Defense Horizons

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  Dual-Track Transformation for NATO

  Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler

  Recent strains between the United States and some European allies have raised concerns that NATO is becoming irrelevant or even headed toward extinction. A breakup of NATO would severely damage the United States and Europe as well as prospects for global peace. As an urgent priority, NATO must restore its unity and strengthen its capacity for common action in the Greater Middle East. But how can this goal be achieved in today’s climate?

  The solution is for NATO to pursue a new dual-track strategy of military and political transformation that could be launched at the Istanbul Summit next spring. The military track should further strengthen efforts to field a NATO Response Force and otherwise prepare European forces for expeditionary missions. The political track should aim to create a common transatlantic vision for the Middle East, while enhancing NATO’s capacity to act flexibly and constructively there in peace, crisis, and war.

  Such a NATO strategic realignment is not mission impossible. NATO has survived previous trans-Atlantic stresses by adopting dual-track strategies that harmonized American and European interests. For example, almost forty years ago the Harmel Report reconciled detente with deterrence and defense. A new Harmel Report is needed to forge a similar reconciliation of U.S. and European policies toward NATO’s role in the Middle East. In addition, the Istanbul Summit can take other practical steps: e.g., a NATO resource commitment to increase defense investments as force structure is reduced, a NATO defense transformation roadmap to guide force improvements, and a new “Partnership for Cooperation” that would pursue ties with friendly Middle Eastern militaries. A bold Istanbul agenda of this sort offers NATO an opportunity to replace recent debates with a common approach for making the alliance more secure and effective in a troubled world.

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  Moore’s Law: A Department of Defense Perspective

  Gerald M. Borsuk and Timothy Coffey

  The past 50 years have seen enormous advances in electronics and the systems that depend upon or exploit them. The Department of Defense (DOD) has been an important driver in, and a profound beneficiary of, these advances, which have come so regularly that many observers expect them to continue indefinitely. However, as Jean de la Fontaine said, “In all matters one must consider the end.” A substantial literature debates the ultimate limits to progress in solid-state electronics as they apply to the current paradigm for silicon integrated circuit (IC) technology. The outcome of this debate will have a profound societal impact because of the key role that silicon ICs play in computing, information, and sensor technologies.

  The consequences for DOD are profound. For example, DOD planning assumptions regarding total situational awareness have been keyed to Moore's Law, which predicts the doubling of transistor density about every 18 months. While this prediction proved to be accurate for more than thirty years, we are entering a period when industry will have increasing difficulty in sustaining this pace. Under the current device and manufacturing paradigm, progress in areas such as total situational awareness will slow or stagnate. If DOD planning assumptions are to be met, the DOD science and technology program would be well advised to search aggressively for alternate paradigms beyond those on which Moore's Law is based to ensure new technology capabilities. The purpose of this paper is to examine the current prognosis for silicon IC technology from a DOD perspective.

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  Hydrogen as a Fuel for DOD

  Timothy Coffey, Dennis R. Hardy, Gottfried E. Besenbruch, Kenneth R. Schultz, Lloyd C. Brown, and Jill P. Dahlburg

  Energy issues have been at the center of the national security debate for some time, and the current situation in the Persian Gulf underscores the strategic importance of sound energy policy. Activities or developments—geopolitical, environmental, technological, or regulatory—that materially change the energy security equation are, naturally, of great interest to the Department of Defense (DOD). The announcement by President George Bush in his State of the Union address that he intends to accelerate research and development (R&D) for hydrogen-powered vehicles toward the objective of total U.S. energy independence has great potential impact on DOD. This paper examines a number of technical issues connected with energy independence through hydrogen and how they might affect DOD. We conclude that the move to a hydrogen economy will be a massive undertaking, requiring large investments and decades to accomplish. We will show that, with few exceptions, pure hydrogen is not a viable fuel for DOD missions, primarily because of the DOD requirement for compact, high-volumetric energy density power sources. As a result, to meet its unique needs, DOD likely will have to increase its dependence on nuclear power and support R&D that investigates ways to use hydrogen to synthesize hydrocarbon fuels in an environmentally compliant fashion. Several suggestions and recommendations will be made in this regard.

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  Alternative Governance: A Tool for Military Laboratory Reform

  Timothy Coffey, Kenneth W. Lackie, and Michael L. Marshall

  Throughout the Cold War, the United States maintained an edge over adversaries by fielding technologically superior warfighting systems. This strategy depended on a strong research and development (R&D) effort in both the public and private sectors, and the community of military laboratories in the Department of Defense played an essential role in the overall effort. Because of the importance of these labs during the Cold War, defense planners continually focused on ways to improve and strengthen them.

  The end of the Cold War, however, shifted the focus away from laboratory improvement toward consolidation, closure, realignment, and personnel downsizing, as many came to believe much of the R&D done by the military laboratories could, and even should, be done by the private sector. Scrutiny of the labs greatly increased as a constant stream of base realignment and closure and other cost-reduction efforts sought to decrease their roles and size. Because these actions focused almost exclusively on efficiency, little attention was paid to improving the effectiveness of the labs—their ability to carry out their assigned missions. Most activity directed at improving laboratory operation has dealt with incremental modifications of the current governance model. Currently, the military labs are Government-owned, Government-operated organizations. As many studies have noted, this governance model puts the laboratories at a great disadvantage and complicates their ability to accomplish their assigned missions. Alternative approaches have been suggested by lab reformers but have never been implemented. Since the current governance model is well known, and attempts to modify it are well documented, this paper discusses several alternative governance models for the labs, with emphasis on the Government-owned, contractor- operated and Government-owned corporation models. While there would be issues with regard to conversion of an existing military lab to a Government corporation or comparable entity, the long-term, mission-enabling benefits of such a conversion could far outweigh any near-term complexities.

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  The Air Force: Science, Technology, and Transformation

  Donald C. Daniel

  A unique connectivity exists in the Air Force between science, technology, and transformation. From the defining moment of powered flight in 1903 to the creation of the Air Force as a separate service in 1947 to the present, these three elements have been continuously linked and undoubtedly will remain so.

  This paper provides a brief historical perspective of the ties between science, technology, and transformation in the earliest days of the Air Force; gives an overview of current Air Force science and technology; offers a look at five future transformational capabilities—unmanned combat aerial vehicles, small munitions, directed energy weapons, microsatellites, and the joint battlespace infosphere—that demonstrate the strong nature of the link today; and lastly, presents some challenges and issues.

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  NATO Defense Science and Technology

  Donald C. Daniel and Leigh C. Caraher

  The accord establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 provided the framework for the greatest international mechanism ever in defense science and technology. From its earliest days, NATO involvement in science and technology has sought to build cooperation and promote security and stability. Today, the central element of the NATO defense science and technology program is the Research and Technology Organization (RTO), which provides the best basis for collaboration among the most technologically advanced countries in the world. Through this body, alliance nations plan and execute activities that cover the full spectrum of technologies vital to current and future security.

  RTO and its two predecessors, the Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development and the Defense Research Group, have a history of fostering long-term relationships among senior executives, scientists, and engineers; sharing information and research; and enhancing military capabilities. There is no international activity that rivals RTO in scope, magnitude, or potential. RTO can continue to build on these successes by emphasizing longevity of its highly qualified members, prioritizing areas of opportunity, integrating the seven newest NATO invitees, and building a closer relationship with Russia. This paper examines the origins of NATO defense science and technology, provides an overview of the Research and Technology Organization, and analyzes the elements that make RTO successful. The paper concludes with recommendations for enhancing RTO effectiveness in the 21st century.

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  The Silence of the Labs

  Don J. DeYoung

  Something important to the Nation’s defense has vanished, yet the top Pentagon brass never noticed. Not the stuff of headlines, this loss would not arouse public concern, especially during these times of terrorist massacres, anthrax attacks, corporate scandal, and war. Nevertheless, like the miner’s canary that is first to die with the rush of an ill wind, this loss is a warning.

  In the span of 18 months, the Department of Defense (DOD) lost a key part of its 25-year-old ability to perform fiber optics research at the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), the only site with this world-class defense capability. It was not time for DOD to exit this critical field. Urgent security needs not being met anywhere else were being addressed. Both the scale of the loss and the speed with which it occurred reveal a growing problem: the private sector’s increasingly successful recruitment of the best scientists working for the DOD Defense Laboratories. While personnel losses are to be expected in any enterprise, public or private, this particular loss exposes the diminished DOD ability to retain the technical talent necessary to accomplish its mission.

  The death of this “canary” sends warning that an ill wind is blowing for the Defense Laboratories.¹ Without reform, their loss of expertise will worsen, eventually to the point where it affects good government and poses significant risks to national security. Should this happen, the Nation will suffer what President Dwight Eisenhower called “a disastrous rise of misplaced power.”

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  Beyond the Mainland: Chinese Telecommunications Expansion

  Robert C. Fonow

  In most countries, expansion of the telecommunications network beyond national borders has followed diplomatic and business expansion. On this basis, an informed practitioner might be expecting the Chinese telecommunications system to spread beyond its borders sometime in the later part of this decade. However, Chinese authorities have been quick to act upon a series of unexpected opportunities for acquiring international telecom- munications assets. This article discusses the international secu- rity implications of Chinese telecommunications expansion.

  Since the telecommunications collapse of 2001, Chinese buy- ers have purchased several large telecommunications networks in Asia previously owned by U.S. investors. Among these are:

  ■ PSINet, which was one of the early developers of the Internet. Hong Kong assets were purchased by CITIC, a company reported to have close relations with the People’s Liberation Army.

  ■ Level 3, which was sold to a joint venture including Pacific Cen- tury CyberWorks, a company run by Richard Li, the son of Hong Kong bil- lionaire Li Ka Shing—both of whom maintain close contacts with central government authorities in Beijing.

  ■ Asia Global Crossing assets, which was purchased by China Net- com, the newly renamed northern division of the incumbent carrier China Telecom.

  ■ Global Crossing, Inc., which claims its own Asian assets in a highly publicized pending deal including a direct investment by Hutchin- son Whampoa and Singapore Telemedia. Hutchinson eventually backed out, leaving Singapore Telemedia as the sole potential owner. But, as this paper argues, the deal still facilitates China’s expanding network capa- bility and influence.

  These assets, previously paid for by American investors at a cost of up to $20 billion, were bought for an average cost of as lit- tle as 3 cents on the dollar, representing a huge loss of American capital value.1 Each company had extensive networks covering several Asian countries with large capacity circuits and direct ity into the United States.

  It is unlikely that such a broad-based move into international telecommunications was simply a fortuitous consequence of China’s transition to a free market economy. Several interesting questions arise. First, to what extent was the Beijing leadership behind this acquisition spree (even though most of the action took place in Hong Kong)? Second, and perhaps more importantly, how will this purchase of assets by national Chinese network services providers enable Chinese interests to control the telecommunications domain in Asia, and how this will impact U.S.-China relations in the areas of military competition and foreign policy? And, third, how will an expanding international telecommunications capability affect internal political and economic developments in China?

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  A New PPBS Process to Advance Transformation

  Stuart E. Johnson

  The Office of the Secretary of Defense has released its first Transformational Planning Guidance to steer the Armed Forces through a joint process of transformation. This is a strong step in the direction of making transformation and innovation visible parts of the defense planning process, but more is needed. The planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) through which the Department of Defense (DOD) prioritizes its programs and resources has to be restructured to facilitate transformation and innovation, not to obstruct them. DOD has begun a trial resource allocation process that will reduce the burden of repetitive report generation that has drained time and energy away from innovative, strategic change. This process gives senior leadership an opportunity to shift its attention from wrestling with budget detail to developing initiatives to transform U.S. forces. However, this change will not happen of its own accord. A set of proposals that would enable senior leadership to move its focus from the back end (budgeting) of the resource allocation process to the front end (planning and idea generation) is presented below. A review of how the PPBS has evolved is presented to highlight the need to target specific parts for restructuring.

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  Decision Dominance: Exploiting Transformational Asymmetries

  Merrick E. Krause

  This paper introduces a new operational concept—decision dominance—to help guide the strategic employment of U.S. forces in wartime. This concept is not a replacement for existing paradigms. If added to the current list, however, it may better illuminate how American forces can operate effectively in ways that will achieve their political-military goals more decisively in future wars.

  Decision dominance builds upon current operational concepts, particularly effects-based operations and rapid decisive operations. Yet it goes further by giving warfighting options to shape the operational and strategic decisions of an adversary. Decision dominance is an attempt to exploit emerging transformational U.S. military capabilities to create a transformational strategy and Joint Capstone Concept. It reflects a strategy for the use of military force in concert with other instruments of power. This strategy involves evaluating adversary options and eliminating those deemed undesirable, effectively funneling the decisionmaking process of the enemy leadership to achieve a desired outcome.

  This paper first discusses the nature of conflict in the modern strategic environment and some popular contemporary military concepts of operations. Next, it examines the operational relevance of decision dominance and its application in conflict. Decision dominance argues that a strategy exploiting the realms of space, time, and knowledge may be invaluable by allowing decisionmakers to achieve political ends, using military means, to coerce methodically and effectively, with minimal cost and risk to both sides.

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  Transformation and the Defense Industrial Base: A New Model

  Robbin F. Laird

  American force transformation is about building a new expeditionary model with flexible, modular forces that can be managed on a global basis to protect U.S. interests. Breaking the tyranny of geography on military forces is a key aspect to change.

  Transformation represents a shift in the demand side of the defense industrial business to provide for these new capabilities. The Department of Defense (DOD) is seeking system-of-systems management to deliver capabilities to the services and for joint military operations. This represents a shift from the past emphasis upon platforms and a primary focus upon service-specific technologies and programs.

  As the demand side of the equation has shifted, so has the supply side. Defense consolidation in the 1990s dealt with scarcity; now the newly emerged mega-primes are asked to play the role of lead systems integrators (LSIs) or system-of-systems managers to deliver capability to DOD for transformed operations.

  DOD moved to a different way of doing business before the transformation effort emerged as a core priority. Now that the transformation agenda is dominating the shift in the relationship between industry and government, working through LSI roles in shaping capabilities-based procurement will be especially important.

  Additionally, the new LSI and system-of-systems management model is shaping a new approach to allies. The new model can allow industry to shape new capabilities on a transatlantic basis. Rather than the old export-after-production model, the new LSI model, coupled with a transformation emphasis, leads to the shaping of new opportunities for developing capabilities before core series production decisions would be taken.

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  Global Warming Could Have a Chilling Effect on the Military

  Richard F. Pittenger and Robert B. Gagosian

  Most debates and studies addressing potential climate change have focused on the buildup of industrial greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and a gradual increase in global temperatures. But this “slow ramp”1 climate change scenario ignores recent and rapidly advancing evidence that Earth’s climate repeatedly has become much colder, warmer, wetter, or drier—in time spans as short as three to 10 years.

  Earth’s climate system appears to have sensitive thresholds, the crossing of which shifts the system into different modes of operation and triggers rapid, non-linear, and not necessarily global changes. This new paradigm of abrupt climate change does not appear to be on the radar screens of military planners, who treat climate change as a long-term, low-level threat, with mostly sociological, not national security, implications. But intense and abrupt climate changes could escalate environmental issues into unanticipated security threats, and could compromise an unprepared military.

  The global ocean circulation system, often called the Ocean Conveyor, can change rapidly and shift the distribution patterns of heat and rainfall over large areas of the globe. The North Atlantic region is particularly vulnerable to abrupt regional coolings linked to ocean circulation changes. Global warming and ocean circulation changes also threaten the Arctic Ocean’s sea ice cover. Beyond the abrupt climatic impacts, fundamental changes in ocean circulation also have immediate naval implications.

  Recent evidence suggests that the oceans already may be experiencing large-scale changes that could affect Earth’s climate. Military planners should begin to consider potential abrupt climate change scenarios and their impacts on national defense.

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  Technology, Transformation, and New Operational Concepts

  Elihu Zimet, Robert E. Armstrong, Donald C. Daniel, and Joseph N. Mait

  Throughout history, technology has been central to warfare, often giving qualitative advantages to numerically inferior forces. Typically, the rate of technology development has been relatively slow and the introduction of new weapons systems even slower, which has allowed evolutionary development of operational concepts. Today’s accelerated pace of technology development no longer allows sequential development of operational concepts. In addition, the current global political environment has placed demands upon the military that range from engaging in major regional conflicts to stabilization, reconstruction and peacekeeping, all creating a continuous need for flexible, adaptive systems and new concepts of operation.

  The first purpose of this paper is to describe principal new developments in technology in the framework of how they can improve operational effectiveness in the uncertain world of the 21st century. The technologies are presented generically rather than by system, because a broader and more generic technology base is required to meet evolving opportunities. A second purpose is to examine the related issue of technology development and acquisition. Expectations for the rapid introduction of technologies that promote transformation must be tempered by the military requirement for continuous capability, even as new systems and operational concepts are introduced. Finally, although the United States leads the world in the development of military systems, the foundational military science and technology base shows signs of erosion. This erosion must be arrested if American military superiority is to be maintained.

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  From Petro to Agro: Seeds of a New Economy

  Robert E. Armstrong

  Winston Churchill is said to have stopped predicting future events because the future was just “one damned thing after another.” Nonetheless, we need to keep an eye on the future and speculate as to what the next damned thing might be. One candidate is the changing raw material base for the economy.

  Today, the hydrocarbon molecule is the basic unit of commerce. In a biobased economy, genes will replace petroleum. So, just as we currently demand assured access to sources of hydrocarbon molecules (oil), in the near future we will demand assured access to a broad-based, diverse supply of genes (plants and animals). This shift has security implications. Relations with oil-rich countries will be of less importance, and relations with gene-rich states—mostly the biodiverse regions along the equator— will assume greater significance. Conflicts may arise between gene-rich, technology-poor countries that control the basic raw materials of a biobased economy and gene-poor, technology- rich nations that control the production methods.

  American instruments of power will be challenged to meet the demands of a biobased economy. We already see diplomatic challenges with the United Nations Framework Convention on Biological Diversity and controversy with Europe over genetically modified crops. Informational and economic challenges and opportunities will likewise appear. It may be challenging for U.S. land forces, especially the Army, to meet the demands of securing access to large supplies of new genetic material.

  Agriculture will become increasingly important as a part of the Nation’s industrial base, as it offers the most economical way to produce large quantities of biological materials. Homeland defense will have to consider heartland defense, as agricultural fields will assume the same significance as oil fields.

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  The Emergence of Mini UAVs for Military Applications

  Timothy Coffey and John A. Montgomery

  The successes of the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in Afghanistan most likely will accelerate the introduction of UAVs into the military force structure. What emerged in Afghanistan was a tiered observation-detection-targeting system consisting of spacecraft, the Global Hawk UAV, the Predator UAV, and often a spotter on the ground. However, in complex terrain, as in Afghanistan, and in urban situations, airborne assets may be needed much closer to the ground. A low-altitude tier of UAVs—mini UAVs—could serve such a purpose.

  This paper provides a basic understanding of the aerodynamic scaling of mini UAVs and a sense of how their capabilities could be matched with specific missions. Mini UAVs have substantial limitations, but the low radar cross section, low infrared signature, low acoustic signature, and birdlike appearance of these vehicles, combined with the remarkable capabilities of miniaturized payloads, make them contenders for certain missions and potential valuable tactical assets.

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  Computer Simulation and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

  Peter D. Zimmerman and David W. Dorn

  All nuclear weapons now in the American stockpile were developed with the aid of computer models validated by comparison with nuclear tests. However, those models required the use of parameters that were not well understood and often needed adjustment to make computation and test agree. Facing the possibility of a test ban, the Department of Energy initiated a Stockpile Stewardship Project to develop a predictive capability with validated, physics-based simulation tools at its core. This program is charged with maintaining the performance, reliability, and safety of U.S. nuclear weapons without nuclear testing. To meet the requirement for maintaining the enduring stockpile, the Department of Energy engaged the three national weapons laboratories in creating the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI). ASCI advanced computational capabilities and three dimensional models, combined with major experimental and testing facilities, should make it possible for the United States to maintain its present nuclear stockpile indefinitely. The authors believe that the ASCI computational capabilities also will enable nuclear weapon designers to draw on archived data from more than 1,000 nuclear tests to adapt proven designs to future mission requirements. Through extensive computer modeling and nonnuclear testing, new nuclear weapons could be designed and introduced into the stockpile, so long as the new weapons used design concepts similar to those proven in nuclear tests.