Occasional Papers

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  NATO Command Structure: Considerations for the Future

  W. Bruce Weinrod and Charles L. Barry

  This paper explores potential future reforms of the NATO command structure. The intent is to stimulate thought on the current structure’s fit to oversee the forces and operations of a growing array of NATO missions.

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  Nuclear Politics in Iran

  Judith S. Yaphe

  This collection of analyses on the unintended consequences of Iran’s nuclear policy for its domestic and international relations is the first in a series of papers that will examine the impact of critical issues and developments on key countries in the Greater Middle East and on U.S. security interests. Succeeding papers will identify similar emerging issues in Turkey, Iraq, Yemen, and the Persian Gulf region. For the most part, the papers will represent the independent research and opinions of academic scholars and regional experts prepared for and presented at the National Defense University.

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  China’s Out of Area Naval Operations: Case Studies, Trajectories, Obstacles, and Potential Solutions

  Christopher D. Yung, Ross Rustici, Isaac Kardon, and Joshua Wiseman

  This study seeks to understand the future direction of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) with regard to out of area deployments and power projection. The assessment is based on the history of past PLAN out of area deployments and an analysis of out of area operations of other military forces. Both short- and long-term lenses are employed to understand the scope and direction of China’s defense planning and strategic decisions.

  The study’s assessment of the PLAN’s short-term (1- to 5-year) trajectory is based on:

  • operational patterns of behavior observed in China’s out of area deployments
  • analysis of information about the PLAN’s current and recent difficulties during these deployments
  • the solutions China has applied to address these difficulties
  • an assessment of the extent to which the PLAN, PLA leadership, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership as a whole are likely to pursue other potential solutions within a 1- to 5-year timeframe.

  We apply the same categories to our analysis of case studies of other nations’ historical out of area deployments to draw out possibilities for the PLAN’s long-term (10-year) trajectory. Examination of the history of China’s out of area operations indicates that the Chinese have been operating out of area since the mid-1970s, they tend to “overprepare” for each out of area deployment, and they conduct deployments not only for operational reasons, but also for carefully calculated political benefits.

  The study identifies five categories of challenges that confront all navies operating at long distances from home ports: distance, duration, capacity, complexity of coordination, and hostility of environment. The recent PLAN Gulf of Aden deployment illustrated some of these difficulties. In the absence of a nearby facility or military base, that task force had difficulty maintaining its ships; the ships had difficulty maintaining supplies of fresh vegetables, fruits, and potable water; and personnel did not have access to comprehensive medical care.

  From the case studies, we derived specific lessons about how other militaries met the five challenges in conducting out of area operations listed above and assessed whether the Chinese leadership is likely to follow their example. We identified five groups of options:

  • access to a facility or base for maintenance, repair, and other logistical support
  • self-protection (for example, carrier support, out of area antisubmarine warfare [ASW], or antisurface warfare)
  • use of mobile supply depots and floating bases
  • intra–task force lift assets (helicopters, lighterage, and landing craft)
  • satellite communications.

  The operational and strategic implications of our findings are as follows:

  • The PLAN still has some ways to go before it can operate effectively out of area. At present, it can effectively replenish at sea, conduct intra–task force resupply, perform long-distance navigation, conduct formation-keeping with competent seamanship, and operate in all weather conditions. The PLAN cannot currently conduct a full-scale joint forcible entry operation, maintain maritime superiority out of area, conduct multicarrier or carrier strike group operations, or provide comprehensive protection against threats to an out of area task force (antiaircraft warfare, ASW, and antisurface warfare).
  • The PLAN appears to be expanding its out of area operations incrementally. This will allow the United States, its allies, and other countries time to work out (with each other and with the Chinese) how to respond to opportunities for greater cooperation and potential challenges posed by a more capable PLAN.
  • China has an even longer way to go before it can be considered a global military power. In particular, it has no network of facilities and bases to maintain and repair its ships. The possession or absence of such a network may ultimately be the best indication of China’s future intentions. If China lacks such a support network, it will have great difficulty engaging in major combat operations (MCOs) far from its shores.
  • Experience gained through out of area operations will help make the PLAN somewhat more effective (in areas such as navigation and seamanship) in some of its other operations. However, most of the tasks performed and lessons gained from out of area operations are not directly transferrable to either a Taiwan contingency or a notional out of area MCO. This implies that time spent on conducting nontraditional out of area deployments for a PLAN unit is time away from combat training for a Taiwan contingency or preparing for MCOs out of area.
  • A more capable and active PLAN will present new challenges for U.S. policy. On the one hand, the United States wants China to “become a responsible stake holder” in support of international security objectives, which implies a need for greater naval capability to operate out of area. On the other hand, improved PLAN operational capabilities potentially pose a greater military threat to the United States and its allies, especially Asia. The United States has to reassure its allies that it will remain present in the region as a hedge even as Chinese military capabilities improve.

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  Army Science and Technology Investment In Interoperability

  Charles L. Barry

  This paper discusses the elements of assessing ‘bang for bucks’ with regard to S&T investment in interoperability. It intends to point to where interoperability investment offers the greatest return and to open our thinking to the possibility that universal interoperability of all systems is not a desirable or attainable goal, especially when allocating investments and accepting reasonable risk.

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  What Democracy for Afghanistan? An Analysis Utilizing Established Norms and Five Non-Western Case Studies

  Charles L. Barry and Samuel R. Greene

  This paper looks at democratic governance and what might be expected to take root in a society such as Afghanistan, shedding light on what is necessary, as a minimum, for democracy to become established. Suggesting replacements for goals that may be simply unattainable, such as an Afghan democracy held to an unrealistic Jeffersonian standard, it aims to impart a sense of what can be accomplished before international political will expires.

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  Understanding and Leading Porous Network Organizations: An Analysis Based on the 7-S Model

  Paul T. Bartone and Linton Wells II

  This paper evaluates STAR-TIDES , an organization seeking to develop and share knowledge and technologies to enhance the capacity of disparate groups to respond effectively to disasters and humanitarian crises. Analyzing STAR-TIDES as a porous network organization, it applies an organizational analysis tool known as the “7-S framework” to clarify some of the key issues that must be addressed for such organizations to be effective and adaptive.

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  Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: Looking Back, Looking Ahead

  Paul I. Bernstein, John P. Caves Jr., and W. Seth Carus

  Nearly 20 years have passed since the United States began worrying in earnest about the risks of regional weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation. In the run-up to Operation Desert Storm in 1990, the Department of Defense (DOD) had no systematic understanding of or approach to prosecuting a regional war against an adversary armed with and prepared to use nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. The improvisational efforts to prepare for possible Iraqi WMD use gave way after the war to a concerted effort during the Bill Clinton administration to prepare the Armed Forces to confront WMD-armed regional adversaries, while working to defuse such threats through diplomacy—coercive and otherwise. The George W. Bush administration brought to the WMD problem a different set of assumptions and beliefs that led to new areas of emphasis and new approaches, many of them shaped by the need, after the attacks of 2001, to confront more directly the threat of WMD use by violent nonstate actors. The following traces the general evolution of the countering WMD enterprise in the Clinton and Bush administrations.

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  Social Software and National Security: An Initial ‘Net Assessment’

  Mark D. Drapeau and Linton Wells II

  This research paper as an initial net assessment of how social software interacts with government and security in the broadest sense.1 The analysis looks at both sides of what once might have been called a “blue-red” balance to investigate how social software is being used (or could be used) by not only the United States and its allies, but also by adversaries and other counterparties.

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  An Extended Deterrence Regime to Counter Iranian Nuclear Weapons: Issues and Options

  Richard L. Kugler

  This paper examines the idea of creating an American-led extended deterrence regime in the Middle East to address potential Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons and missiles in a setting where the U.S. already possesses these weapons and is trying to employ them to geopolitical advantage.

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  Operation Anaconda: Lessons for Joint Operations

  Richard L. Kugler, Michael Baranick, and Hans Binnendijk

  This study is not an official history of Anaconda but an analysis of lessons that can be learned from that battle and applied to future joint operations. This study’s intent is not to criticize, but instead to offer observations for joint operations, multinational operations, and expeditionary warfare in austere settings.

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  The Active Denial System: A Revolutionary, Non-lethal Weapon for Today’s Battlefield

  Susan LeVine

  This paper explains and describes the advantages to ADS (Active Denial Systems) and how they can provide troops a capability they currently do not have, the ability to reach out and engage potential adversaries at distances well beyond small arms range, and in a safe, effective, and non-lethal manner.

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  Pandemic Flu Planning in Africa: Thoughts from a Nigerian Case Study

  Cheryl Loeb, Lynn McGrath, and Sudhir Devalia

  This paper discusses the Avian Influenza/Pandemic Influenza Policy Planning workshop held in Nigeria in June 2007, the objective of which was assisting selected Nigerian officials in evaluating their nation’s pandemic response plan.

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  Strengthening Technical Peer Review at the Army S&T Laboratories

  John W. Lyons and Richard Chait

  The paper recommends that the Army require peer review of the technical quality of its laboratories and proposes a set of norms that must be met. The principal recommendation is that reviews be performed by independent experts who visit the laboratory for two or more days, looking at the technical projects and the strength of the technical staff, equipment, and facilities.

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  Forecasting Science and Technology for the Department of Defense

  John W. Lyons, Richard Chait, and James J. Valdes

  This paper discusses recent trends in S&T, particularly how various disciplines have converged to produce new capabilities, and considers how a new series of studies might be conducted taking into account such convergences.

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  Improving the Interface between Industry and Army Science and Technology: Some Thoughts on the Army’s Independent Research and Development Program

  John W. Lyons, Richard Chait, and Jordan Wilcox

  This paper presents the various ways that the Army laboratories link their work with external laboratories and looks for ways to improve these interfaces, with special emphasis on the IR&D (Independent Research & Development) program.

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  Defending the Military Food Supply: Acquisition, Preparation, and Protection of Food at U.S. Military Installations

  Andrew S. Mara and Lynn McGrath

  This paper examines current measures in place to defend the military food supply and provides a series of recommendations that will enhance food defense and provide ancillary benefits to the military.

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  Directed Energy Weapons – Are We There Yet?

  Elihu Zimet and Christopher Mann

  The purpose of this paper is to examine the barriers to deployment of directed energy weapons and suggest a strategy for an initial deployment that addresses these issues. This strategy will focus on current high-priority threats against which DEW would provide the best alternative for the military.

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  Computer Science Research Funding: How much is too little?

  Elihu Zimet, Stuart Starr, Clifford Lau, and Anup Ghosh

  This papers summarizes and analyzes the findings of a study of the historical and planned level of Department of Defense (DOD) funding in computer science (CS) research from the 2001–2011 DOD records, and formulates key findings and recommendations.

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  International Partnerships to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction

  Paul I. Bernstein

  Building international partnerships is a central element of U.S. strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD). U.S. policy recognizes that the proliferation problem is far too large, complex, and important for any one nation to tackle alone. Meaningful and sustained progress in combating WMD requires active collaboration among all states that have a stake in managing the problem and the will and capacity to contribute. Current policies build on a foundation of global cooperation that dates back decades, even as they reflect significant changes in emphasis to adapt to contemporary proliferation challenges.
  
  These challenges result in large part from the ongoing and in some respects intensifying impact of globalization. As many have observed, the phenomenon is twofold—technological and political—and both dimensions are making the WMD proliferation problem more complex and difficult to manage. Technologies with broad legitimate uses that could be applied to unconventional weapons continue to spread globally at a rapid rate, and the growing demand (and competition) for energy, in particular, has the potential to fuel nuclear proliferation pressures in strategically important and sometimes unstable parts of the world. Politically, globalization has contributed to the erosion of traditional state power and boundaries and served to empower both smaller states that are seeking to challenge the status quo and nonstate actors—ranging from individuals to transnational networks—with independent and often extremist agendas. The results are clear enough: significant proliferation challenges from states whose WMD programs confer on them disproportionate strategic importance; growing interest on the part of terrorists to acquire WMD; and weak states and poorly governed spaces where illicit radical and criminal networks flourish. As these phenomena converge, new proliferation pathways are likely to emerge.

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  Reform of the National Security Science and Technology Enterprise

  William Berry, Timothy Coffey, Don J. DeYoung, James Kadtke, and Cheryl Loeb

  This paper addresses three major topics requiring new thinking in the National Security Science and Technology Enterprise. The first topic is how overarching priorities can be better determined and implemented to direct the vast national security enterprise toward conducting S&T that will address both traditional and new national security challenges. The second deals with the integration of the Congressional committees that oversee and fund S&T. And the third focuses on the competence, role, and impact of the Government’s national security S&E workforce.

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  China’s Science and Technology Emergence: A Proposal for U.S. DOD-China Collaboration in Fundamental Research

  William Berry and Cheryl Loeb

  This report proposes the establishment of a constructive, phased strategy for engaging in collaborative fundamental research with Chinese academic institutions. Recent evaluations of top S&T universities and their specific capabilities suggest appropriate scientific areas where beneficial collaborations between DoD and China should be fostered.

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  Winning the Invisible War: An Agricultural Pilot Plan for Afghanistan

  Edward Borcherdt, Austin Carson, Frank Kennefick, James Moseley, William Taylor, Harlan Ullman, and Larry Wentz

  The purpose of this paper is to propose efforts to integrate a comprehensive campaign plan that brings together security and reconstruction efforts and the plethora of governmental and nongovernmental organizations working in Afghanistan.

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  Building the S and E Workforce for 2040: Challenges Facing the Department of Defense

  Timothy Coffey

  This paper examines some of the trends that have led to the government’s inability to maintain adequate technical competence and/or is not making proper use of the competence that it has maintained. It focuses on the government component of the model and it is expected that many of the same considerations will apply to the quasi-government component, also.

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  Toward a New Transatlantic Compact

  Richard L. Kugler and Hans Binnendijk

  This paper calls for a new NATO strategic concept and a new transatlantic compact, and envisions crafting them in tandem.

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  Army Research and Development Collaboration and The Role of Globalization in Research

  John W. Lyons

  This paper considers a number of approaches to international collaboration in military research, discussing the challenges inherent in collaboration and considering recommendations for the future.