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Description

This commentary, Pt. 1 of the Bold New Bioweapons series, examines how advances in gene editing, synthetic biology, and artificial intelligence are reshaping the biological weapons threat landscape and challenging the effectiveness of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Dr. Giordano argues that decentralized research ecosystems, AI-enabled pathogen design, and dual-use biotechnology complicate detection, attribution, and deterrence. Emerging techniques can produce synthetic or modified biological agents that evade traditional surveillance systems and blur distinctions between legitimate research and weaponization. The absence of clear adjudication mechanisms within the BWC creates governance gaps exploitable by state and non-state actors. The article emphasizes that modern biodefense requires enhanced biosurveillance, precision bioinformatics, and AI-driven threat detection to shift from reactive response to proactive deterrence.

Document Type

Article

Topic(s)

Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Biological and Chemical Issues, National Security

Publication Date

7-21-2025

Keywords

biological weapons, Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), synthetic biology, gene editing, AI-enabled pathogen design, biodefense, biosurveillance, dual-use biotechnology, biosecurity policy, detection and attribution, gray zone biothreats, strategic deterrence, convergent biotechnology, national security

Bold New Bioweapons: Part 1 — The Burdens of Detection and Attribution

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