Defense Horizons

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The Role of Medical Diplomacy in Stabilizing Afghanistan

Donald F. Thompson

Comprehensive stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan are not possible given the current fragmentation of responsibilities, narrow lines of authorities, and archaic funding mechanisms. Afghans are supportive of U.S. and international efforts, and there are occasional signs of progress, but the insurgent threat grows as U.S. military and civilian agencies and the international community struggle to bring stability to this volatile region. Integrated security, stabilization, and reconstruction activities must be implemented quickly and efficiently if failure is to be averted. Much more than a course correction is needed to provide tangible benefits to the population, develop effective leadership capacity in the government, and invest wisely in reconstruction that leads to sustainable economic growth. A proactive, comprehensive reconstruction and stabilization plan for Afghanistan is crucial to counter the regional terrorist insurgency, much as the Marshall Plan was necessary to combat the communist threat from the Soviet Union.¹ This paper examines the health sector as a microcosm of the larger problems facing the United States and its allies in efforts to stabilize Afghanistan.
Privatizing While Transforming

Marion E. “Spike” Bowman

The Armed Forces of the United States are designed to be supported by capabilities provided by civilians. The Army, for example, depends not only on Reserve and National Guard components for warfighting elements, but also on private contractors for numerous roles no longer performed by military personnel. Originally working in small contingents focused on logistical functions, private contractors now rival military personnel in number in the battlespace. In addition to providing direct logistical support to the military, contractors perform equipment maintenance and reconstruction work, train military and police, and work as civil affairs staff, interpreters, and even interrogators. They also provide private armed security services. The issues arising from new roles are exacerbated by the growth of the contractor population in conflict zones at a pace that defies effective recordkeeping.

This rapid increase in the number of contractors has outstripped procedures meant more for acquisition of tangible objects than services. It has also placed private contractors in harm’s way in a manner not envisaged in previous conflicts. Legal and regulatory schemes have been challenged and perhaps stretched beyond limits. The laws of war divide the world neatly into combatants and civilians, but on today’s battlefields, the distinctions blur. Moreover, there are neither recognized nor logical rules of engagement for private individuals. The laws of armed conflict not only fail to accommodate armed private citizens, but also, in some instances, may treat them as unlawful combatants. Put simply, the requirements of the contemporary battlespace do not mesh well with procedures, regulations, and laws devised for a different era.
Organizing for National Security: Unification or Coordination?

James M. Keagle and Adrian R. Martin

Experience gained from the 9/11 attacks, combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, disaster assistance during and after Hurricane Katrina, and the ongoing war on terror provides the basis for amending our anachronistic national security structures and practices. Many analysts and officials have called for a secondgeneration version of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 to address the array of organizational and management challenges that we face. Some argue that the new security environment requires even more fundamental change, similar to what was enacted after World War II. The principal legislation that emerged from that era was the National Security Act of 1947. Goldwater-Nichols aimed to fix inter-Service problems by streamlining the chain of command and promoting “jointness” but did not fundamentally alter the structure of the U.S. military.

These earlier efforts attempted to strike a balance between those who wanted to unite bureaucracies to improve efficiency (primarily resource considerations) and produce more effective outcomes and those who opposed potentially dangerous concentrations of power and desired to preserve their heart-and-soul missions (as well as congressional support for their strategic view and related combat systems and force structures). Today, the debate rages anew with the security of this nation dependent on the outcome.

This paper explores two options for reorganization: unification and coordination. We investigate each against the backdrop of the two previous attempts at reorganization in the context of the Madisonian political culture that constitutes part of who we are as a nation. Finally, each option is judged against its ability to contribute to the development and implementation of the kinds of strategies and operations needed to wage the new kind of war and peace in the emerging global security environment.
I-Power: The Information Revolution and Stability Operations

Franklin D. Kramer, Larry Wentz, and Stuart Starr

Information and information technology (I/IT) can significantly increase the likelihood of success in stability operations—if they are engaged as part of an overall strategy that coordinates the actions of outside intervenors and focuses on generating effective results for the host nation. Properly utilized, I/IT can help create a knowledgeable intervention, organize complex activities, and integrate stability operations with the host nation, making stability operations more effective.

Key to these results is a strategy that requires that 1) the U.S. Government gives high priority to such an approach and ensures that the effort is a joint civilian-military activity; 2) the military makes I/IT part of the planning and execution of the stability operation; 3) preplanning and the establishment of I/IT partnerships are undertaken with key regular participants in stability operations, such as the United Nations and the World Bank; 4) the focus of the intervention, including the use of I/IT, is on the host nation, supporting host-nation governmental, societal, and economic development; and 5) key information technology capabilities are harnessed to support the strategy. Implementing the strategy will include 1) development of an information business plan for the host nation so that I/IT is effectively used to support stabilization and reconstruction; 2) agreements among intervenors on data-sharing and collaboration, including data-sharing on a differentiated basis; and 3) use of commercial IT tools and data provided on an unclassified basis.
Responding in the Homeland: A Snapshot of NATO’s Readiness for CBRN Attacks

Michael Moodie, Robert E. Armstrong, and Tyler Merkeley

The possibility of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members having to respond to a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) incident is not a hypothetical scenario reserved for training exercises. Indeed, a number of countries worldwide have considerable experience in dealing with a variety of naturally occurring, accidental, and deliberate CBRN incidents. NATO itself, however, has no clear conceptual vision of its role in civil emergencies because preparedness of this sort remains a national responsibility.

For many years, NATO’s military forces have addressed CBRN issues as part of their military planning. But the question remains as to how NATO nations view the capability of their military forces and the contribution that these forces can make in dealing with the consequences of a domestic CBRN attack within one or several member countries. This paper provides insights into current thinking of NATO members—based on an informal survey of Alliance military attaches assigned to Washington, DC—regarding the planning, assets, and training for such a contingency.

The resulting snapshot of NATO CBRN capabilities suggests specific initiatives that should be considered within the Alliance to improve its collective response to a CBRN incident. Areas recommended for particular emphasis and further study include bolstering Alliance capabilities for biological and radiological contingencies; strengthening command and control and logistics capabilities; addressing the airlift shortfall; intensifying multilateral exercises; and creating an Alliance-wide mechanism for sharing lessons learned.
The Comprehensive Approach Initiative: Future Options for NATO

Friis Arne Petersen and Hans Binnendijk

Experience has shown that conflict resolution requires the application of all elements of national and international power—political, diplomatic, economic, financial, informational, social, and commercial, as well as military. To resolve conflicts or crises, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should adopt a Comprehensive Approach that would enable the collaborative engagement of all requisite civil and military elements of international power to end hostilities, restore order, commence reconstruction, and begin to address a conflict’s root causes. NATO can provide the military element for a comprehensive approach. Many other national, international, and nongovernmental actors can provide the civilian elements.

In May 2007, the Royal Danish Embassy in Washington, DC, and the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University held an informal workshop of experts from across the Alliance to explore options for creating an international comprehensive approach to postconflict stabilization and reconstruction. This paper is the product of that workshop and subsequent collaborations. It endeavors to describe the major requirements for conflict resolution, what NATO has learned from its post–Cold War experiences to date in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, and how a more effective program of international civil and military engagement can be put in place.

Much work remains to be done to flesh out the initiative, but already it is clear that military efforts in the field must be complemented throughout any operation by nonmilitary means that bring to bear the expert civil competencies of other actors, both national and international. In the Balkans and Afghanistan, NATO engaged with other actors belatedly through ad hoc, situational arrangements. Not knowing in advance what roles and which participants will eventually come into play results in longer and more costly conflict resolution in terms of lives, treasure, and ultimate effectiveness.
Custer in Cyberspace

David C. Gompert and Richard L. Kugler

The combination of abundant networked information and fluid, unfamiliar situations in the current era makes it at once possible and imperative to improve decisionmaking in combat. The key to improvement is to integrate faster reasoning and more reliable intuition into a cognitive whole to achieve battle-wisdom. Although the technologies that both demand and facilitate battle- wisdom are new, military history holds lessons on combining reasoning and intuition in conditions of urgency, danger, and uncertainty.

Today’s fast and distributed style of war has antecedents in the reconnaissance and strike operations of 19th-century American cavalry, which depended on similar qualities—speed, flexibility, and command “at the edge.” Cavalry officers had to make quick decisions in unfamiliar circumstances with imperfect information, and without seeking instructions.

There may be no more arresting case of fateful decisionmaking by a commander in combat than that of George Armstrong Custer at the Battle of the Little Bighorn. Custer’s reliance on his legendary intuitive powers, which had produced many victories during the Civil War, was his undoing. Instead of analyzing his options when he learned of Major Reno’s failed attack and Indian strength, he evidently satisfied himself that his original plan still made sense. Famous for his self-confidence, Custer never asked himself the critical question: Could I be wrong?

Although intuition remains central to decisionmaking under time pressure, the ability to combine intuition with reason in the crush of battle is increasingly important to commanders. The need for this combination of cognitive skills has implications for the recruitment, retention, development, selection, training, and education of military decisionmakers.
Lee’s Mistake: Learning from the Decision to Order Pickett’s Charge

David C. Gompert and Richard L. Kugler

At the Battle of Gettysburg, Robert E. Lee made a mistake that doomed the hopes of the Confederate States of America to compel the United States to sue for peace. Why one of the great generals of his time made such a blunder continues to be a topic of research and intense debate. Lee said little at the time or afterward to justify his decision to launch what has become known as Pickett’s Charge, so analysis must be inferential and inconclusive. Our aim is to explain Lee’s fateful decision not with new facts but with new analytical methods to illuminate decisionmaking in combat.

Understanding how commanders draw on reason and experience to make sense of information, weigh alternatives, and make decisions in conditions of urgency and uncertainty is central to improving military performance in the fast, unfamiliar, “wired” warfare of the information age. Lee’s leadership of Confederate forces at Gettysburg constitutes a valuable case to study: the order of battle and technology of both sides are known in detail, and the terrain and troop movements have been studied thoroughly. Only the cause of Lee’s misjudgment remains elusive.

The pages that follow examine the facts that might have influenced Lee’s state of mind and his decision, offer and test alternative hypotheses on how he was thinking, draw conclusions, and apply those conclusions to matters of current interest.
Creating a NATO Special Operations Force

David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith

In the post-9/11 security environment, special operations forces (SOF) have proven indispensable. SOF units are light, lethal, mobile, and easily networked with other forces. While the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies have extensive SOF capabilities, these forces are not formally organized to collaborate with one another. There would be much to gain if U.S. and allied SOF trained to work together: national SOF assets would be improved, obstacles to effective combined operations would be removed, and a coherent Alliance capability would be readily available for NATO.

The Alliance can focus and grow its SOF capabilities by providing a selective and small combined “inner core” of NATO special operations forces for operations, while using an outer network to expand and improve SOF cooperation with interested allies.
Countering Terrorism Across the Atlantic?

Kimberley L. Thachuk

Differences in strategic vision and concepts of security are central to the U.S. and European Union (EU) approaches to counterterrorism. While the United States conceives of a war against terrorism, Europe does not. As a result of different perceptions of the threat, both sides of the Atlantic take divergent approaches to homeland security. Europeans tend to favor the use of a law enforcement strategy over a warfighting approach. Meanwhile, the U.S. administration believes that a quasi-militaristic, overtly proactive, and highly vigilant stance will serve as the best deterrent to future attacks. By their own standards, Europeans are doing more to counter terrorism since September 11 and even more since the attacks in Madrid (March 11, 2004) and in London (July 7, 2005); by U.S. standards, these measures sometimes appear inadequate. As a result, there are significant transatlantic divergences on the best methods for halting the spread of terrorism.

The way ahead in an EU–U.S. counterterrorism relationship may be to focus on positive areas such as capacity building, anticorruption measures, and strengthening multilateral agreements. Further, the key to apprehending—or at least interrupting—terrorist conspiracies may well lie in cooperating on the law enforcement side to apprehend and incarcerate terrorists for criminal activity. The United States may have to be satisfied when terrorists are brought to justice for organized criminal activity in EU states. While this does not hold the same political weight as convictions for terrorism, the result may be fewer acts of terrorism. Perhaps the greatest task for the transatlantic counterterrorism partnership is to renew the sense of urgency for cooperation in areas where the United States and EU countries do agree.
A New Military Framework for NATO

Hans Binnendijk, David C. Gompert, and Richard L. Kugler

Although Americans and Europeans do not always agree on political strategies in the Middle East, they have a compelling reason to reach an accord on the need to strengthen North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military forces for future operations in that region and elsewhere. If adequate military capabilities are lacking, the Alliance will not be able to act even when its political leaders agree on the need to do so. But if it creates such capabilities, it will be able to act either ad hoc or across the board if a common political strategy eventually were to emerge.

This article proposes a new and comprehensive military framework to help guide NATO improvements in the years ahead. This framework envisions a pyramid-like structure of future NATO forces and capabilities in five critical areas: a new NATO Special Operations Force, the NATO Response Force, high-readiness combat forces, stabilization and reconstruction forces, and assets for defense sector development. The United States would provide one-third of the necessary forces, and Europe would be responsible for the other two-thirds. For the Europeans, creating these forces and capabilities is a viable proposition because they require commitment of only 10 percent of their active military manpower, plus investments in such affordable assets as information networks, smart munitions, commercial lift, logistics support, and other enablers. If NATO succeeds in creating these forces for power projection and expeditionary missions, it will possess a broad portfolio of assets for a full spectrum of operations against such threats as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and cross-border aggression.
The Changing Landscape of Defense Innovation

Paul Bracken, Linda Brandt, and Stuart E. Johnson

In a rapidly evolving business environment, many successful companies have transformed themselves by reexamining their core missions and competencies and exploiting innovation in nontraditional ways. General Electric still manufactures products but now identifies itself as a services company. Wal-Mart has become the premier retailer by capitalizing on its logistics and support systems. These two giants and other companies have realized that they can become more profitable by exploiting new regions of the business landscape.

Applying this business model to national defense, the innovation landscape can be said to have three regions: products (airplanes, tanks, ships), processes (integrated systems), and retrofits of legacy systems. While the Department of Defense (DOD) is not a commercial enterprise, nor can it change its critical missions as a private firm might do, it, too, operates in a dynamic environment and should be in a continual process of transformation to adjust to and exploit change. Achieving the right balance of effort in these three regions will pay handsome dividends.

Until recently, DOD has invested most heavily in region one, the acquisition of new hardware based on new technologies. Already expensive to acquire, new hardware is even costlier because of its added complexity and need for extensive contractor support. To increase value realized from defense investments, the authors recommend shifting some resources to regions two and three. Creating a framework for exploiting process and retrofit innovation would provide significant increases in capabilities while facilitating successful integration of new product technologies into the existing infrastructure.
Russia and NATO: Increased Interaction in Defense Research and Technology

Donald C. Daniel and Michael I. Yarymovych

As a member of both the Partnership for Peace and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)–Russia Council (NRC), Russia enjoys remarkable status in an alliance formed principally to counter Soviet aggression. Active participation in one additional element of NATO—the Research and Technology Organization (RTO)—would offer unique opportunities to enhance relationships and mutual security. The RTO is the largest organization of its type in the world, has an extremely active program of work, and is eager to work with Russia.

Enhanced cooperation between NATO and Russia in defense-related research and technology would not be easy. Mistrust is an obstacle, as is difficulty communicating in English and French, the official NATO languages. Also, Russian economic weakness impedes consistent participation, particularly in events outside Russia.

NATO could reach out to Russia, offering sequential, specific opportunities and limited funding. These opportunities could include involving young Russian scientists and engineers in selected, defense-related research and technology projects; having a special ad hoc senior executive group identify a small number of flagship activities and report on progress to the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors, the Military Committee, and the NRC; and inviting a few mid-level scientists, engineers, or technical managers to work directly with RTO staff in Paris, where they could assist in defining and providing support for specific elements of the RTO program of work.

If NATO vectors toward Russia in this way, Russia must respond by vectoring toward the Alliance. The key here is a more consistent and cooperative representation by Russia in the forums that are available to it. Russian representatives must also become more fluent in English and French to achieve meaningful dialogue. This is especially true at the technical, senior executive levels. Finally, Russia must respond promptly to these initiatives. The opportunities are there. Now is the time.
Sweden’s Use of Commercial Information Technology for Military Applications

Franklin D. Kramer and John C. Cittadino

Sweden, a nation of only 9 million people with a political climate that has fostered a posture of nonalignment for over half a century, has nevertheless maintained highly credible, modern, and high-technology military forces. Sweden has expanded the mission of forces originally designed for the Cold War to include international peacekeeping. The focus of this study is the Swedish formula for achieving the high-technology military capabilities that successfully compensate for a small standing force. What policies and processes enabled the Swedish military to take advantage of leading-edge producers of commercial information technology (CIT)? What lessons does the Swedish model hold for the U.S. Department of Defense?

A National Defense University case study examined the Swedish experience, policy, process, and government-industry relationships to determine ways to improve America’s ability to capitalize on the use of CIT in military systems. The case study included a review of published Swedish policies, regulations, and reports but is based predominantly on meetings and interviews with Swedish industry and government officials.

The case study found more similarities than differences in Swedish and American policies and processes for acquiring commercial technology for military systems. Perhaps the most significant difference is that in Sweden, government and industry participants in the acquisition process have embraced the policy for maximum utilization of CIT, whereas Americans still debate whether commercial technology can do the job in warfighter or other defense applications. Furthermore, Sweden has initiated an acquisition process that routinely examines all requirements to determine the potential to do the job with CIT and then performs tradeoff analyses to determine acceptance.
Needed—A NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Force

Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler

At the Istanbul Summit in June 2004 , NATO endorsed the further transformation of military capabilities to make them “more modern, more usable, and more deployable to carry out the full range of Alliance missions.” The Istanbul Communiqué especially called for continuing progress on the NATO Response Force and the Prague Capabilities Commitments.

To accomplish this, NATO needs a new initiative for its defense agenda: creation of better forces and capabilities for stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations outside Europe, including the greater Middle East. The real challenge is to reorganize, refocus, and rebalance current assets so that NATO can respond promptly and effectively to future contingencies. This challenge can be met by creating a NATO S&R Force (SRF). This force would be a logical complement to the NATO Response Force , but would be structured differently. Instead of a small standing joint force, the SRF would consist of flexible and modular national forces totaling one or two division-equivalents, mostly ground forces, that could be assembled to generate the necessary mix of capabilities for S&R operations. In this new NATO defense concept, the combination of the NATO Response Force for rapid, forcible-entry missions, the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps or other High Readiness Forces for major combat operations under a combined joint task force, and an SRF would provide a full-spectrum capability for the new strategic environment. NATO adoption of this three-pillar posture will constitute a major step toward preparing for future responsibilities.
NATO Technology: from Gap to Divergence?

Donald C. Daniel

A widening technology gap between the United States and other NATO members will challenge the ability of NATO to function as a cohesive, multinational force. Over several decades, great disparities in the funding of defense research and technology by NATO members has produced a widening technological gap that threatens to become a divergence—a condition from which the Alliance may not be able to recover. The technology gap, in turn, is creating a capabilities gap that undercuts the operational effectiveness of NATO forces, including the new NATO Response Force.

With only slight modifications (not additions) to current total defense expenditures, and using funds that will be available as they restructure their forces, European members could not only double their current investment but take significant strides to ensure that they are not left behind in a world dominated by technology.

In addition, and of equal importance, the United States must share more of its fundamental basic and applied research with NATO partners, take a greater role of leadership in NATO’s Research and Technology Organization(RTO), and increase participation across all technical areas in the RTO. These primary actions, coupled with other actions by all NATO nations and the Allied Command Transformation, offer the potential to dramatically improve a situation that very much needs immediate attention. It is a relatively straightforward matter now. NATO has both a capabilities gap and a technology gap. Immediate attention to the latter, with a commitment by every NATO nation to invest three percent of its military budget in research and technology, may, over time, significantly reduce the capability gap.
Global Networks: Emerging Constraints on Strategy

Bob Fonow

If current trends in communications technologies and services persist, the United States will be hard pressed to keep a strategic advantage in network capability. The international telecommunications system is rebalancing into four major centers of influence and innovation. Within ten years, Europe, India, and China will have the same technological and innovative capabilities in telecommunications as the United States. This shift is problematic for U.S. national security, because the global telecommunications infrastructure is becoming an important strategic battlespace—the physical battlefield of information warfare. Understanding the dynamic of regional balancing is critical to shaping U.S. responses

Underscoring this dynamic is a shift from hierarchical science and technology development based on U.S. educational dominance to globally distributed centers of technological development facilitated by the international telecommunications network.

This article assesses the changing geopolitical structure of the international telecommunications system and analyzes the problems and opportunities for the United States in a vastly different telecommunications environment. Much of the writing on U.S. network-centric warfare and information warfare capabilities reflects unbounded enthusiasm, with little emphasis on vulnerabilities and the capabilities of potential adversaries. A thoughtful evaluation of new strategic constraints is imperative.
Military Transformation and Joint Experimentation: Two Views from Above

Harold W. Gehman Jr. and James M. Dubik

Military transformation— “a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations”— is on the minds and agendas of everyone dealing with the military. Many people talk about transformation; the two authors of this Defense Horizons have done something about it. In fact, they are among the few who have been responsible for shaping and implementing the concept. To get a better idea of what goes into this process, particularly the element of joint experimentation that is helping to identify and define the nature of change, Defense Horizons presents the views of two of America’s leading military officers who have been involved in the process.

Admiral Harold Gehman, the last commander of Atlantic Command (before it became Joint Forces Command, or JFCOM) and initiator of the Joint Experimentation Directorate, presents a framework for how experimentation can advance the goals of transformation and clarifies terms and relates them to the tasks at hand. He also considers the role of the joint experimentation process, uses historical analogies to identify the prerequisites for successful transformation, and gives examples of where earlier attempts have failed and why. Finally, he shows how joint experimentation can help achieve success in our current efforts by minimizing conditions that have brought about failure in the past.

Moving from the theoretical basis established by Admiral Gehman to practice, Major General James Dubik, Director of the JFCOM Joint Experimentation Directorate, describes how the Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Campaign is an important catalyst for transforming military capability. He describes the “two-path strategy to innovation” being employed, involving Joint Prototypes and Joint Concepts and actionable recommendations. He leads the reader through how this process is working today to achieve transformation.
XVIII Airborne Corps: Spearhead of Military Transformation

Douglas A. Macgregor

War transforms armies. Combat accelerates transformation by moving it out of the realm of academic debate and endless speculation about the future to a pragmatic approach focused on fielding new capabilities within new combat formations as soon as possible. In war, transformation means conserving equipment and operational methods that are still relevant while incorporating new technologies, tactics, and organizations that enable victory. It is nearly impossible to replicate in peacetime training the true conditions of land warfare—ambiguity, uncertainty, and above all terror, killing, and exhaustion. For the Army, the best opportunity to transform involves parallel evolution, a method that moves new technologies into combat formations today and explores what the troops will actually do with them in action. With a conflict in progress, this approach is better than trying to predict future uses in an inflexible operational requirements document developed in isolation from the field environment.

Joint, expeditionary warfare demands agile land, sea, and air forces linked by more than simply networked sensors and communication. Brain-to-brain connectivity animated by a cultural predisposition to deploy and fight anywhere on short notice akin to the special operations mindset is equally vital to transformation. Additionally, routine joint training and operations within a joint rotational readiness system are essential to readiness for joint expeditionary warfare. In the new come-as-you-are strategic environment, Army mission-focused force packages must bring the Joint Force Commander the capabilities he needs, whether they be theater missile defense or survivable, mobile, armored fighting vehicles that deliver accurate, devastating firepower.

XVIII Airborne Corps seems ideally positioned to spearhead Army transformation. Scaling, equipping, and organizing existing XVIII Airborne Corps forces for integration as specialized modules of combat power into plug-and-play joint command and control structures, such as the notional Standing Joint Force Headquarters, gives the Army an unprecedented opportunity to pursue new directions in adaptive force design.
Alternative Approaches to Army Transformation

Joseph N. Mait and Richard L. Kugler

Army transformation is an attempt to provide future forces with enhanced capabilities in lethality, survivability, and mobility, both strategic and tactical. Alternatives to achieving these goals differ in emphasis on weight and reliance on technology. That is, transformation plans differ if the objective is weight reduction as opposed to weight redistribution. In one approach, platform weight is reduced to meet mobility goals. However, shedding weight has implications for platform survivability and lethality; previous attempts to design a single platform that is simultaneously lethal, mobile, and survivable have not done so satisfactorily. Thus, advances in materials are required to insure the survivability of a lightweight platform. Advances in network technology are also required to make the platform more aware of its environment. The immaturity of these technologies increases the risks inherent in transformation based strictly on platform characteristics.

In contrast, weight redistribution considers parameters other than platform weight and networks to meet Army goals. Indeed, due to the weight of support assets, replacing all combat platforms with 20-ton vehicles reduces only marginally the overall weight of a division and corps. An alternative approach to transformation restructures Army forces into small, modular units, pre-positioned across the globe, and deployed in a timesequential manner. This approach, with its reduced dependency on technology, is a practical near-term alternative and should be pursued in parallel with technology development.
Defense Laboratories and Military Capability: Headed for a BRACdown?

Michael L. Marshall

For 150 years, military laboratories have made vital contributions to national defense. In recent years, they have been significantly reduced in number by several rounds of base realignment and closure (BRAC). Even so, they remain the primary source of internal technical competence within the Department of Defense (DOD). Their capability in that role will depend on how DOD answers two questions. Is there excess laboratory capacity—too many laboratories relative to forecasts of future force structure? What is their military value—their likely contribution to the future operational needs of warfighters.

As required by law, DOD has publicly announced the criteria it will use in making BRAC 2005 decisions. None directly acknowledge the military value of research and development (R&D). Consequently, excess capacity and military value judgments about the labs will depend on metrics now being formulated and the subjective weights they are assigned in computations. This calculus will place greater weight on options that allow DOD to combine separate but similar functions, such as R&D, on single bases. This emphasis on jointness could lead to such recommendations as a single defense research laboratory or to approaches that would parse the current technical work of the labs into a number of bins and then assign responsibility for each to a single service. Experience suggests that reliance on overly simplified “closure-by-arithmetic” decisions could lead to serious mistakes in deciding which laboratories to close and which to keep. America’s ability to wage high-tech warfare depends on avoiding such mistakes.
The Science and Engineering Workforce and National Security

Michael L. Marshall, Timothy Coffey, Fred E. Saalfeld, and Rita R. Colwell

Trends in the American science and engineering (S&E) workforce and national research and development (R&D) funding patterns and priorities have troubling implications for the economic and national security of our nation. Especially worrisome are:
- A general lack of interest among American-born youth, especially women and minorities, in pursuing education in the physical sciences, mathematics, environmental sciences, and engineering at the undergraduate and graduate levels;
- A rapidly accelerating accumulation of intellectual capital, including an educated S&E workforce, in China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan;
- A long-term decline in the overall Federal investment in R&D as a percentage of gross domestic product, especially among the physical sciences and engineering; and
- Reduced Department of Defense funding for research throughout the 1990s, a trend that has exacerbated the general decline in the physical sciences and engineering, despite the importance of these fields to the development of new military capabilities.
Dirty Bombs: The Threat Revisited

Peter D. Zimmerman and Cheryl Loeb

Nuclear radiation, invisible and detectable only with special instruments, has the power to terrify—in part because of its association with nuclear weapons—and to become an instrument of terrorists. Radioactive isotopes can be spread widely with or without high explosives by a radiological dispersion device (RDD) or so-called dirty bomb. This paper provides a general overview of the nature of RDDs and sources of material for them and estimates the effects of an assault, including casualties and economic consequences. Many experts believe that an RDD is an economic weapon capable of inflicting devastating damage on the United States. This paper is in full agreement with that assessment and makes some quantitative estimates of the magnitude of economic disruption that can be produced by various levels of attack. It is also generally believed that even a very large RDD is unlikely to cause many human casualties, either immediately or over the long term. A careful examination of the consequences of the tragic accident in Goiânia, Brazil, however, shows that some forms of radiological attack could kill tens or hundreds of people and sicken hundreds or thousands. Nevertheless, contrary to popular belief, RDDs are not weapons of mass destruction.

The authors recommend several policies and actions to reduce the threat of RDD attack and increase the ability of the Federal Government to cope with the consequences of one. With improved public awareness and ability to respond, it should be possible to strip RDDs of their power to terrorize.
Biology and the Battlefield

Robert E. Armstrong and Jerry B. Warner

The military and the life sciences have been intertwined throughout history. Biology has often been a source of offensive weapons, ranging from the hurling of plague victims over the walls of Kaffa (which probably started the 14th-century Black Death) to the anthrax attacks of fall 2001.

The military-biology relationship also has a humane side. Over the years, medical advances have saved countless soldiers and contributed to the overall well being of society. From the smallpox inoculation of Continental Army recruits in 1777—nearly 20 years before Edward Jenner’s smallpox vaccination—to the development of modern vaccines, military physicians have a lengthy and impressive record of achievements.

Biology has a new military role in the 21st century. Using the tools of biotechnology, the emphasis is now on increasing warfighting capabilities by improving matériel and enhancing warrior performance. Potential new tools range from small electronic devices based on bacterial proteins to foods that contain vaccines. The possibilities range from warriors functioning without difficulty in extreme environments to unmanned aerial vehicles flying in autonomous swarms.

For the military to benefit fully from the advances of 21stcentury biology, a new organization is needed within the Department of Defense (DOD) that addresses the ethical, legal, and regulatory implications of biotechnology. This entity also must ensure that DOD biotechnology spending is increased and that the majority of the funds are directed to warfighting issues rather than the longstanding biological concerns of medical and defensive measures.
Transforming NATO Command and Control for Future Missions

Charles L. Barry

No military function is more critical to operational success than effective command and control (C2). There also is no more daunting military function to get right when it comes to the employment of complex multinational formations in the fast-paced arena of crisis response. Since the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—unique as an alliance with a permanent standing C2 structure—has ventured into a broader spectrum of missions and across a wider geographical area of operations, posing far greater C2 challenges than the single mission, fixed-territory defense of the past. Threats to NATO interests have increased, demanding military structures and capabilities that can be employed on shorter notice and further outside NATO territory. At the same time, more sophisticated information-based battle systems and technologies are driving the need for increasingly interoperable forces. A key factor for success in this new environment will be a more agile, flexible, and responsive NATO C2 architecture for the 21st century.

The NATO summit at Prague in November 2002 was a major milestone in the evolution of alliance command structure and future military force posture. Prague decisions outlined a new arrangement that will take several years and significant investment by both NATO and each member state to put in place. Although many details must still be worked out, early momentum toward the Prague goals is strong and encouraging. Those efforts should not falter at a time of new and proximate threats to NATO member territory and citizens, or collective interests.

Alliance military commanders direct their organizations through the architecture of the distinctive NATO political-military process called consultation, command, and control (C3). Although C3 is a single NATO process, consultation is focused on the political process of consensus decisionmaking among allies, while command and control (C2) is a military function achieved through the full array of NATO military command and force structures, doctrinal command relationships, and technical standards and interoperability agreements. NATO C2 is also underpinned by a multifaceted communications and information system (CIS) that provides the connectivity and networks to conduct military operations. Related but separate NATO doctrines cover the functions of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.