Ukraine, the U.S. Defense Industrial Base, and the Elusive Crisis-Era Munitions Production Surge

Authors

Bryce Loidolt, Center for Strategy and Military Power, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University

Abstract

“Ukraine, the U.S. Defense Industrial Base, and the Elusive Crisis-Era Munitions Production Surge” by Bryce Loidolt examines why U.S. efforts to rapidly increase munitions production during Russia’s war in Ukraine produced uneven results. While crisis-era authorities, funding, and contracting flexibility allowed the Department of War to move quickly after 2022, this article argues that post-crisis actions alone did not determine surge success. Instead, variation in production increases across key munitions - Stinger, Javelin, GMLRS, and PAC-3 MSE, was largely driven by pre-crisis procurement decisions and associated investments in capacity, supply chains, and obsolescence management. Drawing on historical analysis and case studies using U.S. Army budget and production data, the article shows that munitions with sustained prewar procurement were better positioned to surge, while those with “cold” production lines struggled to recover. The findings highlight the need for the Department of War to better conceptualize, resource, and exercise munitions surge capacity before crises emerge, bridging the gap between peacetime production and full economic mobilization.

Author ORCID Identifier

https://orcid.org/0009-0009-3459-201X

Recommended Citation

Bryce Loidolt, "Ukraine, the U.S. Defense Industrial Base, and the Elusive Crisis-Era Munitions Production Surge," Joint Force Quarterly 119 (4th Quarter 2025), 33-46, https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/joint-force-quarterly/vol119/iss4/6.