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Joint Force Quarterly

Abstract

The dilemma of cyber deterrence, alongside its potential failures, has gained increasing academic attention, though its parallels with traditional special operations remain less examined. Cyber and special operations—often covert activities involving espionage, sabotage, and subversion, generally linked to strategic or military intelligence—typically evade standard deterrence mechanisms. Drawing on a theoretical framework of deterrence, academic literature, historical cases, and qualitative analyses, this article argues that deterrence tends to fail when deterrers manage to destabilize an adversary without causing significant strategic impacts on the target’s power, economic, or social dynamics, as well as on international relations. Retaliation, shaped by implicit agreements or explicit protocols, lacks sufficient deterrent force, complicating efforts to prevent such covert activities. This study highlights that these operations, while not deterrents on their own, complement a state’s overall deterrent posture. The article connects the challenges of cyber deterrence with those of traditional special operations. Furthermore, it proposes a preliminary illustrative model of deterrence that encompasses both traditional and cyber special operations, to assess the potential effectiveness of deterrence and to reflect its complexities.

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