CONCESSIONS TO THE LIMITED POWERS: Considerations of Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons, Asymmetrical Capability, and Extended Deterrence
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Description
Quite recently, nuclear strategy scholars Kier Lieber and Daryl Press posited that arms’ tables have turned, citing the asymmetry of limited nuclear powers as a reboot of the United States (US)-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) tactical nuclear playbook during the Cold War. Their key message—that “The United States must take seriously the nuclear capabilities and resolve of its foes”—isn’t lost on us: we previously called for the need to begin serious counter-weapons of mass destruction (WMD) planning for adversarial use of nuclear weapons below the threshold of Armageddon. We must raise an objection, however, to the assertion that states with limited nuclear capabilities are reprising the US’ 20th century strategy of coercion and dissuasion with their handfuls of weapons. Instead, we see a world wherein not only Russia and China, but militarily asymmetrical nuclear aspirants, such as North Korea and Iran, increase their resolve to employ nuclear threats to gain concessions outside previously conceived escalation ladders.
Document Type
Research Paper
Topic(s)
National Security, Leadership, Emerging Science and Technologies, Nuclear Deterrence and Escalation
Publication Date
2024
Publisher
U.S. Army Nuclear and Countering WMD Agency
City
Fort Belvoir, Virginia
Recommended Citation
Williams, Bob and Giordano, James, "CONCESSIONS TO THE LIMITED POWERS: Considerations of Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons, Asymmetrical Capability, and Extended Deterrence" (2024). Research and Case Studies. 3.
https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/cdtfw-research/3