Breaking (Bad) Biotech — Revisiting the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
Abstract
Advances in biotechnology are reshaping the nature of biological threats. The convergence of gene editing, synthetic biology, and increasingly accessible dual-use research has expanded the range of actors capable of developing weaponizable bioagents. These risks extend beyond traditional state programs and challenge existing safeguards. The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), designed for an earlier era, is not well suited to address these emerging realities. To maintain global stability, norms against the misuse and mishandling of biological agents must be reinforced and updated. This includes strengthening oversight, improving international cooperation, and adapting policy frameworks to keep pace with rapid technological change. Without reform, current governance mechanisms may fall short. An agile and modernized BWC will be essential to mitigate evolving biological threats and protect national and allied security.
Document Type
Article
Topic(s)
Biological and Chemical Issues, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Emerging Science and Technologies
Publication Date
4-2026
Author ORCID Identifier
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6505-4729
Recommended Citation
Giordano, James, "Breaking (Bad) Biotech — Revisiting the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention" (2026). Articles & Op-Eds. 22.
https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/cdtfw-articles/22