Joint Force Quarterly
Abstract
This article argues that joint forcible entry operations remain relevant despite the growing threat posed by antiaccess/area-denial networks. Using the Russian assault on Hostomel Airport during the opening phase of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine as a case study, the author contends that the operation failed not because forcible entry had become obsolete, but because Russian forces were unable to isolate and expand the lodgment, protect access for follow-on forces, and integrate maneuver and supporting fires effectively. The article traces the historical development of forcible entry from ancient amphibious operations through airborne and air assault doctrine, then applies lessons from Hostomel to future U.S. operations. It recommends dispersing lift assets and marshalling sites, improving the mobility and precision-strike capabilities of assault echelons, and task-organizing follow-on forces with the combined-arms capabilities needed to consolidate gains and transition rapidly to subsequent operations. The author also calls for more realistic training in dispersed, contested environments and greater experimentation with loitering munitions and cross-Service support. The article concludes that, although future forcible entry operations will involve greater risk, they remain an important means of seizing lodgments, creating operational dilemmas, and preserving joint force freedom of maneuver against capable adversaries.
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