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Cross-Functional Teams in Defense Reform: Help or Hindrance?

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About the Author

Dr. Christopher J. Lamb is a Distinguished Research Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University. He is on record supporting the use of cross-functional teams by the Pentagon,¹ and national security reform more generally, which he reviews in *Strategic Forum* No. 293, *National Security Reform and the 2016 Election* (NDU Press, March 2016).

Key Points

- ◆ There is strong bipartisan support for Section 941 of the Senate's version of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2017, which requires the Pentagon to use cross-functional teams (CFTs). CFTs are a popular organizational construct with a reputation for delivering better and faster solutions for complex and rapidly evolving problems.
- ◆ The Department of Defense reaction to the bill has been strongly negative. Senior officials argue that Section 941 would "undermine the authority of the Secretary, add bureaucracy, and confuse lines of responsibility."
- ◆ The Senate's and Pentagon's diametrically opposed positions on the value of CFTs can be partially reconciled with a better understanding of what CFTs are, how cross-functional groups have performed to date in the Pentagon, and their prerequisites for success. This paper argues there is strong evidence that CFTs could provide impressive benefits if the teams were conceived and employed correctly.

Cross-Functional Teams in Defense Reform: Help or Hindrance?

by Christopher J. Lamb

On May 12, 2016, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) announced its markup of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2017. Committee chairman John McCain (R-AZ) stated that the bill "contains the most sweeping reforms of the organization of the Department of Defense [DOD] in a generation."² The House Armed Services Committee version of the NDAA contained fewer reforms, but the committee emphasized that reform was necessary because "security challenges have become more transregional, multi-domain, and multi-functional. . . . U.S. superiority in key warfighting areas is at risk with other nations' technological advances; and . . . [DOD] lacks the agility and adaptability necessary to support timely decisionmaking and the rapid fielding of new capabilities."³

One common reaction to the volume and diversity of reforms in the NDAA is confusion about the core problems limiting Pentagon performance. Yet the literature on defense reform, as well as the Senate and House reports accompanying the NDAA, does reveal a common core concern: Pentagon decisionmaking is too slow and consensus-based to manage complex security challenges well. Consensus decisionmaking is widely understood to yield highly compromised products that offer senior leaders suboptimal results.⁴ Consensus decisionmaking also limits Pentagon headquarters performance in acquisition and mission management and, by definition, precludes effective strategy.⁵

The tendency of the Pentagon to default to consensus decisionmaking that protects the equities of its functional components at the expense of better enterprise-wide solutions has been noted for decades. For example, a 1980 study found the Pentagon was "strongly vertical and compartmentalized, with little horizontal integration and teamwork."⁶ Other studies and senior DOD leaders have echoed this concern, claiming the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of

Defense provides the first point of strategic integration. Too much of their time is spent refereeing battles among subordinate fiefdoms and trying to develop an integrated understanding of problems and potential solutions.⁷ As former Secretary Robert Gates has argued, consensus decisions must be worked around because they yield so little in the way of useful results.⁸

The Senate's defense reform bill directly tackles the core problem of consensus decisionmaking, but this fact has not attracted much attention. Press attention has focused on provisions such as abolishing the Office of the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and cutting flag officer positions. In contrast, Section 941, which takes on the consensus decisionmaking problem, has received little notice in the news.⁹ Section 941 obligates the Secretary of Defense to produce an organizational strategy for improving DOD performance that would include cross-functional teams (CFTs); an organizational culture that is more collaborative, innovative, team- and results-oriented; and training and personnel incentives to support such teams and cultural changes. Most of the Section 941 language details how the CFTs are to be conceived and employed to overcome consensus decisionmaking.

The SASC states that the CFTs—called “mission teams” in the NDAA—will rectify shortfalls in the Pentagon's ability to integrate functional expertise. According to the SASC, the Pentagon currently uses “sequential, hierarchical planning and decision-making processes oriented around functional bureaucratic structures that are excessively parochial, duplicative, and resistant to integrated operations and solutions.”¹⁰ Consequently, most decisions involving cross-functional solutions are elevated to senior levels where they consume excessive time and leadership attention and lead to “lowest-common-denominator consensus” outcomes rather than “clear, coherent, efficacious courses of action.”¹¹ Consensus-based decisionmaking prevents making difficult tradeoffs between competing functional priorities to achieve broader objectives, which the SASC asserts has numerous deleterious consequences.¹²

Secretaries of Defense can sometimes overcome these limitations and force a clear, decisive solution, but they have limited personal time and typically intervene decisively only in a few cases. The need to elevate all major disputed decisions to the Secretary makes Pentagon decisionmaking slow and limits effective decisionmaking capacity to a handful of critical issues.

According to the SASC, fixing the “strategic integration” shortfall is leftover business from the original Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 reform agenda. The 1985 SASC staff report, *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*, identified “mission integration” as the most important DOD organizational problem not only at the operational level for combatant commanders but also at the policymaking level for the Secretary. At the time it was deemed too difficult to correct the mission integration problems at the policymaking level, particularly because none of the solutions then contemplated seemed compelling.

Now, however, the SASC finds the evidence strongly favors CFTs as a productive solution for inadequate strategic integration. Both Chairman McCain and ranking member Jack Reed (D-RI) have publicly emphasized the need for Section 941. McCain stated that Section 941 was necessary to overcome what “former top defense official Michèle Flournoy characterizes as ‘the tyranny of consensus’ in the Pentagon.” Reed noted the Pentagon's inability “to integrate horizontally to create sound strategies and effectively execute missions acutely affects the national security.”

The Executive Branch response to Section 941 has been negative. The Barack Obama administration has threatened a Presidential veto unless Section 941 and other parts of the Senate's NDAA are dropped or substantially changed.¹³ The administration also stated Section 941 is overly prescriptive and that it would “undermine the authority of the Secretary, add bureaucracy, and confuse lines of responsibility.”¹⁴ In a letter to Senator McCain on July 13, 2016, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter criticized Section 941 as heavily bureaucratic, “requiring the issuance of numerous directives, charters,

metrics and plans, and ignoring the effective manner in which the Department uses cross-functional teams today.”¹⁵ SASC insistence that the Pentagon use CFTs and Pentagon insistence that it already does suggest disagreement about what CFTs are.

CFTs and Their Potential Benefits

Business and management literature describes how large, hierarchical organizations with functional divisions became the dominant organizational model during the industrial revolution, only to be substantially displaced by “horizontal organization” during the information age. Horizontal organization emphasizes flatter, “cross-functional organization designed around end-to-end work flows.”¹⁶ Most organizations retain functional components to provide deep functional expertise and add horizontal processes to rapidly integrate those capabilities. Early versions of this type of organizational change, often referred to as “matrixed organization,” failed to clarify lines of authority and did not work particularly well. Subsequently, small empowered decision groups, or teams, and especially CFTs became a key element in the effective performance of new hybrid organizations.

A decade ago the proliferation of CFTs in the business world could still be called a “quiet revolution,”¹⁷ but it has now attracted a great deal of attention in business and management literature.¹⁸ One survey found no less than 12 comprehensive literature reviews on the topic published between 1982 and 2008.¹⁹ Although the collective value of the literature is limited by a lack of common definitions and cumulative findings, it is possible to extract some key insights about the nature of CFTs. For example, some scholars distinguish CFTs from other groups by their level of task interdependence, a well-accepted concept developed by James D. Thompson in his classic case study on a medium bomber wing.²⁰ Thompson identified three different types of task interdependence, the highest level being reciprocal interdependence.

Reciprocal interdependence occurs when activities require rapid coordination of diverse functional expertise, which in turn necessitates “mutual adjustment” among

the functional specialties on an ongoing basis. The more complex and dynamic the problem (and uncertain and ambiguous the operating environment), the more mutual adjustment of behaviors is required to successfully solve the problem or complete the mission. As new information becomes available, the functional experts (for instance, the pilot, co-pilot, navigator, bombardier, gunners) adjust their behaviors repeatedly to create overall effects that will best accomplish the mission. In the case of a bomber, for example, navigation may be adjusted to lessen the chances of detection by the enemy, or avoid anti-aircraft fires, or improve the accuracy of bombing.

When CFTs work well their ability to quickly make tradeoffs among their functional components produces several notable advantages. They are better able to keep pace with rapidly evolving problems because they make decisions faster (a natural consequence of working a problem full-time and not having to coordinate with an extended hierarchy of management levels). CFTs also typically learn faster because they work a single problem intensely whereas senior leaders must address a multitude of issues and none of them for a sustained period. They relieve the bottleneck otherwise created when information and decisions must flow up through levels of functional bureaucracy to the most senior leader (the Secretary of Defense). Most importantly, CFTs make strategy tailored to the problems they are assigned because they have the flexibility to emphasize different functional capabilities to different degrees depending on circumstances. All effective strategy requires clear choices among competing courses of action that invariably advantage or disadvantage the equities of different functional components. If it were otherwise, no strategy would be required; all organizational components could be left to behave as they like and are inclined to do. Finally, CFTs promote accountability. No one knows who is really in charge of a cross-functional mission when all the functional bodies of expertise pursue the mission independently. When a CFT is empowered to orchestrate those diverse functional capabilities, it is clear who is in charge of and accountable for the mission.

Distinguishing CFTs from Committees

According to Thompson, when behaving rationally, organizations respond to task environments that require less demanding levels of task interdependence by forming committees, and they respond to task environments that demand the higher form of reciprocal interdependence by forming a “task-force or project grouping” (that is, a CFT).²¹ The norm in government, however, is to form committees and not teams. There are lots of cross-functional groups in government, but few of them ever achieve the level of task interdependence associated with CFTs. Committees meet periodically, share some information, and may make recommendations to higher authority, but they do not energetically make tradeoffs and direct behaviors to accomplish a common mission.

Therefore, most government cross-functional groups are more accurately labeled cross-functional *committees* rather than cross-functional *teams*. The essential difference is that the members of a committee are expected to represent and protect their functional organization’s equities. By contrast, CFT members must be willing to make decisions on the basis of what will best advance the common mission assigned to the team.

Such a transfer of loyalty from the parent organization that controls a civil servant’s career progress to a broader mission is uncommon. Most career civil servants feel obliged to respect their immediate chains of command and protect their organizations’ equities and preferences when told to do so. Seldom are they allowed the latitude to commit their organization’s resources and activities as they think the situation demands. The inevitable result is least-common-denominator consensus decisionmaking. It is much easier to obtain consensus approval of a list of objectives or activities that allows all the participating organizations to do what they like or already planned on doing than it is to agree on a course of action that disproportionately promotes some organizational equities at the expense of others in order to produce better enterprise-wide results.

The distinction between cross-functional committees and genuine teams helps explain why the Pentagon and Congress are talking past one another. The Pentagon asserts it already uses CFTs, but it really means cross-functional committees. For example, the Pentagon cited the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) as an example of a CFT. But the JROC is widely seen as a consensus-driven group given to logrolling in order to protect individual Service equities. Even favorable reviews of the JROC acknowledge that it “seeks to maximize political support” by coordinating “internal support through consensus.”²² Lieutenant General David Deptula, USAF (Ret.), reinforced this view in recent testimony to Congress, noting the JROC “and Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System process . . . more often than not result in ‘lowest common denominator’ outcomes.”²³ The same could be said of the many other cross-functional groups operating in the Pentagon. An internal 2006 Pentagon study documented 861 cross-functional groups attended by Joint Staff officers. Yet those officers judged all but a handful as unable to make decisions or even share information well.²⁴

The few commentators paying attention to Section 941 tend to overlook this critical distinction between cross-functional committees and teams. For example, one major think tank echoes the Pentagon’s claim that “there are many cross-functional teams in OSD already,” adding that what makes Section 941 controversial is the “specificity and the tone” of its language.²⁵ But from the SASC point of view, almost all cross-functional groups in the Pentagon are mere committees and not CFTs. The highly specific language of Section 941 (see table 1) is intended to make that distinction clear. The SASC clearly intends for Pentagon CFTs to be empowered with sufficient authority to manage their assigned missions. For example, one notable passage in Section 941 states that “the leader of a mission team shall have authority to draw upon the resources of the functional components of the Department and make decisions affecting such functional components.”²⁶ This stipulation and other detailed passages dictating how the mission teams will operate

Table 1. Anecdotal Evidence for Effective Pentagon CFTs

Team Mission	Example	Results
Strategic integration	Pentagon response to MCRMC	Well-integrated product that accepted many of the commission recommendations or improved upon them, and received kudos from the White House and Congress.*
Strategic integration	Efficiencies Task Force	Cut \$180 billion in overhead costs from the Pentagon budget.†
Operational integration	MRAP Task Force	Large-scale rapid acquisition effort that saved lives and reduced casualties while increasing operational effectiveness.‡
Operational integration	JIATF-South	Successful and ongoing CFT leading a large interagency and international drug-interdiction effort.§
Operational integration	Combatant Command CFTs	Allowed commands to respond quickly to unexpected missions or tasks while working with unfamiliar units from other Services, agencies, and nations, “giving the command flexibility to prepare for and wage war most effectively.”**
Field-level integration	Maritime Operations Centers	The centers combine staff members “across the traditional Napoleonic centers of expertise—intelligence, operations, logistics, etc.—and employ them in various working groups, oriented around functional processes or timelines.”††
Field-level integration	High-Value Targeting Teams	SOF-led interagency task forces targeting terrorist and insurgent leadership deemed a “secret weapon” early in the war on terror.‡‡

Key: CFTs = cross-functional teams; JIATF-South = Joint Interagency Task Force–South; MCRMC = Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission; MRAP = mine-resistant ambush protected; SOF = special operations forces.

* Interview with Laura J. Junor, director of the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University.

† Robert M. Gates, *A Passion for Leadership: Lessons on Change and Reform from Fifty Years of Public Service* (New York: Knopf, 2016).

‡ Ibid.

§ Evan Munsing and Christopher J. Lamb, *Joint Interagency Task Force–South: The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success*, INSS Strategic Perspectives 5 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, June 2011).

** John S. Hurley, “Cross-Functional Working Groups: Changing the Way Staffs Are Organized,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 39 (4th Quarter, October 2005).

†† Margaux Hoar and Dave Zvijac, “Right Ends, Wrong Means: What Congress Is Missing On Defense Reform,” *War on the Rocks*, August 11, 2016.

‡‡ See Christopher J. Lamb and Evan Munsing, *Secret Weapon: High-Value Target Teams as an Organizational Innovation*, INSS Strategic Perspectives 4 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, March 2011).

are clearly intended to ensure the groups work as empowered teams rather than ineffectual committees.

Pentagon Experience with CFTs

The SASC wants the Secretary of Defense to employ CFTs rather than cross-functional committees when the mission at hand, its complexity, and the level of task interdependence make a CFT appropriate. Anecdotally, there is evidence that the Pentagon has used empowered CFTs to achieve cross-cutting objectives on rare occasions, and the results have been notable (table 1). For example, this past year the Pentagon created a cross-functional group

to examine and respond to recommendations of the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission. Under tight time constraints the group distilled inputs from across DOD, the White House, and four Federal agencies (Office of Management and Budget and the Departments of Labor, Agriculture, and Veterans Affairs) to create a well-integrated product that went well beyond least-common-denominator consensus output. The results were well received in the Pentagon, White House, and Congress.

However, earlier attempts to institutionalize CFTs in the Pentagon have not gone well. A case in point cited

by the SASC is Secretary of Defense William Perry's 1995 creation of Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) to improve decisionmaking for acquisition programs. Although there were early reports of IPT success,²⁷ over time most observers agree that IPTs function more like cross-functional committees than CFTs.²⁸ Another attempt to institutionalize CFTs occurred during the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review. A working group recommended empowered CFTs, and the final report language suggested leaders wanted to move in that direction:

*The Department is continuing to shift from stovepiped vertical structures to more transparent and horizontally-integrated structures. Just as the U.S. forces operate jointly, so too must horizontal integration become an organizing principle for the Department's investment and enterprise-wide functions. These reforms will not occur overnight, and care must be taken not to weaken what works effectively during the transition to a more cross-cutting approach. However, the complex strategic environment of the 21st century demands greater integration of forces, organizations and processes, and closer synchronization of actions.*²⁹

Despite this hopeful assessment, the under secretaries who lead major DOD functional organizations objected, and nothing came of the recommendations.

Not long thereafter, Secretary Gates arrived on the scene and began creating authentic CFTs. Gates is "widely considered the best defense secretary of the post-World War II era,"³⁰ and sometimes referred to as a "master of bureaucracy" because he worked his way up from an entry-level position to the highest echelons of the national security system.³¹ In *A Passion for Leadership*, Gates recounts how he "made extensive use of task forces to develop options, recommendations, and specific plans for implementation."³² According to Gates, he created his first task force—the Wounded Warrior Task Force—"because so many different elements of the Pentagon were involved." More task forces followed, and they became "an essential instrument" for not only "matters relating to

the wars" but also "other problems in the department as well," including saving billions of dollars in cost-cutting efficiencies.

The cross-cutting task forces that Gates used equate to the CFTs Congress wants to institutionalize via Section 941 (see table 2). Gates claims his CFTs were necessary to overcome the bureaucracy's tendency to make consensus decisionmaking its priority, which invariably produces "pap." To overcome this tendency Gates states that he carefully structured his task forces.³³ He chose the right leaders, prepared strong charters for the groups, and monitored their work to protect and empower them. Gates states that the task forces needed protection "to keep the bureaucracy from smothering their efforts." They also had to be empowered to "carry out the task" and allowed "space to show what they can do."

Properly configured and employed, Gates argues the CFTs promote accountability. When a subordinate leader and/or group are empowered, they can be held accountable for results. According to Gates, a Secretary must "empower individuals to complete specific tasks" and "establish milestones to measure progress" but then "hold those individuals accountable." Gates did this. For example, he notes he had to change the leadership of his intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance task force "several times" in order to get results.

Overall, Gates claims the CFTs were enormously productive for not only directing the war effort but also aiding other headquarters decisionmaking challenges. He notes, "With only a couple of exceptions, virtually every task force I appointed improved on and enriched my ideas and often expanded the scope of the change." Gates is emphatic about the value of the CFTs, stating, "I want to emphasize one last time that I found task forces and other ad hoc groups immensely useful, indeed crucial, for developing specific proposals for implementation of reforms and for tracking progress." He insists that "any leader can use them effectively."³⁴

Secretary Carter acknowledges that under Gates, "task forces became the model of choice," they were successful, and they "injected badly needed agility into

Table 2. Excerpts from Robert Gates's *A Passion for Leadership* and Section 941 on CFTs

Issue	Gates on Leadership and Reform	Section 941
Purpose	"Task forces to develop options, recommendations, and specific plans for implementation."	"Produce comprehensive and fully integrated policies, strategies, plans, resourcing, and oversight for the mission or other priority output."
Mandate	"I made wide use of task forces and councils, but other than periodic updates I spent little time with them until their work was complete. The important thing . . . is to prepare a strong and detailed charter for the work of such groups."	"Each mission team . . . shall issue a charter. . . . The charter and strategy shall not go into effect until approved by the Secretary."
Authority	"A leader must empower subordinates. . . . A leader must be willing to delegate to them the authority to carry out plans. One person simply cannot effectively oversee implementation of significant change that affects multiple parts of an organization. . . . The leader must decide on the proper course of action and then assign responsibility for implementation to his subordinates and empower them to carry out the task. Give them space to show what they can do. Stay out of their hair. . . . Two common threads through this book have been the needs to listen and to empower subordinates."	"The Secretary shall delegate to the team such decision-making authority as the Secretary considers appropriate in order to permit the team to execute the strategy [approved by the Secretary]. Within the delegation provided [by the Secretary] the leader of a mission team shall have authority to draw upon the resources of the functional components of the Department and make decisions affecting such functional components."
Strategy	"On every matter I thought important, small or large, I always took time to devise a specific strategy to achieve my goal and to identify milestones and deadlines to measure progress."	"Each mission team . . . shall issue a charter and strategy for such team to achieve objectives . . . to specify metrics for evaluation of the achievement of such objectives."
Leadership	"The chair must know the general outcome sought and be in full agreement with it. . . . The chair of a task force must also be a person respected by all those involved and have real influence throughout the bureaucracy, because part of his job is to sell the recommendations."	"The Secretary shall . . . designate as leader of such team a qualified and experienced individual in a general or flag officer grade, or a member of the Senior Executive Service."
Supervision	"I met with each task force every two weeks for status and progress reports. My immediate staff was monitoring the efforts even more closely."	"The Secretary shall designate as leader . . . who shall report directly to the Secretary."
Protection	"It routinely required my personal involvement to keep the bureaucracy from smothering their efforts. "A leader must . . . provide the freedom for members to offer options and ideas, incorporate what is helpful, and then . . . guide the majority to the desired change, even if they come up with a different way of implementing it."	"The Secretary shall ensure . . . team members . . . appropriately represent the views of their functional components without inappropriately pursuing the interests of their functional components . . . while contributing to the best of their ability to the success of the mission team . . . the leaders of functional components may not interfere in the activities of the mission team."

Table 2. Excerpts from Robert Gates's A Passion for Leadership and Section 941 on CFT, cont.

Structure	"The best way to get access to, and use, internal talent . . . is to get people from different parts of the organization working together outside their normal bureaucratic environment. Task forces and similar ad hoc groups are silo busters. Most bureaucracies . . . are rigid, pyramid-like structures in which information is shared with those in ever-higher boxes . . . but rarely laterally."	"The Secretary shall consider representatives from [all DOD functional organizations] and any other functional area the Secretary considers appropriate."
Membership	"An effective leader must structure the groups, be involved in the selection of members."	"The Secretary shall . . . delegate to the team leader . . . authority to select members of such team."
Incentives	"Empower individuals to complete specific tasks . . . and then reward or penalize as appropriate and possible."	The charter and strategy "shall specify incentives for the team and its members."

the Pentagon's notoriously slow bureaucracy."³⁵ Among other things, according to the Government Accountability Office, task forces "decreased the median time needed to locate funding for projects from nine months to one month."³⁶ In reviewing whether Gates's task force approach should be continued, Secretary Carter states he decided upon a "hybrid approach that draws on the advantages of both models."³⁷ Off the record, others close to the process state that when Gates left the Pentagon, his way of doing business with empowered CFTs came to a screeching halt. The Pentagon reverted to its normal practice of using cross-functional committees.

Whether Section 941 and its institutionalization of CFTs will help or hinder future Secretaries wanting to overcome the Pentagon's tendency to produce least-common-denominator consensus decisions remains a contentious issue. The Senate believes Section 941 will help, but to date the Pentagon argues the opposite, predicting dire consequences if Section 941 becomes law.

Key Points of Contention

The sheer range of direction provided in the more than 1,600-page draft National Defense Authorization Act for 2017 was sure to raise Pentagon hackles given the normal organizational preference for autonomy.

However, the Pentagon has criticized Section 941 for several specific reasons that deserve careful scrutiny. A key objection concerns whether Section 941 will assist or undermine the Secretary's control over DOD.

Does Section 941 Undermine or Empower the Secretary? The Pentagon argues that "Section 941 would undermine the Secretary's ability to create effective cross-functional teams, which are already an extremely common feature of the way the Department is organized today."³⁸ It also argued that Section 941's mandate to establish at least six CFTs by October 20, 2017, is an "inflexible legislative schedule"³⁹ that would "limit the Secretary's ability to use teams." The distinction between CFTs and committees made above is key to understanding how the Pentagon can argue it already commonly uses effective CFTs and that the six mandated by Section 941 would limit the Secretary's flexibility and undermine his ability to create effective CFTs.

If the Pentagon were already using the kind of empowered CFTs envisioned in Section 941, it would not find the requirement for six teams problematic. However, by citing the Joint Requirements Oversight Council as an example of an effective CFT, the Pentagon indicates that it means cross-functional committees rather than teams. Having to employ six empowered CFTs as mandated by Section 941 would supplant ineffective cross-functional

committees with real CFTs. The Pentagon is profoundly uncomfortable with the type of empowered CFTs envisioned in Section 941 and used by Secretary Gates. Secretary Carter's "heartburn" letter to the SASC argues that "Enacting the [Section 941] requirements would . . . weaken a critical tool that senior leadership utilizes on a regular basis to make effective policy decisions by separating cross-functional teams from the leadership structure and positioning them to purposely create conflict, rather than solutions, for the defense enterprise."⁴⁰ What this means is that DOD prefers the consensus-driven cross-functional committees that are controlled by the leaders of functional bodies and do not "create conflict." It does not want empowered CFTs, believing their ability to direct functional entities would be conflictual and separate the CFTs from "the leadership structure."

A Section 941 CFT would create friction with functional leaders as it pursues its cross-cutting mission, but it would not conflict with or be separated from the Secretary. The major CFTs called for in Section 941 report to, and derive all their authority from, the Secretary, who chooses their missions, approves their charters, and specifies the scope of their authorities. The Secretary can approve or reject or modify team decisions. Section 941 CFTs would impinge upon the prerogatives of functional leaders in the Pentagon, but they would not produce the kind of consensus outputs that former Secretary Gates warns are meaningless (that is, outcomes where "everyone agrees to say collectively what no one believes individually"⁴¹). In that regard Section 941 CFTs are a tool the Secretary could use for overcoming the Pentagon's "tyranny of consensus."⁴² If for some purposes Secretaries prefer cross-functional committees, they could simply limit the CFT charter and authority accordingly (for example, by clarifying the CFT would be limited to making recommendations rather than taking any action). Thus Section 941 would not undermine but rather empower the Secretary.

Does Section 941 Clarify or Confuse Lines of Responsibility? Closely related to the issue of whether CFTs empower or complicate the Secretary's management of

the Pentagon is the question of whether they confuse lines of authority. The Pentagon has objected that Section 941 "would give [CFTs] directive authority over other elements of the Department and authorize them to requisition personnel and resources from other parts of the Department without regard to competing mission requirements."⁴³ In Secretary Carter's letter to Senator McCain, he adds that Section 941 "appears to assign extensive duties to lower-level officers [that] exceed the assigned responsibilities of the senior officials to whom they report." Continuing, Secretary Carter argues:

*Mandating that these teams have unchecked directive and resourcing authority would undermine the Department's senior leadership and create confusion regarding lines of responsibility, a particularly dangerous scenario in an institution where the chain of command is a central element, where the stakes related to national security decision making are extraordinarily high, and where accountability for actions is meted out by Congress and the American people.*⁴⁴

The Pentagon made the same authority and accountability argument when it tried to defeat the original Goldwater-Nichols reforms. It argued empowered combatant commanders would undermine the Service chiefs and sow confusion about the lines of authority from chiefs to their forces in the field. But what Congress did was create a new chain of command with new authorities for the purpose of joint operations. The issue here is not confused lines of authority but decisionmaking legitimacy.

For functional missions, the lines of authority remain clear: from the Secretary to the functional leaders. For cross-functional missions, they are equally clear: from the Secretary to the CFTs to the functional leaders. Lines of authority are not being confused by Section 941 but rather clarified. The language in the current version of Section 941 invites the Secretary to truly empower the CFTs. It specifies the Secretary "shall delegate to the team such decision-making authority as the Secretary considers appropriate in order to permit the team to

execute the strategy;” that within that delegated authority, “the leader of a mission team shall have authority to draw upon the resources of the functional components of the Department and make decisions affecting such functional components”; and that “the leaders of functional components may not interfere in the activities of the mission team.”⁴⁵

This language clarifies rather than confuses responsibility. Currently it is not clear who is in charge of cross-functional missions other than the Secretary, who does not have the time to personally manage the details of all cross-functional missions. If the Secretary chose to form the type of CFT specified in Section 941 it would be crystal clear who had the responsibility and accountability for executing that mission. Currently the Pentagon prefers to use consensus-based committees and processes for cross-functional missions. They are not empowered to get results, so they cannot be held accountable for results. Functional leaders prefer this approach because it typically gives them an effective veto over any decision they do not like, but that deference to functional equities undermines the Secretary’s ability to manage cross-functional missions.

What really is in dispute is not whether CFTs would confuse lines of responsibility, but rather who has a legitimate right to decide how to integrate functional capabilities to accomplish cross-functional missions. There is always a cross-functional integrator at the next level of a hierarchical organization. For example, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is the cross-functional integrator of expertise in his or her organization on a range of functions: special operations, regional expertise, security assistance, and so forth. The authorities of the functional entities are always impinged on or constrained by whoever performs integration duties at the next level up. In the case of the Pentagon as a whole, everyone agrees that the Secretary has the legitimacy and authority to integrate the efforts of his or her under secretaries for cross-cutting missions. No one accuses the Secretary of “eroding lines of authority and accountability” when he or she manages

an overall war effort. In fact, they say just the opposite: that the Secretary making the final decisions facilitates clear lines of authority over the functional entities and sustains accountability.

Thus the real question is whether CFTs, acting on the delegated authority of the Secretary, are “legitimate” integrators. Put differently, should the Secretary be able to delegate his or her integration authorities to a CFT? There are only three choices. The Secretary can appoint a functional leader as the integrator of a cross-functional mission, but that person would be biased by his or her current duties and experience and not trusted by other functional leaders. Alternatively, the Secretary can give the mission to a cross-functional committee, but then the mission would not be managed well for the reasons already explained. Or finally, the Secretary can give the cross-cutting mission to a CFT and its leader, someone he or she has chosen and trusts and who would pursue the mission undistracted by other duties and knowing the Secretary will hold the team accountable for actual results. The Pentagon position seems to suggest the Secretary ought to be limited to the first two options, whereas the SASC wants the Secretary to also have and exercise the third option.

It is important to note that regardless of which option a Secretary chooses, the authority of functional leaders over their functional domains ostensibly is circumscribed by the need to accomplish the cross-cutting mission. So the issue is not erosion of clear lines of authority. The issue is the legitimacy of the integrator. The SASC and Section 941 encourage, but do not compel, the Secretary to delegate integration authority to empowered CFTs so the department can get better results in cross-cutting missions. It also should be noted that the authority of the empowered CFTs is not “unchecked” or exercised “without regard” to competing requirements; CFT authorities are always limited to whatever the Secretary chooses to delegate. Moreover, Section 941 currently has a specific provision that allows the head of a functional component to ask the Secretary to review and modify decisions made by CFTs.

Couldn't CFTs Be Delegated Advisory Duties Instead of Decision Authority? Informally it has been suggested by senior Pentagon leaders that CFTs would be less objectionable if they were merely making recommendations. It might seem like reducing the scope of the CFTs to generating good advice would be a minor issue. After all, the CFTs work for the Secretary and can only exercise whatever authority the Secretary delegates to them. If the essential value of a CFT is integrating functional expertise, could that not be done in the form of advice to the Secretary without the risk that the CFT would impose unreasonable decisions on the Pentagon? Many wonder what the harm would be in just mandating that the CFTs are advisory only and have no directive authority.

One advantage of CFTs is that they can be effective against a wide range of missions, ranging from hypothetical competitive strategy exercises to real-world field missions. In the case of the former, the desired output from the CFT would be advice. For example, in the famous case of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Project Solarium, he used three CFTs to devise alternative strategies for dealing with the Soviet menace. The President was directly involved in each team's creation, including the selection of members, and ensured each had access to all government information. Yet the teams had no directive authority, and after they briefed their strategies as advised courses of action, they played no role in strategy implementation.⁴⁶

However, a CFT would need directive authority for most missions and particularly those that require real "operational" outcomes such as improving care for wounded warriors or rushing better armor or theater intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to deployed forces. When groups know they will be judged on the quality of their advice rather than actual outcomes, they try to take all views into account and anticipate what leaders are willing to accept in the way of complaints or friction. Thus advisory groups often err in concentrating on what might be received well and inadvertently default to what is politically acceptable rather than rigorously identifying the problem and exactly what it would take to solve or manage it well. Groups that actually have to

make progress and would be held accountable for doing so care far less about the popularity of their decisions and far more about whether they make sense.

The current Section 941 language states that the Secretary will decide what decisionmaking authority to delegate to the CFTs so they can execute their missions, which acknowledges the wide range of missions a Secretary might want to assign to CFTs. The more authority the Secretary retains, the more he or she would have to be involved in the team's ongoing activities. In many cases the Secretary should be willing to delegate authority to the teams to make decisions both with regard to drawing on the resources and information of functional components and making substantive decisions regarding the formulation and execution of their strategies.⁴⁷

Does Section 941 Add or Reduce Bureaucracy? The Pentagon also complains that Section 941 would result "in increased bureaucracy and a larger, less efficient, and less responsive DOD organization." Anyone who has worked on the Secretary of Defense's staff knows the work load is crushing, and all the more so given recent staff reductions. If the CFTs were a major bureaucratic burden, it would be a serious disadvantage. That is not likely, however. The number of teams (six) required by Section 941 is small, and the specified number of people on each team (eight to ten) is also small. Fifty to sixty staff members employed on CFTs full time should not be a major burden given the overall size of the Pentagon, numbering in the tens of thousands.

More to the point, it is important to understand the origins of the current staff workload. Much staff time is expended in the time-consuming consensus-building processes that exhaust staff but yield scant results. Consensus processes enervate not only the rank and file but also senior leaders, including the Secretary.⁴⁸ Section 941 would obviate the need for activities that masquerade as horizontal integration but in reality waste precious time and expensive human capital. The Section 941 CFTs are empowered to cut through that kind of wasted effort and thus would reduce rather than increase the bureaucracy's workload.

In fact, CFTs could make it easier for the Pentagon to absorb previously mandated staff cuts. As has been argued in another context, if the Secretary's staff is cut by 20 percent "he will get 20 percent less of what he does not want—narrow, stove piped advice—but not one iota more of what he truly needs, which is well-integrated, multifunctional problem assessments and solutions." Put differently, if the Secretary wants a staff that is less expensive and also more effective, he must reengineer it for collaboration," which is exactly what Section 941 is designed to assist the Secretary in doing.⁴⁹ As the Pentagon acknowledges, it currently creates numerous cross-functional committees and working groups, but because they are not empowered they are typically ineffective and waste personnel and time. Fewer of these and more of the empowered Section 941 CFTs would make DOD leaner and substantially more productive.

Micromanagement or Oversight? Informally, senior Pentagon officials cite the level of detail in Section 941 as egregious micromanagement. Some experienced observers agree. With respect to Section 941 one former senior official testified to the House Armed Services Committee that it was "profoundly wrong for the Congress to dictate the operational activities within the department" and to "say how the secretary of defense should organize the internal activity of the department."⁵⁰

The distinction between effective oversight and micromanagement is subtle and situation-dependent. Congress is leery of engineering solutions in organizational structure and usually contents itself with requiring reports to draw attention to performance problems. However, there are historic exceptions such as the Goldwater-Nichols Act with its many prescriptions on operational and internal Pentagon activities. If, 30 years ago, Congress had just given guidance to the Secretary of Defense on the need for better joint operations and let him figure out how to achieve it, we would still be fighting wars by dividing the operational space among the Services so they could operate independently of one another. To get better joint operations, Congress had to

direct specifically how DOD would operate to achieve that goal.

The question now is whether Section 941 is another justifiable historic exception. The SASC believes the mandate for effective CFTs is long overdue. Given the Pentagon's history of limited team use and its response to Section 941, which suggests confusion about the difference between the teams and cross-functional committees, it is not likely the Pentagon will employ empowered CFTs without intervention by Congress. Yet even if it appeared that Pentagon leaders understood and were willing to embrace CFTs, it would be helpful for Congress to codify the use of empowered teams in law for reasons explained in the next section.

Do CFTs Require Great Leaders or Great Organizations? Critics of Section 941 argue that even if there is some value to CFTs, their use and management ought to be left entirely to the discretion of the Secretary of Defense. The argument is that it takes a good or even great person to make CFTs work well, and they need as much discretion as possible in deciding exactly how they should be configured and employed.

The response to this argument is that few Secretaries understand the importance of cross-functional teams, much less how to create and manage them well. Secretary Gates learned by trial and error the critical importance of such groups over the many years of his distinguished career, but otherwise senior DOD leaders have largely ignored their potential. Legislating the use of CFTs would ensure the department pays close attention to their productivity. It would also reinforce the legitimacy of the teams and increase the willingness of career civil servants to support them. Resistance to their use by functional leaders would diminish, giving the teams a much better chance to succeed.

In short, there is no need to pit great leaders against modern organizational structure. Both are needed, along with collaborative cultures and other organizational practices and attributes that are conducive to achieving consistently high performance.

Requirements for Success and Common Reasons for Failure

Whether or not Section 941 becomes law, it is important to understand CFT requirements for success. Creating and maintaining an effective CFT is not easy. They often fail. As both opponents and proponents of CFTs note, they are a more sophisticated decision mechanism that requires diligent management.⁵¹ If the Pentagon wants to use CFTs effectively, it needs to understand their requirements for success. Put simply, for a cross-functional team to perform its mission well the members must transfer their loyalty from protecting their parent organizations (and themselves) to accomplishing the common mission assigned to the CFT even though the best way forward requires sacrificing organizational and/or personal preferences. Precisely how a small group achieves this transfer of loyalty is much debated and situation dependent, but a few key points stand out.

First, in most large hierarchical organizations with structures divided according to major functional areas of expertise, it is critical that the CFTs be strongly supported, protected, and encouraged by the senior leader. CFTs cannot succeed in the Pentagon without strong support and careful oversight from the Secretary. If the Secretary's attention is directed elsewhere, the functional leaders will attempt to exert control over their personnel on the CFTs and reduce them to consensus decisionmaking bodies. This was Secretary Gates's experience, and it is a general rule that applies to CFTs in government and the private sector.

Another way CFTs can fail is if the CFT leader is perceived as being more loyal to his or her parent organization's preferences than to accomplishing the team's mission. In such cases the team members will respond in kind and work to protect their parent organizations' interests. Enterprises that hope to create effective CFTs must ensure that team members are rewarded rather than punished for focusing on the interests of the organization as a whole and the mission of the CFT instead of the narrower interests of their functional groups.

The opposite extreme is also a problem. The CFT leader and team must be willing to make risk tradeoffs

to advance mission success. However, if they run roughshod over functional organizations creating unnecessarily high levels of conflict, the team's performance would be compromised. In this regard it helps to have a disciplined, transparent appeal mechanism that ensures functional leaders have the opportunity to make their best case to the Secretary when the CFT makes an especially controversial decision (which Section 941 provides).

Beyond these general issues of empowerment, a number of other best practices ought to be observed. For example, most effective CFTs require collocation and dedicated personnel working full time. Beyond that, the maintenance of trust among the members is generally accorded highest priority on effective CFTs. Given the fast-evolving problems typically assigned to CFTs, it is also important that they are open to learning. To assist this process, Section 941 has provisions for learning from the CFT experience.

Given the limited space available in this article, it is not possible to examine CFT performance factors in greater depth. However, it is possible to illustrate the types of performance factors that CFT leaders should consider by comparing five successful team attributes identified by Google with five major dysfunctional attributes of poorly performing teams identified by Patrick Lencioni (see table 3).⁵²

The first positive attribute cited by Google is *psychological safety*. Dr. Amy Edmondson, who testified to the SASC on Section 941, is well known for coining this term. Edmondson studied medical teams at hospitals to find out what distinguished the best performing groups. She assumed top teams made the fewest medication errors but discovered they appeared to make more errors. Eventually she realized the best teams simply admitted their errors whereas others attempted to cover them up. By forthrightly acknowledging mistakes, the teams could more easily correct them. Edmondson labeled this team attribute psychological safety and observed that it facilitated a climate of openness conducive to high performance.⁵³

Google identified four other factors in its high-performing teams:⁵⁴

Table 3. Five Key Issues in CFT Performance

Issue	Google's Positive Attributes*	Lencioni's Dysfunctional Attributes†
Taking risk	Psychological safety	Absence of trust
Personal accountability	Dependability	Avoidance of accountability
Mission focus	Structure and clarity	Fear of conflict
Commitment	Meaning of work	Lack of commitment
Team accountability	Impact of work	Inattention to results

* Katie Henderson, "Google Says Highly Successful Teams Have This Trait in Common," *BusinessPundit.com*, November 22, 2015, available at <www.businesspundit.com/google-says-highly-successful-teams-have-this-trait-in-common/>.

† Patrick Lencioni, *The Five Dysfunctions of a Team: A Leadership Fable* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2002).

- ◆ they require dependable, high-quality, "on time" performance from the members
- ◆ they have clear goals, roles, and execution plans
- ◆ the members are personally invested in the work
- ◆ the members believe their work fundamentally matters; it provides meaning for them.

These Google attributes align nicely with Lencioni's five team dysfunctions once they are slightly reordered (table 3).

Mission team leaders will have to engineer commitment, mission focus, and personal and team accountability, and be willing to take risks in order to lead their CFTs successfully. These five key CFT performance issues also help make it clear why even properly empowered CFTs may perform poorly, and more importantly, why a cross-functional group that gives priority to protecting parent organizational equities can never perform at a high level.

Recommendations

The Pentagon ought to drop objections to Section 941. Its current organizational approach is outdated. In today's world, the premier lines of authority and accountability are for missions and other cross-functional outputs. Goldwater-Nichols prescribed (over Pentagon objections) such mission authority and accountability for combatant commanders at the operational level. Now a similar clarification is required at the policymaking level where clear authority and accountability for missions and other cross-functional outputs do not exist below the Secretary of Defense. Section 941 provides that clarification

and the tool future Secretaries need to elevate Pentagon performance. Without this breakthrough organizational change, the Pentagon will continue to struggle to overcome consensus decisionmaking and improve headquarters performance. Current Pentagon leaders should accept the tool that Congress is giving the Secretary so that future Secretaries will have a better chance of generating the well-integrated cross-functional problem assessments and solutions they need.

If the Pentagon continues its objections to Section 941 and succeeds in defeating the measure, it will be ignoring the lessons of its own experience. Years ago the Pentagon put the Project on National Security Reform in motion, and one of its major recommendations was the use of CFTs by the national security system. That recommendation was informed by the Pentagon's few but celebrated successes with CFTs, in particular the impressive interagency special operations task forces pioneered by General Stanley McChrystal, USA (Ret.).⁵⁵ U.S. Special Operations Command learned about such cross-organizational collaboration from the CFT that heads up Joint Interagency Task Force-South,⁵⁶ which works for U.S. Southern Command.⁵⁷ The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and National Security Agency (NSA) participated with and learned the value of CFTs from the intelligence-driven operations pioneered by General McChrystal, Admiral William McRaven, USN (Ret.), and other Pentagon leaders.⁵⁸ Both the CIA and NSA have decided to use CFTs and are currently reorganizing around them. And finally, there is the example of Secretary Gates's experience with CFTs in the Pentagon.

Part-time committees cannot win wars or accomplish other cross-cutting missions, but full-time CFTs with empowered leaders can. CFTs are fragile and introduce an element of organizational complexity, but these challenges must be met in order to succeed in our complex and dynamic security environment. Implemented well, CFTs would generate outstanding performance that could constitute an asymmetric advantage for U.S. forces in the future. The Pentagon should welcome CFTs rather than resist them. It would be ironic indeed if the CIA, NSA, and Congress learn from the Pentagon's experience while the Pentagon itself cannot.

Notes

¹ Christopher J. Lamb, "Increasing the Effectiveness of Military Operations," testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), December 10, 2015.

² U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, "Senate Armed Services Committee Completes Markup of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017," press release, May 12, 2016.

³ H. Rept. 114-537, cited in Kathleen J. McInnis, *Fact Sheet: FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) DOD Reform Proposals*, R44508 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 25, 2016), 1.

⁴ Michèle A. Flournoy, "The Urgent Need for Defense Reform," testimony before the SASC, December 8, 2015.

⁵ These assertions have been explored in depth previously. See Christopher J. Lamb, "Impediments to Acquisition Excellence Illustrated by the MRAP Case," statement before the House Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, June 24, 2014; Christopher J. Lamb, "Pentagon Strategies," in *Challenges in U.S. National Security Policy: A Festschrift Volume Honoring Edward L. (Ted) Warner*, ed. David Ochmanek and Michael Sulmeyer (Arlington, VA: RAND, 2014).

⁶ James R. Locher III, "Improving Strategic Integration at the Department of Defense," testimony before the SASC, June 28, 2016.

⁷ Ibid. See also Robert M. Gates, *A Passion for Leadership: Lessons on Change and Reform from Fifty Years of Public Service* (New York: Knopf, 2016).

⁸ Gates, 63.

⁹ An exception is Mark Cancian, *Creating OSD "Mission Teams"* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 1, 2016).

¹⁰ S. Rept. 144-255, *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 Report*, 114th Cong., 2nd sess. (2016), 245.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid., 249–250. The 1985 SASC report on defense reorganization had a longer list of nine deleterious consequences.

¹³ Joe Gould, "New Veto Threat Targets DoD Reform Proposals," *Defense News*, June 7, 2016.

¹⁴ *Statement of Administration Policy: S. 2943—National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017* (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, June 7, 2016).

¹⁵ Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter to Senator John McCain, July 13, 2016.

¹⁶ Frank Ostroff, *The Horizontal Organization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 6.

¹⁷ See Glenn M. Parker, *Cross-Functional Teams: Working with Allies, Enemies and Other Strangers*, 2nd ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2003), 4, for the definition of *cross-functional teams* and 8–9 for differentiating factors.

¹⁸ For an exception, see Daniel R. Denison, Stuart A. Hart, and Joel A. Kahn, "From Chimneys to Cross-Functional Teams: Developing and Validating a Diagnostic Model," *Academy of Management Journal* 39, no. 4 (August 1996).

¹⁹ James Douglas Orton with Christopher J. Lamb, "Interagency National Security Teams: Can Social Science Contribute," *PRISM* 2, no. 2 (March 2011). The 12 meta-reviews are enumerated in the article.

²⁰ James D. Thompson, *Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967; reprint, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 61–62.

²¹ "Organizations with sequential interdependence not contained by departmentalization rely on committees to accomplish the remaining coordination. Organizations with reciprocal interdependence not contained by departmentalization rely on task-force or project groupings to accomplish the remaining coordination." See Fred Nichols, "The Propositions of James D. Thompson," 2015, available at <www.nickols.us/ThompsonPropositions.pdf>.

²² Richard M. Meinhart, "Vice Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Leadership of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council," *Joint Force Quarterly* 56 (1st Quarter, January 2010), 151.

²³ David A. Deptula, "Revisiting the Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces," statement before the SASC, November 5, 2015.

²⁴ Findings from Quadrennial Defense Review Integrated Process Team #3, Roles, Missions, and Organizations Working Group #5. See *Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2005).

²⁵ Cancian, 2.

²⁶ S. Rept. 144-255, § 941, "Organizational Strategy for the Department of Defense."

²⁷ See Allan D. Hartwell and Joseph E. Nance, "IPTs Provide Big Payoffs for JTIDS Milestone III DAB," *Program Manager* 26 (November–December 1997), 28–34.

²⁸ The SASC report accompanying Section 941 notes that "over time, the prerequisites for successful teams were not observed, so that they usually take the form of committees of individuals representing and defending the interests of their functional components." S. Rept. 144-255, 251.

²⁹ *The Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2006), 4.

³⁰ Greg Jaffe, review of *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War*, by Robert M. Gates, *Washington Post*, January 7, 2014.

³¹ Timothy B. Clark, "Master of Bureaucracy," *Government Executive*, May 1, 2012.

³² Gates, 63–64.

³³ Gates made this point in an interview on public radio. See "Robert Gates on Leadership and the 2016 Election," *Here and Now*, January 12, 2016, available at <http://hereandnow.wbur.org/2016/01/12/robert-gates-leadership>.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ashton B. Carter, "Running the Pentagon Right: How to Get the Troops What They Need," *Foreign Affairs* (January/February, 2014), 107.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ *Statement of Administration Policy: S. 2943*, 4.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Carter to McCain.

⁴¹ Gates, 86.

⁴² Flournoy.

⁴³ *Statement of Administration Policy*, 5.

⁴⁴ Carter to McCain.

⁴⁵ S. Rept. 144-255, § 941, “Organizational Strategy for the Department of Defense.”

⁴⁶ William B. Pickett, ed., *George F. Kennan and the Origins of Eisenhower’s New Look: An Oral History of Project Solarium*, Monograph Series No. 1 (Princeton: Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, 2004).

⁴⁷ The SASC makes this point in its report accompanying the draft bill. The SASC stresses that in many cases the cross-functional team leaders should have presumptive authority to draw on the resources and information of the functional components of the department and that without such authority the teams will not succeed.

⁴⁸ Gates notes, “I cannot begin to calculate the time I have wasted in meetings—and task forces—as the person in the chair strives to get all participants to agree to a single recommendation or point of view.” See Gates, 86.

⁴⁹ Christopher J. Lamb, “Viewpoint: Seeking Production from Pentagon Staff Reduction,” *Federal Times*, October 7, 2013.

⁵⁰ John J. Hamre, testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, July 7, 2016.

⁵¹ See Hurley, a proponent of CFTs, and Margaux Hoar and Dave Zvijac, opponents of Section 941, on this point. John S. Hurley, “Cross-Functional Working Groups: Changing the Way Staffs Are Organized,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 39 (4th Quarter, October 2005); Margaux Hoar and Dave Zvijac, “Right Ends, Wrong Means: What Congress Is Missing On Defense Reform,” *War on the Rocks*, August 11, 2016.

⁵² Patrick Lencioni, *The Five Dysfunctions of a Team: A Leadership Fable* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2002).

⁵³ Katie Henderson, “Google Says Highly Successful Teams Have This Trait in Common,” *BusinessPundit.com*, November 22, 2015, available at <www.businesspundit.com/google-says-highly-successful-teams-have-this-trait-in-common/>.

⁵⁴ Julia Rozovsky, “The Five Keys to a Successful Google Team,” November 17, 2015, available at <<https://rework.withgoogle.com/blog/five-keys-to-a-successful-google-team/>>.

⁵⁵ Stanley A. McChrystal, *My Share of the Task: A Memoir* (New York: Portfolio, 2013); Stanley A. McChrystal et al., *Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World* (New York: Portfolio, 2015). See also “Gen (Ret) Stanley McChrystal, Opening Statement on Strategic Integration at the Department of Defense, SASC, June 28, 2016,” available at <www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/McChrystal_06-28-16.pdf>.

⁵⁶ See Christopher J. Lamb and Evan Munsing, *Secret Weapon: High-Value Target Teams as an Organization Innovation*, INSS Strategic Perspectives 4 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, March 2011); Richard Shultz, *Military Innovation in War: It Takes a Learning Organization—A Case Study of Task Force 714 in Iraq*, Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) Report 16-6 (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: JSOU Press, 2016).

⁵⁷ Evan Munsing and Christopher J. Lamb, *Joint Interagency Task Force—South: The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success*, INSS Strategic Perspectives 5 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, June 2011).

⁵⁸ Greg Miller, “CIA Plans Major Reorganization and a Focus on Digital Espionage,” *Washington Post*, March 6, 2015; Ellen Nakashima, “National Security Agency Plans Major Reorganization,” *Washington Post*, February 2, 2016.

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