The Long Pivot: The Development of the Joint Warfighting Concept

Authors

Wilson C. Blythe Jr., Joint History and Research Office

Abstract

In the wake of America’s long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military faced an urgent need to pivot from counterinsurgency back to conventional warfighting, especially against peer competitors like China and Russia. This article traces the decade-long struggle to realign Department of Defense priorities, culminating in the development of the Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC). Early efforts, such as the Third Offset Strategy, highlighted technological innovation but lacked a unifying vision for how to fight future wars. The Services led their own modernization efforts, while analytical tools like Support for Strategic Analysis (SSA) fell short in shaping a cohesive joint force.

By 2019, a revitalized approach emerged through the Joint Force Operating Scenario and the Joint Staff’s leadership of the “Theories of Victory” initiative. The result was the JWC, first published in 2021 and refined through multiple iterations to guide force structure, capability development, and future doctrine through 2030. Backed by senior leadership and incorporated into formal doctrine, the JWC became the most influential joint concept since the disbandment of U.S. Joint Forces Command. It reasserted the Joint Staff’s role in shaping the future of American warfighting, though questions remain about whether it can continue leading from the front or will once again be overtaken by Service-specific visions.

Recommended Citation

Wilson C. Blythe Jr., "The Long Pivot: The Development of the Joint Warfighting Concept," Joint Force Quarterly 118 (3rd Quarter 2025), 92-101, https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/joint-force-quarterly/vol118/iss3/13.