Joint Force Quarterly
Abstract
This article argues that the U.S. military’s emerging concepts for dispersed operations in the Western Pacific risk becoming unsustainable because logistics has not been fully integrated into force design and campaign planning. Focusing on a potential conflict with China, the author contends that logistics would likely be a decisive factor, particularly in scenarios involving a blockade or invasion of Taiwan and operations inside China’s antiaccess/area-denial network. The article reviews the logistical demands of Marine Corps Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, Army multidomain task forces, and Air Force Agile Combat Employment, finding that each concept creates significant sustainment challenges and often shifts risk to the joint force. Drawing on historical examples, the author identifies three broader problems: insufficient consideration of joint logistics, organizational and doctrinal seams across the logistics enterprise, and a persistent cultural divide between combat and support communities. To address these weaknesses, the article recommends building a stronger joint combat-logistics culture, establishing a more capable Pacific-focused joint logistics structure, and giving logistics a greater role in operational planning and force design. The author concludes that technological innovation alone will not solve contested logistics; success will depend on a joint logistics enterprise designed, trained, and organized to sustain dispersed forces under attack.
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