) and the Swedish National Defense University, this paper is the second in a series of Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Forums dedicated to the multinational exploration of the strategic and defense challenges faced by the Baltic states. The December 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy described Russia as “using subversive measures to weaken the credibility of America’s commitment to Europe, undermine transatlantic unity, and weaken European institutions and governments.” The U.S. and European authors of this paper, along with many others, came together in late 2017 to explore possible responses to the security challenges facing the Baltic Sea Region (BSR). This second report highlights early research and gaming insights indicating the importance of total defense and comprehensive security, whole-of-society approaches to deterrence and defense of the Baltic Sea Region from Russian aggression. It also provides recommendations for how the Nordic and Baltic states can leverage aspects of total defense and comprehensive security to generate a credible asymmetric defense and build societal resilience.

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  Just Another Paper Tiger? Chinese Perspectives on the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy

  Dr. Joel Wuthnow

  In March 2018, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi responded to a question about the Donald Trump administration’s new “free and open Indo-Pacific” strategy by comparing it to “sea foam in the Pacific or Indian Ocean” that might get some attention, “but soon will dissipate.” Wang’s remarks raise an important question for U.S. policymakers: Is Beijing so confident in its own influence, and doubtful of U.S. commitments in the region, that it perceives a green light to continue or expand the kinds of behavior Washington is trying to discourage, such as coercion of China’s territorial rivals and “predatory” lending?

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  The PLA Beyond Asia: China’s Growing Military Presence in the Red Sea Region

  Dr. Joel Wuthnow

  China’s establishment of a military base in Djibouti in 2017 was an important “first” for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which had never operated a base on foreign territory. It was also a milestone in a gradually expanding PLA presence in the Red Sea region. Over the previous decade, China deployed peacekeepers to conflicts in the oil-producing states of Sudan and South Sudan, conducted anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, and increased its military diplomacy throughout the area. By the time the Djibouti base opened, the PLA was already maintaining a presence of more than 2,000 personnel in the region—far more than in any other area outside the Indo-Pacific. While PLA capabilities have remained largely concentrated in Asia, its Red Sea presence showcased an increasing ability to project power to other regions and suggested that additional deployments may occur as China seeks to defend its overseas interests.1 The PLA role in the region has also entered the Chinese popular imagination: the navy’s evacuation of Chinese and foreign citizens from Yemen in 2015 was the basis of Operation Red Sea, one of China’s top grossing films of 2018.

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  Baltics Left of Bang: The Role of NATO with Partners in Denial-Based Deterrence

  Colonel Robert M. Klein USA (Ret.), Lieutenant Commander Stefan Lundqvist Ph.D., Colonel Ed Sumangil USAF, and Ulrica Pettersson Ph.D.

  This paper is the first in a sequence of INSS Strategic Forums dedicated to multinational exploration of the strategic and defense challenges faced by Baltic states in close proximity to a resurgent Russia that the U.S. National Security Strategy describes as “using subversive measures to weaken the credibility of America’s commitment to Europe, undermine transatlantic unity, and weaken European institutions and governments." The American and European authors of this paper, along with many others, came together in late 2017 to begin exploration of the most significant Baltic states security challenges through focused strategic research and a series of multinational, interactive theater wargames sponsored by the U.S. National Defense University and Swedish Defence University. This first paper highlights early research and wargaming insights indicating the importance of denial-based deterrence for protection of the Baltic states from potential Russian aggression. It also provides recommendations for how the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States, and the Baltic states can best improve their ground, maritime, and air forces to generate credible denial-based deterrence.

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  The Enduring Relevance of the U.S.-Japan Alliance

  James J. Przystup

  For over six decades, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan and the U.S. forward-deployed military presence in Japan have served as the foundation of stability, prosperity, and security in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. It is the basis of the U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy and is a central pillar of its global strategy. The ability to project power halfway around the world from Japan was critical to the allies’ success in the 1991 Persian Gulf War—the USS Independence was then homeported in Japan. The deployment of the Kitty Hawk from Japan to the Persian Gulf in support of Operations Southern Watch and Iraqi Freedom underscored the global significance of the U.S. presence in Japan and the U.S.-Japan alliance.