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Description

Biological threats present unique challenges to traditional deterrence models due to their dual-use nature, difficulties in attribution, and rapidly evolving scientific landscape. In this commentary, the authors argue that deterrence by denial, while essential, is insufficient on its own to address contemporary biothreats. They propose a broader framework that integrates deterrence by disruption and capability diminishment to interfere with and reduce adversaries’ ability to develop and employ biological weapons. This approach emphasizes coordinated efforts across scientific, technological, economic, intelligence, and policy domains, as well as collaboration with public health and international partners. By shaping the conditions under which biological weapons programs emerge and operate, this expanded deterrence paradigm seeks to more effectively manage the complexity of the global biotechnology environment and strengthen national security.

Document Type

Article

Topic(s)

Emerging Science and Technologies, National Security, Strategic Competition

Region(s)

Global

Publication Date

3-31-2026

Keywords

Biodeterrence, Biosecurity, Biodefense, Biological Weapons, Dual-Use Research, Synthetic Biology, Emerging Biothreats, Strategic Deterrence, Biotechnology Governance, Intelligence and Surveillance, Global Biotechnology Ecosystem, Weapons of Mass Destruction

Author ORCID Identifier

https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6505-4729

Defining the Palette of Biodeterrence: Appreciating a Broader Toolkit

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