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  Chance favors only the prepared mind:” The Proper Role for U.S. Department of Defense Science and Engineering Workforce

  Timothy Coffey

  This publication provides critical recommendations for managing the DoD’s 130,000 person Science and Technology workforce through a period of growing fiscal and geopolitical ambiguity. The report outlines a strategy that: prioritizes lessons learned through hands-on experience; cultivates practices that identify and support the most promising trends in technology and research; promotes advocacy for worthy programs, and; develops a process for ensuring competent “third parties” determine a fair price for acquisition and development. It concludes by urging the DoD return to a prudently managed, conservative S&T strategy that emphasizes workforce recruitment and training, adequate funding for research and development, and increased engagement with colleges and universities.

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  China’s Forbearance Has Limits: Chinese Threat and Retaliation Signaling and Its Implications for a Sino-American Military Confrontation

  Paul H.B. Godwin and Alice L. Miller

  Since its founding in 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has employed military force in defense of China’s security and territorial integrity. In many such instances, Beijing implemented a calculus of threat and retaliation signals intended first to deter an adversary from taking actions contrary to Chinese interests by threatening the use of military force and, if deterrence failed, to explain and justify Beijing’s resort to military force.

  This deterrence calculus was applied in each of the major instances in which Beijing has resorted to military force—in Korea in 1950, in the Sino-Indian border dispute in 1961–1962, in the Sino-Soviet border dispute in 1968–1969, and in China’s attack on northern Vietnam in 1979. It was also applied in instances in which Beijing’s effort at deterrence apparently succeeded and China ultimately stopped short of using military force. Examples include China’s responses to the intensifying American combat effort in Vietnam in 1965–1968 and to the 1991 debates in Taipei about delimiting the Republic of China’s sovereignty claims.

  Beijing implements this deterrence calculus by a carefully calibrated hierarchy of official protests, authoritative press comment, and leadership statements. If the crisis persists and Beijing perceives its interests are not satisfactorily taken into account, its statements escalate in level and may include at first implicit and thereafter increasingly explicit warnings that it may use military force to achieve its goals. This approach has been employed consistently despite the sweeping changes in the PRC’s place in the international order, the proliferation of foreign policy instruments at its disposal, the more complex crisis decisionmaking process and domestic political environment, and the dramatic evolution in the Chinese media over the decades.

  Significant improvements in China’s military capabilities, particularly in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) naval and air arms, have enhanced Beijing’s ability to press its territorial claims in the South and East China Seas. Chinese actions, often in response to challenges by other claimants, have raised regional tensions. Moreover, Beijing has at times hardened its objections to U.S. military exercises, aerial surveillance, and intelligence collection in China’s exclusive economic zone and in international airspace off its coasts. Aggressive maneuvers by Chinese military aircraft, fishing vessels, and civilian agency ships have led to serious incidents, including a collision between a PLA Navy (PLAN) fighter and a U.S. Navy reconnaissance aircraft that led to the death of the PLAN pilot.

  The question for U.S. policymakers is whether improving military capabilities will lead Beijing to substitute sudden or surprise attack for the politically calibrated deterrence signaling it has employed prior to its past use of force. This study assesses the problem in four ways. It first reviews China’s use of force since 1949 to determine the motivations driving Beijing’s employment of military coercion. Second, it assesses China’s crisis decisionmaking process and crisis management. Third, it assesses the prospects for China’s more aggressive use of military coercion in Asia’s emerging security environment. Finally, Beijing’s signaling of China’s intent to employ military coercion is assessed in detail using a series of crisis case studies covering the years 1961–2004.

  Although China’s military capabilities are continuing to improve and its standing and involvement in the world have changed quite dramatically, this study concludes that the traditional calculus of threat and retaliation statements remains a central tool in Beijing’s array of foreign policy and security instruments for responding to and managing tensions and disputes.

  The historical instances where China has used military power can be divided into those cases when Beijing has employed significant military force and those cases when lesser military coercion has been employed. As one would anticipate, the forces employed reflect the immediacy of the perceived threat, the importance of the interest being threatened, and the capabilities of the opposing military forces.

  Deterrence signaling has been more systematically and directly applied when Beijing has perceived a major military threat or strategic trend placing a high value interest in jeopardy. This includes all four of the Taiwan cases examined (in 1991, 1995–1996, 1999, and 2003–2004).

  China’s recognition of the power asymmetry between itself and the United States partially explains why none of the post–Korean War crises involving the United States evolved into direct military conflict. Chinese and American scholars agree that one characteristic of Sino- American crises is China’s consistent policy of seeking to avoid a military confrontation with the United States even as it employed or threatened the use of military force.

  This record does not, however, necessarily transfer to a potential Taiwan crisis. Here, some Chinese hold the view that whereas Taiwan involves a core interest for China, it is only of marginal strategic interest to the United States. Consequently, China should not be fearful of employing military force to deter Taiwan’s de jure independence because the United States could well decide that a war with China over Taiwan is simply too costly given the island’s low strategic value to the United States.

  This view of the asymmetric importance of Taiwan to China and the United States reflects a broader Chinese perspective on past Sino-American crises. From a Chinese perspective, Sino-American crises did not occur in locales where core U.S. security interests were at stake. Whether in Korea, China’s offshore islands, Vietnam, or Taiwan, China’s interests were under greater threat because the locales were on or near China’s national boundaries. More over, in crises over the offshore islands and Taiwan, China’s territorial integrity and national sovereignty were at stake. These perceived asymmetries of interest contribute to China’s view that U.S. policies and strategies are similar to those conducted by imperialist and hegemonic powers in the past.

  This same perspective of asymmetric interests applies to China’s maritime territorial claims in the South and East China Seas. Whereas Beijing recognizes a U.S. interest in freedom of navigation, any U.S. involvement in how these territorial disputes should be settled is unacceptable because the disputes do not involve U.S. strategic interests. For Beijing, these territorial disputes are sovereignty issues extending back to the 19th century when Japanese and Western imperialists began their violations of China’s sovereignty. In China’s view, they are not a matter where the United States has any legitimate interest.

  Despite its commitment to the restoration of its own sovereignty over islands in the South and East China Seas, Beijing is reluctant to employ direct military coercion when its claims are challenged. These disputes do not constitute a direct threat to Chinese security, and the political, economic, and security consequences of a military confrontation between China and its neighbors, including those with mutual defense treaties with the United States, are evident. Beijing’s resolve to avoid a military confrontation is particularly manifest with regard to the United States. Given the potentially grave consequences, if China does consider using military force, Beijing is almost certain to employ the same deterrence calculus it has maintained since the founding of the People’s Republic. It would do so to minimize the possibility that it will have to use the military force on which the deterrence calculus ultimately rests and to reduce the costs if force is used.

  China’s application of the deterrence calculus in a future crisis would likely have the following characteristics:

  • Systematic integration of political and diplomatic action with military preparations as the signaling escalates through higher levels of authority. Such preparations are often, if not always, overt and integrated into the political and diplomatic messages designed to deter the adversary from the course of action Beijing finds threatening.
  • Stating why China is justified in using military force should this prove necessary. The message targets both domestic and international audiences. In essence, Beijing declares that it confronts a serious threat to its security and interests that if not terminated will require the use of military force.
  • Asserting that the use of military force is not Beijing’s preferred resolution to the threat it faces, but one that will be forced upon it should the adversary not heed the deterrence warnings sent. In short, Beijing’s signaling strategy seeks to grant China the moral high ground in the emerging confrontation. Such an argument supports China’s self-identification as a uniquely peaceful country that employs military force only in defense and when provoked by adversaries threatening its security or sovereignty. Presumably, Beijing believes that asserting the moral high ground in a confrontation can ease international response to any military action China might take and thereby reduce the political costs of employing military force.
  • Emphasizing that China’s forbearance and restraint should not be viewed as weakness and that China is prepared to employ military force should that be necessary.

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  Crisis Stability and Nuclear Exchange Risks on the Subcontinent: Major Trends and the Iran Factor

  Thomas F. Lynch III

  Crisis stability—the probability that political tensions and low-level conflict will not erupt into a major war between India and Pakistan—is less certain in 2013 than at any time since their sequential nuclear weapons tests of 1998. India’s vast and growing spending on large conventional military forces, at least in part as a means to dissuade Pakistan’s tolerance of (or support for) insurgent and terrorist activity against India, coupled with Pakistan’s post-2006 accelerated pursuit of tactical nuclear weapons as a means to offset this Indian initiative, have greatly increased the risk of a future Indo-Pakistani military clash or terrorist incident escalating to nuclear exchange.1 America’s limited abilities to prevent the escalation of an Indo-Pakistani crisis toward major war are best served by continuing a significant military and political presence in Afghanistan and diplomatic and military-to-military dialogue with Pakistan well beyond 2014.

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  Suggestions for Evaluating the Quality of the Army’s Science and Technology Program: The Portfolio and Its Execution

  John W. Lyons, Richard Chait, and James A. Ratches

  This paper presents a methodology discussing the goal of establishing the strongest possible technology program appropriately aligned to the needs of its customers and the expectations of its stakeholders. The first chapter presents the essential elements of the Army S&T portfolio followed by discussions of the Army S&T portfolio and the evaluation of it.

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  External Collaboration in Army Science and Technology: The Army’s Research Alliances

  John W. Lyons and James A. Ratches

  In this study, the authors examine the decision for Army Research Laboratories to engage in external, formal collaborations such as collaborative alliances. They go on to assess ARL Collaborative Technology Alliances (CTAs), Collaborative Research Alliances (CRAs), and Information Technology Alliance (ITAs). The report concludes by examining the effectiveness of the examples given above, and a recommendation for formulating a set of assessment questions for Army managers considering collaboration in the future.

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  Some Recent Sensor – Related Army Critical Technology Events

  James A. Ratches, Richard Chait, and John W. Lyons

  Some Recent Sensor-Related Army Critical Technology Events, James A. Ratches, Richard Chait, and John W. Lyons examined current Critical Technology Events (CTEs) that are new or ongoing in US Army Science and Technology (S&T) community. CTEs are ideas, concepts, models and analyses, including key technical and managerial decisions, which have had a major impact on the development of a specific weapons system. The five on-going projects within the Army S&T portfolio selected for inclusion in the report are the Global Positioning System (GPS)-guided munitions, Excalibur; the persistent surveillance platform, Global Hawk; Unattended Transient Acoustic/Artillery MASINT System (UTAMS); the thermal imaging night sight technology; and 5V Li-ion batteries for battlefield power sources. The authors identified 42 CTEs in the development of the Army sensors; 24 of the 42 reported were uniquely contributed by the in-house Army laboratories; 57 percent of all the CTEs originated in the Army S&T laboratories. Further, the authors draw the following conclusions: that Army laboratories make significant technical and enabling contributions to Army platforms and capabilities; Army S&T laboratories are uniquely suited to represent, defend, and guide the satisfaction of Army requirements; Army laboratories have the people, infrastructure, and determination to satisfy evolving and established needs; and the Army S&T community is the singular force in collaboration with industry and academia that ensures Army needs are optimally met in an effective, efficient, and affordable manner. The report attempts to show that the S&T resources and processes in place continue to generate CTEs in the sensor and power area for the next generation of Army systems. It concludes that it is critical to the Army’s mission to foster and nurture the Army’s in-house S&T tech base.

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  Critical Technology Events (CTEs) that Support the Rationale for Army Laboratories Based on Science and Technology Functions Performed

  James A. Ratches and John W. Lyons

  This report, part of the “Project Hindsight Revisited” series of DTP publications, provides a retrospective look at 58 Critical Technology Events (CTEs) in DoD R&D investment, logically divided across 10 separate categories. The authors demonstrate the continuing relevance of Army laboratories in the development of critical weapons systems. Using specific examples, the study articulates the importance of maintaining quality staff and managers, ensuring the relevance of S&T program investments, and integrating servicemen and women with the larger scientific community to forecast technology trends.

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  The New NATO Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism: Analysis, Assessments, and Actions

  Stefano Santamato

  The history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will say that the first, and so far only, time NATO has called upon its Article 5 collective defense clause was on September 12, 2001, following a terrorist attack on one of its members. Yet, until the agreement by NATO Heads of State and Government on the new policy guidelines on counterterrorism on May 20, 2012, NATO did not have an agreed policy to define its role and mandate in countering terrorism.

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  Defining "Weapons of Mass Destruction"

  W. Seth Carus

  In January 2005, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed that U.S. Strategic Command become “the lead combatant commander for integrating and synchronizing DOD [Department of Defense] in combating WMD [weapons of mass destruction].” This assignment was in response to the White House’s December 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.
  
  The Secretary’s memorandum, however, raised a thorny definitional problem with clear bureaucratic implications: what are weapons of mass destruction? Unfortunately, that is not an easily answered question. There are numerous definitions of WMD with some official or semi-official standing (more than 40 are identified in this paper), although most are variations of 1 of 5 basic definitions. In fact, even DOD has adopted alternative and fundamentally inconsistent definitions, including some different from the one used by the White House in its strategy and policy documents.

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  Globalization of S&T: Key Challenges Facing DOD

  Timothy Coffey and Steven Ramberg

  This paper employs the results of a full economic analysis for the period 2005-2050 to estimate the S&T knowledge production for each of the world’s 17 largest economies. The present work establishes an empirical relationship between an economy’s gross domestic product per capita and its ability to generate S&T knowledge.

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  Taking the Battle Upstream: Towards a Benchmarking Role for NATO

  Stephan De Spiegeleire

  The main intuition underlying this paper is that the current (geo) political, technological, and especially financial realities may require NATO to take the battle for capabilities upstream.

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  Constructive Convergence: Imagery and Humanitarian Assistance

  Doug Hanchard

  The goal of this paper is to illustrate to the technical community and interested humanitarian users the breadth of tools and techniques now available for imagery collection, analysis and distribution, and to provide brief recommendations with suggestions for next steps.

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  Non-Traditional Security Threats and Asia-Pacific Regional Cooperation

  James M. Keagle

  The purpose of this paper is for the better understanding of the security challenges and opportunities for expanded cooperation through global regional efforts to manage our planet and govern its inhabitants more responsibly.

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  Report of an Army Workshop on Convergence Forecasting: Mechanochemical Transduction

  Douglas Kiserow, David Stepp, Stephen Lee, and Peter Reynolds

  This is an assessment of the Mechanochemical Transduction Convergence Workshop sponsored by the Army Research Office which took place in January 2012. The workshop was a test case for identifying convergences of disciplines and their potential impact on science and the Army. The chief objective of the workshop was the identify the most promising research opportunities and interdisciplinary convergences that could lead the field of mechanochemical transduction in new direction with unexpected outcomes that would be relevant to future Army needs.

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  Proliferation Security Initiative: Origins and Evolution

  Susan J, Koch

  On December 9, 2002, the United States and Spanish navies cooperated to interdict a North Korean vessel, the So San, in the Arabian Sea.¹ The operation initially appeared to be an unqualified success, a textbook example of interdiction to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), related materials, or delivery systems. According to press reports, the United States began tracking the vessel when it first left North Korea, believing that it was carrying a cargo related to Scud ballistic missiles. The So San flew no flag, making it a stateless vessel under international law, subject to interception and boarding by warships on the high seas.² The United States asked the Spanish navy to stop and search the So San when the ship reached the patrol area of Combined Task Force (CTF) 150, then under Spanish command. The mission of CTF 150 was “to promote maritime security in order to counter terrorist acts and related illegal activities” in the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean.³ Thus, the United States proposed—and Spain agreed—to use a tool developed to combat global terrorism in a counterproliferation mission.

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  Reflections on Over Fifty Years in Research and Development; Some Lessons Learned

  John W. Lyons

  This paper presents some thoughts about research in science and technology gleaned from Dr. Lyons’ more than 50 years working in scientific and engineering research – first in chemical industry, then at two different government laboratories, and later some years in S&T policy. It elaborates on a paper by Richard Chait in which he interviews three former S&T executives in the DoD on how to manage a research laboratory. Its objective is to provide some insights on what it is like to work in a scientific research establishment.

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  Enhancing Army S&T Vol. II: The Future

  John W. Lyons and Richard Chait

  Chapter I of this volume is an introduction, and Chapter II offers an updated view of the work discussed in Vol. I with an emphasis on the relative roles played by the Army laboratories that manufactured the systems. The close collaboration between the two groups was judged by the authors to be the key to the successful outcomes. This chapter presents updated findings and recommendations of the previous studies in Vol I.

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  Cross-currents in French Defense and U.S. Interests

  Leo G. Michel

  France is the only European ally—except for the United Kingdom (UK)—that regards its military capabilities, operational performance, and defense industry as vital levers to exert global influence. While the French believe strongly in their need to preserve “strategic independence,” they see new challenges in the evolving international security environment that will oblige them to accept greater cooperation with others, even in areas once considered too sensitive to discuss. Although some French strategists remain uncomfortable with the notion of closer defense ties with the United States, others ask whether there might be a greater danger ahead: specifically, if Europe’s strength dissipates as America “rebalances” toward the Asia-Pacific region, where does France turn to find capable and willing partners to protect its security interests?

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  Combating Transnational Organized Crime: Strategies and Metrics for the Threat

  Samuel Musa

  This paper provides an overview of the strategic and policy initiatives that the United States and international community have taken, including an assessment of the TOC threat. The overview is followed by the metrics developed to evaluate the relative magnitude and direction of the threat of a 5-year period.

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  Russia and the Iranian Nuclear Program: Replay or Breakthrough?

  John W. Parker

  Despite protests across Russia sparked by last December’s fraud-filled Duma (parliament) elections, Vladimir Putin is preparing to return to the presidency this May. Will Putin replay his 2004–2008 approach to Iran, during which Russia negotiated the S–300 air defense system contract with Tehran? Or will he continue Russia’s breakthrough in finding common ground with the United States on Iran seen under President Dmitriy Medvedev, who tore up the S–300 contract?

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  Japan-China Relations 2005–2010: Managing Between a Rock and a Hard Place An Interpretative Essay

  James J. Przystup

  Between China and Japan, the past is ever-present. Notwithstanding shared cultural and historic ties, throughout the past century and going back to the Sino-Japanese war at the end of the 19th century, a bitter legacy of history—the Boxer Rebellion; the Mukden Incident and Japan’s occupation of South Manchuria (1931); the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Japan’s subsequent invasion of China, and the Nanjing Massacre (1937); and the Sino-Japanese War (1937– 1945)—has left an indelible mark on this relationship.

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  Managing Sino-U.S. Air and Naval Interactions: Cold War Lessons and New Avenues of Approach

  Mark E. Redden and Phillip C. Saunders

  The United States and China have a complex, multifaceted, and ambiguous relationship where substantial areas of cooperation coexist with ongoing strategic tensions and suspicions. One manifestation involves disputes and incidents when U.S. and Chinese military forces interact within China’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Three high-profile incidents over the last decade have involved aggressive maneuvers by Chinese military and/or paramilitary forces operating in close proximity to deter U.S. surveillance and military survey platforms from conducting their missions. Why do these incidents continue to occur despite mechanisms designed to prevent such dangerous encounters? Could new or different procedures or policies help avoid future incidents?

  The problem in the U.S.-China case lies not with inadequate rules (for maritime operations) or history of practice (for air operations), but rather in the motivations that sometimes drive the Chinese to selective noncompliance with their provisions. China regards military surveillance and survey operations in its EEZ as hostile, threatening, illegal, and inappropriate. China’s harassment of U.S. naval vessels and aircraft conducting surveillance and survey operations is intended to produce a change in U.S. behavior by raising the costs and risks of these operations.

  The U.S. military has confronted this problem before. U.S. doctrine and operational practice in conducting and responding to surveillance operations derives primarily from Cold War interactions with the Soviet military. The two countries were eventually able to develop a mutually beneficial protocol, known as the Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA), for managing air and naval interactions, thereby reducing the potential for an incident to occur or escalate. Given the success of INCSEA and tactical parallels between U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-China interactions, the factors that led the Soviet Union to seek an agreement provide a useful prism for evaluating the current situation.

  Three primary factors motivated the U.S.-Soviet agreement: concern over the escalation potential of future incidents, a growing parallelism in the nature and scope of surveillance operations, and a burgeoning period of détente. These factors do not presently exist in the U.S.- China relationship to the degree necessary to induce mutual restraint in maritime and air interactions within China’s EEZ. This situation may change over the next 10 to 15 years as Chinese global economic interests expand and naval modernization produces a more capable and active Chinese navy, but waiting for change is not an attractive solution given continuing operational risks and the potential for an incident to badly damage bilateral relations.

  If U.S. policymakers seek a faster change in Chinese behavior, they need to understand the underlying Chinese policy calculus, how it may change over time, and potential means of influencing that calculus. Based on Chinese policy objectives, official statements, patterns of behavior, and logical inferences, we identify seven decisionmaking variables:

  1. Sovereignty/security concerns: These reflect China’s historical concerns about sovereignty and the economic importance of defending China’s coastal provinces.
  2. Intelligence/counter-intelligence: China needs to gather strategic and tactical intelligence and also seeks to limit intelligence collection by potential adversaries.
  3. Geostrategic considerations: China has concerns about the U.S. role in Asia, needs a stable external environment that supports development, desires to shape international rules and norms, and seeks to project a positive international image.
  4. Chinese domestic context: Aggressive efforts by Chinese naval and maritime forces to defend sovereignty bolster their relative importance and justify increased resources. However, the Chinese navy also seeks to show that it can protect China’s interests and safeguard China’s economic development, missions that require cooperation with foreign militaries.
  5. Global commons access: Assured access to the global economy for resources and to reach markets is essential for continued Chinese economic growth and development.
  6. Escalation control: China shares an interest in preventing interactions with U.S. military assets from escalating into a broader conflict, but Chinese leaders and officers tend to regard the risk of such escalation as limited and manageable.
  7. Relations with the United States: A constructive relationship with the United States is important for China’s continued economic development and ability to achieve its national objectives, but Chinese leaders downplay the likelihood of a military incident causing irreparable damage to bilateral relations.

  U.S. policymakers have several broad avenues of approach to alter the Chinese policy calculus and thereby influence Chinese behavior:

  1. Intelligence/counter-intelligence approaches: These approaches link China’s own ability to gather intelligence with its tolerance of U.S. intelligence-collection activities. Options include creating direct parallels between U.S. operations in China’s EEZ and Chinese operations in Japan’s EEZ; linking Chinese tolerance of U.S. surveillance operations in its EEZ with U.S. tolerance of select Chinese intelligence-collection activities in other areas or using other means; and linking the frequency of U.S. surveillance operations to Chinese concessions or cooperation in other areas.
  2. Maritime cooperation/coercion: These approaches play on the distinction between contentious U.S.-Chinese interactions within China’s EEZ and more cooperative interactions in distant waters. Cooperative options include highlighting the value of agreed operational norms and expanding U.S.-China maritime cooperation, including via surveillance cooperation in support of counterpiracy operations; coercive options include responding to Chinese harassment with “tit for tat” actions against Chinese navy ships or commercial shipping outside China’s EEZ.
  3. Geostrategic and bilateral considerations: These approaches play on Chinese geostrategic interests in maintaining a stable regional environment and a U.S.-China relationship conducive to economic and social development. Options include a more structured, consistent, and sustained U.S. strategic communication plan that highlights international norms of airmanship and seamanship; drawing parallels between the rights of military units to conduct operations in EEZs under the freedom of navigation principle and the more general issue of commercial access to the global commons; and challenging the Chinese assumption that military incidents inside China’s EEZ are unlikely to escalate into broader conflict or seriously threaten bilateral relations.

  Given the importance that China places on sovereignty, no single option is likely to be sufficient. A mixed approach, particularly one that influences more Chinese decisionmakers, may maximize the probability of success. Cooperative approaches require time for benefits to accrue and for normative arguments to be heard and heeded. Some potential coercive approaches require violating preferred U.S. norms of freedom of navigation and U.S. military standard practice of safe airmanship and seamanship to generate the leverage necessary to alter Chinese behavior. This risks shifting international norms in undesired directions and would create greater tension and friction in military-military relations and bilateral relations generally.

  This study does not attempt to weigh the intelligence value of U.S. operations in China’s EEZ against their negative impact on U.S.-China relations or the costs of the coercive options identified above. U.S. policymakers will need to carefully consider whether the status quo is tolerable, the costs and risks of various approaches, and what mix of policies might move China in desired directions at an acceptable cost.

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  Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference

  Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb

  This study explains how one part-time interagency committee established in the 1980s to counter Soviet disinformation effectively accomplished its mission. Interagency committees are commonly criticized as ineffective, but the Active Measures Working Group is a notable exception. The group successfully established and executed U.S. policy on responding to Soviet disinformation. It exposed some Soviet covert operations and raised the political cost of others by sensitizing foreign and domestic audiences to how they were being duped. The group’s work encouraged allies and made the Soviet Union pay a price for disinformation that reverberated all the way to the top of the Soviet political apparatus. It became the U.S. Government’s body of expertise on disinformation and was highly regarded in both Congress and the executive branch.

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  Domestic Event Support Operations (DESO)

  Andrew Smith

  This paper draws heavily on Australian experience in the last dozen years, during which time the country hosted a Summer Olympics and Paralympics, a Commonworth Games, an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Leaders Meeting, and a number of other events, all of which required DESO to be mounted.

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  Chemical and Biological Defense Test and Evaluation (T&E) Future Challenges

  James J. Valdes and Ewelina Tunia

  The objective of this study was to identify emerging technical, methodological, and infrastructure challenges for future Chemical and Biological Defense Test and Evaluation investment, and to serve as a prequel to the development of a full strategic T&E Roadmap.