Occasional Papers

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  Elevating the Role of Socioeconomic Strategy in Afghanistan Transition

  Michael Baranick, Albert Sciarretta, Cyrus Staniec, and John Applebaugh

  This paper reviews the System Analysis and Studies Panel of the NATO Research and Technology Organization which created a Specialist Team in June 2010 in response to an International Security Assistance Force request to help develop, define, and implement a strategy for data collection and management. The goal of the initiative was to provide direct assistance to NATO, ISAF, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

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  A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan

  Mark Fields and Ramsha Ahmed

  Ten years ago in Bonn, Germany, the United Nations Envoy to Afghanistan, Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, and U.S. Envoy to the Afghan Opposition, Ambassador James Dobbins, led a diverse group of international diplomats and warriors to consensus and charted the political course for Afghanistan well into the decade. The process that led to the Bonn Agreement (Bonn 2001, or Bonn I) reflects the best of U.S. and United Nations statesmanship and was the result of the effective application of military and diplomatic power.

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  Secret Weapon: High-value Target Teams as an Organizational Innovation

  Christopher J. Lamb and Evan Munsing

  This study argues that interagency teams were a major catalyst in turning around the Iraq War, and that they will disappear from America’s arsenal unless the knowledge base supporting the innovation can be secured. Most explanations credit the dramatic reduction in violence in Iraq between 2007 and 2008 to new U.S. leadership, the surge in U.S. forces, and/or U.S. financial support to Sunni tribal leaders. In contrast, we argue that the United States employed an underappreciated organizational innovation—interagency teams—to put insurgent clandestine organizations on the defensive and give population security measures a chance to take effect.

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  The Use of High Performance Computing (HPC) to Strengthen the Development of Army Systems

  John W. Lyons, Richard Chait, and Charles J. Nietubicz

  This paper seeks to discuss the growth and trends in High Performance Computing (HPC) and how the Army has utilized HPC in research. It also addresses the possibilities for design and production of new systems and how industry has advanced the use of HPC. One intent of this paper is to re-evaluate the advanced manufacturing area in light of the many recent developments in computational capability and availability. It concludes with comments and recommendations for strengthening Army acquisition using advanced computer technology.

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  Assessing Army Power and Energy for the Warfighter

  John W. Lyons, Richard Chait, and James J. Valdes

  This paper reviews some of the landscape of research and development on power and energy as it pertains to the needs of the Army warfighter. It focuses on the battlefield and considers questions related to vehicles, dismounted soldiers, and forward operating bases. The context of the study is twofold: the National need to reduce the use of petroleum-based fuels and the Army’s need to reduce the logistical burden and hazards moving said fuels on the battlefield.

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  Joint Interagency Task Force–South: The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success

  Evan Munsing and Christopher J. Lamb

  Joint Interagency Task Force–South (JIATF–South) is well known within the U.S. Government as the “gold standard” for interagency cooperation and intelligence fusion, despite its preference for keeping a low profile and giving other agencies the credit for its successes. It is often cited as a model for whole-of-government problem-solving in the literature on interagency collaboration, and other national security organizations have tried to copy its approach and successes. Despite the plaudits and attention, the way that JIATF–South actually operates has only received superficial analysis. In fact, few people actually understand why JIATF–South works as well as it does or how its success might be replicated.

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  Strengthening Government Laboratory Science and Technology Programs: Some Thoughts for the Department of Homeland Security

  Samuel Musa, Richard Chait, Vincent Russo, and Donna Back

  This paper summarizes the second phase of a research and analysis project that stemmed from the initial work which provided DHS Science and Technology leadership with examples of practical approaches to risk-informed decisionmaking and metrics for program and project selection. The second phase was undertaken to provide additional relevant information to DHS as it seeks to strengthen its laboratory programs.

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  Russia’s Revival: Ambitions, Limitations, and Opportunities for the United States

  John W. Parker

  Independent Russia is approaching the start of its third decade of post-Soviet existence. After the economic chaos of the Boris Yeltsin decade and the recovery and stabilization of the Vladimir Putin decade, Russia’s leaders have high ambitions for a return to great power status in the years ahead. Their aspirations are tempered, however, by the realities of Russia’s social, economic, and military shortcomings and vulnerabilities, laid painfully bare by the stress test of the recent global financial crisis. Looking ahead, some also calculate that Russia will be increasingly challenged in the Far East by a rising China and in the Middle East by an Iran that aspires to regional hegemony.

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  Challenges to Leadership: Responding to Biological Threats

  Paul Rosenzweig

  This paper seeks to identify certain gaps and overlaps in existing structure and mechanisms and to advance potential solutions that can be implemented. It examines two issues of concern: Federal Coordination Structure and Federal/State Coordination and recommends that a more comprehensive set of planning and response exercises be developed in order to better understand and develop a doctrine of incident leadership suitable for a biological crisis.

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  Korean Futures: Challenges to U.S. Diplomacy of North Korean Regime Collapse

  Ferial Ara Saeed and James J. Przystup

  There is no shortage of plausible scenarios describing North Korean regime collapse or how the United States and North Korea’s neighbors might respond to such a challenge. Yet comparatively little attention has been paid to the strategic considerations that may shape the responses of the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan, China, and Russia to a North Korean crisis. These states are most likely to take action of some kind in the event the North Korean regime collapses. For the ROK (South Korea), North Korean regime collapse presents the opportunity for Korean reunification. For the other states, the outcome in North Korea will affect their influence on the peninsula and their relative weight in Asia. This study identifies the interests and objectives of these principal state actors with respect to the Korean Peninsula. Applying their interests and objectives to a generic scenario of North Korean regime collapse, the study considers possible policies that the principal state actors might use to cope with such a crisis.

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  Buy, Build, or Steal: China’s Quest for Advanced Military Aviation Technologies

  Phillip C. Saunders and Joshua K. Wiseman

  Although China continues to lag approximately two decades behind the world’s most sophisticated air forces in terms of its ability to develop and produce fighter aircraft and other complex aerospace systems, it has moved over time from absolute reliance on other countries for military aviation technology to a position where a more diverse array of strategies can be pursued. Steps taken in the late 1990s to reform China’s military aviation sector demonstrated an understanding of the problems inherent in high-technology acquisition, and an effort to move forward. However, a decade later it remains unclear how effective these reforms have been. Where are the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and China’s military aviation industry headed? What obstacles must be overcome for China to join the exclusive ranks of those nations possessing sophisticated air forces and aviation industries capable of producing world-class aircraft?

  This study identifies potential aviation technology development and procurement strategies, presents a general model of the options available to developing countries, and applies that model to explain Chinese procurement and aviation technology acquisition efforts over the last 60 years. The model articulates three main technology procurement avenues: purchase (buy), indigenous development (build), and espionage (steal), and three subavenues: reverse engineering (combining buy/steal and build), coproduction (combining buy and build), and codevelopment (combining buy and build, with an emphasis on build). It examines the costs, benefits, and tradeoffs inherent in each approach. Four variables influence decisions about the mix of strategies: (1) a country’s overall level of economic development, in particular the state of its technical/industrial base; (2) the technological capacity of a country’s military aviation sector; (3) the willingness of foreign countries to sell advanced military aircraft, key components, armaments, and related production technology; and (4) the country’s bargaining power vis-àvis potential suppliers.

  In applying the model, we divide the evolution of China’s military aviation industry into five periods based on China’s changing access to foreign suppliers of military aircraft and aviation technology. Soviet assistance (1950–1960) provided the foundation for China’s military aviation industry, which cut its teeth coproducing Soviet fighter, bomber, and transport aircraft. Given Western embargoes, Moscow offered the only viable path to advanced aviation technology and provided assistance on favorable terms to support its communist ally. The second period (1960–1977) is marked by the Sino-Soviet split, which eliminated Chinese access to cutting-edge aviation hardware. China continued to produce and make modest refinements to 1950s vintage Soviet aircraft designs, using reverse engineering to fill in gaps where technical information was lacking. In the third period (1977–1989), China gained some access to Western aviation components and technologies and sought to apply them to a variant of the J–8 (a twin engine fighter based on a modified MiG–21 design) and the JH–7 (a fighter-bomber with a British engine). The fourth period (1989–2004) is marked by Western bans on arms sales to China in the wake of Tiananmen, Sino-Soviet rapprochement (leading to sales of advanced Russian fighters and coproduction arrangements), and a brief but important window of access to Israeli technologies. Covert access to advanced Western fighters and espionage (in both traditional forms and via computer network operations) also began to make more contributions.

  In the fifth period (2004–present), China has enjoyed increased access to foreign commercial aviation technologies and has benefited from a “spin-off, spin-on” dynamic in gaining commercial access to dual-use technologies and applying them for military purposes. However, China’s legitimate access to advanced military-specific technologies has been reduced as Western sources of supply remained closed and Russia has become more reluctant to provide advanced aviation technology due to China’s reverse engineering of the Su-27, fear of future competition for export markets, and concerns about China’s long-term strategic direction.

  China has used coproduction, selected purchases of advanced aircraft, reverse engineering, and foreign design assistance to build a capable military aviation industry with a significant indigenous design and production capacity. The Chinese military aviation industry can now produce two fourth-generation fighters roughly equal to those in advanced air forces: the J–10 (indigenously developed with Israeli assistance) and the J–11B (based on coproduction and reverse engineering of the Su-27). Both aircraft still rely on imported Russian turbofan engines. Test flights of the new J–20 stealth fighter prototype demonstrate Chinese ambitions to build fifth-generation fighters, but the extent to which the J–20 will match the performance of state-of-the-art Russian and Western fighters is unclear. Significant technical hurdles in engine design, avionics, and systems integration are likely to delay operational deployment of the J–20 until about 2020. This would be about 15 years after the F–22 entered U.S. Air Force service, supporting an overall assessment that the Chinese military aviation industry remains 15–20 years behind.

  Producing state-of-the-art fighters requires an aviation industry to master a range of highly advanced, military-specific technologies. The historical development of China’s military aviation industry reflects an ongoing tension between the desire for self-reliance in defense and the need for access to advanced foreign technologies. China’s legitimate access to cutting-edge Western military technologies will likely remain curtailed and Russian reluctance to supply advanced military technologies will likely grow. These assumptions support two important conclusions. First, the Chinese military aviation industry will have to rely primarily on indigenous development of advanced “single-use” military aviation technologies in the future. The Chinese government is pursuing a range of “indigenous innovation” and technology development programs, but mastering advanced technologies becomes more difficult and expensive as a country moves closer to the technology frontier. This leads to a second, related conclusion: China will likely rely more heavily on espionage to acquire those critical military aviation technologies it cannot acquire legitimately from foreign suppliers or develop on its own.

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  Assessing Military Benefits of S&T Investments in Micro Autonomous Systems Utilizing a Gedanken Experiment

  Albert Sciarretta, Joseph N. Mait, Richard Chait, Elizabeth Redden, and Jordan Wilcox

  This paper address The Army Research Laboratory’s Micro-Autonomous Systems and Technology Collaborative Technology Alliance program which was chosen to demonstrate the utility of the methodology in the evaluation of an actual Army S&T effort. It was chosen because it offers significant future capabilities for our Army, provides a set of very robust present-day technical challenges, and offers a significant assessment challenge since it is focused on basic research.

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  Task Force Stryker Network-Centric Operations in Afghanistan

  Harry Tunnell IV

  This case study examines the real-world application of the network-centric warfare concept during combat operations in Afghanistan.

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  Analysis of the Threat of Genetically Modified Organisms for Biological Warfare

  Jerry B. Warner, Alan J. Ramsbotham Jr., Ewelina Tunia, and James J. Valdes

  This study seeks to better understand the evaluation of the potential threats posed by advances in biotechnology, especially genetically modified organisms and synthetic biology. It narrows the scope of consideration into two parts: defining a catastrophic biological attack focused on bioterrorism and that this attack would be restricted to the United States.

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  A Primer on Alternative Transportation Fuels

  Timothy Coffey

  This paper reviews several approaches to producing alternative transportation fuels using feedstocks that are under the control of the United States. The purpose is to provide the non-specialist reader with a general understanding of the several approaches, how they compare regarding process energy efficiency, their individual abilities to provide for national transportation fuel needs, and their associated capital costs.

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  Hours of Boredom, Moments of Terror: Temporal Desynchrony in Military and Security Force Operations

  Peter A. Hancock and Gerald P. Krueger

  The authors examine resultant psychological and behavioral implications for combatant and security personnel performance as viewed through application of a traditional human psychological stress model. Inadequate recognition of the implications resulting from long lull periods, combat pulses, and the need to recover from stress can lead to dysfunctional soldiering as well as poor individual and small unit performance.

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  Assessing Chinese Military Transparency

  Michael Kiselycznyk and Phillip C. Saunders

  The United States and other countries in the Asia-Pacific region have expressed concerns about China’s expanding military capabilities and called on Beijing to increase transparency on military issues. Chinese officials and military officers argue that Chinese transparency has increased over time and that weaker countries should not be expected to meet U.S. standards of transparency. Lack of an objective method for assessing military transparency has made it difficult to assess these Chinese claims and has inhibited productive dialogues about transparency.

  This paper presents a methodology for assessing military transparency that aims to confront the question of China’s military transparency from a comparative perspective. Drawing upon research done by Korean defense expert Dr. Choi Kang as part of a Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific working group, it focuses on defense white papers as a readily available and comparable source of official defense information. The paper develops an objective methodology for comparing the relative transparency of defense white papers by employing standardized definitions and a four-tiered set of criteria to evaluate transparency across 19 categories. This approach can be used to evaluate changes in transparency over time and to compare China’s transparency with that of other Asia-Pacific countries.

  We use this methodology to evaluate changes in transparency in China’s six defense white papers (from 1998 through 2008) and to compare its 2008 white paper with 13 other recent Asia-Pacific defense white papers. We find that there has been a gradual but modest increase in the transparency of China’s defense white papers over time. China’s degree of transparency is roughly comparable to that of most Southeast Asian countries and to India, but significantly less than Asia-Pacific democracies such as Japan and South Korea. We argue that China’s growing economic and military power makes major countries such as Japan, South Korea, India, and Australia a more appropriate basis of comparison.

  Despite some limitations in the methodology (most notably omitting information published in other government documents when assessing transparency), we believe that it provides a reasonably objective and comparable way to evaluate relative military transparency. Although a full assessment would require considering a country’s unique context and using all available information, the methodology employed in this study provides a useful starting point to compare how different countries within the Asia-Pacific region approach military transparency. We argue that this methodology could be used as the basis for broader comparative studies of transparency and as a way to support regional dialogues about military transparency.

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  Civil-Military Relations in China: Assessing the PLA’s Role in Elite Politics

  Michael Kiselycznyk and Phillip C. Saunders

  This study reviews the last 20 years of academic literature on the role of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in Chinese elite politics. It examines the PLA’s willingness to support the continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and to obey directives from top party leaders, the PLA’s influence on the selection of China’s top civilian leaders, and the PLA’s ability to shape the domestic political environment. Over the last two decades the discussion of these three issues has largely been shaped by five trends identified in the literature: increasing PLA professionalism, bifurcation of civil and military elites, a reduced PLA role in political institutions, reduced emphasis on political work within the PLA, and increased military budgets. Together, these trends are largely responsible for the markedly reduced role of the PLA in Chinese elite politics.

  The theoretical models of Chinese civil-military relations that exist within the literature during the period divide into three distinctive categories. “Traditional models” including the Factional, Symbiosis, Professionalism, and Party Control models, dominate the literature from 1989 to 1995. Scholars worked to integrate information becoming available as the PRC opened to the world into these already existing models of Chinese civil-military relations. However, evolving political dynamics within the PRC following Tiananmen marginalized the utility of the models. From 1995 to 1997 many scholars argued that these traditional models should not be considered mutually exclusive but complementary. This concept of a “combination model” was short lived as it became increasingly apparent that even a combination of traditional models had little predictive or even explanatory power in light of rapidly changing political dynamics. Two new models, the Conditional Compliance and State Control models, emerged in the period of 1997–2003. Both incorporated elements of the traditional models while attempting to address the implications of new political and military dynamics in the PRC.

  Examining the predictions of these models against four case studies involving major developments in civil-military relations, we found that although each model had some descriptive and explanatory power, none possessed strong predictive ability. The traditional models help explain the PLA’s reaction to intensified Party control following Tiananmen, but none was able to predict how Chinese civil-military relations evolved subsequently. Civil-military models offered their most specific (and ultimately least accurate) predictions regarding the leadership succession from Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin. Most models predicted a strong role for the PLA in the succession that did not materialize. This was the period when traditional civil-military models began to run up against the reality of changing political dynamics within the PRC. When the PLA was forced to withdraw from most commercial activities in the mid-1990s, the models predicted a far slower, more contentious, and less complete divestiture than ultimately occurred. Most analysts correctly predicted that the PLA would have only limited involvement in the leadership transition from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao following the 16th Party Congress in 2002, but subsequent explanations for why the transition went smoothly emphasize different factors. The models did agree in their emphasis on the importance of greater political institutionalization in reducing PLA influence and highlighted the implicit role and future potential importance of the PLA in elite politics, especially if divisions among the civilian leadership produce a political crisis in the future.

  Based on this assessment, we conclude that existing models serve a useful role in identifying key variables for analysis in the study of Chinese civil-military relations. However, most of the literature has been descriptive and interpretive rather than predictive. The widespread practice of using elements of multiple models to analyze civil-military relations makes it difficult to assess the validity of individual models or to generate falsifiable predictions, thus limiting the predictive ability of current models. Although China is a much more open society today, lack of reliable information continues to make the study of civil-military relations in China difficult, forcing analysts to rely on indirect evidence and dubious sources to speculate about the military’s influence on elite politics and about the relationships between top civilian and military leaders.

  Since 2003 the literature on Chinese civil-military relations has successfully exploited new sources of information to offer useful analysis of the PLA’s relationship with the Chinese economy and society at large.Yet there has been a notable lack of effort to develop, employ, or test new theoretical models that could help produce a new unified theory of Chinese civil-military relations. Future work may find fertile ground in exploring the nature of official and unofficial interactions between the PRC’s bifurcated civilian and military elite, comparing how broader trends in China’s civilian government are implemented in the PLA, or conducting a more genuinely comparative analysis with the experiences of other one-party states, transitioning democracies, or other Asian states.

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  Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for National Security Integration

  Christopher J. Lamb and Edward Marks

  The inability of the President of the United States to delegate executive authority for integrating the efforts of departments and agencies on priority missions is a major shortcoming in the way the national security system of the U.S. Government functions. Statutorily assigned missions combined with organizational cultures create “stovepipes” that militate against integrated operations. This obstacle to “unity of effort” has received great attention since 9/11 but continues to adversely affect government operations in an era of increasingly multidisciplinary challenges, from counterproliferation to counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Presidents have tried various approaches to solving the problem: National Security Council committees, “lead agencies,” and “czars,” but none have proven effective.

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  Assessing the Health of Army Laboratories: Funding for Basic Research and Laboratory Capital Equipment

  John W. Lyons and Richard Chait

  In this paper, the authors respond to requests from the office of the Army S&T Executive to address the adequacy of the funding provided to equipment and basic research in an effective S&T laboratory.

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  Improving the Army’s Next Effort in Technology Forecasting

  John W. Lyons, Richard Chait, and Simone Erchov

  This paper makes the case for approaches to be pursued when the Army conducts its next comprehensive S&T forecasting effort.

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  Islamic Radicalization in the United States: New Trends and a Proposed Methodology for Disruption

  Samuel Musa and Samuel Bendett

  This paper addresses the growing and evolving threat of domestic terrorism that is advocated and perpetrated by radical Islamic ideologues. Specifically it will review terrorist attempts on American soil and against the American population in order to offer recommendations.

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  Risk-Informed Decisionmaking for Science and Technology

  Samuel Musa, William Berry, Richard Chait, John W. Lyons, and Vincent Russo

  This paper discusses risks and impact areas in relation to decisionmaking and the development of metrics or a figure of merit for decisionmaking. The metrics are then applied to three examples of interest to the Army, Air Force, and DHS.

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  Redefining Success: Applying Lessons in Nuclear Diplomacy from North Korea to Iran

  Ferial Ara Saeed

  The United States has no good options for resolving the North Korean and Iranian nuclear challenges. Incentives, pressures, and threats have not succeeded. A military strike would temporarily set back these programs, but at unacceptable human and diplomatic costs, and with a high risk of their reconstitution and acceleration. For some policymakers, therefore, the best option is to isolate these regimes until they collapse or pressures build to compel negotiations on U.S. terms. This option has the veneer of toughness sufficient to make it politically defensible in Washington. On closer scrutiny, however, it actually allows North Korea and Iran to continue their nuclear programs unrestrained. It also sacrifices more achievable short-term goals of improving transparency and securing vulnerable nuclear materials to the uncertain long-term goal of denuclearization. Yet these short-term goals are deemed critical to U.S. national security in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

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  Bio-Inspired Materials and Devices for Chemical and Biological Defense

  James J. Valdes and Erica R. Valdes

  This report addresses materials for synthetic matrices of chemical and biological defense using a conceptual platform known as the abiotic networked threat system (ANTS). This system is based on lessons learned from biology, incorporating abiotic homologues to biological recognition events and metabolic pathways to provide programmable capabilities to sense and respond to environmental threats.