Joint Force Quarterly
Abstract
This article argues that the Department of Defense should reconsider the current geographic organization of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and create a second geographic combatant command in the region. The author contends that USINDOPACOM’s vast area of responsibility, expanding subordinate structure, growing operational demands, and increasing strategic competition with China are placing excessive strain on a single theater headquarters. Drawing on the U.S. experience in the Pacific during World War II, when separate commands under Admiral Chester Nimitz and General Douglas MacArthur divided responsibilities across the theater, the article presents a dual-command model as a historically proven way to improve span of control and unity of effort. A second command, potentially based in Australia, could assume greater responsibility for South Asia, the Indian Ocean, and parts of the South Pacific, while allowing the Hawaii-based command to focus more directly on Northeast Asia and a potential Taiwan contingency. The author argues that two theater commands could improve joint command and control, strategic engagement with allies and partners, force posture development, contingency planning, logistics, and integrated deterrence. Although such a reorganization would require significant political, financial, and organizational investment, the article concludes that the next Unified Command Plan review should seriously consider dividing the Indo-Pacific theater before a major conflict exposes the limitations of the existing structure.
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