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Strategic Shift: Appraising Recent Changes in U.S. Defense Plans and Priorities

Richard L. Kugler

Linton Wells II

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CONTENTS

This "Strategic Shift" study examines important changes in U.S. defense planning unveiled by the Department of Defense (DOD) during 2012 and early 2013. Through a series of strategic and operational documents DOD has put forth an interlocking set of changes that placed greater emphasis on the Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions, created a new force-sizing construct, adopted new operational concepts, trimmed the U.S. force structure and defense budget, and called for enhanced cooperation with global partners. The FY13 Defense budget submission was developed in collaboration with the strategies and concepts articulated in this time period, and, so far, have not been affected by the FY14 budget submission. This study describes these changes, evaluates them, and addresses the challenges of implementation. In particular, it recommends that DOD "double down" in its pursuit of *globally integrated operations* through joint force integration in the context of the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations and the *cross-domain synergy* needed to operate effectively in the face of sophisticated adversaries. These are likely to be important in any strategic context. This study's conclusions and recommendations are not altered by DOD's budget request in FY14, though effective implementation will be more challenging.

The additional budget reductions imposed by sequestration, and others that may follow, will affect these strategies, forces, and operational concepts. In response, in March 2013 Secretary of Defense Hagel launched a DOD-wide "Strategic Choices and Management Review" to be completed by May 31, 2013, that is intended to inform DOD's next Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The announcement of the review said: "We'll need to relook at all our assumptions and we'll need to adjust our ambitions to match our abilities. That means doing less but not doing less well. It also means relying

on other instruments of power to help underwrite global security." This was reinforced in Secretary Hagel's speech at the National Defense University on April 3, 2013.

Against this background, the "Strategy Shift" study should be considered not only for its analysis of the 2012 strategic and operational guidance, but also as a baseline from which to assess changes that will be developed in the 2013 review, 2014 QDR, and subsequent DOD decisions.

Richard L. Kugler
Linton Wells II

This book examines major changes in U.S. defense plans and priorities that the Department of Defense (DOD) has issued through high level strategy and other guidance documents during 2012 and the beginning of 2013. These include:[1]

- *Defense Strategic Guidance: Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, January 2012 (DSG)
- *Defense Budget Priorities and Choices*, January 2012 (DBPC); *Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request*, February 2012 (FY13BR); *Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Request*, April 2013 (FY14BR); and Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Hagel's speech, *Defense Department Strategies and Challenges*, April 2013 (DSC)
- *Chairman's Strategic Direction to the Joint Force*, February 2012 (CSDJF)
- *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations 2012*, September 2012 (CCJO 2012); and *Joint Operational Access Concept*, January 2012 (JOAC)
- *SecDef speeches on "Building Partnerships in the 21st Century,"* June 2012 (BP21), *"Cyber Security,"* October 2012, and *"The Force of the 21st Century,"* December 2012
- *Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) white papers on Profession of Arms* (POAWP), *Mission Command* (MCWP), and J*oint Education* (JEWP), all issued in 2012
- *NATO declarations and communiqués from the Chicago Summit* (May 2012).

A Tripartite Set of Major Changes. These documents lay out an ambitious agenda of political-military, operational, and force structure changes.

The genesis for these changes is an unpredictable, complex and dangerous security environment with accelerating rates of political and technological change, and fiscal constraints that will demand hard choices and prioritization.[2] The collective result is new strategic guidance, regional priorities, overseas deployment frameworks, force-sizing constructs, budget proposals, operational concepts, force improvement plans, alliance reform priorities, and partnership-building activities. Taken together, these changes constitute an important shift in U.S. national security strategy and defense affairs: a shift aimed at reshaping how U.S. military forces are to be employed in both combat and non-combat roles into the future. They will be key components of a future U.S. grand strategy.

A worrying aspect of implementing the overall shift is that growing operations and maintenance (O&M) and personnel costs are likely to squeeze research and development (R&D) and procurement funds disproportionately. Moreover, the cost of replacement equipment is increasing—a tactical vehicle in 2010 cost more than five times what it did in 2000—which will add further budgetary pressures.[3] Together, these factors will restrict expensive approaches to innovation—we will not be able to spend our way to innovation. Resource constraints need not be crippling, however; serious innovation has often occurred in austere times. Witness the development of carrier aviation, amphibious warfare and blitzkrieg in the 1920s and 30s.[4] But effective concept development and experimentation, tied to outcomes, will be needed to bring new ideas to fruition.

The individual documents include many action steps, with the CCJO alone listing 23 initiatives, but collectively these changes can be seen as 6 interactive approaches. These must be considered as a whole if they are to be understood, appraised, and implemented effectively through coordinated implementation plans:

1. *Pursuing new Regional Priorities and Defense Missions*. Consistent with its efforts to help sustain U.S. global leadership in times of change, DOD will shift attention and resources to the Asia-Pacific region, including the Indian Ocean, by strengthening the U.S.

military presence there and bolstering collaboration with old and new allies and partners. Meanwhile DOD will pay close attention to new dangers and imperatives in the Middle East, and continue to work with European allies to preserve and enhance North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) capabilities for new missions. The DSG specifies ten primary missions which range from nuclear deterrence to stabilizing presence. A broad portfolio of military capabilities will be needed to accomplish these missions, including a rebalanced overseas presence and power-projection from the continental United States (CONUS) that uses tailored naval, air, missile defense and ground forces. Regional combatant commands will need highly effective and competent plans to make effective use of these diverse forces. The U.S. global commands: Strategic, Transportation, and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) will be called upon to make improvements, with Strategic Command pursuing improved deterrence and long-range strike capabilities, while Transportation Command will seek better ways to deploy U.S. forces swiftly to contested areas. SOCOM's global presence with ground, sea and air components reflects changes to DOD overall.

2. *Implementing a New Force Sizing Construct and a Smaller, Rebalanced Force Structure*. DOD is adopting a new force-sizing construct that maintains its preparation for two regional wars, but demands a full-spectrum campaign using all assets in only one war. This could include temporarily occupying enemy territory, while conducting mainly defensive operations in the other war. The new construct represents a shift away from being prepared for two full-scale regional wars but, more important, it recognizes the need to plan flexibly for diverse conflicts that could require different types of U.S. joint force operations. The new construct rules out sizing active forces for major, sustained stability operations similar to Iraq and Afghanistan, but calls on DOD to retain its combined-arms capability and knowledge of how to conduct smaller operations successfully. As part of a 7 percent cut in active manpower, the Department will reduce its combat forces by about 8 percent by eliminating some Army brigades, Marine battalions, Navy surface combatants, and Air Force squadrons. DOD judges that some

forces can be cut now that a decade of war is ending, and that a somewhat smaller posture will be adequate. The Department will devote major efforts to ensuring that Joint Force 2020 forces are ready, modular, flexible, and technologically sophisticated and that they can be operated jointly to carry out the new strategic concepts.

3. S*haping Joint Force 2020 for Globally Integrated Operations*. Reflecting the new strategic guidance, DOD adopted a revised Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO). The concept's core idea is globally integrated operations. When the need to employ force arises, globally postured and agile U.S. forces will be able to combine quickly to form tailored packages, deploy swiftly, harmonize their command structures, seize the initiative, achieve cross-domain synergy, apply adroit maneuvers and lethal fires, and thereby defeat the enemy. This forward-looking, innovative concept requires well-armed combat forces, as well as critical enablers like special operations forces (SOF), and capabilities in the cyber and space domains, as well as Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR). The critical importance of information networks to the joint force cannot be overstated. The CCJO is of vital importance now because about 80 percent of Joint Force 2020 capabilities are already present or programmed. They will need to be used innovatively within the CCJO force to complement the 20 percent of new capabilities that will be created over the next decades. Mindsets also will have to be shaped—not just the mindsets of leaders, but also the thinking of the majority of the 2020 force that is not yet in uniform.

4. *Preparing to Counter Anti-Access/Area-Denial Threats*. In parallel with the new capstone concept, DOD will develop better capabilities to assure access in the face of significant enemy anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) campaigns, such as could be mounted by China in the Asia-Pacific region or Iran in the Persian Gulf. The new *Joint Operational Access Concept* (JOAC) focuses on achieving *cross-domain synergy* by fusing joint forces to include cyber and space assets, air and naval forces, and long-range strike assets.

5. *Building Cooperative Relationships with Allies and Partners, and Strengthening NATO.* DOD will launch intensified efforts to develop closer, cooperative relationships with allies and partners in all key

regions, including the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East, through mechanisms such as joint consultations and planning, training, exercises, and security assistance. In Europe, DOD will work closely with NATO allies to carry out the 2012 Chicago Summit's call for pursuing Smart Defense. This plan calls for enhanced multilateral cooperation, prioritization, role specialization, and related measures to improve military capabilities over time for new missions. Execution of these initiatives is essential in the face of tight fiscal constraints.

6. *Preparing for Reduced Defense Budgets and Constrained Modernization Spending.* The base defense budget requested for FY13 was $525.4 billion, plus $88.5 billion for overseas contingency operations (OCO). This was the basis for the 2012 strategy, including annual base budget cuts of about 8-9 percent, totaling $259 billion over five years. The FY14 base request is for $526.6 billion, which are judged "…sufficient resources to carry out our national defense strategy."[5] The OCO request will be amended once required force levels in Afghanistan are decided. Sequestration cuts are not expressly included in the $526.6 figure and overall budget levels are likely to be reduced during deficit reduction negotiations. The impact on the strategy of these adjustments, and those that may follow, remains to be seen.

Overall Evaluation and Key Questions. This paper judges that DOD has produced a sensible and comprehensive approach to aligning its responses to an increasingly complex international landscape with the reality of smaller forces and shrinking budgets. The combination of focusing more intently on the Asia-Pacific region, enhancing the strategic impact of DOD's regional engagement, adopting the new *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, bolstering capabilities in assured access and other areas, and strengthening cooperation with allies and partners could promote U.S. security goals in all key regions. The FY14 Budget Request does not change this.

DOD still must muster and sustain the capacity to carry out this complex, wide-ranging construct with many interacting parts. The agenda raises thorny issues that cannot be finessed. Secretary Hagel's emphasis on controlling costs does not yet change the broad strategy. Success will require exceptional skill in

using scarce resources, pursuing difficult innovations, and fielding a future force posture that has the needed flexibility and agility. The concepts behind several of these changes, however, are still in the early stages of development, and aggressive maturation and testing will be needed. Plausible alternatives still should be considered.[6] If these are done well, the future, smaller DOD military posture should be capable of protecting U.S. national interests with acceptable, manageable risks. But implementation will be a challenge.

Implementation: Aligning Changes in Strategy to Changes to People, Processes, Organizations, and Technology. Implementing the emerging agenda successfully will demand coordinated, persistent, whole-of-government, public-private, and transnational approaches. Collectively, they generate more than a dozen important questions which are described in detail in the *Handling Key Strategic Issues* section of this book.

A central recommendation of this study is that DOD should "double down" on the cross-cutting aspects of these plans to deliver *globally integrated operations* and *cross domain synergy* while helping the military Services organize, train, and equip quickly so that their contributions can come together to form a cohesive and joint whole. Leader development should emphasize innovative thinking and action under resource constraints and operational uncertainty. Concepts such as "Quick Wins at Low Cost" that look to deploy capabilities in months for a few thousand dollars instead of multi-year proposals with multi-billion dollar budgets deserve attention.

Sustained, unconventional governance will be essential—something DOD has not often done well. New capabilities in DOD staffs and operators must be supplemented with public-private, whole-of-government and transnational cooperation.[7] Government institutions should be networked to minimize stovepipes and maximize information flow. Feedback mechanisms must be in place to track progress and identify divergence from guidance early.[8] Underlying assumptions need to be revisited frequently, alternatives examined, and policies, strategies, and plans adjusted as needed. Decision-makers will require insights through actionable foresight early enough for them to act.[9]

Key changes will have to be institutionalized if these initiatives are to be sustained across personalities and administrations. DOD has five core processes: Requirements—Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS); Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE); Acquisition (based on DOD 5000 series directives); the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES); and the personnel assignment system. It is an open question is whether these can be made nimble and interactive enough to meet the challenges of the new strategy. History does not induce optimism. DOD leadership needs to make this a priority, perhaps with legislative support as needed.

Changes in training, exercises, and educational curricula must be an integral part of the mix, since no lesson is ever really "learned" until behavior changes. The Chairman's white papers on *Profession of Arms* and, especially, *Joint Education* and *Mission Command*, highlight the need to develop creative, agile thinkers who will do things differently. In sum, the changes need to include balanced approaches among people, processes, organizations, and technology. Pursuing them will require new types of thinking, analysis (outcome-based, not input-based), planning, and execution: a challenging task but one that also could prove invigorating.

The decade will be interesting and demanding. The goals are worthwhile, the barriers longstanding, the fiscal climate unforgiving and the security environment challenging.

NOTES

[1] These new documents supplement and in some ways supersede official documents issued in 2010, including the *National Security Strategy* and the *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. They alter the former by shifting emphasis to the Asia-Pacific region and the latter by putting forth new constructs for sizing, employing, and budgeting U.S. conventional military forces.

[2] LtGen George Flynn, USMC, briefing, "Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Joint Force 2020," November 27, 2012.

[3] Ibid.

[4] For example, the revolutions in military affairs of the 1920s and 30s that brought about carrier aviation, amphibious warfare, and armored warfare. They typically included six factors: innovative thinkers to develop the concepts, practitioners to experiment with them, links to the acquisition community to procure equipment, a senior sponsor to speak for the concept and provide top cover for operators while the capabilities were growing, budgets in rough proportion to potential yield, and a personnel system to grow the people to staff the organizations when they became mainline.

[5] *Fiscal Year 2014 Budget of the U.S. Government* (Washington, DC: Office of Management and Budget, 2013), 69.

[6] See T.X. Hammes, *Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict*, Strategic Forum 278 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2012), available at <www.ndu.edu/inss/docUploaded/SF%20278%20Hammes.pdf>.

[7] See Linton Wells II and Samuel Bendett, *Public-Private Cooperation in the Department of Defense: A Framework for Analysis and Recommendations for Action*, Defense Horizon 74 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2012), available at <www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/Defense%20Horizons%2074.pdf >.

[8] See Leon S. Fuerth with Evan M.H. Faber, *Anticipatory Governance: Practical Upgrades* (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2012).

[9] Neyla Arnas and Warren Fishbein, Actionable Foresight Project, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, in partnership with Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 3 workshops, Washington, DC, National Defense University, June 2010, January 2011, March 2011.

INTRODUCTION

SEEING DOD'S COMPLEX AGENDA AS A WHOLE

The major changes that the Department of Defense (DOD) has recently announced to U.S. defense plans and priorities merit close scrutiny because of their importance, comprehensiveness, innovativeness, strategic promise, and complexity. These changes will cut a wide swath across contemporary U.S. defense affairs. As noted in November 2012 by Admiral James A. Winnefeld, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, these changes directly affect the details of DOD's approaches to shaping the defense budget and developing doctrine, new weapons, and personnel management:

> At the same time, leaders had to account for changes in warfare. This included changes across the range of combat bred by the efficacy of networks to speed awareness. It also included understanding the benefits interagency partners provide to the military and the importance of cross-service cooperation at all levels. On the equipment side, the strategy had to consider the effect of unmanned vehicles, cyber capabilities, stealth technology, and the contributions of 'the best people we have ever had in the U.S. military.' The talent that young people bring to the military was actually folded into the new strategy.[1]

Overall DOD is embarking on a tripartite agenda of political-military, operational, and force posture changes that will be pursued cooperatively. The desired changes will bring about significant adjustments in regional security strategies, force-sizing practices, joint force structures, operational concepts, priorities for regional combatant commands, overseas military presence, relationships with allies and partners, modernization programs, and future budgets. Although these were developed in conjunction with the FY2013 budget

build, the FY2014 budget submission also is considered to provide "…sufficient resources to carry out our national defense strategy."[2]

This book's intent is to address these multiple changes in one study so that they can be understood and appraised as a whole. In the process, it seeks to assess their consequences and implications both individually and collectively, to identify their strengths and potential challenges, and to suggest issues that will require analysis as they are implemented. This book's purpose is educational. It aims to describe, explain, and evaluate these changes, not to advocate for or against them. Its goal is to help readers, especially in DOD and the Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) system, to better understand where the U.S. defense enterprise will be headed in future years, and to form their own opinions and judgments.

DOD judges that its proposed changes will produce an important transition in U.S. defense affairs. The changes will be an "inflection point" that produces widespread "rebalancing" in multiple areas, headed away from a decade of war toward a newly demanding set of endeavors.[3] Some U.S. officials and newspapers have coined the term "strategic pivot" to describe these changes, but this term has generated controversy and mistaken impressions in some quarters. Accordingly "strategic shift" is used here instead, but even its meaning must be properly understood. By this term is meant a change of position and turning motion away from a pre-existing stance in order to pursue new directions and goals. It does not mean that everything is changing or that vital things are being cast off. It does mean that the changes taking place are consequential and will produce something freshly different, hopefully for the better. Some commentators have viewed the coming shift through the lens of DOD's intent to focus more heavily on the Asia-Pacific region while paying appropriate attention to the Middle East and withdrawing some U.S. forces from Europe. While this important change is part of the new picture, it is far from the whole picture, for the full set of changes being pursued goes well beyond this shift in regional priorities alone and affects how U.S. military forces will be structured, used, and modernized.

These changes are being driven not only by withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq and Afghanistan, but also by China's growing power and other trends in global and regional security affairs, new U.S. military doctrines and technologies, and cutbacks to U.S. defense spending. This paper examines major changes in U.S. defense plans and priorities that the Department of Defense (DOD) has issued through high level strategy and other guidance documents during 2012 and early 2013. These include:

- *Defense Strategic Guidance: Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, January 2012 (DSG)[4]
- *Defense Budget Priorities and Choices*, January 2012 (DBPC);[5] *Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request*, February 2012 (FY13BR);[6] *Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Request*, April 2013 (FY14BR)[7]; and Secretary of Defense Hagel's speech, *Defense Department Strategies and Challenges*, April 2013 (DSC)[8]
- *Chairman's Strategic Direction to the Joint Force*, January 2012 (CSDJF)[9]
- *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations 2012*, September 2012 (CCJO 2012)[10]; and *Joint Operational Access Concept*, January 2012 (JOAC)[11]
- *Secretary of Defense Panetta speech on* "Building Partnerships in the 21st Century," June 2012 (BP21)[12]
- *Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) white papers on Profession of Arms* (POAWP),[13] *Mission Command* (MCWP),[14] and *Joint Education* (JEWP),[15] all issued in 2012
- *Secretary of Defense Panetta speech on* "Cybersecurity," October 2012[16]
- Plus *NATO declarations and communiqués from the Chicago Summit*, May 2012.[17]

These new DOD documents supplement and, in some ways, supersede official documents issued in 2010, including defense aspects of the *National Security Strategy* and the *Quadrennial Defense Review Report.* They alter the *National Security Strategy* by shifting emphasis to the Asia-Pacific region and the *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* by putting forth a new strategic construct for sizing, employing, and budgeting U.S. military forces. They do not

appreciably alter two other 2010 documents, the *Nuclear Posture Review Report* and the *Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report,* both of which call for modernizing improvements to U.S. forces in their respective areas. Nor do they suggest major changes to the State Department's *Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* of 2010.[18]

This book begins by portraying DOD's strategic shift as a product of multiple changes that must be considered as a whole for their implications and consequences to be understood and appraised. The book then devotes the following section to examining and evaluating these changes individually with attention to their constituent details. Next, the book examines fifteen key issues that likely will arise as DOD's strategic shift is implemented, and will require effective, cross-cutting DOD and U.S. Government (USG) responses to them. At the end, this book closes with brief conclusions and recommendations on challenges ahead in analyzing and implementing these changes. The Appendix provides data and assessments on conventional military trends in Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, and the Persian Gulf.

NOTES

[1] Jim Garamone, "Winnefeld Discusses Defense Strategy, Budget Link," Armed Forces Press Service, November 28, 2012, available at <www.jcs.mil/newsarticle.aspx?id=1044>.

[2] *Fiscal Year 2014 Budget of the U.S. Government* (Washington, DC: Office of Management and Budget, 2013), 69.

[3] The term "strategic rebalancing" is increasingly being used.

[4] *Sustaining Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 2012), available at <www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf>.

[5] *Defense Budget Priorities* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 2012), available at <www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Budget_Priorities.pdf>.

[6] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/CFO, *Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request*, available at <www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=Defense+Fiscal+Year+2013+Budget+Request&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&ved=0CDUQFjAB&url=%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3DDefense%2BFiscal%2BYear%2B2013%2BBudget%2BRequest%26source%3Dweb%26cd%3D2%26cad%3Drja%26ved

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[7] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/CFO, *Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Request*, available at <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget.html>.

[8] Chuck Hagel, *Defense Department Strategies and Challenges*, speech at the National Defense University, Washington, DC, April 3, 2013, available at <www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1764>.

[9] *Chairman's Strategic Direction to the Joint Force* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 6, 2012), available at <www.jcs.mil//content/files/2012-02/021312101535_CJCS_Strategic_Direction_to_the_Joint_Force_--_13_Feb_2012.pdf>.

[10] *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September 10, 2012), available at <www.jcs.mil/content/files/2012-09/092812122654_CCJO_JF2020_FINAL.pdf>.

[11] *Joint Operational Access Concept* (JOAC) *Version 1.0* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 17, 2012), available at <www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/JOAC_Jan%202012_Signed.pdf>.

[12] Leon E. Panetta, Dean Acheson Lecture, *Building Partnership in the 21st Century*, United States Institute of Peace, June 28, 2012, available at <www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1691>.

[13] *America's Military—A Profession of Arms: White Paper* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, available at <www.jcs.mil/content/files/2012-02/022312120752_Americas_Military_POA.pdf>.

[14] *Mission Command: White Paper* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April 3, 2012), available at <www.jcs.mil/content/files/2012-04/042312114128_CJCS_Mission_Command_White_Paper_2012_a.pdf>.

[15] *Joint Education: White Paper* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, July 16, 2012), available at <www.jcs.mil/content/files/2012-07/071812110954_CJCS_Joint_Education_White_Paper.pdf>.

[16] Leon E. Panetta, speech, *Remarks by Secretary Panetta on Cybersecurity to the Business Executives for National Security*, New York City, October 11, 2012, available at <www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5136>.

[17] *Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan*, May 20, 2012, available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-6213ADFB-6B7178B3/natolive/official_texts_87595.htm?>;

Summit Declaration on Defence Capabilities: Toward NATO Forces 2020, May 20, 2012, available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87594.htm>; *Chicago Summit Declaration*, May 20, 2012, available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-6213ADFB-6B7178B3/natolive/official_texts_87593.htm?mode=pressrelease>; *Deterrence and Defence Posture Review*, May 20, 2012, available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-6213ADFB-6B7178B3/natolive/official_texts_87597.htm?mode=pressrelease>; *NATO's Policy Guidelines on Counter-Terrorism*, May 21, 2012, available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-6213ADFB-6B7178B3/natolive/official_texts_87905.htm?>.

[18] For a review of the earlier official documents, see Richard L. Kugler, *New Directions in U.S. National Security Strategy, Defense Plans, and Diplomacy: A Review of Official Strategic Documents* (Washington, DC: NDU Press 2011).

CHAPTER ONE

A STRATEGIC SHIFT OF SIX INTERACTING PARTS

DOD's documents and associated statements by Pentagon spokesmen outline a complex agenda of change composed of six interacting parts, each of which marks an important departure in its own right and all of which need to be seen in the context of each other in order to gain a sense of the whole.[1] This agenda charts a course toward future DOD efforts that are less than now in some areas, different in others, and greater in others still. Components of this future include:

1. Pursuing new Regional Priorities and Defense Missions. Consistent with its efforts to help sustain U.S. global leadership in an era of change, DOD will be devoting more attention and resources in order to handle emerging challenges in the Asia-Pacific region. As the Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG), *Sustaining Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, points out, this effort will be pursued principally by maintaining an influential and altered U.S. forward presence there, carrying out security commitments to allies while expanding ties to new partners, and preserving a stable military balance of power with China in mind. DOD will broaden its focus beyond Northeast Asia to include the entire zone stretching from Southeast Asia to the Indian Ocean. Simultaneously DOD will pay close attention to new threats and dangers emerging from the Middle East including terrorism and Iran's nuclear ambitions while still working closely with NATO allies to protect Europe and develop improved capabilities for new missions. DOD will be not only rebalancing its regional priorities toward the Asia-Pacific region, but also recalibrating its presence and commitments in all three regions. These global changes will likely cause important geopolitical ripple effects among allies and adversaries that will require careful handling by DOD and USG. DOD will shape its future military forces and capabilities to carry out a wide spectrum of ten missions that include countering terrorism, deterring and defeating aggression,

projecting power globally, projecting power against A2/AD, nuclear deterrence, homeland security, and others. Animated by the goal of providing a wide portfolio of capabilities, DOD will rely upon a rebalanced overseas presence and still-sizable, flexible CONUS-based forces that can deploy rapidly in whatever combinations are mandated by the situations at hand. In guiding the new overseas presence, growing efforts will be launched to ensure that all regional combatant commands plan and act strategically in integrated ways in order to effectively apply their resources, carry out their missions, and achieve national security goals. Abroad and at home, the U.S. joint military posture will be placing enhanced emphasis on air, naval, and missile defense forces while still retaining capable ground forces for new missions. Whereas the Asia-Pacific region will become a more maritime theater, naval and air forces will be mostly used to carry out peacetime missions in the Middle East, and withdrawal of two Army brigades from Europe will elevate the importance of air, naval, and missile defense forces stationed there. While Army and Marine forces will remain stationed in Asia and Europe, large ground forces will mainly perform the role of providing power-projection capabilities from the United States. The enhanced focus on naval, air, and missile defense forces will bring about an important transition in U.S. defense planning and force operations that must be addressed in new-era terms even as the nuclear triad is being modernized.

2. Implementing a New Force Sizing Construct and a Smaller, Rebalanced Force Structure. DOD will be adopting a new force-sizing construct that replaces the old emphasis on being fully prepared for two concurrent major regional wars that could mandate powerful counterattacks on enemy territory. The new construct still has a two-war focus, but whereas U.S. forces will be prepared for counterattack missions and temporary occupations in one war, they will now be mainly limited to border defense missions and related operations in the second war. While this new construct represents a downshift away from the old concept's call for being ready for two full-scale regional wars, it recognizes that future conflicts likely will come in different shapes and sizes, and that U.S. forces must be flexibly prepared to handle them through tailored

responses. The new construct also rules out the act of sizing active forces to conduct large, protracted stability operations. The new construct thus trims U.S. wartime force requirements somewhat while aiming to avoid the big stability operations that have characterized Iraq and Afghanistan. The price of this more-limited focus is acceptance of some risk that unanticipated wartime needs could exceed the force posture's ability to meet them, but DOD judges that this risk is manageable. The main challenge is to ensure that this more-limited construct has a sufficiently wide lens to cover the full spectrum of crises and wars that may lie ahead and that it helps keep U.S. forces sufficiently flexible and agile in order to carry out shifting global missions.

As part of an effort to reduce active manpower, DOD will be trimming the size of its active conventional combat forces by about 8 percent through such steps as eliminating several Army brigades and Marine battalions, several Navy cruisers and other combatants, six Air Force fighter squadrons, and some strategic airlift assets. This reduction comes with some risk, but DOD judges that remaining forces will be adequate to meet core requirements, and it will be devoting major efforts to ensure these forces are as flexible, agile, technologically sophisticated, and capable as possible. In future years, U.S. forces will be relying less on quantity, and more on quality, to perform their missions—not something entirely new, but with fresh dimensions all the same. This emphasis on enhanced quality for the Joint Force 2020 will produce modernization programs focused on SOF, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), the F-35 fighter, a new long-range bomber, missile defenses, littoral combat ships, and submarines.

3. Shaping Joint Force 2020 for Globally Integrated Operations. In response to the DSG and the Chairman's *Strategic Direction to the Joint Force* (CSDJF), DOD has issued a new, landmark *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (CCJO 2012) of which globally integrated operations are a core part. The purpose of this new concept is to affordably and effectively guide the process by which Joint Force 2020 is built and used. This concept aims to enhance the quality of future U.S. joint forces by improving their capacity to muster decisive military power and to skillfully carry out sophisticated new-era operations including against well-armed opponents. Although the concept acknowledges

that about 80 percent of Joint Force 2020 already exists or is programmed, it argues that the remaining 20 percent can be used to innovate, including by acquiring better low-signature, small-footprint assets. The concept envisions that when demands for use of force arise, globally postured, agile U.S. force elements are to combine quickly, deploy swiftly to the scene, jointly integrate their capabilities, harmonize their command structures, seize the initiative, achieve cross-domain synergy, apply adroit maneuvers and precise fires, and thereby defeat enemy opposition. This forward-looking, innovative concept relies upon well-armed ground, air, and naval combat forces, but it also calls for new, enabling capabilities in such high-leverage areas as Special Operation Forces (SOF), cyber, space, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), and information networks. It also calls for parallel improvements in decentralized operations, logistic support, interoperability, doctrine, training, exercises, personnel, and joint professional military education. The new concept's vision of endowing U.S. joint forces with operational excellence has considerable appeal, but its many uprooting changes will need to overcome barriers and hurdles in the way. A well-conceived implementation strategy is needed if major progress is to be made.

4. Preparing to Counter Anti-Access/Area Denial Threats. In a manner that reflects the new capstone concept, DOD will be placing growing emphasis on a new Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) aimed at employing "cross-domain synergy" in order to blend air, naval, ground, and cyber/space assets in ways that effectively counter adversary efforts to pursue A2/AD campaigns in such regions as Asia-Pacific and the Middle East. This assured-access effort is itself an important departure with military and geopolitical implications. It seems destined to be critical in determining whether DOD will remain able to swiftly project military power to distant areas in the face of well-armed opposition, including against China and Iran. The JOAC puts forth a compelling framework for improving U.S. military forces in multiple areas, including joint doctrine, readiness, modernization, training and exercises, deployment practices, and cyber defenses. While its program and budget implications are yet to be determined, fully carrying out the JOAC will not be easy, and it will

require even stronger joint fusion, especially of naval and air forces, than exists today. It also will require unprecedented joint integration of many other capabilities including ISR, command structures, cyber and space assets, and logistic support. Here too a robust implementation strategy will be needed if the JOAC is to be brought to full operational life and effectiveness.

5. Building Cooperative Relationships with Allies and Partners, and Strengthening NATO. In ways publicly outlined by Secretary Panetta, DOD will be launching intensified efforts to develop closer cooperative relationships with key allies and partners in all key regions—including the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East as well as Africa and Latin America. This effort will be carried out through such mechanisms as joint consultations and planning, training and exercises, and security assistance. The strategic goal is to create a larger, stronger web of allies and partners that can work closely with U.S. military forces in pursuing common interests and stable security affairs. In Europe, meanwhile, DOD will work closely with NATO allies in carrying out the Chicago Summit's call for pursuit of Smart Defense and NATO Forces 2020 through multilateral cooperation, prioritization, role specialization, missile defenses, and related measures. The strategic goal is improved European forces for carrying out new missions, including power projection and expeditionary operations in distant areas.

6. Preparing for Reduced Defense Budgets and Constrained Modernization Spending. The base defense budget requested for FY13 was $525.4 billion, plus $88.5 billion for overseas contingency operations (OCO). This was the basis for the 2012 strategy, including annual base budget cuts of about 8-9 percent, totaling $259 billion over five years, about $50 billion less than had been anticipated in 2011. The FY14 base request is for $526.6 billion, which are judged "…sufficient resources to carry out our national defense strategy."[2] The OCO request will be amended once required force levels in Afghanistan are decided. Sequestration cuts are not expressly included in the $526.6 figure and overall budget levels are likely to be reduced during deficit reduction negotiations. The impact of these adjustments on the strategy, and those that may follow, remains to be seen.

Taken together, these six changes add up to an important strategic shift in how DOD intends to address an unpredictable and complex future in which international challenges will be mutating in important ways but U.S. defense resources will be declining, thus mandating an intense focus on new challenges and altered priorities. The new defense agenda, of course, is not the first time that DOD has been compelled to make a strategic shift since the end of the Cold War washed away the previous era of continuity. Indeed, DOD made major shifts in the 1990s and the 2000s, when events first compelled a focus on a new regional defense strategy with reduced forces and precipitated in two major, prolonged wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even judged by these earlier standards, however, the current strategic shift stands out as large, multifaceted, and consequential, and it points DOD toward a new and different future. If it is fully carried out, it will mean that a decade from now the U.S. military will be pursuing goals, missions, and operations that differ appreciably from those of today, and will be employing forces that are sized, structured, and balanced in different ways than now. The Joint Force of 2020 will field forces that are about 20 percent new compared to now: e.g. new fighters, naval combatants, and information networks, and the remaining 80 percent will need to be aligned to the new realities. Even more importantly, some 60 percent of the people who will be in the force in 2020 are not in uniform today, and the future leaders of this force will have to adjust their thinking significantly.

Is DOD headed in sound directions? This paper judges that DOD has produced a sensible, balanced approach in its efforts to harmonize its responses to the changing international landscape with the reality of smaller budgets and shrinking forces. DOD's agenda of constructive, resource-wise changes clearly makes better sense than either trying to stand pat in strategic terms, or trimming its force posture in "salami-sliced" ways in response to budget cuts, or radically disengaging the United States from responsible leadership abroad. The reshaped agenda portrays a future in which U.S. military power will be manifested in new forms globally and regionally rather than decline in some wholesale way. The greater attention that it devotes to the Asia-Pacific region, while not losing sight of the Middle East and Europe, makes sense. It gets high

grades for its efforts to strike a workable balance among multiple missions and priorities rather than focusing too much on some at unwise expense to others or scattering scarce resources in too many directions (recognizing that this balance is easier said than done). Likewise it does a good job of showing how the past decade's emphasis on ground force operations is likely to give way to a heightened joint focus on air and naval forces in the era ahead, and it does a commendable job of trying to pursue an affordable modernization effort through 2020. It also does a good job of showing how new operational concepts can improve the U.S. military's capacity to carry out sophisticated new-era operations. Overall, DOD seems correct in reasoning that although future U.S. military forces will be somewhat smaller than now, they can improve qualitatively if properly funded, and they will remain capable of effectively carrying out national security strategy, albeit with risks that are deemed manageable.[3]

Nonetheless, many difficult issues and challenges seem likely to arise. Details of this agenda are likely to be debated: some will criticize DOD for trying to do too much even as others accuse it of doing too little. Much will depend on how effectively the new agenda is implemented. The act of implementing it, in turn, will require continuing efforts at planning, analyzing, and judging in fresh terms by Pentagon staffs and joint military commands as well as training, exercising and educating. The bottom line is that DOD has tabled sound concepts for guiding its emerging strategic shift, but these concepts so far are general and abstract. They will need to be developed further before they can be judged fairly, much less carried out fully in the face of an extraordinarily challenging fiscal and international security environment. A future of deep thinking and concerted action lies ahead.

NOTES

[1] For an academic assessment of U.S. defense strategy and preparedness prior to the recent changes, see Michael O'Hanlon, *The Wounded Giant: America's Armed Forces in an Age of Austerity* (Washington, DC: Penguin Press, 2011).

[2] *Fiscal Year 2014 Budget of the U.S. Government* (Washington, DC: Office of Management and Budget, 2013), 69.

[3] For an evaluation of DOD's changes that reaches positive conclusions, see Michele Flournoy and Janine Davidson, "Obama's New Global Posture: The Logic of Foreign Deployments," *Foreign Affairs* 91, no. 4 (May/June 2012), 54–63. For a critique that DOD and the USG are trying to do too much, see Barry Posen, "The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 92, no. 1 (116-129). For related analysis that puts forth a range of U.S. defense budget choices, see Stimson Center, "A New U.S. Defense Strategy for a New Era: Military Superiority, Agility, and Efficiency" (Washington D.C, November 2012. See also Michael J. Mazarr, "The Risks of Ignoring Strategic Insolvency," *The Washington Quarterly*, Fall 2012, 7–22, for an assessment of U.S. over-reach from a "grand strategy" perspective.

CHAPTER TWO

PURSUING NEW REGIONAL PRIORITIES AND DEFENSE MISSIONS

The DSG is intended to provide strategic guidance for the coming years. By outlining an agenda of change it supplements, and in some ways supersedes, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that was issued in 2010. The QDR was mainly preoccupied with guiding wartime policies in Iraq and Afghanistan. The DSG's new strategic guidance looks beyond these two wars—U.S. forces have already withdrawn from Iraq and will no longer be performing combat missions in Afghanistan after 2014—to prepare for challenges over the coming decade and beyond. The DSG comes across as both pensive and proactive about the evolving future international security system. It foresees a future of complex global challenges—some already-existing and others new—that will be manifested in different ways in different regions. Accordingly, it argues that U.S. global leadership and power will be critical to safeguarding international peace and stability, and that U.S. defense missions and force operations must be tailored to address the unique features of each region.

While acknowledging the need to continue countering al-Qaeda and other violent extremist threats that mainly arise in the Middle East and South Asia, the DSG announces that the U.S. military will rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region, including the entire strategic arc stretching from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia. It proclaims that the United States will maintain a strong military presence there, and will emphasize its existing alliances that provide a vital foundation for Asia-Pacific security, including its close alliances with South Korea, Japan, and Australia. DOD also will pursue closer ties with the Philippines and emerging partners such as as Singapore, while investing in a long-term strategic partnership with India that can serve as a vital economic anchor and security-provider in the

Indian Ocean region. In addressing U.S. relations with China, the DSG guidance is both firm and forthcoming in judging that the maintenance of peace, stability, free commerce, and U.S. influence will depend partly on an underlying balance of military capability and presence as China's power grows. It states that the United States and China have a strong stake in building a cooperative relationship that helps promote peace and stability, but that China's growing military power must be accompanied by greater clarity of its strategic intentions in order to avoid causing friction in the region. The DSG further announces that the United States will continue to make the necessary investments to ensure continuing regional access and the capacity to fulfill treaty obligations with allies that might be menaced by an unstable military balance in the Asia-Pacific region.

In dealing with the Middle East, the DSG judges that the Arab awakening may ultimately produce new governments that are more responsive to the legitimate aspirations of their people and are more stable and reliable partners of the United States. Nonetheless the DSG guidance foresees a region that will continue to be characterized by stressful security affairs. In dealing with this challenge, the DSG is not limited to countering violent extremists and other destabilizing threats. It also puts forth a larger framework for promoting stable regional security affairs that is anchored in upholding commitments to allies and partner states particularly against threats posed by nuclear proliferation. It states that U.S. policy will emphasize Gulf security in collaboration with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, including efforts to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons and counter its destabilizing policies. It further proclaims that the United States will continue standing up for Israel's security while continuing to promote a comprehensive Middle East peace. In order to support these objectives, it says, the United States will continue to place a premium on U.S. and allied military presence in, and in support of, partner nations in and around this region.

The DSG judges that Europe and NATO will remain the United States' principal partner in seeking global and economic security. It calls for U.S. efforts to continue promoting Europe-wide peace and integration, while continuing to

meet NATO treaty obligations to protect alliance members. Noting that most European countries are now producers of security rather than consumers of it, the DSG calls for U.S. efforts to promote NATO defense reform and capability-building through "Smart Defense" measures in such areas as pooling, sharing, and specializing in order to meet new-era challenges inside and outside Europe. The shifting strategic landscape in Europe and NATO, it judges, creates an opportunity to move the U.S. military presence there away from a focus on current conflicts toward a focus on future capabilities. Accordingly it calls upon the U.S. military presence to change in appropriate ways (details discussed later). In addition, it calls for engagement with Russia in order to strengthen cooperation in areas of mutual interest, as well as small-footprint efforts to build partnerships in Africa and Latin America through exercises, rotational presence, and advisory measures.

The DSG also calls for sustained U.S. efforts to protect access to the global commons, including protection of commercial sea lanes and airspace against potential anti-access threats posed by states and non-state actors. Similarly it calls for efforts to protect against cyber threats at home and abroad, and to protect safety and security in space. In these arenas, it states that the United States will lead efforts to protect access to the global commons by working with allies and partners, building interoperable military capabilities, and strengthening international norms of responsible behavior. Finally the DSG calls for DOD to enhance its capabilities further, acting with domestic agencies and foreign partners, to conduct effective operations aimed at countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

In order to pursue these global security goals, the DSG declares that the U.S. joint military posture will need to recalibrate its capabilities and make selective additional investments aimed at performing ten key missions which are reiterated in the CCJO:

1. Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare. This mission will require on-going efforts to dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda, to prevent Afghanistan from ever being a safe haven for al-Qaeda again, and to use a widely dispersed combination of direct action and security assistance to counter terrorism elsewhere.

2. Deter and Defeat Aggression. This mission requires that U.S. military forces be capable of deterring and defeating aggression by any potential adversary. The deterrence mission will be performed by denying any adversary the prospect of successful aggression while threatening to inflict unacceptable costs if aggression is committed. The defense mission will be performed by possessing the capacity to carry out a successful combined-arms campaign across all domains—land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace. In order to achieve deterrence and defense, the DSG says, U.S. forces must be capable of defeating aggression in one theater even while simultaneously carrying out large-scale operations in another theater.
3. Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area-Denial Challenges. Power projection has long been a mission for the U.S. armed forces, but the addition of the counter-A2/AD component requires that U.S. military forces be capable of deploying and operating effectively in crisis areas even in the face of efforts by such countries as China and Iran to use military force to counter U.S. power projection efforts. The DSG states that in order to create improved capabilities in this arena, the U.S. military will need to make investments in order to strengthen its capability to carry out the new JOAC including undersea capabilities, a new stealth bomber, improved missile defenses, and critical space-based capabilities.
4. Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction. This mission requires efforts aimed at preventing the proliferation and use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, including Iran's attempts to acquire nuclear weapons. It also requires capabilities to detect, protect against, and respond to WMD use should preventive measures fail.
5. Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space. Recognizing that modern armed forces cannot operate without sophisticated information and communication networks, this mission calls for DOD to work with domestic agencies and international allies and invest in advanced capabilities to defend its networks, operational capability, and resiliency in cyberspace and space.
6. Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent. In pursuing this mission, the DSG reasons that as long as nuclear weapons remain in existence, the United States will need to retain a safe, secure, and

effective arsenal of missiles and bombers in order to deter attack on the United States and reassure allies and partners that they can rely on U.S. security commitments to them. It further notes the possibility of achieving deterrence goals with a smaller nuclear force than now planned in ways that would reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the U.S. inventory as well as their role in U.S. national security strategy.

7. Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities. This mission requires U.S. forces to defend U.S. territory from direct attack by states and non-state actors, including through missile defenses. It also requires them to assist domestic civil authorities in event such defense fails or natural disasters occur.
8. Provide a Stabilizing Presence. In carrying out this mission, the DSG calls for a combination of overseas stationed forces, rotational deployments, and training exercises with allies and partners in ways that reinforce deterrence, strengthen allied capabilities, enhance alliance cohesion, and preserve U.S. influence. Noting that overseas resources will decline in future years, it calls for innovative use of still-available resources coupled with thoughtful choices regarding the location and frequency of U.S. operations.
9. Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations. In carrying out this mission, the DSG states that in the aftermath of Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States will emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to address instability. It proclaims that while the U.S. military should remain ready to conduct limited counterinsurgency and other stability operations, U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.
10. Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations. The DSG calls upon the U.S. military to maintain adequate capabilities and response options for this mission, including the capacity to respond to mass atrocities and perform evacuation of Americans located in dangerous overseas locations.

In order to perform these missions, the DSG articulates eight principles for guiding force posturing and program development:

1. Because DOD cannot predict the future strategic environment with absolute certainty, it should strive to maintain a broad portfolio of military capabilities that offer versatility across the range of missions. Likewise, DOD should strive to protect its ability to regenerate capabilities that might be needed to meet unforeseen demands.
2. DOD should differentiate between investments that should be made and those that can be deferred, while preserving "reversibility" in its capacity to make changes if necessary.
3. DOD should maintain a ready and capable force even as its overall size is reduced, and should resist the temptation to reduce readiness in order to preserve force structure.
4. DOD must reduce the "cost of doing business" by pursuing economies in such areas as manpower costs, overhead and infrastructure, business practices, and affordable health care.
5. DOD should examine its campaign plans and contingency plans in order to determine how limited resources can best be used, and it should renew emphasis on the need for a globally networked approach to deterrence and warfare.
6. DOD will need to re-examine the mix of Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) forces with the goal of determining how the expected pace of operations will influence the balance that should be struck between them.
7. DOD should take extra measures to retain and build upon advancements in networked warfare in which joint forces have truly become interdependent.
8. DOD should make strong efforts to maintain an adequate industrial base and investments in science and technology.

What can be said about the implications that the DSG's ten missions pose for U.S. defense planning and building the Joint Force 2020? Taken together, these ten missions create a wide and diverse range of demands, requirements, and priorities for future U.S military forces. They mandate that U.S. forces continue to counter terrorism while providing a stabilizing global peacetime presence, remain prepared to deter and defend against aggression in multiple

regions, and be improved to project power effectively despite growing A2/AD threats. In addition to these classical military missions, they require concurrent efforts to counter WMD proliferation, operate effectively in space and cyberspace, protect the U.S. homeland, conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations, and perform humanitarian operations. Finally, they require an effort to modernize the U.S. nuclear deterrence posture and its associated infrastructure: an expensive agenda that is not addressed by the DSG in any detail but is covered in a previous DOD study released in 2010.[1]

Performing all ten missions will dictate the need for a high operational tempo by U.S. forces that clearly will continue to have their work cut out for them. The ten missions also will stretch thin the defense budget and joint force posture. Building the Joint Force 2020 will dictate an effort to ensure that the future posture possesses the full set of capabilities, in sufficient amounts, needed by all of these ten very different missions. Especially because the future posture will be somewhat smaller than now, these ten missions will dictate that U.S. joint forces possess the flexibility and agility to continuously combine and recombine in order to form tailored packages that can respond to shifting mission requirements. The decision not to remain ready for major sustained stability operations takes some of the pressure off U.S. forces. Even so, the prospect of ongoing and growing missions in other areas, rather than retrenchment, dictates that Joint Force 2020 must possess the diverse assets and preparedness needed to make it a posture for many different seasons. The act of handling this demanding agenda, generating its required forces, and making the necessary improvements promises to be anything but easy.

In order to carry out overseas missions, the DSG and other DOD documents call for efforts to ensure that all regional combatant commands conduct their planning and operations in ways that are tailored, integrated, and harmonized in order to make effective use of resources, carry out their diverse missions, and achieve national goals. Of the commands, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) seems likely to be especially challenged in this arena owing to its widening geographic focus, multiplying missions, and menaces to its force operations. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) likewise faces a challenging

future owing to political changes sweeping over the Middle East and to mounting military rivalry with Iran in the Persian Gulf. U.S. European Command (EUCOM) faces the challenge of remaining prepared for contingencies on Europe's periphery, fulfilling Article 5 commitments to NATO, and working with NATO allies to develop better power-projection capabilities. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) may be less challenged in terms of potential military threats, but all will be tasked with a host of outreach and partnership-building missions that complicate their planning efforts. Meanwhile, DOD will face the challenge to forge together all of its regional combatant commands to ensure that they form a coordinated global web of responsive capabilities. As an example of proactive steps being taken, DOD is affiliating Army Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) with each regional combatant command to help ensure that they have ready access to a pool of ground forces. Likewise, U.S. military global commands—e.g., Strategic Command and Transportation Command—will be called upon to make improvements of their own in ways that help carry out the new strategic guidance. Strategic Command will need to enhance deterrence if additional nuclear proliferation occurs and to support the conventional war-fighting doctrines of the regional combatant commands. Transportation Command will need to provide improved mobility capabilities for globally projecting U.S. military forces from CONUS when situations warrant this step.

DOD's pursuit of a rebalanced overseas presence and joint preparedness will place new emphasis on air, naval, missile defense forces, and cyber defenses in Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, and the Middle East/Persian Gulf even as concerns about major ground wars decline in importance. The new overseas presence will be backed by continued reliance upon large, diverse joint forces—land, air, sea, and mobility—that are stationed in CONUS and available for rapid power projection missions anywhere in the world. Whereas past decades have witnessed main emphasis on planning for a limited set of canonical contingencies, future years are likely to see a growing emphasis on preparing for a widening set of operations that require a well-oiled capacity to quickly assemble differing combinations of joint force packages. For example, contingencies

in the Asia-Pacific region may place a premium on naval and air forces including long-range strike assets and complex logistic challenges, while Middle East/Persian Gulf contingencies may require larger numbers of ground forces as well as other joint assets. The capacity to operate flexibly in dispatching CONUS-based forces for power projection missions will be a major factor in determining the success of DOD's new defense plans for multiple theaters.

NOTE

[1] For details of the current U.S. nuclear modernization program, see *Nuclear Posture Review Report* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April 2010).

CHAPTER 3

IMPLEMENTING A NEW FORCE-SIZING CONSTRUCT AND A SMALLER, REBALANCED FORCE POSTURE

Analysis of the new force-sizing construct can best begin by recalling the history of such constructs over the past two decades. When the Cold War ended in 1990, DOD shifted away from sizing its forces to wage a global war with the Soviet Union. As a replacement, it adopted a construct for deterring and defending against aggression by two regional adversaries: e.g., North Korea and Iraq. This construct postulated nearly-simultaneous wars in Asia and the Middle East, and it called for sufficient U.S. forces to deploy swiftly there, conduct defensive campaigns to halt the aggression, and then transition to offensive campaigns aimed at restoring allied borders, occupying enemy territory, and imposing regime change on adversary governments. In its vision, roughly one-half of the U.S. active defense posture would be required by each conflict. This force-sizing construct called for a force posture that would be 25 percent smaller than during the Cold War, composed of 13 active Army and Marine divisions, 20 Air Force fighter wings, 10-11 carrier battle groups, and a large number of amphibious ships and strategic airlift transports. This construct prevailed throughout the 1990s.[1]

In early 2001, DOD adopted a modified construct called the "1-4-2-1" strategy. It proposed to size U.S. forces to deal with homeland defense missions; normal peacetime operations in the four regions of Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, and Asia; two concurrent major theater wars (MTWs); and one major counterattack/occupation campaign. Accompanying this new force-sizing construct came a DOD-wide effort to pursue transformation of U.S. military forces with new information systems and other technologies.[2] Shortly afterward, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq resulted in large U.S forces being committed to both countries in order to conduct sustained stability operations: a new, previously unanticipated mission for U.S. forces. In response,

Army and Marine forces were enlarged in order to carry out these operations, but Navy and Air Force combat forces remained mostly constant. The transformation process was broadened to focus on improving U.S. forces for prolonged stability operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

In 2010, the QDR put forth a new, more-complex construct composed of several features that took into account the ongoing stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In it, U.S. forces would be sized in order to:

- conduct a major stabilization operation, deter and defeat a highly capable regional aggressor, and deal with a catastrophic event in the United States
- deter and defeat two regional aggressors while maintaining a heightened alert posture by other U.S. forces
- conduct a major stabilization operation, a long-duration deterrence operation in a separate theater, a medium-sized counterinsurgency operation, and extended support to civil authorities in the United States.

Based on this construct, the QDR called for a joint force posture composed of:

- Department of Army: 73 combat brigades (45 Active and 28 Reserve Component) plus 21 combat aviation brigades, 15 Patriot battalions, and 7 Terminal High Altitude Defense (THAAD) batteries.
- Department of Navy: 10 to 11 carriers and 10 carrier air wings, 84 to 88 large surface combatants (including 21-33 Aegis missile defense warships plus Aegis ashore), 14 to 28 small surface combatants, 14 mine countermeasure ships, 29 to 31 amphibious warfare ships, 53 to 55 attack submarines, 4 guided-missile submarines, 126 to 171 ISR and Electronic Warfare aircraft, 98 to 109 support ships, and 3 Marine Expeditionary Forces that include four divisions and four aircraft wings.
- Department of Air Force: 8 ISR wing-equivalents with 380 aircraft, 30 to 32 airlift and air-refueling wings with 33 aircraft per wing, 10

to 11 theater strike wing-equivalents with 73 aircraft per wing, 5 bomber wings totaling 96 bombers, 6 air superiority wing-equivalents with 72 aircraft per wing, 3 command and control wings, and 10 space and cyberspace wings.

- Joint SOF: Approximately 600 special operations teams, 3 Ranger battalions, and 165 tilt-rotor and fixed-wing aircraft.

The DSG puts forth a new force-sizing construct that alters this strategic calculus about wars and operations. It reasons that because the United States has important interests in multiple regions, DOD forces must be capable of deterring and defeating aggression by an opportunistic adversary in one region even as large forces are operating elsewhere. Accordingly, it continues to call for the capacity to conduct two regional wars, but it treats these two wars differently. For one war, it mandates that U.S. forces must be capable of fully denying a capable aggressor's objectives by conducting a combined arms campaign across all domains—land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace. This campaign includes not only initial defense of allied borders, but also a subsequent counterattack to secure enemy territory and populations and facilitate a transition to a stable government. The new construct envisions such a post-war presence on enemy territory as taking place on a small-scale for a limited period using standing forces, and if necessary, for an extended period using mobilized forces. For the other war, the new construct envisions a defensive campaign aimed at denying the aggressor's objectives or imposing unacceptable costs on the aggressor, but it calls for no significant and enduring occupation of enemy territory. It calls for U.S. wartime operations to be conducted along with allied forces when possible, and it mandates that U.S. ground forces should possess the mobility, presence, and prepositioning needed to remain prepared for operations in several areas where such conflicts might occur.

The new construct takes a restricted but hedged view of stability operations. It says that U.S. forces must be capable of conducting limited counterinsurgency and other stability operations, and it calls upon them to retain the lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan. However, it further dictates that

U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations. Yet it also acknowledges that while DOD does not anticipate engaging in major stability operations requiring a large rotational force in the coming years, it cannot rule out the possibility. Accordingly it reasons that if such a campaign were to occur, DOD could respond by mobilizing Reserve Component forces and, over time, regenerating Active Component end strength. The words of the new construct may seem murky in this arena, but the strategic intent is clear. If at all possible, the United States does not intend to repeat the frustrating experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan anytime soon, and it will not be spending scarce defense resources to prepare for stability operations that are large and prolonged. The issue, of course, is whether the future international environment will permit this war-weary stance from being fully carried out. As the past two decades show, sometimes wars erupt in unanticipated ways, and they are capable of unfolding in different ways than envisioned, or desired, by U.S. defense plans.

In response to the new force-sizing construct, the DSG and associated DOD documents call for the reduction of some U.S. forces, especially those whose main rationale may stem from preparing for large stability operations. They specify the following reductions:

- Total DOD total active and reserve manpower will be reduced from 2.269 million in FY12 to $2.145 million in FY17, a 5.5 percent reduction. Active manpower will be cut to $1.32 million, only 60,000 less than in 2001. The active Army will drop by 10.4 percent, and total manpower, counting RC forces, will be cut by 6.8 percent. Total Navy manpower will be cut by 3.9 percent, Marine Corps manpower by 8.3 percent, and Air Force manpower by 2.3 percent.
- The Army will eliminate 8 BCTs, while studying its future brigade structure. If the size of future BCTs is increased by re-introducing a third maneuver battalion, the total number of active BCTs could drop from 45 to 33, or the number that existed in 2001.[3]

- The Navy will continue to have 10-11 carriers and associated air wings. But it will reduce its number of ships by retiring some early and deferring acquisition of others. It will retire 7 cruisers (most of which do not have a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capability) and 2 amphibious ships, reduce acquisition of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) by 2 and High Speed Vessels by 8, and delay acquisition of a Landing Helicopted Assault amphibious ship and one Virginia-class submarine.
- The Marine Corps will eliminate 1 infantry regiment headquarters, 5 infantry battalions, 1 artillery battalion, 4 tactical air squadrons, and 1 combat logistics battalion.
- The Air Force will reduce by 303 aircraft. It will disestablish six tactical fighter squadrons out of sixty and one training squadron, resulting in retirement of 102 A-10 fighters and 21 F-16s. It will also eliminate 150 mobility and tanker aircraft (65 C-130, 27 C-5A, 20 KC-135, and 38 C-27) plus 30 ISR aircraft.

Basically DOD will be losing about 8 percent of its joint combat forces: not a wholesale reduction, but one that trims valuable assets at the margins. In order to offset this loss, DOD will aim to make qualitative improvements through high readiness and modernization programs. In addition, as the *Defense Budget Priorities and Choices* document points out, major efforts will be made to strengthen the degree to which future forces directly support the DSG for bringing greater security to the key regions and performing core strategic missions. The combination of continuity and change being pursued by DOD in this arena will produce several important trends to regional defense priorities and force composition.

In the Asia-Pacific region, DOD will continue providing security commitments to Japan and South Korea through the presence of joint forces in both countries. In the Republic of Korea (ROK), plans are underway to shift wartime operational control of ROK forces to ROK commanders by 2015; while in Japan, 5,000 U.S. Marines are being shifted from Okinawa to Guam, and another 4,000 are deploying elsewhere, in response to a recent U.S.-Japan

agreement, thus leaving 10,000 Marines on Okinawa. In order to carry out a more maritime approach elsewhere in the region, DOD will retain its current carriers and large-deck amphibious fleet, deploy more surface combatants and submarines, maintain the current bomber force, sustain Army and Marine Corps forces in the region, and build up Guam as a major regional hub. In addition, DOD will forward station LCSs in Singapore, periodically deploy some Marines and Air Force units to Australia, and intensify defense cooperation with such friends and allies as the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore as well as Vietnam and India. Future years may see increased U.S. access to Subic Bay and Clark Air Base in the Philippines as well greater access to bases and facilities in neighboring countries. Based on these priorities, it is reasonable to conclude that the future U.S. peacetime military presence in the Asia-Pacific region will continue to total about 100,000 military personnel, but will develop improved capabilities for operating not only in Northeast Asia, but also Southeast Asia, the South China Sea, and the Indian Ocean, thus providing greater geographic coverage.

DOD will continue to deploy naval, air, and land forces to the Middle East/Persian Gulf, while using training, exercises, rotational deployments, and security assistance to upgrade cooperation with close friends and allies and strengthen their defense capabilities. Recent months have seen intensified security assistance efforts to the GCC allies and Israel. Barring a severe crisis with Iran, the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf likely will total about 25,000 military personnel, including regular deployment of naval, air, and land forces. In a crisis, larger forces could be deployed from CONUS if necessary.

In Europe, Pentagon documents say, DOD will remove 2 of 4 Army BCTs, leaving one in Germany and the other in Italy. In compensation, DOD will use a CONUS-based BCT to conduct rotational deployments to Europe for exercises, affiliate U.S. forces with the NATO Response Force, deploy 4 Aegis ships with BMD assets to Spain, and pursue plans to deploy SM-3 missile defense interceptors to Romania and Poland as part of its Phased Adaptive Approach and a parallel NATO effort that also will incorporate allied missile defenses. The future U.S. military presence in Europe likely

will total about 65,000 personnel counting ground, air, naval, and missile defense forces.

Although the Army and Marine Corps will have somewhat fewer ground combat forces, withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan will enable them to concentrate more on other missions, including being prepared for two future regional conflicts. The Air Force will have fewer strategic air transports, but its smaller, streamlined mobility force will enable it to continue meeting deployment requirements for two wars. Acquisition of UAS, as well as Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems and information networks, better SOF, better cyber defenses, better counter-insurgency assets, improved long-range strike capabilities, improved munitions, development of better capabilities for operating in A2/AD settings, and the steady procurement of new ships and combat aircraft such as the F-35 fighter will gradually produce a more modern, capable posture as the future unfolds. The Navy and Air Force particularly will experience qualitative improvements, and while the Army and Marine Corps will modernize at a slower pace, they will remain powerful and superior to future adversaries. The bottom line is that although future U.S. military forces may be somewhat smaller than now, DOD judges that they will remain ready, deployable, and well-armed for handling the uncertain missions ahead.

In appraising the relationship between the new force-sizing construct and the trimmed-down force posture, it is important to remember that all such constructs are analytical devices employed to gauge future requirements and capabilities. They are not literal predictors of how, where, and when U.S. forces will actually be used in crises and wars. For example, the United States has fought in five wars since 1991: in Kuwait, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. Of these wars, only one—ejection of Iraq from Kuwait—closely paralleled DOD's force-sizing construct of the time. The other four wars were not anticipated far enough in advance to prepare U.S. forces for them. Indeed, DOD had to alter existing plans in order to intervene effectively in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. Two of these wars were carried out mainly by air forces, and two required major, enduring stability operations that were not

originally envisioned by DOD plans. In gauging the future, what will matter is whether the U.S. force posture provides the flexibility and agility to provide for the combinations of joint assets needed in all situations: small and large, familiar and surprising.[4]

Even after the coming reductions, the future U.S. posture will contain about 10 active Army divisions and more than 30 BCTs, three active Marine Expeditionary Forces, 10-11 carrier strike groups, a large submarine force, nearly 30 Aegis ships equipped with SM-3 missile interceptors, 100 bombers, and 1300 USAF fighter aircraft, plus sizable SOF and a growing force of UAS aircraft. The Reserve Component posture will provide an additional 28 Army BCTs and a Marine division and air wing. By any standard, this is a large posture, one that could be overpowered only by something worse than two regional wars—provided the United States avoids again becoming bogged down in major stability operations. In addition to its large size, the U.S. force posture will be marked by a multiplicity of different assets, all of them large enough to have operational significance. The result is a broad portfolio of capabilities endowed with the modularity that permits tailored packaging and repackaging in response to changing situations. This is another reason for confidence that the U.S. posture will provide the necessary flexibility, agility, and adaptability if high readiness is preserved.

In appraising this smaller but qualitatively better posture, an important trend will be the degree to which U.S. military operations are increasingly led by naval and air forces—a trend noted by the DSG guidance and other DOD documents. The past decade of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially the lengthy stability operations there, were mostly dominated by large ground forces with air and naval forces playing a supporting role. The coming era of geopolitical competition with China in Asia and Iran in the Persian Gulf seems likely to mainly levy requirements for U.S. air and naval forces that are operated jointly, with ground forces playing a mostly supporting role unless major land wars erupt there or elsewhere. Moreover, deployment of SM-3 interceptors aboard Aegis ships operated globally means that missile defense will become an increasingly important part of U.S. force operations. The important issue

will not be whether U.S. ground forces are large enough for their missions, but whether U.S. naval and air forces are sufficiently large and properly equipped with modern war-fighting capabilities.

Looking ahead, Joint Force 2020 is currently planned to be similar in size and composition to the posture approved by the DSG. That is, in future years U.S. forces will not enlarge, but neither will they shrink provided DOD budgets are not reduced further than now planned. Where they will change is in their quality and capacity to perform new missions. In particular, future U.S. forces will be less dependent upon guaranteed access for overseas bases and infrastructure, and they will be more capable of rapidly deploying to new, austere areas where contingencies might erupt. They also will be more capable of carrying out deterrence, defense, and reassurance missions across the entire Asia-Pacific region, and of gaining access to contested zones against stiff opposition there and in the Middle East. Acquisition of sophisticated SM-3 interceptors will strengthen their capacity to provide widespread missile defense against new threats. Acquisition of better C4ISR systems, more UAS assets, modern fighters and warships, smart munitions, and improved cyber defenses will significantly strengthen the combat capabilities of the Navy and Air Force. Eventually the Air Force will receive a new bomber capable of long-range strike operations. Meanwhile the Army and Marine Corps hopefully will be granted a lengthy period to recover from Iraq and Afghanistan, and to gradually modernize their postures with new weapons, C4ISR systems, and other technologies.

The bottom line is that U.S. military power will increase in an absolute sense: tomorrow's U.S. forces will be more mission-capable than now, and by a wide margin, they will remain the world's best military. Whether their combat power will increase in a relative sense—i.e., relative to the gains of potential adversaries—is a different, more complex matter. Not only is China's military power growing, but other potential adversaries are gaining access to better air defenses, ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, capable naval patrol aircraft, fighter aircraft, ground weapons, and other modern weapons. Future U.S. force operations in Asia and the Middle East promise to be more challenging than now. If U.S. forces are to preserve their superiority in combat against well-armed opponents, they

will need to continue refining their mastery of joint operations in demanding conditions.

NOTES

[1] In 1991–1992, the George H.W. Bush Administration crafted the Two-Major Theater War regional strategy and selected a "Base Force" to support it. When the Clinton Administration took office in 1993, its "Bottom-Up Review" preserved the Two-Major Theater War strategy but slightly downsized the Base Force to achieve the levels cited here.

[2] For analysis of early George W. Bush Administration defense policies, see Hans Binnendijk, ed., *Transforming America's Military* (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2002).

[3] For an analysis of the effects on the U.S. Army, See Raymond T. Odierno, "The U.S. Army in a Time of Transition: Building a Flexible Force," *Foreign Affairs* 93, no. 3 (May/June 2012), 7–11.

[4] Even though NATO had begun contemplating expeditionary operations earlier in the 1990s, the war in Kosovo of 1999 caught the Alliance by surprise, compelling an effort to hastily assemble an air-dominated joint strike force led by the United States. The Libya war of 2011 was less of a shock to Alliance defense plans: NATO was able to promptly assemble an air and naval effort that was led by the Europeans after the initial stages. For analysis of U.S. preparedness and policies for stabilization operations early in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, see Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations* (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2003).

CHAPTER FOUR

SHAPING JOINT FORCE 2020 FOR GLOBALLY INTEGRATED OPERATIONS

Although the DSG and associated budget documents provide broad strategic guidance on the future size and composition of U.S. military forces, they do not offer deep insights on how the Joint Force 2020 is to be guided by new-era approaches to force operations in peace, crisis, and war. The need for strong, new-era operational guidance is imperative because U.S. forces are entering a period of change and innovation as they prepare for new missions and challenges and as they adopt new technologies. Guidance on future concepts and principles is required both to determine how future U.S. forces are to carry out new operations and to determine how future attributes and capabilities are to be pursued through improvement efforts in such multiple areas as joint integration, new weapons, C4ISR systems, information networks, cyber and space systems, doctrine, training, and logistic support. Important steps aimed at providing the necessary operational guidance are provided by two key documents released in 2012: the *Chairman's Strategic Direction to the Joint Force* and the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020*. Whereas the former document provides overarching strategic principles, the latter document puts forth and articulates a new, specific operational concept called *globally integrated operations*.

Issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey in February 2012, the *Chairman's Strategic Direction to the Joint Force* (CSDJF) envisions a future in which the world will remain dangerous, unexpected geopolitical changes can occur, and U.S. military forces will be undergoing an important transition as they leave behind a decade if war, thus requiring a re-examination of the contributions made by military power to national policy. The CSDJF calls for efforts to keep U.S. military forces strong by focusing on four areas:

- Continue to strive to achieve national objectives in current conflicts, including in Afghanistan and against al-Qaeda.
- Work intently on shaping the U.S. military of the future by developing a Joint Force 2020 that can respond effectively anytime, anywhere through a process aimed at offsetting fewer resources with more innovation.
- Confront what the Profession of Arms requires in the aftermath of war by encouraging leaders of consequence throughout the force posture.
- Keep faith with the U.S. Military Family—active, guard, reserve, and veterans—by assigning high priority to their well-being.

In handling current conflicts, the CSDJF calls for efforts to sustain persistent action against al-Qaeda and other violent extremists, transition security responsibility to Afghan National Security Forces, deter aggression by North Korea and Iran, prevent and mitigate the impact of a cyber attack, and expand the envelope of interagency and international cooperation. It also mandates efforts to promote multilateral security approaches and architectures to deter and defeat aggression, and to pursue such other missions as patrolling the global commons, maintaining nuclear deterrence, training partners, and delivering humanitarian goods. In order to remain alert to new threats and challenges, the CSDJF calls for vigilant efforts to out-think and out-adapt adversaries, to improve U.S. force structures and develop new capabilities, and to coordinate U.S. military power with USG diplomacy and development efforts.

In assessing how Joint Force 2020 should be developed, the CSDJF envisions a future in which the act of keeping U.S. military forces as the world's best will need to be carried out in a setting of fiscal constraints that will compel hard choices and selectivity in reconstituting joint forces after a decade of war. A principal challenge, it says, will be getting smaller in order to stay strong while becoming more jointly integrated by advancing interdependence and acquiring new capabilities. Especially because the future security environment will be more competitive than now, the CSDJF calls for a versatile, responsive, and decisive joint force that is also affordable. Creating this force, it says, will

require smart cutbacks, targeted improvements in capabilities, reliance on new specialized assets such as cyber defense, and policies aimed at preserving high readiness by valuing quality over quantity. Furthermore, it judges, DOD must build forces that can be molded to context, are interdependent in ways that enhance capabilities when combined, and are regionally postured but globally networked and flexible in ways that can be scaled and scoped to demand in order to produce successful outcomes. Accordingly, the CSDJF calls for key efforts in the following areas:

- Pioneer new ways to combine and employ emergent capabilities such as cyber, SOF, and ISR while examining organizational and other force development changes to better apply game-changing capabilities.
- Drive jointness deeper and sooner in capability development, operational planning, and leader development while identifying and reducing, but not eliminating, overlapping capabilities among the Services.
- Preserve high readiness by choosing a smaller, well-trained, and well-equipped force over a large force that cannot afford world-class readiness.
- Move quickly toward joint information and simulation networks that support secure and agile command and control.
- Be affordable in every way possible by being demanding stewards of the nation's financial resources.

In calling for a renewed commitment to the profession of arms, the CSDJF proclaims that learning, leadership, and joint teamwork are core attributes that require major emphasis. Accordingly it calls for efforts to learn lessons from the past decade of war, to define essential knowledge and skills for this profession, to promulgate leadership throughout the Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) system, and to recruit people with the attributes needed by the U.S. military. This emphasis on high-quality people is reflected in the CSDJF's treatment of the Military Family. It urges efforts to reform military compensation and benefits in ways that are affordable and improve readiness, to address family needs, to strengthen treatments of mental health issues, to

promote a culture of physical fitness, and to build public awareness of the value and needs of the Military Family.

In addition to the CSDJF, General Dempsey has issued three White Papers that address *Mission Command*, the *Profession of Arms*, and *Joint Education*. These papers address themes contained in the CSDJF, but Mission Command has important implications for determining how future joint operations are to be conducted and therefore merits special attention. The paper defines "mission command" as the conduct of military operations through a process in which commanders use "mission-type" orders to make their intent clear, and then preside over a decentralized execution of actions in which subordinate leaders at all echelons exercise disciplined initiative and act aggressively and independently. This paper anticipates a future in which U.S. joint force operations often will be conducted by small units that are distributed across a wide battle space and perform diverse actions but will still require close coordination and synchronization. Accordingly, it calls for commanders to blend the art of command with the science of control in ways that promote common efforts as well as decentralized operations in order to achieve advantageous tempo, adapt effectively, and make decisions faster and better than can be done by adversaries. It judges that three attributes are necessary in order to rely on mission command approaches: cognitive understanding, clear intent, and binding trust. Arguing that reliance upon mission-type orders will become a common practice for Joint Force 2020, the paper calls for this approach to be inculcated into the DNA of the U.S. military by embracing it in doctrine, training, education, planning, operational art, and force execution.

The *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020* (CCJO 2012) was issued in September 2012. In his foreword to the document, General Dempsey pointed out a strategic paradox. Although the world is trending toward greater stability overall, a disparate range of adversaries are acquiring destructive technologies, thereby making the world more dangerous in important ways and places. New concepts of operations, he said, are needed to address this strategic paradox. In order to provide such a concept, the CCJO 2012 proposes *globally integrated operations*. This concept envisions that when

demands for force application arise, globally postured U.S. joint force elements are to combine quickly with each other and mission partners in order to integrate capabilities fluidly across domains, echelons, geographic boundaries, and organizational affiliations. While acknowledging that this approach remains to be fully developed, General Dempsey said that it aims to leverage the distinct advantages that the U.S. military holds over adversaries so that the United States remains immune from coercion. In employing this concept to build future forces and capabilities, General Dempsey pointed out that about 80 percent of Joint Force 2020 already exists today or is programmed for acquisition. This situation, he said, allows the U.S. military to innovate in two ways: by significantly changing the other 20 percent of the force and by changing the ways in which the entire force is used. While new capabilities are essential, he concluded, many of the most important advances will come through training, education, personnel development, and leadership development.

The CCJO 2012 document devotes its sixteen pages to developing General Dempsey's formulation further. It proclaims that its main purpose is to guide force development toward Joint Force 2020. A capstone concept, it says, provides a higher-order vision of how the future force will operate. While acknowledging that a capstone concept cannot provide highly detailed guidance, it says that such a concept can advance new concepts for joint operations, suggest necessary attributes of the future force, and thereby establish a connecting bridge from the new DSG strategic guidance to subordinate concepts, force development, and follow-on guidance. It further points out that military force will remain only one component of national power, and that in many cases, success will depend upon the capacity of U.S. forces to operate closely with other U.S. Government agencies, allied governments and forces, and nongovernmental partners.

The CCJO 2012 argues that in performing the ten missions identified by the DSG, U.S. military forces will be operating in a global security environment characterized by several persistent, dangerous trends that already are manifest. These trends include WMD proliferation, the rise of competitor states, violent extremism, regional instability, transnational crime, and competition for

resources. Such an environment, CCJO 2012 says, inevitably will give rise to armed conflicts along with opportunities for cooperation and peaceful competition. Moreover, it says, new, emerging trends will influence the future security environment. Among these trends, the diffusion of advanced technologies will mean that middleweight powers and non-state actors will be able to create capabilities once available only to superpowers. In particular, the proliferation of cyber and space weapons, precision munitions, ballistic missiles, A2/AD capabilities, asymmetric operations, and the capacity to fight across multiple domains will grant more adversaries the capacity to inflict devastating losses on opponents, thereby threatening U.S. forces as they deploy to operational areas. Consequently, the CCJO 2012 reasons, U.S. forces may no longer enjoy the advantages over opponents that exist today.

Another key trend, the CCJO 2012 notes, is that digital networks, the worldwide flow of capital and material and the accelerating evolutions of teaching are transforming not only warfare but global politics as well. In this setting, it reasons, the geography of threats and crises will grow more complex, thereby creating threatening transnational dynamics and enhancing the capacity of adversaries to escalate conflicts laterally. In this world, CCJO 2012 reasons, security challenges may not align with existing geographic boundaries or command structures, traditional conventions for waging wars are changing, and the definition of battlefields is mutating. Taken together, these factors mean that the future security environment likely will be more unpredictable, complex, and potentially dangerous than today. A key effect will be to create greater stresses and challenges for U.S. force operations, necessitating greater flexibility in planning, speed in deployments, adaptability on the battlefield, and skill in combat operations against capable opponents. The CCJO 2012 judges that the key operational challenge facing U.S. military forces is this: How will U.S. forces, with constrained resources, protect national interests against increasingly capable enemies in an uncertain, rapidly changing, and increasingly transparent world?

CCJO 2012 answers this question by putting forth and developing the new concept of globally integrated operations. Reflecting General Dempsey's

formulation, it says this concept requires a globally postured joint force that can quickly combine capabilities with itself and mission partners across domains, echelons, geographic boundaries, and organizational affiliations. These networks of forces and partners, it declares, will form, evolve, dissolve, and reform in different ways with significantly greater fluidity than today's posture. The principal aim of this concept, it says, is to accelerate and expand how the joint force musters decisive force. The concept, it further proclaims, envisions the integration of emerging capabilities—especially SOF, cyber, and ISR assets—with new ways of fighting and partnering. The desired effect is to achieve high levels of military effectiveness against future threats.

Globally integrated operations, CCJO 2012 says, are anchored in eight key elements:

1. *The concept requires a commitment to the use of mission command.* By combining clear expression of commanders' intent with decentralized execution, mission command endeavors to empower the capacity of subordinate commanders to use the most effective means at their disposal. A key enabling capability is to be a new generation of digital communications technology that allows distributed senior commanders and subordinate staffs to collaborate as though co-located, thus widening the circle of actors who can support a particular operation and facilitating mutual decision-making, feedback, initiative, adaptation, and mission effectiveness.
2. *The concept aims to provide the ability to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative in time and across domains.* A key goal of this element is to enable U.S. military forces to control the pace of operations and to decide and direct faster than adversaries. This capacity requires efforts to develop leaders that possess the cognitive ability to understand the environment, visualize operational solutions, and provide decisive direction in order to achieve mission success.
3. *The concept is premised upon global agility and aims to enhance such agility.* This element recognizes that all future joint operations will begin with a combination of forward-stationed forces and bases, prepositioned stocks, and home-stationed forces. Based on the premise that future operations will require greater speed than now, it aspires to place

a premium on swift and adaptable responses. It calls for joint forces to use such capabilities as cyber and global strike to bring combat power to bear rapidly. While acknowledging that massed formations will remain an option, it judges that increasingly smaller formations will be selected, and that greater use of prepositioned stocks and expeditionary basing can increase the operational reach of U.S. forces. In addition, it envisions that more nimble command and control will allow resources to be allocated and shifted more fluidly. The result, it postulates, will be a more agile capability of joint forces to aggregate, reconfigure, and disaggregate than now.

4. *The concept places a premium on partnering.* This element requires U.S. military forces to be capable of working closely with other U.S. Government agencies, partner militaries, and indigenous and regional stakeholders. Such integration, it judges, must be scalable, ranging from individual units to multinational coalition operations. The concept thus is favorably inclined to making full use of existing multilateral alliances while expanding the size, scope, and useful of new partnerships in multiple regions.

5. *The concept provides for more flexibility in how joint forces are established and employed.* This element asserts that although the traditional practice of establishing joint forces on a geographic or functional basis will continue to play an important role, hybrid command arrangements will often be employed in order to provide greater flexibility in how forces perform their missions. For example, future joint forces might be organized around specific security challenges or missions. This might be done globally—e.g. SOCOM synchronizing counterterrorism missions—or on a tailored basis: a joint task force operating across multiple non-contiguous geographic areas to counter a specific threat. This element further asserts that the imperative for lateral coordination will be a distinguishing feature of such hybrid arrangements. This will especially be the case, for example, in situations where two commanders are operating in geographic proximity performing interacting missions, thus necessitating both of them to be mutually supporting. This element argues that the functional need for lateral coordination and the associated idea of mutually supporting commands is one of the most important insights of CCJO 2012.

6. *The concept mandates that future joint forces must strive for better integration and associated leverage in order to improve cross-domain synergy.* This element asserts that the capacity of U.S. forces to project power across multiple domains (e.g., air defense and strike domains) plays a major role in their advantages over adversaries. Accordingly it calls for increased efforts to ensure that operations in multiple domains not only have additive effects, but are also complementary. It further notes that emerging capabilities and doctrine will make such synergy possible at increasingly lower echelons. Future joint forces, it says, should be positioned to exploit even small advantages in one domain in order to create or increase advantages in others, thus compounding mutually reinforcing advantages until the enemy is overwhelmed.
7. *The concept calls for flexible low-signature or small-footprint capabilities—such as cyberspace, space, special operations, global strike, and ISR—to play more pronounced roles in future joint operations.* This element asserts that these capabilities represent unique sources of U.S. military advantages over adversaries, but they often have been viewed as adjuncts rather than integral parts of joint operations. Accordingly this element calls for their fuller integration into operations: an example is the manner in which SOF have been integrated with general purpose forces. It judges that improvements to these capabilities can greatly increase the effectiveness of other forces and capabilities. In addition, such capabilities add to U.S. strategic flexibility and global responsiveness, are rapidly deployable, have relatively low logistic support requirements, have operational reach, can be persistent, and do not always require policy commitments. The implication is that as these assets are improved and better integrated into joint forces and operations, the combat power of the U.S. military can grow significantly.
8. *The concept states that future joint operations will increasingly strive for discrimination in targeting and related operations in order to minimize unintended consequences.* This element asserts that the increased transparency of the future security environment, with digital devices everywhere, heightens the need for military force to be used precisely when possible. Military force, it says, may still need to be employed overwhelmingly and broadly, but its effects must be limited as much as possible to the intended targets. This dictum applies most obviously

to military fires, where even minor lapses can damage the international reputation of the United States, but it also applies to maneuver and information operations.

CCJO 2012 judges that the act of applying these eight elements together will help improve U.S. force capabilities in multiple ways. They will strengthen the U.S. capacity to operate at high tempo, to adapt effectively, to tailor forces to specific situations, to scale military force applications, to promote decentralization, to enhance situational awareness and cognitive understanding, and to enable commanders to cope with uncertainty, complexity, and rapid change. An overall effect will be to enhance U.S. operational advantages over future adversaries that themselves will be well-armed and otherwise hard to defeat. By applying them, U.S. forces can emerge qualitatively stronger in important, potentially decisive ways.

What are the implications of globally integrated operations for strengthening U.S. military capabilities as Joint Force 2020 is pursued? What concrete improvements should be sought? CCJO 2012 answers these questions by tabling a lengthy list of potential improvements in seven different areas that together yield 23 specific initiatives.

Command and Control:

- *Use joint professional military education to realize mission command in joint operations*—especially by ensuring that differences among the services are overcome in order to create a common understanding of varying manifestations and how they may be harmonized.
- *Develop portable, cloud-enabled command and control technologies for commanders and their staffs*—especially by acquiring new platforms and cloud services that can untether commanders from their command centers while improving their situational awareness and cognitive understanding.
- *Enhance our ability to operate effectively in a degraded environment*—especially by building greater resilience in technical architectures so that command and control systems can operate in the face of enemy efforts to degrade them through attacks on cyber and space systems.

- *Explore how the notion of mutually supporting commands can help construct command relationships tailored to specific future threats*—especially by beginning now to experiment with hybrid command architectures.
- *Become pervasively interoperable both internally and externally*—because interoperability is the critical attribute that will provide synergy from integrated operations, it must become widespread and exist across all services and echelons.
- *Maintain and enhance the integration of general purpose forces and special operating forces*—a key to achieving synergy that enables joint forces to dominate adversaries.

Intelligence:

- *Develop analytic capabilities and tradecraft that correspond with the wider array of threats and contexts in which they will occur*—especially by creating technical and cultural expertise can be directly aid decisionmakers.
- *Improve capabilities that better fuse, analyze, and exploit large data sets*—especially by achieving advances in machine learning, automated processing, and machine-analyst interactions that help improve the capacity to mine large data sets to serve operational needs.

Fires:

- *Provide a fire support coordination capability that integrates all fires, including cy*ber—especially by ensuring that all available fires, including niche capabilities, are available to all joint force commanders.
- *Improve capabilities to defeat anti-access and area-denial threats*—developing mature joint fires to defeat these threats is a priority.

Movement and Maneuver:

- *Become rapidly deployable on a global scale*—especially by using a combination of low-signature, low-footprint capabilities such as

cyber and global strike, smartly positioned forces prepared for a variety of missions, and swift deployment of massed forces from distant locations.

- *Develop deep regional expertise*—by maintaining trained personnel with political and cultural knowledge and calibrating the posture of U.S. forces to the particular security environment of individual regions.
- *Improve strategic and operational mobility*—by using prepositioned equipment, strengthening airlift and sealift, and seeking the most cost-effective mix of assets.
- *Improve tactical maneuver*—especially by using training in order to affordably increase the capacity of ground forces to maneuver over distance.
- *Synchronize global distribution*—by ensuring the availability of adequate transportation assets and the ability to quickly open sea ports and air bases near operational locations.
- *Standardize tactics, techniques, and procedures across combatant commands to facilitate the shifting of forces*—use training and exercises to help produce standardization and lessen differences among commands.

Protection:

- *Improve cyber defense capabilities*—enhance the capacity to defend key systems and ensure network continuity in the face of disruptions.
- *Continue to improve defensive space capabilities*—including defensive space control and space situational awareness capabilities.
- *Integrate missile defense systems*—integrating existing capabilities into a comprehensive defense system will be as important as developing new capabilities.

Sustainment:

- *Continue to develop and implement the Joint Logistics Enterprise*—by enhancing enterprise-wide visibility for logistics processes, resources, and requirements.

- *Reduce operational energy requirements and develop operationally viable alternative energy sources*—including by reducing demands for liquid fuel.

Partnership Strategies:

- *Identify those agencies with which joint forces will work most often and develop common coordinating procedures and interoperability standards*—continue to refine and strengthen progress made in recent years.
- *Field a mission-partner information environment to facilitate integration with various external partners*—because the U.S. joint force will possess a more sophisticated command and control system than virtually any partner, it is responsible for creating the information systems that will facilitate partner integration, including the capacity to collaborate across multiple security levels without segregated hardware systems.

What are the barriers and risks to adopting and implementing the new operational concept? CCJO 2012 cites seven of them:

- *The communications required by this concept may be unavailable*—The greatest risk to a highly-networked U.S. joint force is that robust, global communications may not be available because of enemy operations, budgetary shortfalls, technological failures, or operational friction. Redundancy and diversity can help lessen this risk, but in the extreme, elements of the joint force might have to operate autonomously.
- *Partners may be unable or unwilling to integrate*—When this occurs, the utility of the concept will decline if operational success is highly dependent upon partner contributions.
- *An overemphasis on decentralization may lead to lack of coordination and inefficient use of scarce resources*—Decentralization implies reliance upon smaller units of action to accomplish more limited objectives. If taken too far and implemented unwisely, the result could be ineffective operational performance as well as an inadequate or unaffordable force structure. The solution is to strike an optimal balance between centralization and decentralization.

- *The armed forces may fail to achieve the required level of global agility*—The new concept asserts that smaller joint forces than now can meet their global requirements through increased agility. Whether this will be the case will depend upon several factors, including the deployability of the forces and their strategic lift. To the extent shortfalls arise, Joint Force 2020 will be less capable of executing the concept.
- *Standardization may lead to decreased diversity, flexibility, versatility, and ultimately, effectiveness*—Standardization offers increased interoperability, but if taken too far to the point of extensive homogeneity, it could weaken the core goal of using jointness to achieve the complementary employment of diverse capabilities.
- *Elimination of redundancies may lead to operational brittleness and risk*—Whereas some redundancies are merely inefficient, others provide alternative means to accomplish objectives. Elimination of productive redundancies could make the joint force more easily disrupted and less resilient against capable adversaries.
- *The emphasis on organizational flexibility may limit operational effectiveness*—The new concept requires greater flexibility: the ability of practically any unit to integrate with practically any other unit. Effective integration requires familiarity, trust, teamwork that comes from repeated joint training, and the precise combination of specialized skills. Shortfalls in these areas can reduce flexibility. In the process of pursuing such flexibility, moreover, forces must not enhance their modularity at the expense of their mission effectiveness.

CCJO 2012 ends its narrative by declaring that the new concept of globally integrated operations offers an attractive way to build Joint Force 2020 and thereby protect U.S. security interests by enhancing the capacity of joint forces to combine and recombine in fluid, flexible, and responsive ways. Pursuing this capacity, CCJO 2012 says, requires an emphasis on mission command, the ability to seize the initiative, global agility, flexibility for establishing tailored joint forces, cross-domain synergy at low echelons, and more pronounced roles for cyberspace, space, SOF, global strike, and global ISR, as well as a better capacity to minimize unintended consequences. To what extent will this agenda

mandate changes to U.S. military forces, their structures, and their operations? CCJO 2012 judges that although the current force already poses some of the necessary characteristics, the institutional implications of the new concept are potentially dramatic and far-reaching. The challenge facing the U.S. military, it concludes, is one of studying this new concept, assessing its validity, and determining what it might achieve for Joint Force 2020.

How can the CSDJF and the CCJO 2012 be appraised? Although they were issued nine months apart, they should be viewed in tandem. Together they do an excellent job of providing future-oriented operational guidance that helps bridge the wide gap between the DSG and concrete decisions about force structures, budget priorities, and improvement efforts aimed at building the Joint Force 2020. In particular, they chart a future course in which the joint posture will be transitioning to new missions and must develop improved capabilities, but will face a lengthy period of smaller forces and constrained investment spending. In order to deal with this challenging situation, they call for systematic efforts to enhance the quality of U.S. military forces by improving how they operate together and by targeting specific, high-leverage, and accompanying ways in which better, affordable capabilities can be acquired. The two documents postulate that if U.S. military forces can pursue this innovative agenda in ways that strengthen their ability to perform demanding force operations, they can preserve superiority over future threats and successfully carry out the wide variety of missions at their doorstep.

In determining the ways in which the Joint Force 2020 should be pursued, the CSDJF sets the stage by calling for deeper jointness, high readiness, sophisticated information networks, and acquisition of new capabilities in such areas as cyber, SOF, and ISR. In turn, the CCJO 2012's new operational concept of globally integrated operations calls for an emphasis on mission command and decentralization, flexible creation of responsive force packages in varying combinations, fast deployments and associated agility, close cooperation among combatant commands, seizing the initiative, enhanced joint integration and interoperability that creates cross-domain synergy, use of low-signature and small-footprint assets, partnering with allies and friends, and discriminating

operations. None of these initiatives speak of glittering new weapon systems and expensive modernization programs. They acknowledge that in basic size, composition, and other outward appearances, Joint Force 2020 will resemble today's posture in many ways. But they also hold out the promise that by improving in these multiple areas of high-quality operational performance, Joint Force 2020 can perform significantly better than today's posture and thereby pack comparably greater military punch.

Both documents claim to offer initial insights on a complex subject, not the final word. As such, they leave some subjects in need of further analysis. For example, the CCJO 2012's important idea that Joint Force 2020 will be 80 percent similar to today's posture and 20 percent different does not provide insightful analysis of exactly how this new 20 percent is to take shape and how it will affect the other 80 percent. Likewise, CCJO 2012 provides in-depth analysis of many operational issues, but it provides little material on how U.S. military firepower and lethality is to be strengthened beyond improving capabilities for suppressing A2/AD threats. Nor does CCJO 2012 assess in any detail how the act of acquiring some new weapon systems—e.g., many F-35 fighters—will strengthen operational fires and lethality. Nor does it provide much analysis on the critical subject of how ground, air, and naval forces are to operate closely together once they have been jointly integrated in the envisioned ways. In addition, CCJO 2012 speaks mostly in terms of general operating principles and does not illuminate how these principles are to be applied differently to different missions. For example, such diverse missions as major regional war-fighting, limited high-tech strike operations, and temporary stability operations are likely to be different from each other in ways requiring different operating concepts in both deployment and employment practices. CCJO 2012 leaves this important subject to subordinate Joint Operating Concepts, such as the new JOAC, which is discussed below.

Now that this new operational concept has been adopted, a full implementation strategy must be created to guide how it is pursued in shaping Joint Force 2020. Because the concept's implications and consequences are so widespread and sweeping, such an implementation strategy must be comprehensive. It should

stretch across the entire force posture, and penetrate from top to bottom in ways that affect all services and commands, as well as constituent combat forces and training regimens, C4ISR assets, logistic support, doctrinal development, and manpower policies. An implementation strategy should be equipped with appropriate goals, requirements, targets, programs, budgets, timelines, and benchmarks in ways showing how concrete changes and innovations are to be phased and coordinated over the coming years, thus providing a clear picture of how Joint Force 2020 is to evolve in stages and how all critical phases are to unfold in a coordinated manner. A key bottom line is that the new operational strategy will be effective only to the extent that it is embraced and put into practice by the U.S. military. Because a marginal adoption of the concept will not be enough, a major embracing of it should be the principal aim.

In summary, three important questions arise from these documents. Does the operational agenda put forth by these documents make strategic and military sense: does it accurately capture how Joint Force 2020 should be pursued in the years ahead? If this agenda is successfully pursued, will the resulting joint force be able to fulfill the promise of being able to perform better in militarily decisive ways against well-armed adversaries? Is this agenda fully feasible: can it be carried out to completion in light of the many barriers and roadblocks that are likely to be encountered—not only fiscal but also organizational and doctrinal?

The first question doubtless merits an affirmative answer even though the new operational concept is still in the early stages of its development. As the concept evolves and grows, it likely will gain in attractiveness and impact. It thus seems to have strong legs and good staying power. The second question merits a qualified yes. Future U.S. forces doubtless will be qualitatively better than now, but whether they will be able to decisively triumph over all capable opponents is an uncertainty that can be resolved only when the future becomes better known. What can be said is that future U.S. forces will be able to perform far better if they possess these new operational characteristics in strong doses than if they fail to develop them. This much is certain.

The third question merits a guarded appraisal. The coming quality-improvement agenda facing the U.S. military is both demanding and complex. The act of assembling unique force combinations, deploying swiftly, harmonizing commands, operating jointly, and achieving cross-domain synergy may sound conceptually straightforward, but it is far from easy for both large and small operations. The task of preparing U.S. forces to carry out this new, ambitious approach will require strong ongoing efforts to leap over a lengthy set of high hurdles along the way. Perhaps complete success is too much to expect or even hope for. But if only partial but significant success proves possible, this alone seems enough to justify the effort. After all, what else is the U.S. military to do in an era when the strategic demands facing it will be multiplying but its resources will not be growing? As a practical matter, it must turn to improving its capacity to skillfully execute sophisticated operations in order to remain strong enough to carry out the global security business.

CHAPTER FIVE

PREPARING TO COUNTER ANTI-ACCESS/AREA-DENIAL THREATS

The CCJO provides a general, overarching framework for preparing subordinate documents called Joint Operating Concepts, which are written by the Joint Staff in concert with the combatant commands and services. Such JOCs areas address areas such as deterrence, irregular warfare, and homeland defense. The newest of these JOCs is the *Joint Operational Access Concept* (JOAC), which has special importance because it provides a valuable instrument for determining how to implement the DSG and charts a path toward new, different types of combat operations by U.S. forces.

The JOAC puts forth a new war-fighting concept intended to enable U.S. military forces to gain forcible entry and assured operational access in distant crises and wars in the face of serious adversary opposition aimed at denying them this access. It is a doctrine for gaining assured, powerful access to war-fighting zones anchored in the premise that once such access is gained, decisive U.S. combat operations aimed at success can be launched. It does not mandate superiority everywhere in a particular war zone, but it does require local superiority in domains and locations that are critical for subsequent defensive and offensive operations.

The JOAC's focus on gaining assured access marks an historic and strategic departure for U.S. defense planning, one that has both military and geopolitical implications when seen in the context of DOD's enhanced emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region and the other changes that will be made to forces and budgets. For the past two decades, the United States has faced major threats in such vital regions as Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf, but almost always it has enjoyed ready access to the locations in which wars might erupt. Indeed, the United States has benefitted from peacetime-deployed forces, bases, and infrastructure in all three regions, plus the capacity to deploy large

reinforcements swiftly, free from major enemy efforts to interdict them. The JOAC responds to a future in which these comfortable conditions seem likely to change for the worse both because large U.S. military assets may not be based near the focal points of conflicts and because future enemies seem likely to launch A2/AD campaigns aimed at opposing U.S. entry into the fight.

The JOAC thus no longer takes U.S. military superiority for granted. It anticipates a future in which war will once again become a two-sided affair in which fighting is conducted at long-distances not just close quarters, and the outcome is in doubt and will be determined by which side employs its military forces to best advantage. In JOAC's eyes, the term "anti-access" means an enemy campaign, normally conducted at long distances, aimed at preventing U.S. forces from entering an operational area. "Area-denial" refers to an enemy campaign, normally conducted across short distances, aimed at preventing U.S. forces from operating effectively once they have arrived. Together, the two terms spell trouble because future enemies could combine both types of campaigns to damage the capacity of U.S. forces to wage the types of assertive, effective wars needed to gain victory. Such threats have not been confronted recently, but the United States faced them during World War II in the Pacific and Atlantic, where very large U.S. forces were needed to gain access and ascendancy. In addition, throughout the Cold War in Europe the United States faced the prospect of an intense Soviet military effort designed to prevent U.S. reinforcement of NATO during a war. The JOAC envisions this type of stiff opposition as re-emerging because of three interacting trends:

- Future possible enemies (e.g., China and Iran) seem poised to acquire significantly improved capabilities for anti-access campaigns in such areas as ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, long-range reconnaissance and surveillance systems, kinetic and non-kinetic anti-satellite systems, submarines capable of long-range operations, cyber attack capabilities, and terrorists willing to attack U.S. forces, bases, and even debarkation ports. Likewise, their capacity to conduct area-denial campaigns seems destined to improve in such areas as improved air forces and air-defense systems, short-range missiles and submarines, precision-guided munitions, chemical and biological weapons, computer and electronic attack

assets, abundant land and naval mines, armed small boats and craft, land maneuver forces, SOF assets, and UAS capabilities.

- The future U.S. overseas defense posture likely will face significant constraints owing to a lack of forces stationed near crisis spots, decreased political support abroad for an extensive network of U.S. bases around the globe, shrinking U.S. military deployments abroad and resource constraints, and difficulties in protecting forward bases and installations. Often U.S. forces may be compelled to operate in austere settings that provide few bases, little infrastructure, and no pre-stationed combat forces.
- Space and cyberspace are emerging as increasingly important and contested domains, thus enabling potential adversaries to damage U.S. C4ISR systems, information networks, and the capacity for sophisticated joint force operations.

Owing to these trends, the JOAC reasons that future adversaries are likely to see advantage in both focusing their military improvement efforts in this arena and launching ambitious A2/AD campaigns in event of war with the United States. Unless countered, the degrading effects on U.S. force operations could be major. For example, there is a great deal of difference between a war with China in which U.S. forces enjoy unfettered access to Western Pacific sea lanes and airspace, and one in which China conducts not only aggressive local defense efforts aimed at denying this access but also tries to interfere with the flow of U.S. forces and supplies from CONUS. Likewise, waging war against a passive Iran is one thing; waging war against an Iran employing modern, lethal weapons aimed at attacking nearby U.S. forces and bases as well as supply lines is something else. Perhaps current U.S. forces could prevail in the face of such determined future opposition, but at high costs in casualties and equipment, and, in the worst of circumstances, they might not be able to prevail at all.

In order to organize U.S. efforts to counter such opposition, the JOAC puts forth the concept of "cross-domain synergy," which means employing joint forces and assets not only in additive ways, but also in complementary ways aimed at enhancing the capabilities of each force element and reducing their vulnerabilities,

thus enabling U.S. forces to gain access to the battle space and operate effectively within it. Whereas the term "synergy" refers to a dynamic in which the whole of force operations is greater than the sum of its parts, "cross-domain" refers to operations in which different force elements and their domains not only work closely together, but also exchange goods and services for the mutual enhancement of all. An example of cross-domain synergy, the JOAC says, is the emerging Air-Sea Battle concept that aims to blend air and naval forces together in order to protect both better while defeating enemy opposition. For example, Air Force aircraft can provide air defense protection of combat ships and cargo vessels, and deployed U.S. carriers can provide the air defense coverage that enables Air Force forces to deploy into contested zones. Similarly, air and sea forces can provide the protection that enables U.S. land forces to deploy swiftly and in adequate size, thereby better protecting air and naval forces. The entire joint effort is to be guided, coordinated, and blended by advanced C4ISR systems, information networks, UAS, cyber assets, and space assets working together.

Cross-domain synergy, judges JOAC, will require deeper force integration and closer multi-service cooperation plus more use of cyber and space assets than ever before. The attraction is that it can enable U.S. joint forces to accelerate the tempo of battle, suppress enemy opposition, and gain success more quickly, decisively, and easier than otherwise would be the case. In essence, the JOAC reasons that while the emerging A2/AD threat is serious, it can be overcome through the close fusion of joint forces collaborating closely together. The last time that such a fused wartime campaign was waged was during the U.S. offensive drive across the Pacific toward Japan in World War II, an effort that required the close blending of naval, air, ground, and logistic support forces in ever-shifting ways that suppressed Japanese short-distance and long-distance opposition.[1] The Normandy invasion in Europe, of course, falls into the same category. The JOAC provides a modern, higher-tempo, advanced technology version of this creative joint thinking. It can be applied to all wars and, in the most demanding wars, it has the theoretical capacity to spell the difference between victory and defeat, but it requires U.S. joint forces that can operate differently and better than now.

In ways that reflect the CCJO, the JOAC puts forth eleven general principles for guiding how future joint forces can gain assured operational access against armed opposition:

1. *Conduct operations to gain access based on the requirements of the broader mission, while also designing subsequent operations to lessen access challenges.* This principle asserts that gaining access is not an end in itself, but rather a means to allow U.S. forces to pursue broader objectives and missions. It argues in favor of decisive access operations, but cautions against attacking into the teeth of enemy A2/AD capabilities, projecting power deeper into enemy territory than is necessary, and carrying out unwarranted escalation.
2. *Prepare the operational area in advance to facilitate access.* This principle argues in favor of assured access efforts that begin long before war erupts. It recommends U.S. efforts to establish forward bases and prepositioned equipment, continuous surveillance of adversary force-improvement efforts, and collaborate closely with allies and friends to strengthen the capacity of their forces to contribute to assured access campaigns.
3. *Consider a variety of basing options*. This principle recognizes the importance of forward bases and infrastructure whenever possible, but also acknowledges that such assets will be principal targets of enemy military strikes. In order to lessen this vulnerability, it recommends a combination of five steps: protect and harden permanent bases, disaggregate large bases into a larger number of smaller dispersed bases, employ austere temporary bases, employ mobile seabasing, and when feasible, emphasize capabilities with minimal dependence on forward bases, such as long-range strike, amphibious forces, cyber, electronic, and space assets in either primary or support roles.
4. *Seize the initiative by deploying and operating on multiple, independent lines of operation.* Seizing the initiative is a classical principle of warfare. Doing so in the modern era, the JOAC says, can be carried out by U.S. forces that employ complex operations and multiple avenues of advance at high tempo in ways that overload the enemy's ability to cope. Moreover, such practices can increase friendly employment options while forcing the enemy to defend multiple avenues of approach, and they

can enable U.S. forces to exploit unforeseen opportunities and overcome setbacks. Pursuing this principle, the JOAC reasons, will often require U.S. forces, including land forces, to organize tactically into tailored joint formations that can deploy, operate, and survive autonomously in dispersed ways, and that can swiftly transition from access operations into major combat operations. Such dispersed forces, the JOAC says, must be able to maneuver independently while maintaining the capacity to concentrate smoothly into larger formations when necessary.

5. *Exploit advantages in one or more domains to disrupt or destroy enemy anti-access/area-denial capabilities in others.* This principle argues in favor of using U.S. domain advantages to exploit mismatches, apply relative strength against weakness, and employ multiple domain strengths in coordinated ways in order to enlarge U.S. advantages in all relevant areas. The JOAC acknowledges that while there is no universal sequence for guiding U.S. operations, joint force projection and forcible entry almost always will include early information operations as well as operations in space and cyberspace. Accompanying such operations, the JOAC says, should be use of low-signature forces that can penetrate and destroy enemy A2/AD defenses. Such forces include submarines firing cruise missiles and sinking enemy combat vessels, air strikes by long-range bombers and tactical fighters/UAS using precision-guided munitions, and SOF forces for striking vulnerable targets. The JOAC reasons that large land forces normally will be the last to penetrate within range of enemy defenses, but small forces might be employed earlier to attack specific targets. Afterward, the JOAC judges, the assured access campaign can be steadily expanded in whatever ways that are mandated by the situation at hand. It envisions air power as a likely domain for major expansion, but judges that deployment of large surface naval formations and large land forces will require operational superiority in both domains in order to prevent catastrophic losses.

6. *Disrupt enemy reconnaissance and surveillance efforts while protecting friendly efforts.* This principle notes that the reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance fight will be critical to contests over U.S. efforts to gain assured access as each side strives to gain situational awareness in a

setting where the adversary may enjoy the initial advantage as a result of sophisticated capabilities that may be located in concealed locations. Accordingly, it calls for a dual effort in which U.S. forces strive to defend against enemy attacks on their own ISR assets while mounting a major intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance campaign aimed at gathering actionable information on enemy forces and dispositions.

7. *Create pockets or corridors of local domain superiority to penetrate the enemy's defenses and maintain them as required to accomplish the mission*. This principle judges that U.S. forces likely will not need to gain superiority throughout a war zone, but they will need to gain local superiority in domains and locations in order to gain and maintain the access required to mount combat operations. Accordingly, it calls upon U.S. joint forces to manage the fluid opening and closing of access corridors over time and space as needed, while denying them to the enemy.

8. *Maneuver directly against key operational objectives from strategic distance.* This principle observes that some elements of the U.S. joint force will be able to operate against key targets and objectives from points outside the theater and without forward staging. Examples include strategic bombers and submarines carrying cruise missiles that can strike targets from long distances. Use of such assets, the JOAC reasons, is desirable because they do not require fixed forward bases and can provide considerable operational flexibility and complicate enemy defensive efforts. Long-distance strike operations, moreover, can help open access corridors that, when necessary, allow short-range forces to deploy to forward positions from which they can operate.

9. *Attack enemy anti-access/area-denial defenses in depth rather than rolling back those defenses from the perimeter.* This principle argues against the traditional practice of initially attacking the outer perimeter of an enemy's defenses and then gradually pushing them backward as the U.S. advance unfolds. In the modern-era, the JOAC argues, such a roll-back offensive would merely compress enemy defenses while not threatening their integrity, and in some situations may operate to the enemy's advantage by allowing its forces to trade space and time in order to inflict casualties on U.S. forces. Accordingly, this principle calls for concerted U.S. efforts to strike enemy defenses in depth from

the onset in order to damage their integrity by weakening command and control nodes, long-range firing units, operational reserves, and logistic support.

10. *Maximize surprise through deception, stealth, and ambiguity to complicate enemy targeting*. This principle argues that surprising the enemy can be critical to U.S. assured access campaigns, but may be hard to achieve against an enemy equipped with pervasive sensors and information networks. Accordingly it calls for a combination of three surprise-enhancing measures: deception aimed at convincing the enemy that U.S. forces will operate differently than planned; stealth that tries to deny the enemy information about U.S. capabilities and intentions; and ambiguity by operating in ways that support multiple courses of action and therefore compel the enemy to prepare for all of them
11. *Protect space and cyber assets while attacking the enemy's space and cyber capabilities*. Noting that control of space and cyberspace will be critical to U.S. assured access campaigns, this principle calls for concerted efforts to protect U.S. assets in both domains from enemy efforts to degrade them, such as cyber attacks on U.S. information networks and attacks on U.S. satellites and their data-transmission capabilities. Likewise, this principle calls for aggressive U.S. offensive efforts to attack, degrade, and disrupt enemy cyber assets, satellites in space, as well as other electromagnetic assets.

In order to carry out these demanding principles of assured access campaigns, the JOAC calls for sophisticated capabilities and concerted improvement efforts in six domain areas:

1. *Command and Control*. The JOAC acknowledges that assured access campaigns against well-armed opposition will place a heavy burden on the U.S. command and control system. This system, it reports, will need to support forces operating at global distances, deploying and maneuvering independently along multiple lines from multiple points of origin, and concentrating fluidly as required. In addition, it must support a high operating tempo that the enemy cannot match and

facilitate joint force integration across multiple domains simultaneously and at lower echelons. Accordingly, the JOAC judges, the joint command and control system will need to include sophisticated techniques, procedures, and technologies that provide capability-enhancing innovations. Moreover, the JOAC reasons that in order to support high-tempo distributed operations in degraded environments, the system will need to employ decentralized command and control practices in both planning and execution. Such decentralization, it judges, can be facilitated by relying more heavily upon mission command practices that enable subordinate commanders to act independently in consonance with the intent of higher commanders.

2. *Intelligence.* The JOAC argues that because of the effectiveness of enemy A2/AD systems, the U.S. joint force will require the ability to collect, fuse, and share accurate, timely, and detailed intelligence information about them, and often to share this information with allies, partners, and other U.S. agencies. This agenda, the JOAC reasons, will require a re-examination of current classification, access, and data sharing protocols, as well as continuing improvements to all-source reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities.

3. *Fires.* Assured access campaigns, the JOAC states, will require lethal and non-lethal fires (including cyber attacks) that are timely, accurate, flexible, and responsive. The JOAC argues that because current capabilities are not adequately flexible and responsive, a qualitative improvement in them is needed, especially in procedures for making fire support allocations and acquiring targets rapidly and accurately. Joint forces, the JOAC further reasons, must be able to concentrate or distribute fires quickly and effectively, and this capacity will require access to them by elements maneuvering independently. In addition, the JOAC argues, care must be taken in using precision-guided munitions in areas where inventories may not be as large as desirable. Finally, it judges that control of cyber fires and space operations may need to be devolved to field commanders rather than handled by commands in CONUS.

4. *Movement and Maneuver.* The JOAC asserts that assured access operations will require fluid, adaptive maneuvers by joint forces as they move to a war zone, operate within it, and withdraw. Such maneuvers

will require naval, air, and land forces to perform simultaneous and complementary movements as they advance in ways that make use of deception, stealth, and ambiguity. All of these maneuvers, the JOAC reasons, will place substantial demands on command and control systems and put an enhanced premium on en-route communications.

5. *Protection.* The JOAC judges that protecting the joint force will be critical since most enemy A2/AD strategies will rely upon attrition. The JOAC calls for traditional active and passive measures as well as efforts to minimize the exposure time of U.S. forces as they advance, protection of command and control systems (a likely target for attack), protection of logistic support assets and missile defenses, and protection against sabotage.
6. *Sustainment.* Noting that power projection operations place great demands on logistic support assets especially for distributed operations, the JOAC envisions no breakthrough advancement that will greatly alter the sustainment challenge. Instead it calls for incremental efficiencies in three areas: decreasing the logistical appetites of combat forces especially for fossil fuels, improving supply chain management in ways that better address the interaction between expenditure rates and inventory levels, and improving the capacities of U.S. military airlift and sealift.

Can this new JOAC concept be effectively carried out in the years ahead? The JOAC document expresses guarded optimism, but it also identifies risks that could arise to damage progress:

1. The most serious risk is that U.S. joint forces may fail to achieve the synergy that is essential to the concept.
2. Joint forces may not be able to achieve the necessary coordination required to apply combat power effectively across domains, again negating the concept's central premise.
3. The concept's emphasis on cross-domain combat power could be misread by resource-allocators to suggest significantly less need for organic self-sufficiency.

4. The concept's conditional preference for disruption could produce an over-emphasis in this arena in search of precise disruption mechanisms even when they do not exist.
5. The concept's reliance on deep, precise strikes to neutralize enemy A2/AD weapons may be unrealistic in their emphasis on short time frames and quick results.
6. The concept could be logistically unsupportable.
7. The concept could be economically unsupportable in an era of constrained defense budgets.
8. Current national policy may not support the concept's operational requirements, such as deep strikes into enemy territory plus cyber and space attacks.
9. Gaining and maintaining operational access in the face of armed resistance is inherently fraught with risk.

What are the implications and consequences of the JOAC? Beyond question, it spotlights an emerging challenge that could threaten the wartime use of U.S. military power in both the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East. If this challenge is not addressed, U.S. forces will experience a decline in their wartime effectiveness as well as their ability to attain such peacetime goals as deterring adversaries, reassuring allies and friends, maintaining stable regional balances of power, and preserving U.S. political influence at high levels. The JOAC puts forth a compelling intellectual framework for addressing this strategic challenge. In the absence of larger forces and bigger defense budgets, its central concept of cross-domain synergy provides a sound approach to maximizing the performance of the joint forces and resources that will exist, and its eleven principles provide an agenda not only for mounting assured access campaigns, but also for improving U.S. forces in high-leverage ways. Its emphasis on using sophisticated C4ISR systems, timely and accurate intelligence, space systems, and cyber defenses to help joint forces achieving operational dominance over adversaries is well-conceived—for both access campaigns and follow-on combat operations.

If the JOAC suffers from a drawback, it fails to articulate precisely where and to what extent U.S. forces need strengthening in order to carry out fully its version of assured access campaigns. Its program and budget implications are unclear, but its clarion call for improved joint access capabilities seemingly suggests that while efforts to fuse existing forces better will be critical, additional programs and technologies could be needed in several areas. Pursuing the JOAC thus will likely not be a free lunch, but instead will wear a dollar sign. Another key issue is whether, and to what degree, the JOAC can be implemented effectively in ways that induce the U.S. military services to produce better joint access capabilities while not unduly intensifying geopolitical and military competition with China and other potential adversaries. As the JOAC document points out, the need fully to pursue this agenda seems compelling, but significant constraints, including political controversies, could stand in the way. Only time will tell, but a demanding implementation agenda seemingly lies ahead, and the efforts exerted by DOD will be a critical factor in the equation determining success or failure. A coherent, purposeful implementation plan is needed, one that matches goals to actions and that puts forth a full framework of plans, programs, budgets, and associated activities aimed at unfolding in a coordinated manner over the near-term, mid-term, and long-term. The principal aim should be a steady building of assured access capabilities for the Joint Force 2020 in timely ways that keep ahead of adversary A2/AD improvements.

A strategic bottom line of the JOAC is that although future adversaries seem likely to pose major A2/AD challenges in the future, the United States does not need to abandon the importance it attaches to the forward defense of key allies and vital geographic zones, or otherwise engage in retrenchment. But in order to maintain forward access, the U.S. military will need to upgrade its capacity significantly to employ joint operations, new doctrines, and new systems in order to win the contest against future threats of the sort that China, Iran, and other adversaries could pose. Whether it will be able to do so is to be seen. What can be said now is that the competitive interaction between adversary actions and countervailing U.S. military reactions in this arena likely will

determine one of the world's central, most important, military dynamics in the years and decades ahead.

NOTE

[1] For analysis, see John Costello, *The Pacific War 1941–1945* (New York: Quill, 1982).

CHAPTER SIX

BUILDING COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIPS WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS, AND STRENGTHENING NATO

Secretary of Defense Panetta's landmark speech in June 2012, "Building Partnerships in the 21st Century," has introduced a fresh, visionary dimension to the new U.S. national security strategy and defense plans. Pointing out that the bulk of future U.S. overseas defense operations will be multilateral because they will involve U.S. forces working closely with the forces of allies and partners, Panetta called for a major increase in efforts to build an improved global web of defense partnerships that can be drawn upon to help perform future missions. Panetta called for DOD-wide initiatives in three broad areas:

- Efforts to make sure that the U.S. military develops improved partnership relations that provide comprehensive and integrated capabilities in key regions.
- Strengthening DOD's skills and capabilities needed to build improved partnerships.
- Streamlining U.S. security assistance programs to help promote partnership-building.

Panetta especially highlighted the need for regional combatant commands to establish themselves more deeply in the partnership-building enterprise through energetic use of training and exercises with partners, joint operations across a wide spectrum, and security assistance programs focused on enhancing the mission-performance skills and capabilities of partner nations. Panetta pointed to the need for increased partnership-building efforts in multiple areas:

- Cooperating with partners in the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia to counter violent extremism.

- Cooperating with Persian Gulf partners to counter Iran's destabilizing activities while protecting Israel.
- Cooperating with partners in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia to establish improved maritime security and humanitarian assistance capabilities. This includes establishing improved defense ties to India in such areas as naval preparations, military exercises, intelligence sharing, and sales of such U.S.-made systems as C-17s, C-130s, and P-8I maritime surveillance aircraft.
- Pursuing increased defense cooperation with China and Pakistan where possible, as well as Afghanistan after U.S. and NATO combat missions cease there.
- Building improved multilateral cooperation to counter the adverse strategic effects of North Korean nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia.
- In Europe, strengthening NATO's Article 5 defense capabilities including deployment of improved missile defenses.
- Cooperating with Western Hemisphere partners to control illicit drug trafficking.

Shortly after Panetta's speech was delivered, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen delivered a similar speech in which he called upon NATO to intensify its own efforts to strengthen its capacity to act with global partners.[1] While making clear that NATO will remain devoted to its alliance-wide defense missions in Europe, Rasmussen endorsed closer links with global partners in Asia, Africa, and elsewhere. He said that NATO should seek clusters of willing and able allies and partners for cooperation in specific areas of common security concerns. He said that such clusters should:

- be flexible yet focused on concrete security results
- build beyond the current ad-hoc approach to establish more structured approaches
- seek partnership-building activities in such areas as training and education, smart defense, SOF capabilities, drone systems, cyber defenses, and other areas of emerging security challenges

- strengthen NATO's role in working with African countries to establish better humanitarian response capabilities there
- use NATO's recent defense cooperation agreement with Australia as a template for developing ties with other countries.

What are the strategic implications of these two initiatives by Panetta and Rasmussen? In essence, they further broaden U.S. and NATO thinking about how defense alliances and multilateral cooperation are to be used. Historically, both the United States and NATO have viewed alliances in focused, strategically circumscribed ways that address specific threats and challenges in such limited areas as Europe and Northeast Asia. A byproduct of this narrow focus has been a lack of formalized multilateral cooperation with nations outside existing alliances across broad areas of the world, including much of the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East as well as Africa. The Panetta and Rasmussen initiatives aim at altering this traditional practice by significantly enlarging the number of potential partners that are now welcomed to intensify their defense cooperation with the United States and NATO in functional areas where common security goals can be pursued and new-era challenges countered.

A key implication is that both the United States and NATO will find their defense activities stretched in new directions with new labors. Bringing such extended partnerships to flourishing life promises to be demanding, time-consuming, and sometimes costly in scarce resources that must be committed. Clearly U.S. regional combatant commands, especially PACOM, will be called upon to pursue new partnership-building missions in ways that stretch their resources, and DOD's limited security assistance likely will need to be enlarged and realigned. Success in this arena does not promise to be easy, and it might come slowly in small doses. Southeast Asia countries seem increasingly willing to take up Panetta's offer. Countries in the Middle East and Persian Gulf present a mixed picture: some are likely to respond favorably, but others cautiously. In Africa, the United States is only in the early stages of establishing ties with most countries, and has only limited military resources for pursuing the enterprise, but AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM are taking the initiative seriously. China and Pakistan could be tough nuts to crack.

During summer and fall, 2012, senior DOD civilian and military leaders paid visits to the key regions, including Asia-Pacific, the Persian Gulf, Africa, and Latin America, in order to articulate the new U.S. partnership-building agenda and to encourage their hosts to participate in it. The long-term results are to be seen, but initial responses seemingly have been positive. If success is achieved, the payoffs could be substantial. One payoff is access to greater multinational military capabilities for performing future missions. Another strategic payoff is the potential growth of multilateral thinking and actions in addressing the major security challenges facing the Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East/Persian Gulf, and Africa: large geographic zones that, until now, have suffered from a lack of defense multilateralism. The biggest payoff is that regions now facing security tensions, including the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East/Persian Gulf, could achieve greater stability.

Panetta's effort to emphasize India as a key target of U.S. partnership-building efforts is especially significant not only because of India's size and importance to South Asia security affairs, but also because of emerging geopolitical dynamics taking place in the Indian Ocean. For years, the Indian Ocean has been largely viewed—by powers outside South Asia—as a backwater body, one used for maritime transit (e.g. shipping of oil from the Middle East to Asia) but not having much bearing on global security affairs. This situation is now rapidly changing. One reason is the growing importance of Indian Ocean maritime supply lines as Asia's appetite for Middle East oil increases. Security of these supply lines and control over them is becoming a factor of mounting significance in global affairs. A second reason is that India, an increasingly wealthy country, is now building the types of modernized naval and air forces that will allow it to establish an extended security zone in the Indian Ocean, thus potentially affecting control of these supply lines. A third reason is that China, animated by its quest for energy security and its long-standing rivalry with India, is expanding its naval presence in the Indian Ocean through force deployments as well as establishing bases in Pakistan and other friendly countries. These three trends create the potential for a growing, potentially dangerous China-India military competition and geopolitical rivalry across the Indian

Ocean, one that could have significant ripple effects on the global power balance elsewhere. For such reasons, a growing U.S. effort to establish closer cooperative relations with India makes sense not only as a worthy goal in itself, but also to provide greater American political and military influence across South Asia and the Indian Ocean in a future era in which they will increasingly reside at the front waters, not the backwaters, of global affairs and relationships among the great powers.

Even as the United States and its European allies are now looking outward for new partners, they also are taking assertive measures to strengthen NATO's defense preparedness for new missions. The agenda being pursued by them was put forth by NATO's Chicago Summit in May 2012. In addition to celebrating NATO's recent success in Libya and charting the course to ISAF's withdrawal from Afghanistan by 2014, the Summit issued three key documents:[2]

- A Summit Declaration on overall NATO policy and strategy.
- A Summit Communiqué on NATO's Deterrence and Defense Posture Review.
- A Summit Declaration on Defense Capabilities

The Declaration on Defense Capabilities praised NATO for having made progress since the Lisbon Summit of 2010 in several areas:

- NATO's decision to pursue a missile defense system to protect Europe and deployed forces.
- The decision to deploy a sophisticated Alliance Ground Surveillance system initially led by five Global Hawks.
- The decision to extend air policing of the Baltic members of NATO.
- The decision to create a new, leaner, and more effective command structure.
- Steady progress in such areas as cyber defense, air command and control, and steps in Afghanistan to improve ISR and counter-IED capabilities.

The Summit Communiqué on Deterrence and Defense articulated NATO's approach to building a Europe-wide missile defense system that is intended to protect against such nuclear threats as Iran, not to undermine Russia's nuclear deterrence posture. It announced that NATO's future missile defense system will be composed of the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense command and control system, the U.S. Phased Adaptive Approach that will provide U.S.-owned SM-3 interceptors, and other missiles, radars, and associated assets that will be contributed by individual European countries and groups of collaborating nations. Of these three components, the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense system will provide a centralized command and control capability to which various national missile defenses can be added and integrated. U.S. SM-3 interceptors, initially stationed aboard Aegis ships deployed in the Mediterranean Sea, will provide a zone of missile defense protection around NATO's southern borders. As improved SM-3 models become available, more interceptors will be added to help defend the European continent as a whole (e.g., deployments to Romania and Poland). The missile defense plans of individual European nations—such as Britain, France, and Germany—are not yet clear, but to the extent that additional interceptors are deployed, they will further strengthen NATO's defense capabilities against future threats.

The Summit Declaration on Defense Capabilities proclaimed the goal of creating "NATO Forces 2020": modern, tightly connected forces equipped, trained, exercised, and commanded so that they can operate together and with partners in any environment. One strategic purpose of NATO Forces 2020 is to continue protecting Alliance borders under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, but another purpose is to strengthen NATO's forces for carrying out power-projection operations and expeditionary missions in distant areas outside Europe. The Declaration portrayed Smart Defense as residing at the heart of this enterprise, representing a changed outlook in which a renewed culture of cooperation will be established that gives prominence to multinational collaboration as an effective and efficient option for developing critical capabilities. Included in this endorsement of Smart Defense was a call for improved priority-setting, enhanced

specialization, deepened connections among Alliance members, and stronger defense industrial cooperation.

The Declaration praised already-existing European pursuit of multinational Smart Defense in such areas as force protection, surveillance, and training. It also called for NATO Smart Defense efforts to work closely with the European Union's pooling and sharing initiative in such areas as air-to-air refueling, medical support, maritime surveillance, and training. Likewise, it called for pursuit of NATO's Connected Forces Initiative in order to strengthen networks and bonds among NATO's command structure, the NATO force structure, national headquarters, NATO SOF, and the NATO Response Force.

The Declaration also announced adoption of a NATO Defense Package of multiple measures that will help develop and deliver improved capabilities in the years ahead. The Declaration did not specify the exact measures of this Smart Defense package, but newspaper articles identified ten measures in such areas as NATO universal armaments interface, robotics, pooling of maritime aircraft, multinational cooperation on munitions and aviation training, pooling and sharing of medical training, multinational logistics cooperation for fuel handling and ground vehicle maintenance, and deployable contract specialists. The Chicago Summit closed by instructing the NATO Defense Ministers to develop an expanded, multiyear plan for Smart Defense that helps build NATO Forces 2020.

When the NATO Defense Ministers met in Brussels in October 2012, they reported that the number of approved Smart Defense initiatives had grown to 24, that 10 additional measures will be adopted soon, and that many more are on the drawing boards. They further reported that European countries are participating in two-thirds of these measures and are leading one-third of them. The Brussels meeting thus suggests that Smart Defense is off to a good start, but only time will tell how many measures are brought to fruition. Smart Defense can helpfully contribute in such areas as training, education, maintenance, and logistic support, but a key challenge will be whether it can succeed at improving NATO combat capabilities in such critical enablers as command and control, ISR, missile defense protection, and air-to-air refueling. Acquiring

such critical enablers through multinational investments as well as pooling and sharing will be essential if NATO European forces are to develop an improved capacity to deploy larger numbers of forces outside their borders and to perform distant expeditionary missions. Currently only about 10 percent of European forces are deployable with any speed, which is far less than NATO's own official target of 50 percent. If NATO could achieve 25 percent deployability by 2020, this alone would be a significant accomplishment.

What are the strategic implications for NATO's military capabilities and defense relevance in the coming years? The Chicago Summit charts a conceptual path toward a more energetic future in Alliance defense preparedness, one aimed at acquiring new capabilities and rectifying long-standing European deficiencies in power projection and expeditionary missions, including operations in the Middle East and protection of the Arctic regions. Much will depend upon the degree to which the Summit's visionary endeavors are actually carried out. The likelihood of success in the goal of building a NATO missile defense system has been increased by to the U.S. decision to provide SM-3 interceptors to this mission and Europe-wide agreement on the enterprise. The future of Smart Defense and NATO Forces 2020 is hopeful but murky in this era of European defense budget austerity. NATO's has issued fine-sounding defense communiqués before only to see weak follow-through. The advantage of Smart Defense is that it highlights the importance of matching well-defined priorities to limited resources, focusing on high-leverage and affordable improvements, and encouraging European nations to embrace greater multinational cooperation in building and operating forces. In today's setting, many European countries are aware of the importance and opportunities contained in the Smart Defense agenda. Britain, France, and Germany all fall into this category, and because they are Europe's leaders, they likely will have a positive impact in motivating other Alliance members to follow suit. Thus, NATO's often-uninspiring past may not be prologue. If so, by 2020 NATO may be able to field a significantly improved set of military capabilities, a development that would serve the interests of Europe as well as the United States.

NOTES

[1] Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Speech at Chatham House, "NATO—Delivering Security in the 21st Century," London, July 4, 2012, available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_88920.htm>.

[2] For background analysis of NATO defense planning during 2000–2008, see Hans Binnendijk and Gina Cordero, eds., *Transforming NATO: An Anthology* (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2008).

CHAPTER SEVEN

PREPARING FOR REDUCED DEFENSE BUDGETS AND CONSTRAINED MODERNIZATION SPENDING

Even as DOD's force plans are undergoing a strategic shift in multiple areas, its future budgets will be undergoing an important shift of their own: toward a future in which money will be tight and rigorous priorities will have to be set. As reported by DOD budget documents of early 2012, DOD's "Base Budget" for normal peacetime spending rose from $297 billion to $530 billion during FY01 through FY12. Of this nearly 80 percent increase, roughly one-half was due to inflation, but the other one-half provided real increases in spending. Meanwhile funding for overseas contingencies (the OCO budget) soared from $13 billion to a high of $187 billion in FY08, dropping afterward to $115 billion in FY12 owing mainly to the withdrawal from Iraq. Earlier DOD had hoped that during FY13 through FY17, its Base Budget would rise from $571 billion to $622 billion, a roughly 9 percent increase that primarily would cover inflation. The 2011 Budget Control Act, however, brought an end to this hope by mandating that DOD cut future expenditures by $259 billion over the next five years and by $487 billion over the coming decade. Sequestration has imposed further cuts, but these are not reflected in the FY14 budget submission.

DOD tabled a FY14 Base Budget request of $526.6 billion (close to FY13's $525.4 billion request) plus an OCO budget of $88.5 billion (same as FY13). There also is a defense energy budget of $17.5 billion, but it is within the U.S. Department of Energy. The Base DOD Budget request for FY14 is some $59 billion less than anticipated in 2011—a reduction of about 10 percent. DOD's future requests during FY15 through FY17 reflect similar reductions (compared to 2011 estimates) of about $60 billion per year, also about 10 percent. As shown below, DOD FY14 documents envisioned a slow increase in the Base Budget to $560 billion through FY17, but virtually all of this increase will be

for inflation. Judged in real terms, and before adjustments that are expected during future negotiations with Congress, DOD expects its budgets over the coming five years to be largely flat-lined, with little, if any, real growth. The strategic implication is that because an era of austerity lies ahead, DOD will be compelled to make do with the budgets that it will actually get, not those that it prefers to receive. DOD's constraints, of course, will become even more severe if sequestration, or other forces, deduct an additional $500 billion or so over the coming decade.

TABLE 1. DOD'S BASE BUDGETS (FY, $BILLIONS)

	12	*13*	*14*	*15*	*16*	*17*	*Total 13–17*
11 est.	531	571	586	598	611	622	2,988
12 est.	531	525	534	546	556	567	2,728
13 est.	531	525	527	541	551	560	2,704
11–13 reductions est.		–46	–53	–57	–60	–52	–284
% Real growth		–2.5	0	+0.8	+0.2	+0.2	–0.3

Whatever specific changes are made, what matters most is the basic path being set for today and tomorrow. The strategies outlined in this document were developed in concert with the FY13 DOD budget request, and the FY14 submission seeks to sustain this guidance by emphasizing such goals as prevailing in today's wars, preventing and deterring conflict, preparing to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, preserving and enhancing the all-volunteer forces, and reforming the business and support functions of the defense enterprise. The FY14 budget request carried forth the principles and priorities that were adopted by the new strategic guidance of the previous year. Its spending plan for personnel, operations, and acquisition are similar to those of the FY13 proposal. When such continuity remains will depend heavily on the DOD-wide Strategic Choices and Management Review commissioned by Secretary of Defense Hagel in March 2013, and on DOD's writing of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review.

In early April, 2013, Secretary of Defense Hagel offered an overview of budgetary challenges facing DOD in an important speech delivered at the National Defense University. In order to find savings, Hagel called for a searching examination of funds spent on acquisitions, personnel costs, and overhead. He said that "if left unchecked, spiraling costs to sustain existing structures, provide benefits to personnel, and develop replacements for aging weapons platforms will eventually crowd out spending on procurement, operations, and readiness—the budget categories that enable the military to be and stay prepared." He argued in favor of designing an acquisition system that responds more efficiently and effectively, taking a hard look at DOD personnel numbers and how they are compensated, and closely scrutinizing DOD's organizational chart and command structures including the so-called "Fourth Estate": The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, and such defense agencies and field activities as the Missile Defense Agency. Hagel's speech provides an illuminating overview of where DOD can look to find efficiencies and savings, but as he acknowledged, achieving success in this arena is hard work.[1]

In the future, an interesting trend to watch is the degree to which the new strategic guidance, as it is fully inculcated across DOD, brings about further changes to the internal composition of the defense budget. For the moment, allocations among the service departments reflect traditional patterns. The Army is to receive $134.6 billion of the FY13 budget (25.6 percent), the Navy $155.9 billion (29.6 percent), the Air Force $140.0 billion (26.7 percent), and DOD-wide programs $94.9 billion (18.0 percent). Of the roughly $6 billion reduction from the enacted FY12 budget, the Air Force absorbs the lion's share, with its budget cut by $4.8 billion, including a $2.6 billion reduction to its procurement. The FY14 budget request carries forth a similar distribution among the three service departments, but while cutting the Army and Navy by a total of $5.4 billion, adds $4.7 billion to the Air Force mostly to its O&M budget. Whether such traditional service shares prevail in the future is to be seen, but the growing strategic emphasis on maritime and air forces could result in the Navy and Air Force shares rising somewhat.

How will DOD future budgets be allocated among functional line-accounts? The FY13 budget request shows the allocations listed below. Of the $525 billion requested, $135 billion will be spent on military personnel and $208 billion on O&M, or about two-thirds of the total. The O&M account alone consumes fully 40 percent of the budget, an all-time high: in the past, it typically consumed 30 to 35 percent. Compared to FY12, the FY13 request shows an increase of $12 billion for O&M, and reductions of about $17 billion to the other accounts. The FY14 request carries forth the pattern established in the budget, but cuts $1.9 billion from Research Development Test & Evaluation (RDT&E). The personnel and O&M accounts are large for two strategic reasons. DOD pays careful attention to human capital, especially the education and training of its All-Volunteer Force, and it strives for high readiness of its military forces, which requires substantial spending on unit training. Both investments have high payoffs, but they are expensive, their costs tend to rise, and they are resistant to major savings unless the size of the U.S. military is significantly reduced. In addition, the upward spiral of DOD health care costs in recent years has caused the O&M budget to grow by $25 billion.

Of special significance is that the procurement budget has been reduced by nearly $6 billion and the RDT&E budget by nearly $2 billion. Whereas only a few years ago, DOD was anticipating annual procurement budgets of about $120 billion or larger, the FY13 budget proposal will provide only $99 billion, as did the FY13 request. If this scale-back is projected over five years, DOD will have about $100 billion less for procurement than once envisioned, thus requiring about a 20 percent paring back of modernization efforts for buying new weapons and equipment. Taking account the need to fund steady-state procurement of items such as new trucks and small vehicles, funds available for acquiring major new weapon systems could shrink by a greater margin. Even if the standard of comparison is the FY13 budget, future procurement spending will not increase in real terms, and if O&M costs continue rising, it will shrink.

Judging by these projections, DOD will be pursuing an acquisition strategy that tries to push the RDT&E effort energetically in order to develop new

technologies, while pursuing a procurement effort at less than full throttle. Constrained procurement budgets will be coming at a time when DOD will be trying to modernize much of its inventory by buying new ships, aircraft, and ground vehicles. The implication is that although buying new weapons will not grind to a halt, it will proceed at a slower pace than DOD prefers and, arguably, the strategic situation requires.

TABLE 2. DOD BASE BUDGET BY APPROPRIATION TITLE (FY, $BILLIONS, PERCENT CHANGE)

	12 Enacted	*13 Request*	*14 Request*
Military personnel	141.8	135.1 (–6.7)	137.1 (+2.0)
O&M	197.2	208.8 (+11.6)	209.4 (+1.8)
Procurement	104.5	98.8 (–5.7)	99.3 (+0.5)
RDT&E	71.4	69.4 (–2.0)	67.5 (–1.9)
Military construction	11.4	9.6 (–1.8)	9.5 (+0.1)
Family housing	1.7	1.7 (0)	1.5 (–0.2)
Other funds	2.6	2.1 (–0.5)	2.3 (+0.2)

How is DOD planning to achieve its annual spending cuts of about $50 billion per year? Part of the saving comes from reductions in active military manpower. Under the FY13 proposal, during FY13-FY17, DOD's total manpower, counting reservists, was projected to decline from 2,238,400 to 2,145,800, a 5.5 percent reduction. Virtually all of this reduction was to come from active manpower that was to be cut by 7.2 percent. The planned Army reduction was from 562,000 to 490,000; the Navy from 325,700 to 319,500; the Marine Corps from 202,100 to 182,100; and the Air Force from 332,800 to 328,600. Overall DOD planned to shed 102,400 active personnel. Planned cutbacks to combat force structures also will generate savings, particularly in O&M costs, but also some procurement funds. Of the total $259 billion in savings, roughly 60 percent evidently comes from cutting manpower and force structure.

In addition, under the FY13 submission, DOD expected to generate savings of about $60 billion during FY13-FY17 by reforming business practices,

overhead, and support costs in manifold areas such as streamlining headquarters, improving contracting procedures, deferring pay increases, and controlling health care costs. The remainder of the savings would need to come from reduced spending on acquisition, including RDT&E and procurement spending that powers modernization. During FY10-FY11, DOD made major cutbacks to spending on expensive weapons, such as production of F-22 fighters and C-17 transports. During FY12, it switched focus to reforming business practices but engaged in some changes to weapons programs. The FY13 budget continued this focus on business practices, but nonetheless had to set painful priorities for future modernization programs.

As a baseline for the FY14 submission, the FY13 budget proposal funded modernization improvements in several important areas:

- For the Army, it funded the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T), CH-47 Chinook helicopters, and Stryker vehicles.
- For the Navy and Marine Corps, it funded procurement of 10 new ships, 26 F/A-18 E/F fighters, 12 EA-18G aircraft, and Small Tactical Unmanned Aircraft Systems (STUAS).
- For the Air Force, it funded improved cyber capabilities, advanced satellites, RDT&E on a next-generation bomber, NATO Global Hawk systems, and improvements to Minuteman ICBM missiles.
- For Defense-Wide programs, it funded missile defense programs including the SM-3 and Patriot PAC-3 interceptors, science and technology programs, chemical-biological defense programs, global biosurveillance programs, non-traditional agent (WMD) defense programs, and cooperative threat reduction.

The FY13 budget submission also terminated or restructured several modernization programs across DOD that will generate about $52 billion in savings through FY17:

- For the Army, it terminated the High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle recapitalization program, restructured the Joint Air-to-Ground Missile Program, delays the Ground Combat Vehicle program, restructured the

Joint Light Tactical Vehicle program, restructured the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles program, and restructured the program for Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Sensor System: all of which generated savings of about $10 billion through FY17.

- For the Navy and Marine Corps, it terminated the Medium-Range Maritime Unmanned Aerial System, restructured programs for acquiring MV-22 Osprey aircraft, the P-8A maritime aircraft, and the E-2D Hawkeye aircraft, and delayed development of the SSBN(X) submarine—totaling $14.5 billion in savings through FY17.
- For the Air Force, it reduced F-35 procurement by 179 aircraft through FY17, terminated the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30 program, terminated the Defense Weather Satellite System, and the C-130 avionics modernization program, terminated the C-27J joint cargo aircraft programs, restructured the KC-46A tanker program, and restructured the Unmanned Air Systems program by acquiring fewer Reaper aircraft—totaling $26 billion in savings through FY17.
- For Defense-Wide programs, it reduced THAAD missile procurement from 330 interceptors to 180 through FY17, for a saving of $1.8 billion.

The FY14BR carries forth the basic modernization policies launched for FY13, but with some new features as well as additional savings. The FY14 request emphasizes readiness investments in training technologies, command and control, and ISR systems. It continues to pursue a new generation of satellites and other space systems, and upgrades DOD cyber capabilities. It buys more F-35 fighters for USAF and Navy/Marine Corps, acquires more Global Hawk Block 40 and E-2D Hawkeye, and funds continued development of the KC-46 tanker and a new strategic bomber. It upgrades missile defenses by enlarging the Ground-based Mid-course Defense system operated from the continental United States, reconfiguring the SM-3 Block IIB program, procuring a sixth THAAD battery, and improving PAC-3 missiles. For the Army, it upgrades the AH-64 helicopter, buys more CH-47 and US-60 helicopters, and acquires new equipment in several areas. For the Navy, it carries forth its Future Years Defense Program to buy 41 new submarines, surface combatants, and

other vessels, and also pursues a program to convert additional surface combatants to Aegis configuration. For all services, it endorses a post-Afghanistan effort to shift training and exercises back to a focus on major combat operations and related missions. The FY14 budget request also announces an effort to achieve $39 billion in savings through: a) making more effective use of resources by trimming costs for health care and other personnel expenses—a saving of $19 billion; b) terminating or restructuring 14 different weapons programs such as the Precision Tracking Space System—a saving of $13.7 billion; and c) reducing expenses for military construction and infrastructure—a saving of $6.5 billion.

There also are questions about what changes congress will make on the FY14 request, and perhaps the final FY13 budget. Many of these termination/restructuring decisions have generated controversy within the Services, on Capitol Hill, and elsewhere. Examples include the decisions on the Army's Ground Combat Vehicle Program and DOD's refusal to acquire more M-1 tanks, the Navy's Osprey and P-8A aircraft, and the Air Force's programs for acquiring F-35 fighters, C-27J transports, and Global Hawk Block 30. Whether these decisions will have a major impact on DOD's modernization programs can be debated, but by definition, they will somewhat slow the pace at which U.S. military forces improve over the coming years. The Army, in particular, will be left relying heavily on current-generation weapons for some time. The Navy will gradually modernize by acquiring several new warships per year, but at a slower rate than senior Navy officers would prefer. The Air Force likely will modernize faster by acquiring large numbers of F-35 fighters and UAS aircraft that together will strengthen its combat capabilities in such areas as reconnaissance and surveillance, air intercept, and precision strike missions. The same faster trend applies to Navy and Marine Corps air wings, which also will be receiving the F-35 and UAS. In general, the U.S. Air Force seems likely to make the biggest quality improvements owing to modernization in future years, with the Navy improving at a moderate pace, and the Army bringing up the rear. Growing quality of air forces, of course, will benefit not only the Air Force and Navy, but also the Army and Marine Corps by virtue of providing

better air support to ground operations—a trend that faithfully reflects the new strategic guidance.

U.S. military forces will remain quite powerful for the foreseeable future, the world's best. Especially for air and naval forces, their defensive and offensive capabilities will improve significantly as their C4ISR systems, weapons, and munitions benefit from new acquisitions, doctrinal enhancements, and growing joint interoperability in ways that combine together to produce the Joint Force 2020. But will DOD be able to make do with future budgets that are mainly flat-lined in real terms? A guarded appraisal seems appropriate on this score. The main reason is that the costs of performing the defense enterprise normally rise in real terms as the future evolves. For example, manpower salaries and O&M spending typically rise faster than inflation, and procurement expenses typically rise faster because new weapons often cost more than originally advertised. If history is a reliable guide, the act of offsetting these rising expenses typically requires 1 to 2 percent real DOD budget increases each year. DOD is striving to combat this cost inflation but its ability to succeed in sufficient ways may be problematic. If it does not fully succeed, rising normal expenses will crowd against force structure and acquisition programs, thereby necessitating some cutbacks to both. If so, future U.S. military forces could be somewhat smaller than currently advertised and less modern as well: a double-whammy degrading effect on U.S. combat power.

The larger strategic issue is whether DOD force improvements will be adequate to achieve the quality gains that are needed to offset quantity reductions to the force posture as well as adversary modernization efforts, and to meet the requirements of new DOD's new plans for defending all key regions. At the moment, uncertainty exists on this score, and DOD's official documents, for all their analytical power and detailed material, do not provide a definitive answer. The prospect of flat-lined defense budgets, nonetheless, takes some of the starch out of the new strategic guidance, which otherwise comes across as energetic and assertive. The prospect of pursuing new geographical deployments, missions, doctrines, and operations with rising defense budgets is one thing. It is something else again with constant budgets, which necessitate

that if new endeavors are to be funded, others must be sacrificed. The future always will be unknowable in some precise sense, but this issue clearly will require close attention as events unfold. What can be said with confidence is that a future of mutating military requirements and flat-lined defense budgets will generate ongoing debates about how priorities should be set and resources allocated in an era when the claimants on resources likely will outnumber the budgets available to fund them.

DOD senior spokesmen argue that planned defense budgets will be adequate to preserve national security. It is noteworthy that the FY14 budget does not include sequestration-based reductions, recognizing that complex negotiations lie ahead with Congress. Nevertheless, they have insisted that sequestration would inflict grave damage on U.S. defense preparedness. Outside the Pentagon, proposals range from substantial cuts to sizable increases. Whether this mounting political debate will produce major changes—up or down—remains to be seen. It is worth noting that the post-Vietnam drawdown was 23.7 percent over 7 years (1968-75), and the post-Cold War reductions reached 25.1 percent over 11 years (1987-1998).[2] In any case, future decisions about defense spending will be taken in the larger context of how the nation chooses overall federal approaches in an era of sizable deficits and uncertainty about both future economic growth and tax revenues.

NOTES

[1] Hagel, *Defense Department Strategies and Challenges*.

[2] "National Defense Consumption Expenditures & Gross Investment (FDEFX)," *Economic Research, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis*, April 26, 2013, available at <http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/FDEFX>.

CHAPTER EIGHT

HANDLING KEY STRATEGIC ISSUES: THE NEED FOR CAREFUL EVALUATION AND WISE ACTIONS

In his speech "The Force of the 21st Century", delivered to the National Press Club in December 2012,[1] Secretary Panetta said that DOD has gotten off to a good start in pursuing its multi-part defense agenda. He cited five components of the strategy, to: (1) build a smaller, leaner force, (2) maintain force projection where needed in the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region, (3) maintain global leadership and presence by building innovative partnerships and partner capacity across the globe, (4) remain capable of confronting and defeating aggression from more than one adversary at a time anywhere, anytime, and (5) invest in the future. But he also noted that major challenges lie ahead in setting priorities and making tough decisions to build the improved, flexible defense posture that will be needed. He especially cited the risks of stress on the force, and the absence of budget certainty.

The strategic shift being pursued by DOD may seem complex and daunting when its details are understood, but the United States has made major shifts several times before in the past decades. DOD and USG can succeed again if they act energetically, wisely, and prudently. This is but one component of U.S. grand strategy, which must include economic, education, and other elements, but it is an important one. Implementing the new U.S. defense agenda and its manifold changes will generate many important issues that will require careful evaluation and wise action. A discussion of fifteen of them is merited here because of their strategic nature and their capacity to have major impacts on the success or failure of the enterprise:

1. Will DOD be able to carry out successfully its complex tripartite agenda of changing its political-military priorities, operational concepts, and force structures in ways that produce a highly capable Joint

Force 2020—notwithstanding resource scarcities, barriers to innovation, and fast-changing technologies?

2. How can new U.S. regional defense plans best be accompanied by changes to U.S. foreign policies and political agendas aimed at handling diverse geopolitical dynamics?
3. How can DOD successfully carry out its agenda of encouraging regional combatant commands to plan and act strategically while developing closer cooperative relationships with new allies and partners?
4. Can the new DOD emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region and assured access capabilities there be carried out in ways that not only protect friends, allies, and U.S. control of vital sea lines of communication and air-sea commons and provide adequate crisis response capabilities, but also do not precipitate a serious military rivalry with China?
5. Will a U.S.-led extended deterrence regime in the Middle East be needed to counter potential Iranian access to nuclear weapons as well as the growing Iranian conventional threats to the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf?
6. How can European NATO allies best be induced to use Smart Defense to create better forces and capabilities for power-projection and expeditionary missions through enhanced multinational cooperation in an era of austerity?
7. Will DOD successfully be able to deploy networks of SM-3 missile interceptors and other systems to defend key regions against missile attacks while lessening dependence on nuclear weapons for extended deterrence?
8. Will DOD's new force-sizing construct and smaller posture prove to be properly designed and balanced to provide adequate responsiveness and flexibility—e.g., will SOF assets be able to operate effectively without major support from general purpose forces on some occasions?
9. Can pressures to reduce U.S. defense budgets and forces further in major ways—e.g., by sequestration or sustained budget cuts—be fended off, and if additional cuts are made, how will the new defense strategy and plans need to change?

10. Will the United States realistically be able to plan on avoiding entanglements in large, sustained stability operations and Middle East land wars, while maintaining the capacity for quick, affordable successes in smaller operations, as well as the capacity to carry out comprehensive approaches with other agencies and partners?
11. Will DOD's new operational concept of globally integrated operations prove viable, and will DOD be able to make the widespread changes to Joint Force 2020 needed to carry out this concept?
12. Will DOD be able to succeed in developing the full set of actions and programs needed to bring the JOAC's new assured access concept to effective operational life, including improvements to C4ISR systems, unmanned capabilities, forward missile defenses, integrated joint operations by air and sea forces, long-range strike assets, and cyber efforts?
13. Can DOD, while maintaining high readiness, generate additional budget savings to fund larger procurement efforts and faster modernization rates?
14. Will DOD successfully be able to strengthen its cyber capabilities as part of a whole-of-government, public-private approach to counter major new threats and achieve the cross-domain synergy the strategy demands?
15. Can the DOD requirements, acquisition, budgeting, operational planning and personnel assignment processes be adjusted to respond to the major changes in the security environment and the military and dual-use technologies that likely will be affecting all regions in the coming years? These include: UAS assets, information technologies, accurate ballistic missiles, precision-strike munitions, robotics, nanotechnology, innovative energy approaches, biotechnology, and socio-cognitive science? Adversaries also will have access to many of them.

Successfully pursuing new political-military priorities, operational concepts, and force structures. The recent changes to U.S. national security strategy and defense plans include three major components: pursuing new political-military priorities, new operational concepts, and new force structures in tandem. This tripartite

agenda means that DOD will be altering how it pursues core security goals in the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East through new types of forward presence, reinforcement plans, and partnering, at the same time as it will be preparing the Joint Force 2020 to carry out such new operational concepts as globally integrated operations and cross-domain synergy. This will be done while also making changes to the force structures of all components. These are three separate and distinct endeavors even though they are interrelated.

Making three major changes at once is not easily accomplished even for a department of DOD's talents and sophistication. In the past, DOD has made many big innovations, but it normally had the luxury of being able to focus primarily on one category of changes at a time. During the Cold War, for example, it made basic changes to NATO military strategy several times—e.g., the switch from massive retaliation to flexible response—but it was able to focus intently on these changes until they were fully adopted, and only then switched attention to the subsequent task of reconfiguring its budgets and forces to carry out the new strategies.[2] When the Cold War abruptly ended, DOD was compelled to switch its strategy from defending Europe to addressing regional challenges in Northeast Asia and the Middle East, and to downsize its military posture by about 25 percent. But for several years afterward, it did not have to worry about creating new forces or crafting new types of combat operations. Its 2-MTW strategy for the 1990s was carried out principally with forces, weapons, and operational doctrines inherited from the Cold War. When the Bush Administration took office in early 2001, it embraced the idea of defense transformation, which did not change regional strategies or their political goals, but did pursue new technologies and operational doctrines. The eruption of the war on terrorism later that year resulted in the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, which ultimately produced major stability operations and counterinsurgency that required some forms of transformation under fire. But core U.S. strategic goals and priorities in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere in the Middle East remained constant.

The tripartite agenda now being pursued thus is an historically new experience, one not having been seen since World War II and the initial stages of

the Cold War when containment and deterrence were being born. The simpler course would be to first pursue one component of the agenda and only then, the second component: e.g., by making the political-military changes first and the operational changes and force structure changes afterward, or vice versa. But the political-military agenda will not wait, and it can be pursued only if the operational agenda is pursued along with it, which in turn requires an appropriate force structure. The reality is that the United States has little choice but to pursue all of the parts of this agenda now, rather than waiting for one effort to succeed before another is launched.

With the initiatives announced during 2012, DOD has gotten off to a good start in pursuing all parts of this agenda. Steps are being taken to reshape the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, to broaden cooperative practices with friends and allies, and to conduct initial training and exercises on the assured access concept. In the Persian Gulf, the United States is stepping up efforts to strengthen its missile defenses, to bolster its naval presence, and to encourage multilateral cooperation with the GCC states. Nonetheless, a great deal of innovative work remains to be done, and the entire effort will take years before it is complete. Persistence and steadiness of purpose will be critical to achieving sustained, comprehensive success.

The demanding nature of this agenda carries with it clear risks. The United States might find itself reaching too far, too fast. Its ambitions might exceed its abilities. DOD could find itself overloaded, trying to make three big changes at once, and failing to carry out any of them well because they interfere with each other. Moreover, each part of this agenda could prove so complex and difficult that carrying it out successfully may not be achievable in the allotted time with the available resources. This risk cannot be eliminated, but it can be mitigated with well-conceived implementation plans that clearly chart relevant goals, mobilize the available resources to pursue them, carefully track progress as well as setbacks through benchmarks, and make mid-course corrections when needed. Good implementation plans are neither cure-alls nor guarantee of success, but they can significantly reduce the chances of failure, make the most of opportunities, and achieve the greatest progress possible.

Crafting sound political courses and foreign policy agendas in key regions. The new U.S. defense agenda focuses on altering overseas U.S. force deployments and crisis commitments not only for potential wartime purposes, but also to pursue key peacetime strategic goals. Such a new strategic agenda should not be pursued in a political and foreign policy vacuum. The United States will need to know how it aspires to shape the inter-state political dynamics of each region so that it will be better able to chart its precise military course. It needs to let allies and partners know what is expected of them. The USG needs to do better in this arena than it is now doing.

Part of the problem is that is that key regions are evolving in new political directions in ways that are eroding previous U.S. conceptions. Equally true, existing U.S. official documents on foreign policy do not devote much attention to regional political goals and foreign policies. For example, the *National Security Strategy* (NSS) of 2010 pays attention to the goal of crafting a stable international order but does not pay much attention to the demands of handling each key region individually. Something similar can be said of the State Department's first quadrennial report, *Leading Through Civilian Power*, which devotes considerable attention to pursuing stability and development goals in the Middle East and other troubled regions, but does not fully discuss the diplomatic challenges of managing big-power relations with Russia, China, and India. The *QDR* of 2010 called for U.S. efforts to craft new security architectures in the key regions, but although it discussed defense priorities there, it did not specify overarching political goals and policies. The recent DOD documents of 2012 discuss new regional strategic priorities, but only in cryptic terms that fall short of crafting full-fledged political and diplomatic strategies.

Something better is needed if the new U.S. defense agenda is to be carried out effectively. Because all three major regions are being buffeted by new-era geopolitics that are unique to them individually, the United States will need to craft foreign policy agendas that are tailored to these geopolitical trends region-by-region. In Europe, for example, the United States and NATO face a muted but real geopolitical rivalry with Russia over control of the Baltic region, Central Europe, the Balkans, and Georgia. In the Asia-Pacific region, the United

States faces new geopolitical challenges brought about by the emerging, potentially dangerous strategic interaction of China with close U.S. friends and allies in the entire zone stretching from Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia and even the Indian Ocean, where China and India are engaging in a growing political-military contest. In the chaotic Middle East, the geopolitical challenges are particularly complex because of the interaction of continuing terrorist threats in some places, the Arab Spring, Israel's security needs, close U.S. ties to friends and allies in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere, and Iran's apparent pursuit not only of nuclear weapons but also of regional geopolitical domination. Critics often accuse the United States of lacking the capacity to think in visionary geopolitical terms. Whether they are correct or not, the United States does need to sharpen its sense of geopolitical foreign policy and diplomacy in all key regions if it hopes to gain maximum strategic mileage from its unfolding defense agendas there.[3]

Most knowledgeable observers agree with the proposition that in order to preserve peace and promote stability, sophisticated geopolitical diplomacy begins with handling big-power relations in ways aimed at not only deterring potential adversaries but also at striking a balanced equilibrium of interests and power with them. Such a concept does not mandate a resort to old-style balance-of-power politics. But it does necessitate exerting U.S. presence and influence so that potential adversaries are both dissuaded from menacing conduct and left reasonably confident that their security and interests are properly safeguarded. The ultimate goal of establishing cooperative U.S. relations with such big powers as Russia and China makes obvious sense. But before this goal can be pursued, much less attained, geopolitical dynamics with them must first be handled in ways that both safeguard U.S. interests and promote stability in relations with them.

Effective geopolitical diplomacy, moreover, goes beyond dealing wisely with big powers that may be part-time adversaries. It also includes protecting the security of close friends and allies that may be menaced by neighboring big powers, recognizing that providing such protection can complicate the maintenance of a stable equilibrium with those big powers. This axiom holds true in all key

regions, but it especially applies in new-era terms to the Asia-Pacific region where friends and allies are increasingly clamoring for clarification and reassurance about the alleged dangers posed by China's rise to power. Whereas U.S. foreign policy and defense agendas in Europe benefit hugely from the multilateral ties created by NATO, similar multilateral ties do not exist in the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East, even though growing efforts are being made to promote them. Are new forms of stronger multilateral ties needed in both regions, and are they even possible? The answer to this question may be unclear, but one thing seems certain: if greater multilateralism can be fashioned in both regions, it will greatly assist U.S. efforts to apply its military power there effectively. The new U.S. defense agenda is pointed toward achieving greater multilateralism in both regions, but the task will require hard strategic labor.

Encouraging regional combatant commands to plan and act strategically, while developing cooperative relations with allies and partners. DOD's agenda of encouraging regional combatant commands to plan and act strategically means that these commands—especially EUCOM, PACOM, CENTCOM, and AFRICOM—will not be able to view their missions and priorities only through the narrow military prism of preparing to carry out wartime contingencies. For all of them, a larger strategic planning framework will be necessary. They will need to carry out their peacetime operations with conscious political-strategic goals, missions, and operations in mind. These include deterring and dissuading adversaries, reassuring allies and partners, pursuing engagement activities, fostering stable security conditions, and performing such missions as stability operations, counter-piracy, and disaster relief. Moreover, wars in any of these theaters, if they erupt, will be infused with complex political and diplomatic goals, dynamics, and calculations.

Such considerations, of course, have been on the minds of these commands for many years. But what stands out in today's setting is the extent to which multi-faceted strategic imperatives are multiplying and becoming more complex. In particular, PACOM and CENTCOM are likely to find themselves juggling multiple political-strategic balls at once even while staying constantly prepared for crises, wars, and other contingency responses. In addition, their

juggling acts are likely to take place in settings that are susceptible to sudden, unanticipated changes in fundamental geopolitical conditions: the recent series of political revolutions across the Middle East is an example of how sudden and sweeping these changes can be. Both the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region will be vulnerable to major, swift changes in their underlying geostrategic tectonic plates for many years.

This prospect demands strategic sophistication. These commands will continually need to harness all of their instruments—e.g., command centers, intelligence, force deployments, training and exercises, prepositioned equipment and reinforcement plans, and security assistance—to form integrated, prioritized programs that are designed with a sense of political-military strategy and means-ends relationships in mind. This will mean well-prepared leaders, staffs, personnel, and procedures to handle the strategic challenges that are likely to lie at their doorsteps. Close working relationships with other government agencies operating in their regions will be essential—including the State Department and the Agency for International Development as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Agency. Equally important, they will need to cooperate closely with other members of the interagency community in Washington as well as with the governments of allies and partners in their regions. The bottom line is that the manner in which these regional combatant commands operate will have a major bearing on the success of future U.S. foreign policy and national security strategy—the more strategic and sophisticated their operations, the better.

Growing U.S. efforts to foster close cooperative relationships with a widening set of allies and partners in key regions will demand comparable sophistication. This is especially true in the Asia-Pacific region, but also in the Middle East/Persian Gulf, and Africa. Establishing close defense relationships with as many new countries as possible sounds appealing in principle, especially if it may make more partners available to help U.S. forces in contingencies. But each budding relationship must be judged by how it advances U.S. security interests as well as by the receptivity of the targeted country and the value of its military capabilities, and the U.S. commitments that must be made. Since

security assistance funds and U.S. force operations for these efforts will be constrained, execution will have to be prioritized. The emerging situation likely will require a focused strategy that begins with a limited number of high-priority and receptive countries, and then expands gradually in response to available resources and opportunities.

Achieving security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and achieving higher operational preparedness without triggering military rivalry with China. The defense changes being pursued by the United States in the Asia-Pacific region are not aimed at containing and deterring China. Indeed, the U.S. hopes that China can be brought into a web of cooperative security relations with the United States and its allies. Nonetheless, some observers judge that a growing military rivalry with China may be inevitable or, at least will be hard to avoid short of acquiescing to China's growing regional ambitions for control of maritime zones stretching as far as Guam. China's ongoing military buildup, which is focused heavily on developing better forces and capabilities for outward power-projection and domination of Taiwan and sea lanes in the Western Pacific and South China Sea, is a principal contributor to this pessimistic appraisal. If military rivalry emerges, it will owe heavily to China's own assertive conduct that menaces U.S. friends and allies as well as control of the Asia-Pacific maritime commons. If China restrains its military ambitions, prospects for a safe, stable future will improve. But whether China's military understands this need for self-restraint, rather than being guided by nationalism and self-assertion, seems problematic in the eyes of pessimists.[4]

In this context, the U.S. military shift to the Asia-Pacific region is a partial response to China's assertive military agenda. However, rather than treating China as a potential enemy, it is primarily aimed at preserving U.S. influence, protecting friends and allies, maintaining a regional balance, avoiding a widespread descent into multipolar rivalry, and preparing U.S. forces for new missions and contingencies. In theory, this mainly defensive agenda can be carried out in restrained ways that avoid posing a direct military threat to China and thereby provoking an upward-spiraling action-reaction cycle. The reason is that there is a big difference between a U.S. offensive war-oriented strategy and a

peacetime defensive strategy. Even so, history shows that in this arena, the devil lies in the military details, misperceptions can occur, and unanticipated consequences can unfold.

The growing U.S. military emphasis on developing assured access capabilities by countering A2/AD threats is a necessary strategic response if future U.S. defensive goals in the Western Pacific are to be attained. Because it is forward-leaning in ways that bolster deterrence and enhance U.S. military options while protecting friends and allies, it is clearly preferable to withdrawing all U.S. military forces to Guam and other Marianas Islands and relying solely on long-range strike forces. The combination of creating Guam as a rearward strategic hub and developing improved long-range strike assets while maintaining forward bases and naval deployments along the geographic axis stretching from Japan and South Korea to the Philippines, Singapore, and Australia provides a sound formula for advancing U.S. security interests and protecting allies in peace, crisis, and war. Nonetheless, if not managed carefully, this new-era forward presence could draw the U.S. military into closer interactions with China's military buildup. The risk is not only that a tense peacetime standoff might develop, but also that a political crisis could escalate into a war even if both sides have an interest in avoiding it. For example, a political crisis over control of Western Pacific sea lanes could draw Chinese military forces outward in ways aimed at denying U.S. forces access to the contested zone at the same time that U.S. forces are moving into the zone in order to establish assured access. This dynamic could set the stage for premature combat operations by both sides, thereby producing rapid, unwarranted escalation. U.S. and Chinese strategists will need to remember the impact of rapid force deployments and early attack strategies by both sides on the outbreak of World War I.

The United States will need to strike a wise balance between necessary assertiveness and wise self-restraint. An open military dialogue with China can help lessen risks deriving from misunderstandings. Agreements to control military encounters at sea could reduce the danger of unintended clashes. As the United States strives to safeguard its legitimate defense interests without unduly provoking China, the best path ahead is not clear. There also can be

bad strategic outcomes, such as China being unwisely provoked and/or close friends and allies left vulnerable. Assumptions will need to be re-examined often, and alternative paths considered[5] in designing the future U.S. military agenda in the Asia-Pacific region.

Deciding whether to create an extended deterrence regime against Iran. Current U.S. policy is focused on using diplomacy and sanctions to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. But the issue of how best to deal with Iran is a subject of intense debate in the United States and abroad. Whereas some observers argue in favor of continuing to rely on diplomacy and sanctions, others argue in favor of creating a containment and deterrence regime, and still others favor military strikes aimed at destroying Iran's nuclear facilities. Of these options, all have their plusses and minuses, but military strikes on Iran clearly would be the most extreme step. Senior U.S. officials have emphasized that military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities will be an option on the table if diplomacy and sanctions do not succeed. Some observers argue that such strikes could succeed, while others argue that they might delay Iranian nuclear programs only a few years and could provoke a wider, costly war between the United States and Iran as well as Iranian attacks on GCC countries and escalating violence across the Middle East. Military strikes against Iran thus are not a course of action to be taken lightly even though they might become necessary. Even if they are launched, they should not be carried out in a strategic vacuum that is blind to the political goals being pursued then and during the aftermath. They are a means to an end, not an end in themselves.[6]

Iran maintains that it is not trying to become a nuclear power, but its enrichment activities and related programs cause many observers deep concern. Should Iran choose to acquire nuclear weapons and long-range missiles to deliver them, and begin making major strides in this direction, the United States would face incentives and pressures to create an extended deterrence regime. It would be aimed at preventing Iran from acquiring, using, or threatening to use these weapons against U.S. forces as well as Israel and other close friends and allies in the Persian Gulf, the broader Missile East, and even Europe. Such a deterrence regime would need to be combined with diplomacy

and sanctions prior to Iranian weapons acquisition. It could become doubly important if Iran actually acquires both nuclear weapons and long-range delivery mechanism. Some observers hold out the prospect that military strikes could obviate the need for such a deterrence strategy by disarming Iran. Perhaps so, but an equal likelihood is that such strikes would be only partially successful and would only temporarily delay Iran from restarting nuclear programs in the aftermath. In this event, a deterrence strategy would be a logical accompaniment to military strikes against Iran, not an alternative to them.

Could such a deterrence regime work against Iran? The argument against it is that Iran, because of its implacable hatred of Israel and extremist ideology, is inherently not deterrable, and that if it acquires nuclear weapons, it might either fire nuclear-tipped missiles at Israel or covertly smuggle nuclear weapons to Hezbollah and Hamas for use against it. The argument in favor of such deterrence efforts is that Iran is sufficiently rational to want to avoid nuclear destruction in retaliation against first-use by itself or terrorists in any form, and that this rationale of self-preservation provides the core necessary feature of an effective U.S. deterrence strategy.

Assuming that creation of such a deterrence regime might be pursued, what would be required to make it work effectively? Clearly one vital ingredient would be a credible U.S. willingness—credible in Tehran's eyes—to launch devastating retaliation against Iran in event of nuclear aggression. Another vital ingredient would be sufficiently strong U.S. security ties to Israel, which faces an existential threat from Iran, as well as to other friends and allies in the Persian Gulf and Middle East, to convince them that a U.S.-led deterrence regime would be truly reliable and effective—convincing enough to prevent Israel from launching a nuclear preventive attack in a crisis and to induce other regional countries not to become nuclear powers on their own. A third vital ingredient would be adequate U.S. forces and capabilities to achieve deterrence in peacetime, protect friends and allies, and carry out necessary military operations in wartime. While such a deterrence regime would require nuclear forces that could launch second-strike retaliatory attacks, it also would require deployment of modern missile defenses that could shoot down Iranian missiles and warheads before they reach their

targets. A combination of missile defenses and nuclear retaliatory capabilities likely would work better than one or the other component alone. Such a deterrence regime also would probably require deployment of some U.S. conventional forces—mainly air and naval forces—as well as creation of improved GCC forces. Together these could provide deterrence against non-nuclear attack on allies and the Strait of Hormuz, plus flexible response options in a crisis.

Thus, an extended deterrence regime may be a viable choice, but its success could not be taken for granted just because the United States issues rhetorical warnings that would be credible to Iran and offers security ties that are reassuring to friends and allies. To back them up, such a regime also would need a sophisticated set of U.S. military forces and capabilities that can work together in a highly complex, chaotic region that lacks the bipolar clarity and sober judgments of the Cold War in Europe. It must pass modern-era Middle Eastern tests of sufficiency, not previous-era European tests.

Behind the scenes, quiet steps are already being taken to create some of the military ingredients for an extended deterrence regime. They include plans to deploy such U.S. missile interceptors to the region as the SM-3 and PAC-3, efforts to help Israel build its own missile defense shield, security assistance programs to elevate the defense postures and missile defenses of GCC allies in the Persian Gulf, and the sustained deployment of U.S. naval forces and other assets to the Gulf. As these efforts gradually unfold, they will create a virtual military architecture for an extended deterrence strategy, but if Iran seems close to actually acquiring and deploying nuclear-tipped missiles, they may need to be sped up and expanded on. The bottom line is that in its efforts to maximize the military options on the table, the United States arguably should strive to ensure that extended nuclear deterrence is one of them.

Guiding European NATO allies toward acquiring better military capabilities for power projection and expeditionary missions. In its new strategic concept issued at the Lisbon Summit of 2010, NATO publicly called for the Alliance to develop better forces and capabilities for deployment missions including outside Europe. The reason for this public declaration was widespread agreement that existing European assets are unimpressive and capable of meeting

only a small portion of requirements if multiple events occur simultaneously. Working against this goal being achieved anytime soon is the recently arrived "age of austerity" that is causing cuts in defense budgets, forces, and modernization programs by many European countries. Can this age of austerity be overcome? Or is NATO, despite its recent operations in Libya, destined to decline in strategic significance on the world stage, thereby leaving the United States without the European military allies and partners that are needed for its own new global strategy to succeed?

NATO's answer to this problem is "Smart Defense": the idea of using existing resources more efficiently and effectively through mechanisms such as setting priorities, multinational cooperation, pooling and sharing, and specialization. Officially adopted at the Chicago Summit, Smart Defense has now been turned over to NATO defense ministers and military commands for pursuit over a multiyear period, thereby producing an improved NATO Force 2020. Similar to previous ambitious NATO initiatives—e.g., the Long Term Defense Program, the Conventional Defense Improvement, the Defense Capabilities Initiative, and the Prague Capabilities Commitment—Smart Defense is an idea that can succeed, fail, or fall somewhere in between. Much depends upon how it will be implemented: strongly or weakly, innovatively or in uncreative ways. Its likelihood of success will increase if multiple European countries are willing to pursue it enthusiastically by strengthening their defense collaboration efforts. NATO can improve Smart Defense's relevance by ensuring that it focuses on strengthening badly needed combat capabilities for deployment missions, such as air-refueling assets and modern information networks, rather than on lower priority assets such as military infrastructure for territorial defense and logistic support in Europe, minor research and development projects, and improved basic military training. NATO headquarters could help by setting sound defense priorities: e.g., by striving to improve the deployabilty of European forces in stages rather than all at once. Another important imperative is organizing how individual Smart Defense measures are carried out. Currently each measure is equipped with a single national leader but, especially for major measures, this single leadership model will need to grow into a larger group of involved countries that work closely together.

Because the United States remains NATO's principal leader, it cannot be a passive observer of the Smart Defense process. It cannot afford to allow DOD to lose sight of NATO's continuing importance as it pays growing attention to the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East. Future U.S. military forces stationed in Europe will be smaller than now because two Army brigades are being withdrawn and eliminated from the force structure. But sizable U.S. forces will remain in Europe, including two Army brigades, two Air Force air wings, and the U.S. Navy 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea. In addition, some U.S. Army forces in CONUS will be affiliated with the NATO Response Force (NRF) and others will be rotated periodically to Europe to conduct training and exercises there. Equally important, U.S. SM-3 missile defense interceptors will be deploying to the Mediterranean and continental Europe as part of the Phased Adaptive Approach, including defense against Iran. Missile defense can become a new, major U.S. military mission in Europe of enduring significance. But the United States must also remain a potent contributor to NATO's capabilities for power projection and expeditionary operations. Unless it remains so, European countries likely will slacken their force-improvement efforts in this arena, not strengthen them. In the final analysis, future U.S. military operations in the Middle East and elsewhere are likely to need European forces by their side. This alone is valid reason for continuing to remember NATO's potential strategic weight and usable military power even as the Asia-Pacific region beckons.

Deploying SM-3 missile interceptors with regional military and political goals in mind. For decades, the United States has relied exclusively on the threat of nuclear retaliation to deter nuclear aggression against CONUS as well as friends and allies. This long-standing strategic calculus is now changing in ways that constitute an important departure in its own right. Deployment of 30 Ground Based Interceptors in Alaska and California will provide protection of CONUS against limited missile attacks of the sort that North Korea and Iran could launch while not menacing the ability of Russia's nuclear posture to strike CONUS targets effectively. Meanwhile deployment of SM-3 interceptors on Aegis ships and ashore will provide protection for U.S. forces overseas plus

friends and allies that benefit from U.S. extended deterrence coverage. DOD is also deploying PAC-3 and THAAD interceptors that will protect against shorter-range missiles, but the SM-3 will provide the main capability for defending against such longer-range, high-performance ballistic missiles as intermediate-range ballistic missiles and medium-range ballistic missiles. Current DOD plans call for installing SM-3s on 32 Aegis ships plus deploying them ashore in Europe and potentially other locations. A sea-based fleet of 32 Aegis ships will not provide enough vessels to cover the entire globe, but it will provide the flexibility to allow for concentrating ships in endangered regions. This favorable prospect promises not only to strengthen military deterrence against nuclear-armed regional adversaries, but also to enhance U.S. political influence abroad as well as security ties to friends and allies, at least in Europe, Asia-Pacific, and the Middle East.[7]

Technical success of this enterprise should not be taken for granted. The current SM-3 interceptor, the SM-3 1A version, has only limited capability against enemy missiles that are flying at high speed and steep angles, and otherwise make for difficult targets to shoot down. Accordingly, DOD is conducting RDT&E on successor interceptors. By 2015, the SM-3 IB will arrive, and will upgrade the performance of Aegis ships and locations ashore. Later in the decade, the SM-3 IIA and IIB will arrive, thereby producing additional qualitative upgrades. For these improvements to be made, DOD will need to fund the necessary RDT&E programs fully, and these programs will need to achieve their performance goals. Using kinetic energy, hit-to-kill technologies to destroy multiple enemy missiles and warheads reliably is a demanding task that requires highly performing C4ISR systems, radars, and ultra-accurate interceptors. Even if fully funded, the RDT&E program will have its work cut out for it, and only a few years to succeed.

Strategic success for the SM-3 program will also require new types of security ties with friends and allies in all three key regions. In Europe, NATO provides the already-existing multilateral security alliance needed to make effective use of SM-3 interceptors to defend the continent, but even there, NATO will need to address such details as allied contributions, common investment funding, and

operational deployment schemes and practices. In the Asia-Pacific region, there is no equivalent multilateral security alliance, despite the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, US) treaty framework and the nascent security dimensions to ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asia Nations). U.S. security ties to multiple nations largely are carried out through bilateral cooperation, though there are some multinational exercises like the RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) series. The goal of using Aegis ships and SM-3 interceptors to protect multiple nations likely will require a degree of multilateral collaboration that is beginning to emerge but has not yet been not adequately achieved.

The same applies to the Middle East and Persian Gulf, where multilateral collaboration is weaker than in the Asia-Pacific region, and even bilateral U.S. security ties to some countries are shaky. A security assistance effort already is underway to sell PAC-3 and THAAD missile interceptors, as well as X-band radars and command systems, to all six GCC allies, but if these national missile defenses are to be successful, they must be integrated to form an interoperable multinational system. A demanding political and diplomatic agenda, focused on enhanced multilateral cooperation in both regions, lies ahead. But if it can be mastered, it will not only provide the type of collaboration that is needed for coordinated missile defense programs, but also provide a stronger foundation for many different types of defense cooperation among countries that seek security from close partnership with the United States. A good step in the right direction has been the launching of a U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum, which first met in March 2012 and held its second session in September 2012. This Forum is intended to foster multilateral cooperation not only in trade and economics but also in security affairs including maritime security and ballistic missile defense protection.

A successful SM-3 missile defense effort thus provides a recipe for bolstering U.S. political influence abroad in key regions at a time when other security dynamics may be eroding this influence. This effort also will have the beneficial effect of reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in providing extended nuclear deterrence and lessening the incentives for protected countries to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. A balanced sense of perspective, however,

is necessary. U.S.-provided missile defenses can have a deterrent power of their own, and to the extent that they can reliably destroy incoming enemy nuclear warheads, they will reduce the need to rely on U.S. nuclear retaliatory strikes. But even capable SM-3 interceptors will not be able to provide an impenetrable umbrella over friendly and allied countries. If an enemy barrage attack is launched, statistical realities suggest that some warheads will reach their targets. In order to achieve fully effective deterrence, the United States will need to pursue a combination of missile defenses and continued, even if reduced, reliance on the threat of nuclear retaliation and advanced conventional arms,

Preserving the flexibility for handling diverse major regional conflicts. The new force-sizing construct calls for the capacity to wage two nearly-concurrent regional wars, not only because such a demanding event plausibly could occur, but also because of the need to be able to carry out one war while maintaining deterrence elsewhere. Yet the new construct scales back the 2-MTW construct by calling for only enough forces to wage one war fully while pursuing mainly defensive operations in the other. This narrowed focus coupled with the reduction of U.S. combat forces by about 8 percent creates the impression, in the eyes of critics, that the United States is pulling back its military horns and will be accepting greater risks in the years ahead. While some enhanced risk may exist in a technical sense, the larger strategic reality is more assuring.

The reductions taking place, particularly in ground forces, are mainly focused on discarding assets that were added to handle the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. When they are completed, as said earlier, the U.S. military will still have an active posture of 10 Army divisions, 3 Marine Expeditionary Forces, 10-11 carriers and 10 carrier air wings, and about 54 Air Force fighter squadrons. This is virtually the same posture that existed in 2001, when the U.S. military was commonly judged adequate for handling two full-scale regional wars. Perhaps this entire posture could be consumed, or even overstretched, by two concurrent wars each of which requires a major commitment of joint forces. But not all such wars are destined to be so demanding, and ongoing quality improvements to U.S. forces likely will mean that smaller forces will be needed to carry out operations that, in the past, necessitated larger

forces. A decade or two ago, for example, U.S. defense plans commonly assumed that 6-7 ground divisions, plus commensurate naval and air forces, would be needed for a major regional war. In future years, this standard calculus is likely to shift downward to 4-5 divisions equivalent or less and similarly fewer numbers of naval and air forces. If wartime requirements indeed decline in such ways, the future U.S. military posture may have greater scope, reach, and coverage capacity than surface appearances today suggest. Moreover, if one conflict is mainly a land war and the other is mainly a maritime war, the U.S. military may have ample assets for full-scale operations in both conflicts, and thus may not have to make such stark choices about where and when to conduct offensive operations.

The important issue may not be the overall size of the U.S. defense posture and the theoretical adequacy of the force-sizing construct, but instead whether the posture has the flexibility and responsiveness to handle multiple different types of regional wars, each of which could pose unique deployment requirements. As an illustration, a NATO conflict with Russia over the Baltic region would be mainly handled by European forces, but the United States could be required to commit something on the order of 1-2 Army divisions and 3-4 Air Force fighter wings. In the Asia-Pacific region, war on the Korean peninsula could require 6-7 Army and Marine divisions plus commensurate Air Force fighter squadrons, but a conflict with China over control of Western Pacific waters might necessitate the commitment of 4-6 carriers and multiple Air Force fighter squadrons with few ground forces. In the Persian Gulf, a war with Iran could require 3-4 carriers and 10-15 Air Force fighter squadrons, but a temporary invasion and stability operation in an East African state (e.g., Yemen) could require 2-3 divisions, 5-6 fighter squadrons, and 1-2 carriers. All of these force numbers are strictly estimates, but they illuminate a key strategic point. Future regional conflicts likely will not come in a one-size-fits-all form, and forces for them cannot be planned with a single cookie-cutter in mind.

Future regional defense plans will need to be flexible creations that are tailored to address the unique requirements that could arise in each case. U.S. forces will need to be large enough to meet their collective requirements but,

equally important, they will need to provide diverse joint assets that can be packaged and repackaged to provide the different combinations of capabilities that are needed in each case. Fortunately current U.S. forces have a wide array of such assets, but their sizing, training and equipping will have to be sustained and evolved if they are to keep providing the needed flexibility, adaptability, modularity, and agility. Such an approach, together with reasonable force-sizing standards, is likely to it likely serve better than focusing too rigidly on the theoretical dictates of one set of scenarios. The old force-sizing construct suffered from drawbacks in this arena: when the Kosovo war unexpectedly erupted in 1999, DOD officials had trouble extracting requisite air forces from canonical plans to wage war in Asia and the Persian Gulf. Avoiding such rigidity could be one of the most important features of future U.S. defense plans and postures.

Should the United States have to fight regional wars in the future, it must preserve the capacity to win them quickly and affordability. The Persian Gulf War of 1991, the Kosovo War of 1999, and the major combat phases of the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan in 2001 saw success achieved quickly with low casualties. But these conflicts were waged against opponents that were fighting out of their league. Future opponents may be better prepared, with better weapons and greater military skill, and they likely will employ asymmetric strategies to prolong the conflicts and inflict as much pain as they can on U.S. forces. The U.S. as a nation will need to be careful about engaging in regional wars that are hard to win, time-consuming, and costly. If U.S. forces are engaged, however, a combination of modernization and skillful preparation to improve U.S. forces' performance in combat can help reduce the duration and cost of the conflict. Effective execution of the two new operational concepts of globally integrated operations and cross-domain synergy would contribute significantly.

SOF assets must continue to be used effectively. These forces have established a justified reputation for operational excellence in Iraq and Afghanistan. But, in both places, they had the advantage of operating within the framework of established joint command structures and large conventional forces that

provided many supporting assets, including attack helicopters, ISR, and logistics. Such conventional forces will be available in foreseeable regional wars, but they may not be present in small conflicts that require only SOF, including stability operations, strikes against terrorists, and counterinsurgency. Using small SOF units alone is a manageable proposition, but using large SOF commitments that require conventional combat support is more demanding. DOD force planning will need to address how to overcome this problem—perhaps by affiliating a portion of the conventional posture with SOF.

A final imperative is to become more skillful at performing small operations with low-signature, small-footprint assets. This especially applies to small-scale strikes in multiple places that may rely on SOF assets backed by sophisticated ISR capabilities as well as limited air and naval forces. It also applies to such peacetime missions in conjunction with partner nations and helping them build modern militaries through training, exercises, visitations, and other consultations. The use of such partnership operations seems especially relevant to Africa, but it also applies in nearly all regions. A principal goal of such operations should be to achieve significant results through a modest commitment of resources.

Making the case against major additional defense budget cuts, and reducing wisely if they do occur. A looming menace to DOD's new defense agenda is the likelihood of prolonged budget cuts beyond those already programmed. Sequestration, which could mandate further reductions of $500 billion over the coming years, is but one of these. Senior DOD officials have warned against the dangers of sequestration, but even if this menace is avoided, the debate over future budgets and forces is unlikely to cease in this era of large federal budget deficits. Post-Vietnam cuts extended over seven years while those after the Reagan Build-up lasted for 11 years. In both cases spending fell more than 20 percent from the peak, more than the reductions from current planned cuts and sequestration combined. Already today, some critics are arguing that the DOD budget and force posture could be reduced by significant additional steps without damaging national security. What is to be made of this argument for lesser U.S. military power?

Addressing this question can best begin by acknowledging that there is no way to gauge future defense requirements through such single-minded terms as a fixed budget line, above which total success will always be guaranteed and below which abject failure will always be inevitable. Defense proponents will always see more defense resources as better, and fewer resources always worse. The real issue to gauge levels of confidence in the ability to meet national needs, and these typically shift up or down as resources rise or fall. DOD judges that its current defense agenda and budget will provide adequate confidence and acceptable, manageable risks. With this strategic judgment as a back-drop, it is fair to conclude that further reductions would reduce confidence levels and increase risks by some margin as a function of the size of reductions imposed. Minor reductions might not have greatly deleterious consequences, but truly deep cuts are another matter. For example, reducing U.S. forces to the point of being able to wage only one regional war, not two, could have a crippling impact on the overall U.S. defense strategy that would leave more than one region significantly less secure. Likewise, steep budget cutbacks might not only reduce DOD's top-line, but also result in major, damaging reductions to procurement spending, thus producing significantly slower modernization than now planned. If future global security affairs prove as dangerous as many observers now forecast, the combination of a hamstrung force posture and a slow modernization effort could push U.S. defense preparedness off a cliff and take U.S. national security strategy along with it.

What about countervailing arguments that instead of reducing further, U.S. defense budgets and forces should be enlarged above current plans? Here again, the judgment turns on whether enhanced confidence levels, and lower risks, are necessary. What can be said is that although the future U.S. military posture will provide more than bare-minimum adequacy and larger ground forces likely will not be needed, a plausible case can be made for somewhat larger naval and air forces especially in light of the new emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region. Likewise, a case can be made for larger procurement budgets that permit faster modernization than now planned. In the near-to-midterm, the United States is unlikely to face a need for the type of major defense buildup

that was required after September 11, 2001. But if national budget realities permit increased defense spending and larger forces than now planned, DOD will be able to make good use of them. After all, only a year ago DOD was planning to request an additional $50 billion a year through FY17 and beyond. If such a vision had a coherent rationale then, it likely will not disappear in the future. If only a modest portion of this funding could be restored, it could be used to help accelerate procurement and modernization—a high-priority effort in need of more resources.

Avoiding U.S. entanglement in large, sustained stability operations, while succeeding in limited operations that may be launched. In 2011, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates famously said that if any future U.S. official again contemplates a major land war in the Middle East, "he ought to have his head examined."[8] Although Secretary Gates later issued a more nuanced interpretation, he aptly portrayed the widespread U.S. frustration with having to carry out two major, costly stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for a decade and more. For many years, U.S. defense strategy avoided major entanglements in the Middle East. Although large U.S. forces were deployed to carry out *Desert Storm* in 1991, they were mostly withdrawn soon afterward, and DOD resorted to its traditional peacetime practice of stationing small, largely rotational, naval and air forces in the region. At the time that Iraq and Afghanistan were invaded, U.S. officials commonly were thinking only in terms of achieving regime-change, not pursuing nearly endless stability operations aimed at suppressing terrorism, insurgents, and ethnic and sectarian conflicts. The actual result shows not only the difficulties of prolonged stability operations but also the travails of becoming deeply entangled in treacherous regional politics.

DOD's new defense agenda proposes to solve this problem by recognizing that while small, temporary stability operations may be needed in the future, DOD will no longer size U.S. active forces for major, sustained stability operations. It further notes that if major stability operations again become necessary, DOD will resort to the use of Reserve Component forces as well as programs for re-inflating the force posture. This stance offers DOD two important strategic advantages. First, it lets DOD preserve the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan while

shifting attention away from its recent preoccupation with stability operations, their doctrines, and their force requirements. Second, it lets DOD return its focus to its previous, long-standing practice of concentrating its forces, budgets, and preparedness policies on fighting major wars against new-era opponents such as China and Iran. The implication is that as U.S. military forces transition away from stability operations, they will be able to devote much more attention to modern war-fighting doctrines and capabilities.

Is such a major turning away from prolonged stability operations wise, and can it actually be carried out in future years? Unfortunately the answer to this question is unclear. The nation has forgotten, to its regret, the lessons learned painfully from "small wars" in the past. Even if Iraq and Afghanistan will soon fade into the background of history, merely wishing away future stability operations, and not preparing for them, does not guarantee that they will never reoccur. East Africa, the location of several failing states of strategic importance, could provide reasons for such operations, small or large. Nuclear-armed Pakistan could descend into rampant turmoil in ways that mandate large U.S.-led stability operations. A post-war North Korea could require enormous stabilization commitments. It is plausible to imagine a war with Iran escalating to the point where some ground engagement might become necessary. In its efforts to embrace a new, sensible sense of priorities, DOD's intent to avoid major stability operations and future Middle East land wars is understandable. But if this stance translates into blindness toward a future contingency that may actually emerge, it will account for a weighty portion of the strategic risks that U.S. defense plans will face.

If some stability operations of at least limited size and duration seem likely to be mounted in the years ahead, the U.S. military will need to be prepared to carry them out successfully. An enduring lesson of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars is that although invading U.S. forces quickly swept over conventional militaries in both countries, they did not bring with them the skills and capabilities to prevent major insurgencies from gaining hold and escalating to the point of producing costly ten-year conflicts with mixed results. Clearly this is not a mistake to be made again. When future stability operations are launched,

U.S. forces must enter them with well-developed capabilities to suppress insurgent uprisings quickly, impose political and social order, and if necessary, perform reconstruction missions. Such operations will need to be mounted by well-prepared U.S. and coalition forces capable of performing comprehensive operations in conjunction with host governments, interagency partners, and international institutions, including non-traditional mission participants such as NGOs and commercial firms. Successful comprehensive operations in failed/failing states will never be easy. Paying close attention to their requirements will need to remain a focus of DOD and the interagency community.

Pursuing the new operational concept of globally integrated operations. Although U.S. forces already are globally postured and integrated in important ways, the new operational concept calls for many improvements to how they are structured and operated in this arena. Orchestrating these improvements will be demanding, and many obstacles in people, processes, organizations and technology will need to be overcome. Today's U.S. military posture has many impressive assets, but it is not configured to embrace this new operational concept without significant changes and innovations. The globally integrated operations concept must be taken seriously and pursued intently if it is to succeed.

The act of creating ultra-sophisticated global information networks and sensor grids will itself require major innovations, some of them costly and difficult. Sophisticated cyber and space assets also will be needed. The act of making multiple U.S. military commands fully cooperative while creating settings in which mission command approaches can work will require a host of innovations in command structures, doctrines, and practices. The same judgment applies to the act of making U.S. forces sufficiently agile to combine and recombine quickly, and being able to deploy swiftly anywhere in the world. High readiness across the force posture is needed to achieve this goal, as are programs aimed at prepositioning weapons and stocks overseas in multiple locations.

Combat forces stationed overseas are best suited to respond quickly to local emergencies, but when forces must be deployed from the United States, effective transportation assets, in the form of airlift and fast sealift, will be needed. These

will be especially challenged by the distances in the Asia-Pacific region. Low-signature and small-footprint assets like SOF often can deploy quickly, as can air forces, though they require airfields to bed them down. Naval strike forces and seaborne logistics are constrained by their rate of travel over long sea lanes, and can take two weeks or more to converge on distant scenes. The most difficult task is swiftly deploying large ground forces. Although some light ground forces can deploy by airlift, movement of heavier units requires transport of not only high-weight combat units but also their logistic support assets and war reserve stocks. When all of these assets are taken into account, a single heavy division can require sea transport of many thousands of tons of equipment and supplies. A month or two can be required to transport one division, and longer periods can be needed to deploy multiple divisions. All of these are physical impediments that cannot be fully overcome regardless of mobility programs pursued by the United States, but further progress on building capabilities for swift mobility operations can lessen the time lost to inefficiency and ineffectiveness.

It will be challenging to fuse ground, air, and naval forces, plus space and cyber, to achieve ultra-high interoperability and joint integration in the ways required to seize the initiative, achieve cross-domain synergy, ward off threats, and decisively overpower well-armed adversaries. U.S. forces, of course, have been striving for interoperability and joint integration for years, but much still needs to be done to meet the demanding standards of the new operational concept. This will be especially true in cases when joint combat operations must begin before the deployment process is complete. In such contingencies, SOF, cyber, and space assets might begin operations quickly, air and naval forces engage as they arrive, and ground forces arrive later in serial fashion and be committed to combat as capabilities are ready. Clearly this is not the way the U.S. would want to fight, and for a U.S. military used to the luxury of fully deploying all forces and carefully preparing them before combat begins, this would be a new and difficult way of fighting wars. But it may be necessary. New-era training, exercises, and doctrine will all need to be designed to provide the requisite knowledge, skills, and capabilities.

A further complication is that future U.S. forces will need to be configured not only to carry out big, sophisticated combat operations against well-armed opponents, but also to carry out a host of smaller but demanding missions adroitly. These include strikes against terrorists and WMD sites, cyber and space defense, counterinsurgency, temporary stability missions, and humanitarian relief operations. The U.S. military will need to learn how to perform such operations with relatively small forces and how to achieve success quickly. What must be avoided is again becoming bogged down for years in expensive counterinsurgency campaigns and stability operations that cause high casualties and fall short of their goals.

The key point is that the concept of globally integrated operations is not an idea on the margins. It provides an exciting and promising vision for shaping the Joint Force 2020 and how it operates, but it is built on a very ambitious and demanding set of interconnected approaches that will require years of effort and change to master. All of DOD, including all commands and services, will need to buy into the enterprise. A multi-year implementation strategy and plan will be needed to ensure that it is not only launched properly but also pursued seriously with concrete results in mind. If it fails, U.S. forces are likely to be worse off since a core element of the strategy for using them will not be in place. If it succeeds, however, they will be better prepared for a demanding future of many diverse missions.

Pursuing the assured access concept vigorously and successfully. For the past two decades, the U.S. military has not confronted serious enemy A2/AD threats, but for Cold War veterans, the prospect of growing threats in this arena is nothing new. Recalling Cold War history can help focus on the types of new-era U.S. improvement efforts—not only joint doctrinal fusion but also force commitments and modernization programs—that will be needed to overcome such threats posed by China, Iran, and other adversaries.

During the 1970s and 1980s, DOD pursued a major effort to speed the deployment of CONUS-based air and ground forces to Central Europe in a crisis. Building on a peacetime stationed posture of 4 Army divisions and 8 Air Force fighter wings, its goal was to use strategic airlift and prepositioned assets

to elevate its deployed forces to fully 10 divisions and 20 fighter wings within ten days. Afterward it planned to send additional divisions and supplies by fast sealift so they could arrive within a month or so. In response, the Soviet military developed plans and capabilities aimed at rebuffing this U.S. reinforcement effort. In particular, the Soviets planned to employ their large air posture of about 2000 ground-attack fighters and 400 medium bombers to launch massive strikes against U.S. air bases, prepositioned equipment sites, supply depots, and rail and road networks leading to the forward areas. In addition, they planned to use their large force of attack submarines and Backfire bombers carrying cruise missiles to sink U.S. convoys transiting the North Atlantic from CONUS.

For the U.S. military, countering this Soviet A2/AD threat was imperative to bolster NATO's defense posture and carry out its defense strategy of forward defense and flexible response. DOD responded with an alacrity that included forces, funding, and modernization programs. In Central Europe, the United States and NATO took vigorous steps such as deploying F-15 interceptors and Patriot air defense batteries in order to rebuff Soviet air attacks. In addition, they hardened air bases, ports, and reception facilities, dispersed prepositioned equipment sites, and improved their capacity to repair roads, rail lines, and petroleum, oil, and lubricating pipelines. At sea, the U.S. Navy planned to deploy multiple carrier battle groups and other assets into the northern waters above Iceland and Greenland to contest Soviet naval and air forces before they could reach the North Atlantic sea lanes. U.S. naval forces were modernized with new fighters, defense missiles, and other hardware so they could not only protect U.S. carriers, but also inflict major damage on approaching Soviet bombers and submarines. The AirLand Battle concept, a form of alliance A2/AD, brought improved C4ISR capabilities, precision munitions and aggressive maneuver to threaten Soviet second echelon forces before they could engage. Overall, this vigorous effort succeeded. By the time the Cold War ended in 1990, the U.S. military possessed a far better capability, in the face of enemy opposition, to gain assured access to Central Europe as well as the northern and southern flanks.[9]

In the years ahead, gaining assured access in the Asia-Pacific region and the Persian Gulf will be a comparably important imperative, and it will need to be carried out in the face of sophisticated A2/AD campaigns by China, Iran, and other potential adversaries. The JOAC presents a well-designed operational concept for this mission, and correctly calls for the joint fusion of U.S. forces in order to achieve swift deployments and cross-domain synergy. But while the DOD strategic response must start with the JOAC agenda, it cannot be only a conceptual plan, but must be accompanied by concerted action that brings it to operational life. This especially will be the case in the Western Pacific. In addition to employing cyber and space assets effectively, DOD will need to deploy an integrated system of SM-3, THAAD, and Patriot batteries in order to provide robust defense of U.S. forces and allied territory against potential Chinese attacks by high volumes of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. DOD also will need to be able to engage large numbers of attack submarines rapidly in order to counter Chinese undersea threats. Moreover, DOD will need to be able to launch long-distance strikes with bombers, cruise missiles, and unmanned capabilities. When the situation permits, DOD will need to be able to deploy a significant number of carrier strike groups and tactical fighter squadrons into forward areas, protect them once they have arrived, and use them to conduct coordinated offensive strikes. The need for improved assured access capabilities applies to the Persian Gulf also in order to counter Iranian capabilities for strikes against U.S. forces, allies, and sea lanes.

As during the Cold War, this demanding access agenda will mandate a sophisticated, coordinated, and multifaceted U.S. military response. The new operational concepts and associated doctrines are only a first step of a comprehensive effort that will require effective forces, adequate funds, necessary modernization programs and serious new ways of thinking to implement cross-domain synergy. The bottom line is that assured access cannot be allowed to reside only in the JOAC. It must be brought to life by responsive, far-sighted DOD plans, programs, budgets and leadership. To achieve this, assured access must be elevated to become a centerpiece goal of the emerging U.S. defense agenda.

Preserving high readiness while modernizing faster and affordably. Observers of the new U.S. defense agenda typically praise DOD for placing top priority on preserving high readiness, not only because readiness is a military virtue but also because it can help compensate for ongoing force reductions. Yet some critics are expressing worry that DOD's procurement budgets for the coming years will not be large enough to sustain adequate modernization during a period in which all services will need new weapons and associated systems, sometimes in large amounts. These critics have a valid point. Larger procurement budgets will be needed in the coming years. The vexing question is whether and how they can be funded with the constrained DOD budgets that will be available.

The DOD procurement budget for FY13 of about $99 billion is larger than the budget of $75 billion that existed as recently as 2005, but nearly one-half of the increase is due to inflation, which means that real spending has increased by only $10-15 billion . An additional complication is that roughly one-half of the current procurement budget must be allocated to secondary items such as trucks, which means that only about $50 billion is available for major end items: i.e. new weapon systems. During the George W. Bush Administration, DOD officials hoped to fund the coming new wave of modernization by elevating procurement spending to $120 billion or more. But the recent defense budget cuts have put an end to this hope. If future procurement budgets continue to capture only 20 percent of the total budget—i.e. well-less than the historical norm of 25 to 30 percent when vigorous modernization was being pursued—they will grow by about 2 percent per year through FY17, and virtually all of this increase will be eaten by inflation. If so, the implication is that DOD will be hard-pressed to fund the procurement of 2,400 F-35 fighters and other aircraft, more UAS, new naval combatants and other ships, and new equipment for the Army once decisions are made on which models to acquire.

If larger DOD budgets become available, they could help alleviate the coming procurement and modernization crunch. If not, DOD will face a difficult choice: either make do with insufficient procurement budgets, or try to find savings elsewhere that can be switched to procurement. If about $10 billion

annually could be saved and reinvested in this way, it would not only elevate the procurement budget by this amount in real terms, but also increase the funds that could be spent on major end items by fully 20 percent, a sizable gain. Where could such savings be found? One potential candidate is DOD's O&M budget of $209 billion. About half of this spending is needed to fund force readiness, but the remainder is spent on infrastructure and related accounts. Trimming the O&M budget by $5 billion would be a cut of only 2.4 percent, and it could provide one-half of the savings envisioned here for procurement. Another candidate is the RDT&E budget, currently funded at $69 billion. An effort to find savings of $5 billion would mean cutting the RDT&E budget by 7 percent: an appreciable amount but not necessarily crippling if DOD accelerates its ongoing efforts to achieve greater efficiency in RDT&E programs. Finding such savings in O&M and RDT&E doubtless would require painful sacrifices, but if the consequence is faster modernization in critical areas, U.S. military preparedness might gain in the exchange.

Strengthening Cyber Defense and Security. Little more than five years ago, the idea of paying close attention to cyber defense and security was mostly confined to a narrow range of technical specialists concerned with criminal attacks and harassments of U.S. military and civilian computers. Recently this situation has undergone a dramatic change in awareness and attention—it now preoccupies senior DOD civilian and military leaders—because the potential for much bigger and more damaging attacks launched by foreign adversaries and terrorist groups has grown. Today senior DOD and USG officials are justifiably worried about major attacks aimed at inflicting catastrophic damage to DOD information systems as well as national infrastructure including electrical power grids, water supplies, transportation networks, and business corporations. Indeed, a calamitous scenario envisions a "cyber Pearl Harbor" aimed at inflicting paralyzing damage that rivals or exceeds the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. More likely is a rapid, but not complete, degradation of capability, followed by a restoration over time. The goal will be to minimize the extent of the degradation and accelerate the restoration. Preparing to address such major attacks is destined to become a major mission and focus of DOD

and other government agencies in the coming years. To do so will require a comprehensive U.S. response. Many important steps are now being taken, but whether they will be backed by the necessary resources, technologies, organizations, policies, and legislation, many of which are beyond DOD's control, remains to be seen.

Secretary of Defense Panetta emphasized the importance of cyber defense in a speech in October 2012 entitled "Defending the Nation From Cyber Attack."[10] Arguing that DOD and USG are well-aware of growing cyber threats, Secretary Panetta outlined an agenda of three parts. The first is a well-funded effort to develop new cyber defense capabilities in the form of trained workers, sensors, and software that will permit DOD and the USG to detect cyber threats, defend against them, and retaliate in appropriate ways when attribution can be determined. The second part is organizational innovation, and it includes strengthening DOD's new Cyber Command that is collocated with the National Security Agency, and that will work closely with the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and other agencies that perform domestic cyber security. The third step is to strengthen partnerships not only with U.S. domestic agencies but also with global friends and allies. Panetta voiced optimism about the ultimate success of this three-part effort, but expressed concern about whether Congress will pass the necessary enabling legislation.

While this comprehensive program seems well-tailored to defend the continental United States and its allies from cyber attack, an additional, parallel effort is clearly needed and is already being pursued: configuring future U.S. military forces to conduct combat operations in settings where the contestants will be employing cyber capabilities to gain operational advantages both in deploying and employing joint forces. A looming reality is that future U.S. joint forces will need to operate effectively in cyber space if they are to deploy swiftly to battle zones, gain effective access, and carry out defensive and offensive operations against opponents. Likewise, U.S. offensive cyber operations can aspire to degrade the forces and capabilities of opponents significantly. In response to this challenge, DOD is configuring its principal combatant commands with assigned cyber staffs, and taking steps to ensure that they can work

closely with each other and the Cyber Command. Such efforts make sense, indeed they are essential to achieve the cross domain synergy, but coordinating the activities of multiple component cyber commands, often across multiple regions, will doubtless further complicate future joint operations.

Adapting DOD processes and people to rapid changed in the strategic environment and in military and dual use technologies. One of the key features of the early 21st century is the rapid rate at which new technologies, including military technologies, have been evolving, often in eye-popping ways. Little more than a decade ago, the idea of pursuing information networking as a centerpiece of U.S. defense transformation was widely regarded as visionary, revolutionary, and charting mostly unknown territory. Today, it has become commonplace: advanced information systems have been installed in virtually all U.S. force components, have brought major gains in effectiveness and efficiency, are now taken for granted, and more of them are in demand. Moreover, information technologies are changing the winners and losers in economies, the way nations interact, and the way our children think. These are issues for policymakers, commanders, and Ambassadors, not just technical experts. What comparable technological revolutions with military consequences lie ahead in the coming decade?

This question is hard to answer precisely, but clearly unmanned systems will play increasingly important roles in future military operations as well as civilian affairs. Within Air Force and Navy, significant numbers of UASs will be operating alongside manned aircrafts and in some cases replacing them, performing not only ISR missions, but also air intercept and ground attack missions in growing ways. Indeed, newspaper articles are writing of a future in which UAS aircraft will be populating the skies over CONUS in growing numbers, performing functions ranging from police operations to watching forests for fires. There are great parallel revolutions underway in areas such as biology, robotics, information systems and cognitive science, nanotechnology and new materials, and energy approaches (BRINE).[11] Precisely what these trends portend is not clear, but it is likely to be considerable. Will the future battlefield be heavily populated by multiple different robots, miniaturized weapons and munitions made possible by nanotechnologies, and computers

making judgments? How can defenses deal with swarming attacks. What other developments may yet emerge. But it is worth remembering that many of the new technologies will be dual use: they will be applied in both the domestic economy and U.S. military forces, thereby affecting each other in interactive ways, and also being available to adversaries.

Even if the technological future unfolds in evolutionary (not revolutionary) ways, it is likely to be very important to military operations, yet it has not figured heavily into public discussions of the new U.S. defense agenda. Not only are new technologies likely affect military operations, but they also are shaping the international security environment. The increase in emphasis placed on the strategic impacts of technology between January's DSG and September's CCJO is striking. The velocity of technological change is such that linear projection cannot work as a basis for planning.[12] More thinking, analyzing, and explaining should be done in this arena, not only to increase public awareness, but also to determine how emerging U.S. defense plans and programs may need to be altered within a decade or so, and to help make the important related decisions that may lie ahead.

NOTES

[1] Leon E. Panetta, speech, *The Force of the 21st Century*, National Press Club, Washington, DC, December 18, 2012, available at <www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1742>.

[2] For background history of U.S. military participation in NATO defense affairs during the Cold War, see Richard L. Kugler, *Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003). NATO still was able to achieve these changes despite major U.S. commitments like Vietnam.

[3] For geopolitical analysis of global security affairs, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2012).

[4] For analysis, see Aaron L. Friedberg, *A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2011); Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, "How China Sees America: The Sum of Beijing's Fears," *Foreign Affairs* 91, no. 5 (September/October 2012), 32–49.

[5] For one alternative, see T.X. Hammes, *Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict*, Strategic Forum 278 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2012).

[6] For analysis, see Colin H. Kahl and Kenneth Waltz, "Iran and the Bomb: Would a nuclear Iran make the Middle East More Secure?/Waltz Replies," *Foreign Affairs* 91, no. 5 (September/October 2012), 157–162.

[7] For analysis of U.S. missile defense programs, see *Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2010).

[8] Robert M. Gates, speech, United States Military Academy, West Point, February 25, 2011, available at <www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1539>.

[9] NATO's pursuit of rapid reinforcement programs and capabilities against Soviet opposition especially accelerated during its Long-Term Defense Plan of the late 1990s and Conventional Defense Improvement effort of the 1980s.

[10] See Panetta, *Remarks by Secretary Panetta on Cybersecurity to the Business Executives for National Security*; Jim Garamore, "Panetta Spells Out DOD Roles in Cyber Defense," American Forces Press Service, October 12, 2012, available at <www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=118187>.

[11] Linton Wells II, "Tech Changes Affect U.S. Security," *Defense News*, January 22, 2012.

[12] See, for example, Linton Wells II, "Managing Network Risk in Times of Rapid Change: Implications for DOD IT Investments and Enterprise Architectures," unpublished paper.

PURSING IMPLEMENTATION PLANS ENERGETICALLY

This paper judges that DOD has produced a sensible and comprehensive approach to aligning its responses to the increasingly complex international landscape with the reality of smaller forces and shrinking budgets. The combination of focusing more intently on the Asia-Pacific region, enhancing the strategic performance of regional combatant commands, adopting the new CCJO, bolstering capabilities for assured access and in other areas, and strengthening cooperation with allies and partners offers the promise of promoting U.S. security goals in all key regions. This leads to a tripartite agenda of political-military, operational and force structure changes composed of six interacting parts. The concepts behind several of these changes, however, are still in the early stages of development, and further maturation and testing will be needed before they can be judged knowledgeably.

Whether DOD will muster and sustain the capacity to carry out this complex, wide-ranging construct also remains to be seen. The many interacting parts of the agenda raise thorny issues that can't be finessed. Success will require exceptional skill in using scarce resources, pursuing difficult innovations, and fielding a flexible and agile future force posture. The concepts behind several of these changes, however, are still in the early stages of development, and aggressive maturation and testing will be needed. Plausible alternatives still should be considered, such as the Offshore Control strategy discussed earlier.[1] If these are done well, the future, smaller DOD military posture should be capable of protecting U.S. national interests with acceptable, manageable risks. But implementation will be a challenge.

Implementing the emerging agenda successfully will demand coordinated, persistent, whole-of-government, public-private, and transnational approaches. Collectively, the agenda generates 15 important issues which are detailed in the *Handling Key Strategic Issues* section above. Many of these are not fully under

DOD's control, so an important question is "How to increase the chances for success" when there is no unity of command?

A central recommendation of this study is that DOD should "double down" on the cross-cutting aspects of its plans to deliver *globally integrated operations* and *cross domain synergy* while helping the military Services exercise their Title 10 responsibilities to organize, train, and equip in ways that can come together quickly to form a cohesive, joint whole. Innovation under constrained resources has succeeded in the past, but concept development and experimentation needs to be done effectively, and tied to outcomes such as new equipment or procedures. Beside the high end capabilities required by the JOAC and other mission areas, low end concepts such as "Quick Wins at Low Cost" that look to deploy capabilities in months for a few thousands of dollars instead of multi-year proposals with multi-billion dollar budgets deserve attention.[2]

Key processes will have to be institutionalized and improved if these initiatives are to be implemented quickly sustained across successive personalities and administrations. This is especially true where rapidly changing areas such as information technology and C4ISR are involved. DOD has five core processes: JCIDS, PPBE, 5000 series acquisition, JOPES, and the personnel assignment system. These must be made nimble enough to meet the challenges—history does not provide grounds for optimism. Serious efforts were made during the George W. Bush administration to improve integration among requirements (JCIDS) and acquisition (PPBE and 5000 series) activities, without lasting success. DOD leadership needs to make improving them a high priority so that all five systems and processes function effectively to meet emerging demands, and anticipate them where possible. Legislative support also may be needed, but that is outside the scope of this study.

Sustained, unconventional governance will be essential—something DOD has not often done well before. New capabilities in DOD staffs and operators must be supplemented with public-private, whole of government, and transnational forms of cooperation. As described in the Anticipatory Governance initiative,[3] government-wide institutions should be networked to minimize stovepipes and maximize information flow. Feedback mechanisms must be in

place to track progress and identify divergence from guidance early. Underlying assumptions need to be revisited frequently, and policies, strategies, and plans adjusted. Actionable foresight will be needed to deliver insights to decision makers early enough for them to act on the knowledge.

Changes in training, exercises, and educational curricula must be an integral part of the mix since no lesson is every really "learned" until behavior changes. General Dempsey's white papers on Profession of Arms, and especially, Joint Education and Mission Command, highlight the need to develop creative, agile thinkers who can act effectively and differently in unpredictable, complex and dangerous environments. The joint education paper specifically highlights the need for professional educational programs that develop leaders who can not only think critically, but also can understand the global security environment, design campaigns at the operational level, sustain mission command, enable jointness, and master competitive advantages. We must be able to outthink our opponents.

In sum, the multiple changes being pursued by DOD need to be implemented through balanced approaches among people, processes, organizations, and technology. Pursuing them will require new types of thinking, and outcome-based, not input-based analysis. Planning and execution in a world with many simultaneously moving parts is challenging, but also one that could prove invigorating. Traditional methodologies such as strategic evaluation, systems analysis, operations research, and computer simulations can still be useful, but to remain relevant in an increasingly non-linear world they will need to be equipped with new conceptual frameworks, data, models, and calculations. In this sense, the fundamentals of how to perform defense analyses are changing.

The coming decade will be interesting and demanding. The goals are worthwhile, the barriers longstanding, the fiscal climate unforgiving, and the security environment complex. DOD has faced and surmounted such stiff challenges before. The looming issue is how to do so again.

NOTES

[1] T.X. Hammes, *Offshore Control*.

[2] For examples in a NATO context, see Derrick Neal and Linton II Wells, ed., *Capabilities Development in Support of Comprehensive Approaches: Transforming International Civil-Military Interactions* (Washington DC: NDU Press, 2011), available at <www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/ITX2_Capability%20Development%20for%20CA.pdf >

[3] Leon S. Fuerth with Evan M.H. Faber, *Anticipatory Governance: Practical Upgrades* (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2012), available at <http://forwardengagement.org/images/stories/anticipatory_governance_practical_upgrades.pdf>.

APPENDIX

CONVENTIONAL MILITARY TRENDS IN EUROPE, ASIA-PACIFIC, AND THE PERSIAN GULF

As DOD pursues its new defense agenda in Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, and the Persian Gulf, it will need not only to work within the framework of conventional military trends there, but also strive to shape these trends in ways that contribute to achieving such multiple goals as deterrence, defense, security of allies, expansion of partnership relations, and stable security affairs. Whereas the text provided summary strategic judgments about how these trends are currently unfolding, this technical Appendix provides additional data on them. Three major conclusions stand out:

- In Europe, NATO allies together provide the world's second strongest military power (next to the United States). But their defense budgets and force postures are steadily shrinking in response to austerity conditions. More important, together they are capable of deploying only about 10 percent of their forces for expeditionary missions, a total that falls well short of NATO's requirements and Level of Ambition (LOA), which calls for 40 to 50 percent of forces to be deployable. Improving their deployable forces and capabilities is a high-priority goal in future years.
- In the Asia-Pacific region, the most dominant trend is China's increasingly well-funded, ambitious force modernization effort, which is steadily expanding that country's power-projection assets, maritime dominance capabilities, and capacity to threaten Taiwan. North Korea, of course, continues to pose a serious military threat to peace on the Korean peninsula. But such close U.S. allies as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and others have sizable military budgets and forces of their own, and are pursuing modernization efforts. These allied forces, supported by deployed U.S. forces, help bring a sense of balance to the region in ways that counteract China. The main impediment is that while these allied forces cooperate with U.S. forces, they do not work

together in ways that create collective defense assets of the sort possessed by NATO. Fostering a greater sense of multilateral cooperation by them is a high-priority goal.

- In the Persian Gulf, Iran's alleged efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems have attracted the greatest attention among the United States, Israel, and GCC allies. But in quieter ways, the Iranian military is acquiring improved conventional forces and capabilities—e.g., air defenses, offensive missiles, naval patrol craft, and mines—that are posing a growing threat to the Strait of Hormuz, Persian Gulf shipping lanes, and the nearby GCC countries. Countering this Iranian threat will be a primary mission for deployed U.S. forces. But the GCC countries can contribute as well: they possess modern fighter aircraft and other important naval and ground forces, and they are acquiring sophisticated missile defenses. In the years ahead, encouraging the GCC countries to pursue multilateral cooperation and collective defense will be critical to determining whether maximum strategic value can be gained from their military preparedness efforts.

NATO Europe: The Troubled Quest for Better Deployable Forces and Capabilities. Today the NATO European allies are spending about $287 billion on defense annually, and they field militaries that total about two million active-duty personnel. But troubling trends are unfolding in both arenas. Europe's defense spending has fallen to only 1.6 percent of GDP, real defense spending (discounting inflation) has declined by about 5 percent in recent years, and the budgets of several countries are slated to be reduced in the future. Such reductions will further constrain European investment spending on RDT&E and procurement, which currently totals only about $50 billion annually: less than one-third of U.S. investment spending. Manpower is also being pared. Of Europe's manpower total of two million, only about one million personnel are allocated to modern military forces that can perform demanding missions. Owing to ongoing force cuts, this pool of modern forces is likely to be reduced to about 850,000 in future years. Especially noteworthy are sizable cuts to Europe's best-prepared forces: those of Britain, France, and Germany. All three

countries are headed toward reduced postures of only 150,000-185,000 personnel apiece, which will be distributed among relatively small numbers of ground brigades, fighter aircraft, and naval combatants. Their forces will remain modern and strong, but as they are aware, they will need to consider pooling their forces in order to launch major operations.

TABLE 1. NATO EUROPE'S PRINCIPAL COMBAT FORCES IN 2012

	Ground brigades	*Fighter aircraft*	*Naval combatants*
Modern militaries	54	1,368	153
Other original members	62	664	61
New members	37	316	18
Total	153	2,348	232

As table 1 shows, today NATO Europe fields a total of 153 ground brigades, 2348 fighter aircraft, and 232 naval combatants. But not all of these forces are equipped with modern weapons, high readiness, and training regimes that make them usable in demanding combat operations. NATO's best-prepared forces are concentrated mostly in the wealthy countries of northwestern Europe and Italy; forces from other southern region countries and new members mostly fall into a lower category of preparedness. Owing to this disparity, NATO's well-armed, well-prepared forces total about 70 brigades, 1600 fighters, and 170 warships. As a result of ongoing force cuts, this usable posture likely will be reduced by 15 to 20 percent in the coming years. NATO Europe will not be left defenseless. But its future well-armed forces will be smaller than those fielded by the United States—with comparable ground forces, somewhat fewer fighter aircraft, and far smaller blue-water naval forces that lack the sizable numbers of carriers, cruisers, and amphibious ships needed for major naval combat operations.

These downward trends are further exacerbating an already-existing serious problem that arises because of NATO Europe's lack of adequate forces and capabilities for major deployment missions and expeditionary operations in

distant areas. In recent years, NATO Europe has had the military wherewithal to deploy about 35,000 troops to ISAF in Afghanistan, to carry out its bombardment campaign in Libya with significant U.S. support, and to pursue numerous small operations in such places as Kosovo and Africa. But the act of mounting bigger, more-demanding expeditionary operations is another, more-problematic matter because, Britain and France aside, European forces remain mostly configured for local border defense missions. NATO has never publicly put forth an official estimate of its power-projection capabilities, but a common appraisal is that NATO could swiftly deploy only about 10 percent of its forces: e.g., four divisions, 200-250 fighters, and 20-25 naval combatants over 2-3 months. This limited deployment capacity is not only far less than possessed by U.S. forces, but falls far short of that required by NATO's own defense strategy.

NATO might be challenged by the task of swiftly deploying enough forces to defend its Baltic members if they are threatened by Russia in a major way, and it would face far bigger problems trying to deploy more than a single ground corps and comparable air and sea assets to distant areas outside Europe. In order to meet both requirements concurrently, NATO's LOA calls for the capacity to deploy enough forces to handle 2 major joint operations and 4 small joint operations. Such a capability would require concurrent deployment of 40 to 50 percent of NATO's existing forces. As a result, NATO today is capable of meeting only about one-fourth of its deployment needs. NATO's LOA is criticized in some quarters as being too ambitious, but even if a more prudent standard is employed, the gap between NATO's limited capabilities and demanding requirements is quite large: large enough to prevent NATO Europe from being anywhere near a co-equal partner with the United States in this arena.

A major issue is whether the emerging NATO European efforts to pursue Smart Defense and NATO Forces 2020 can appreciably close this wide gap. NATO Europe does not need to assemble larger numbers of forces, but it does need to remedy major deficiencies in critical enablers such as modern C4ISR systems, combat support aircraft, naval warships, air and sea mobility assets,

precision-guided munitions, and long-distance logistics support. Owing to slow but steady progress in recent years, fortunately many of these assets already exist, but they are widely scattered across Europe. They need to be brought together through cooperative measures so that they can be made available in adequate numbers to deploying forces. In some areas, increased assets are needed, but most of them are affordable only if proper priorities are set. The task of doing better seems daunting, but far from impossible. If NATO Europe could double its deployment capabilities in the next decade, this would be a major accomplishment even if the LOA is never fully met.

Hope comes from the growing awareness of several European countries that if they are to achieve such a goal, they will need to pursue enhanced multinational cooperation and otherwise blend their separate national forces together. Most notably has been recent signing of the British-French Defense Cooperation Treaty, which calls for blended forces for performing expeditionary missions. Germany has been pursuing multinational cooperation with France, Poland, and other countries in such areas as UAS aircraft and other technologies. Likewise, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark have been strengthening their cooperation in several areas. NATO already is starting to see the fruits of these efforts: examples are the act of creating a small strategic air transport wing and the recent decision to establish a hub in Italy for blending multinational surveillance assets including Global Hawk. These are small steps in the right direction, and if they can be enlarged upon, perhaps NATO may succeed in making significant progress in the coming years.

The Asia-Pacific Region: Coping with China and Defending South Korea While Pursuing Enhanced Partnerships with Friends and Allies. The most important trend in the Asia-Pacific region is China's ongoing emergence as a well-armed military power potentially capable of affecting regional security affairs, menacing close U.S. allies, and challenging U.S. forces. Military trends in China are addressed by DOD's *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2012*.[1] This study reports that according to DOD estimates, China today is spending between $120 and $180 billion annually on defense preparedness. This spending allows China to

field a People's Liberation Army (PLA) ground force of 1.25 million troops plus another 800,000 personnel allocated to navy, air, and missile forces. In addition to its small but significant number of nuclear-tipped missiles, China's force posture totals about 38 PLA divisions and 37 independent brigades, 2100 combat aircraft, and 130 naval surface combatants plus 53 attack submarines of which 5 are nuclear-powered. China's defense strategy is guided by an operational doctrine of "active defense." This strategy and doctrine calls upon China's military posture to defend the homeland and also to prepare for outward-looking missions. Such missions include presence missions in the Western Pacific and nearby waters, selective global deployments, fighting local regional wars, and carrying out potential operations against Taiwan and in the Taiwan Strait in ways that contest U.S. forces for supremacy there.

As DOD's study says, preparing for potential contingencies in the Taiwan Strait is a principal focus and driver of much of China's military investment efforts. China's military modernization program is focused on acquiring integrated C4ISR systems, advanced cruise missiles, conventional ballistic missiles, anti-ship missiles, counter-space weapons, and military cyberspace capabilities as well as integrated air defenses, undersea warfare, modern fighters, and warships that include China's first carrier. Among these modernization trends, the PLA is transitioning to a modular brigade structure while acquiring new armored vehicles, attack helicopters, artillery, and air defense weapons. The PLA Air Force is acquiring modern fighters and air defense missiles, flight testing its first prototype stealth fighter, acquiring improved long-range strategic transports, and developing ballistic missile defenses. The PLA Navy is focusing on employing new warships and other systems to strengthen its anti-air and anti-surface warfare capabilities, and is commissioning its Russian-built aircraft carrier for sea trials while striving to build its first home-produced carrier. These comprehensive modernization programs will not bear full fruit until 2020 or so. But when they come to fruition and are forged together, they could pose a serious threat to Taiwan and U.S. forces operating in the Western Pacific, including carriers, air bases, and reinforcements sent to defend the Taiwan Strait.

TABLE 2. MILITARY FORCES OF CHINA AND TAIWAN IN 2012

	All PRC	*PRC forces near Taiwan*	*Taiwan*
Divisions/brigades	38/37	16/18	0/17
Fighter aircraft	2,100	500	410
Surface combatants	130	94	42
Submarines	53	32	4

The DOD study reports that about one-fourth of China's Army—400,000 troops that include 16 divisions and 18 brigades— as well as 500 combat aircraft, and 126 warships are concentrated in eastern regions near Taiwan. In a contingency, of course, they could be reinforced by assets drawn from elsewhere. In its strategy to defend its homeland against this threat, Taiwan fields a military posture of 130,000 personnel that provide 17 ground brigades, 410 fighter aircraft, and 46 naval warships. The DOD study judges that today, China would be hard-pressed to mount a full-scale amphibious invasion of Taiwan, but it could launch a wide spectrum of lesser offensive operations, including a limited maritime quarantine or blockade, air and missile attacks on Taiwan, and efforts to assert military control over the Taiwan Strait. Such operations could be inspired by political goals, such as coercing the Taiwan government or driving away U.S. naval and air forces. In future years, China's advantages and options against Taiwan will increase owing both to China's fast rate of military modernization and Taiwan's comparatively slower rate. For the United States, the key strategic implication is that U.S. forces will need to consider crisis responses and contingency operations in the Taiwan Strait for a long time to come.

A similar judgment calling for U.S. awareness and preparedness applies to deterrence and defense on the Korean peninsula. In recent years, North Korea's effort to acquire nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems has attracted the greatest public attention as well as U.S.-led diplomatic pressures to contain and dismantle them. Behind the scenes, meanwhile, North Korea continues to pose a major offensive military threat to South Korea: especially to Seoul, which is located only about 25 miles from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The International

Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) *Military Balance 2012* reports that North Korea's conventional military posture includes 1.2 million active personnel, 32 ground divisions and 29 separate brigades, 3,500 tanks and over 20,000 artillery pieces of varying types, 603 combat aircraft, and 72 tactical submarines and 383 patrol boats/coastal combatants.[2] To defend against this threat, South Korea fields a military posture of 655,000 active personnel, 24 ground divisions and 14 separate brigades, 390 combat aircraft, and a navy of 23 tactical submarines, 28 surface combatants, and 110 patrol boats/coastal combatants. This posture is well-armed and well-trained, and it benefits from U.S. support in command and control, ISR, and other areas.

TABLE 3. MILITARY BALANCE ON KOREAN PENINSULA IN 2012

	North Korea (DPRK)	*South Korea (ROK)*
Divisions/brigades	32/39	24/14
Fighter aircraft	603	390
Surface combatants	3	28
Patrol craft	383	110
Submarines	72	23

Surface appearances suggest that North Korea possesses a significant numerical advantage over South Korea. Magnifying the danger is the concentration of large North Korean forces near the DMZ in an attack posture. Yet, closer inspection shows a more balanced situation. South Korea spends about $28 billion annually on its military posture. As a result, South Korea's forces are generally better trained, more ready, and have greater staying power than their adversary, whose readiness and mastery of modern doctrine are suspect. Moreover, the DMZ terrain favors the defender in important ways. The Korean peninsula is narrow, and thus can be defended by a ROK Army of 24 divisions. Moreover, the ROK Army is deeply entrenched on terrain that is highly mountainous, presenting only three narrow attack corridors that can be readily blocked with forces and fires. If North Korea were to launch a full-scale invasion, it would be hard-pressed to defeat the ROK Army and conquer all of South

Korea. But it might be able to advance far enough to capture Seoul or at least destroy it with devastating artillery fires. In order to help deter such an attack, a continuing U.S. military presence of limited ground and air forces is needed in South Korea. In a full-scale war, large U.S. air and naval reinforcements would be needed, and if reversals are encountered, sizable U.S. ground forces could be required as well. For the foreseeable future, the Korean peninsula will remain a location where a major regional war could break out in ways that necessitate a major U.S. commitment of joint forces from all components.

The Asian military balance contains forces from other countries than those arrayed along the Taiwan Strait and on the Korean peninsula. A particularly important posture is Japan's. Today Japan spends about $58 billion per year on defense preparedness, comparable to the spending of Britain and France. Its Self-Defense Force includes 248,000 active personnel, 9 ground divisions and 7 separate brigades, 370 combat aircraft, and naval forces of 18 tactical submarines and 48 major surface combatants. These forces are ready, well-trained, and equipped with modern weapons that are benefitting from ongoing investments in new hardware and other systems. For example, Japan will be acquiring the F-35 fighter when it becomes available for foreign sale. A principal constraint is that Japan's constitution limits this military posture to defense of the homeland. But owing partly to U.S. prodding, Japan has enlarged its maritime defense zone over the years, has participated in humanitarian operations, has expressed willingness to allow U.S. forces to use their Japanese bases to provide logistic support for wartime Korean operations, and has begun joining multilateral training with U.S. and South Korean naval forces. If Japan can be persuaded to perform a wider set of regional security operations in the coming years, the effect would be helpful to U.S. forces and those of other allies and partners. In any event, the U.S.-Japanese alliance will remain bedrock to Japan's security strategy as well as a key factor in U.S. regional defense operations in ways that will continue to mandate the stationing of significant U.S. military forces on Japanese soil.

Noteworthy military forces of other allies and friends include those of Australia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. Whereas Australia's forces are modern and ready, they are small—totaling 3

ground brigades, 142 fighter aircraft, plus naval forces of 12 surface combatants and 6 submarines—but they have a long history of fighting alongside U.S. and British forces in wartime operations. Singapore's forces are the best-armed in Southeast Asia, totaling 4 divisions, 148 fighters, six surface combatants, and 5 submarines. If the forces of Australia and Singapore could be brought together for multinational operations, they could provide valuable assets for regional air defense and patrol of vital sea lanes, including the Malacca Straits. The other Southeast Asian countries are less well-armed. They have relatively large, lightly equipped ground forces that play domestic roles, plus small air forces and navies that together total 125 fighters, 21 surface combatants, and 4 submarines. These forces can play helpful roles in protecting national coast lines and air space, and they could be used for such multinational operations as counter-piracy and humanitarian response. Finally, the military forces of India merit attention because of growing U.S. efforts to build partnership ties to that important country. India spends about $32 billion annually on defense, and fields an active military of 1.3 million personnel. According to IISS data, its force posture includes 36 ground divisions, 798 fighter aircraft, and naval forces of one carrier, 15 tactical submarines, and 21 surface combatants. India's forces are being slowly modernized as funding permits, and in future years, their naval capabilities are expected to grow and become stronger, thus permitting India to play a larger role in performing Indian Ocean maritime security operations.

In summary, the United States faces important strategic challenges in the Asia-Pacific region that include dangers and threats, but it is not lacking in allies and friends. Its alliances with well-armed Japan and South Korea provide a great deal of security and stability to Northeast Asia, and they could benefit from increased reliance upon multinational force operations that include collaboration by Japan and South Korea. Taiwan is vulnerable to China, but possesses military forces that would not easily be overcome if China invades and could be reinforced by U.S. forces in a crisis. Given China's emergence, the greatest lack of organized military power arises in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. The principal challenge there is not to defend U.S. friends and allies from direct invasion, but instead to protect them from diplomatic coercion and to safeguard critical

maritime sea lanes and air space. As U.S. forces operate in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea in growing numbers, they can help pursue this strategic agenda by developing closer ties to allies and partners in ways that encourage multilateral cooperation, while reaching out to India.

To date, bilateral ties with the United States have mostly characterized the cooperative agendas of most Asian-Pacific countries. They now need to be encouraged to think in broader terms that include greater military cooperation with their neighbors. The guiding strategic principle here is simply stated: united they can stand but divided they may fall. Ideally the democracies of the Asia-Pacific region should be drawn together to create a collective security alliance similar to NATO in Europe, perhaps by broadening talks about formalizing Trans-Pacific economic ties to acquire a bold security agenda. But even short of this major step, successful efforts to harness increased multilateral defense planning and cooperation across this wide region could make all countries more secure, lessen the demands on U.S. forces and increase their strategic leverage, and promote greater stability in the face of growing Chinese military power and other dangerous trends.

The Persian Gulf: Dealing with Iran by Encouraging GCC Multilateralism and Keeping the U.S. Military Presence Strong. A common assessment of worried observers is that Iran is trying to establish itself as the dominant military power in the Persian Gulf. Iran's alleged pursuit of nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems resides at the forefront of this apparent strategy, but conventional military forces play a contributing role in Tehran's strategy equation as well. According to IISS *Military Balance* data, Iran's military includes 523,000 active personnel that are distributed as follows: 350,000 in the Army, 125,000 in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, 18,000 in the Navy, and 30,000 in the Air Force. This large amount of manpower permits Iran to field a sizable conventional posture composed of 10 divisions and 4 separate brigades, 310 fighter aircraft, and a naval force of 23 tactical submarines, 6 corvettes, and 163 patrol boats and coastal combatants.

Surface appearances suggest that this large military posture could pose a major threat to Iran's GCC neighbors in the Persian Gulf, but a closer look at

constraining realities suggests a more complicated picture. Iran's Army is composed of 6 armored/mechanized divisions and 4 infantry divisions, but many of its weapons are aging and it largely lacks logistic support assets for expeditionary missions. The Army benefits from the experience of waging war against Iraq in the 1980s, and it likely could do a good job of defending national borders if attacked. But it would be hard-pressed to launch major offensive operations at long distance outside Iran's borders. Iraq may have reason to fear the Iranian Army, but the Persian Gulf states need not have similar fears. Although Iran's Air Force has numerous fighters of U.S. and Russian origin, most of them are aging, some evidently are being cannibalized for spare parts, and their operational availability rate is estimated by IISS to be as low as 60 to 80 percent. Flyable aircraft could be used to launch limited air strikes against Persian Gulf ships and GCC countries, but they likely would be hard-pressed to conduct a sustained air offensive aimed at inflicting major damage. Iran's Navy has numerous submarines and many patrol boats armed with anti-ship missiles, but it lacks the major surface combatants—e.g., destroyers and frigates—needed to exert sustained control over Persian Gulf waters.

Notwithstanding such constraints, however, Iranian military forces are capable of using their assets to launch asymmetric offensives that pose genuine menaces to U.S. and GCC interests in the Persian Gulf. Iran's military has been regularly used to support terrorism in Iraq, to help Hezbollah in Lebanon, and to support Syria's regime in suppressing internal dissent. In addition, Iran's forces could launch a determined and stubborn effort to close the Strait of Hormuz by using mines, fighter aircraft, patrol craft, anti-ship missiles, and air defense missiles for this purpose. They also could launch sustained attacks against commercial ships transiting Gulf sea lanes, and even menace U.S. warships in the area. Likewise, Iran could use its fighter aircraft and limited numbers of conventional-armed SRBM and MRBM missiles to attack GCC seaports, oil refineries, and even urban areas. Such options make Iran a conventional power to be concerned about today, and if current sanctions on it are lifted, Iran would be able to use its oil revenues to modernize its forces in critical areas. In the future, the combination of nuclear weapons,

missile delivery systems, and modernized conventional forces with serious offensive capabilities—if all this transpires—would make Iran a quite dangerous threat to the United States and its allies.

TABLE 4. GCC MILITARY POSTURES, 2012

	Saudi Arabia	*Other countries*
Defense spending	$46 billion	$19 billion
Active manpower	235,000	122,000
Ground brigades	17	19
Fighter aircraft	255	265
Principal surface combatants	7	1
Patrol craft/coastal combatants	30	63

The six GCC countries of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and UAE are hardly defenseless against Iran. Led by Saudi Arabia, with a defense budget of $46 billion, these countries spend $65 billion annually on defense preparedness. Together, they field military postures of 357,000 active personnel, 36 ground brigades, 520 fighters, 8 principal naval combatants, and 93 patrol boats/coastal combatants. Of them, Saudi Arabia's forces are the best armed and trained, with 17 brigades, 255 fighters, 7 principal combatants, and 30 patrol boats/coastal combatants. The UAE fields 6 brigades, 139 fighters, and 17 patrol craft. The other forces are smaller, but cumulatively significant. Of the GCC forces, the ground forces are mostly designed for internal control and border defense, and have few expeditionary capabilities. The air forces are impressive not only because of their large size but also their modern equipment. Saudi Arabia's air force has a combination of F-15s and Tornados, and the UAE's air force has F-16s and Mirage 2000s. The other countries have a mix of F-18s, F-16s, F-5s, and Mirage 2000s. Together, these GCC air forces are capable of defending homeland airspace and patrolling the Persian Gulf skies. GCC navies are less impressive in size, but have modern equipment. Their few surface combatants and multiple patrol boats/coastal combatants are capable of defending home ports and nearby waters, but are not sufficiently large and capable of protecting Persian Gulf sea lanes.

The principal constraint on GCC forces is their lack of multilateral cooperation. Historically these six countries have mostly planned their forces and operations on a unilateral basis while working bilaterally with the United States. But they have not worked closely together. This practice owes largely to different threat perceptions, sovereignty issues, distrust of each other's competence, fear of Saudi dominance, and failure to appreciate the potential benefits of cooperation. But as the IISS *Military Balance* points out, there are signs of change. The GCC countries have joined together to create a Peninsula Shield force even though it is mostly designed to protect internal security. GCC air forces and air defense missile systems operate independently, but are electronically linked to a US information and operations hub. Owing to concern about Iran's navy, there is growing talk of greater GCC naval cooperation. Perhaps most important, the GCC countries have recently been taking steps to buy such U.S.-made systems as PAC-3 and THAAD missile defenses in order to provide protection against Iranian ballistic missiles. Of necessity, such missile defense systems will need to be networked together through common command centers and radars in order to provide early warning and coordination of operational fires. As this cooperation takes hold, perhaps it will pave the way to additional multilateralism in other areas: a prospect that could bolster GCC defense capabilities significantly.

The strategic bottom line is that although the GCC countries are improving their defense postures, they alone cannot counterbalance Iran. They will need significant U.S. military help for this purpose. Along with C4ISR systems, the presence of sizable U.S. naval forces and some air forces will be especially needed to provide control of the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf sea lanes. Beyond this, the GCC countries are not capable of major offensive operations against Iran. If such operations become necessary, U.S. forces will need to lead the way. For these reasons, the U.S. military, including carriers and major surface combatants, will be called upon to remain in the Persian Gulf for a long time to come.

NOTES

[1] See *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2012* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 2012), which contains 45 pages of analysis, data, and maps.

[2] Published annually in the United Kingdom, the IISS *Military Balance* provides data and analysis on worldwide defense trends. *The Military Balance 2012* (United Kingdom: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012).

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Richard L. Kugler is a Senior Consultant to the Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP), Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University. Formerly, Dr. Kugler was Distinguished Research Professor in CTNSP, and earlier, Director of the Department of Defense's Strategic Concepts Development Center, a Senior Executive in the Office of Secretary of Defense, and a Senior Defense Analyst at the RAND Corporation. He has been awarded the Distinguished Civilian Service Medal and other high-level decorations. He has published 17 books on national security strategy and defense planning, and multiple articles in *Foreign Affairs*, *Survival*, and other journals. He holds a Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Linton Wells II is Director of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Distinguished Research Professor, and Force Transformation Chair at the National Defense University (NDU). He has served in the Department of Defense (DOD) for 47 years. During 26 years as a naval officer, he served on a variety of surface ships, including commanding a guided-missile destroyer squadron. Before NDU, he worked for 16 years in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, serving last as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information Integration). He has been awarded the DOD medal for Distinguished Public Service three times.

In the period since early 2012, the Department of Defense (DOD) has been pursuing a major shift in U.S. defense planning. Through a series of strategic and operational documents, DOD has put forth an interlocking set of changes that places greater emphasis on the Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions, creates a new force-sizing construct, adopts new operational concepts, trims the U.S. force structure and defense budget, and calls for enhanced cooperation with regional partners. This illuminating book brings these multiple changes together in one forum, describes their features and shows how they interact, evaluates them, and assesses the challenges of implementing them. It argues that to carry out these demanding changes in ways that produce a successful outcome, DOD will need to devote intense, focused, energetic attention to pursuing them in coordinated, properly resourced ways. In particular, DOD will need to "double down" in its pursuit of its two new operational concepts of "globally integrated operations" and "cross-domain synergy" in order to gain assured access to contested areas against sophisticated threats. For all readers, this book offers a quick, readable way to understand and critique the major changes now sweeping U.S. defense plans, forces, regional priorities, and budgets.

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